Work Flexibility and its Individual Cons
Work Flexibility and its Individual
Consequences1
Max Kashei
Abstract. The concept of “employee lexibility,” and its implementation, have taken a
central place in industrial sociology and human resources management during the last
several decades. The two types of lexibility most often adopted in the workplace are
functional and numerical. Employees and their labour unions approve of functional
lexibility more often than numerical lexibility, which is usually rejected. This study is
designed to examine the associations between functional and numerical lexibility with
job rewards. Using 2002 General Social Survey (GSS) and Current Population Survey
(CPS) data, the indings reveal signiicantly higher rewards for functionally lexible
jobs while rewards associated with numerically lexible jobs vary signiicantly between
and within two major categories — standard and nonstandard jobs. Among those with
nonstandard jobs, independent contractors have signiicantly better opportunity for job
rewards than other groups, such as regular part-time or on-call workers. The paper
ends with a discussion on the theoretical signiicance of the indings and their policy
implications.
Résumé. Le concept et sa pratique de «la lexibilité de l'employé» prennent une position
centrale dans la sociologue industrielle et la gestion des ressources humaines depuis
plusieurs décennies. Deux types de la lexibilité, celle de fonction et celle de nombre
d'employés, plus que les autres, ont été adoptée dans l'emploi. Les employés et leurs
syndicats ont été accepté avec enthousiasme la lexibilité de fonction tandis qu'ils ont en
majeure partie rejeté la lexibilité de nombre. Pour illustrer les attitudes des employés,
cette étude a comme but d'examiner les rapports entre la lexibilité de fonction et celle
de nombre avec des récompenses du travail. En utilisant les données, du GSS et du CPS,
les recherches révèlent que les emplois formulés à partir du concept de la lexibilité de
fonction donnent sensiblement plus de récompenses que les emplois formulés a base
du concept de la lexibilité de nombre. Les récompenses gagnés par la formulation
de jobs à base du concept de la lexibilité de nombre varient considérablement entre
et à l'intérieur des deux catégories principales, celle des emplois standard et celle des
I am grateful to Dr. Gary Foster, Dr. Craig Eckert and Dr. Kevin Haggerty for their
reading of the earlier drafts of this paper and their suggestions and editorial comments. I also would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of CJS for their invaluable comments. Direct correspondence to: Max Kashei, Department of Sociology/
Anthropology Eastern Illinois University Charleston, IL. 6920; E-mail: mkashei@
eiu.edu
Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie 32(3) 2007
341
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Canadian Journal of Sociology
emplois non-standard. Parmi les travailleurs, les entrepreneurs indépendants ont une
meilleure possibilité des récompenses que les autres groupes d’employés, comme,
par exemple, mi-temps régulier ou sur appeler des ouvriers. Cette étude init par une
discussion de l'importance théorique de ces recherches et de ses implications possibles
sur la formulation de certaines politiques.
During the last few decades, the concept of employee “lexibility,” and its
implementation, has taken a central place in social science research as well
as in workplace management. Social scientists and policymakers are reaching the conclusion that the traditional workplace system, with its bureaucratic
and hierarchical control system, is no longer eficient or compatible with the
dynamic features of a global economy, which is characterized by global price
competition, technological innovation, and network-based production. For an
eficient and competitive economy, management needs lexible employees able
to “switch gears” and respond to new forms of production (e.g., Appelbaum
2002; Belanger, Giles, and Murray 2002; Cappelli 999; Kalleberg, Reskin,
and Hudson 2000; Kalleberg 2003; Osterman 999; 2000; Smith 994; Vallas
999).
A survey of studies reveals that management responses to this ongoing
economic transformation have increasingly involved the adoption of two kinds
of workplace lexibility: functional and numerical.2 Functional lexibility refers to the ability of employers to deploy or redeploy workers from one task to
another with minimal interruption in the work process. Numerical lexibility3
relects employers’ ability to adjust the size of workplace organizations to the
changing economy using contingent, temporary, part-time, or other forms of
“nonstandard” workers, rather than full-time regular employees, categorized as
“standard” employees (Kalleberg et al. 997; Smith 200).
The responses of workers and their labour unions to workplace lexibility are mixed. They often dislike numerical lexibility, since nonstandard jobs
mostly are designated “bad jobs,” measured by the degree of earning, pension,
and heath insurance (Kalleberg 2000). Numerical lexibility threatens job rewards — including security, payment, and fringe beneits — for both nonstan2 Other types of lexibilities, such as “lexible and shift work schedules” (workers
may vary the time they begin or end work), or “pay and wage lexibility” (workers’ wages vary with business luctuation) have been discussed in previous studies.
These, however, have been neither theoretically well developed nor adopted as an
alternative work arrangement in practice.
3 Various labels have been used to represent numerical lexibility, such as “traditional” vs. “alternative” (CPS Supplement 995–200); “primary and secondary” labour
markets (Doeringer and Piore 97); “core and periphery” occupations (Osterman
988); “two-tiered organizations” (Christensen 99); “lexible stafing arrangement” (Houseman 200); “contingent versus regular work” (Blank 998), and
“nonstandard versus standard work arrangement” (Kalleberg et al. 997; Kalleberg
2003).
Work Flexibility and its Individual Consequences 343
dard and regular full-time employees (Davis-Blake and Uzzi 993; Kalleberg
et al. 997; Olsen and Kalleberg 2004). Findings reported by Kalleberg, Reynolds, and Marsden (2003: 545) are consistent with the argument that labour
unions dislike numerical lexibility, “because such arrangements threaten the
job security or compensation package of regular full time employees.” McGovern, Smeaton, and Hill’s (2004) study in Britain suggests that nonstandard
jobs have inferior employment conditions (low pay, no health insurance, and
no pension beneits) because they are less likely represented by labour unions
(one in three for standard and only one in ive for nonstandard jobs). Houseman, Kalleberg, and Erickcek’s (2000: 26) case study in hospitals concludes
that the increasing use of temporary help agencies (nonstandard jobs) offered
several disadvantages, including “. . . wage discrimination in favor of new entrants, and lower costs of hiring risky workers” as well as “reduced pressure on
companies to raise wages in [a] tight labor market.” Finally, Kalleberg (2000:
359), reviewing the literature on nonstandard jobs, concludes that “there is
substantial agreement . . . that nonstandard work arrangements are associated
with the lack of health insurance, pensions, and other fringe beneits, this is
particularly problematic in the United States since employment is the main
source of these beneits.”
Workers and their labour unions have, however, embraced functional lexibility. Appelbaum (2002) reported that 70 percent of surveyed workers at the
Ford Escort Plant liked their jobs after adopting functional lexibility, especially the teamwork arrangement. In addition, 73 percent of them reported beneiting from a functionally lexible work arrangement. Batt and Appelbaum (995)
found that over 75 percent of traditional workers said that they would volunteer
for teamwork arrangements, given the opportunity. By contrast, less than 0
percent of the workers who hold functionally lexible jobs said that they would
prefer their traditional supervisory work arrangement. Finally, Belanger and
his colleagues (2002: 62) suggested changing roles and interests for labour
unions in functionally lexible organizations. With functional lexibility, labour
unions become “more focused on co-operation and problem solving around
integrative issues.” Their bargaining mode shifts to organizational innovations,
such as “lexibility and cross-trades co-operation on a continuous, rather than
a periodic basis.” Overall, such interest in functionally lexible jobs should be
attributed to their intrinsic and extrinsic rewards: for instance, workers can participate in the decision-making process and achieve higher degrees of work autonomy, which increases job satisfaction (Belanger et al. 2002; Wright 2000).
This paper updates and extends the discussions of job rewards associated
with functional and numerical lexibility in three ways. First, I use General
Social Survey (GSS) 2002 data to examine the relationships between functional lexibility and several extrinsic and intrinsic job rewards — some of them
unique to this study. Second, I examine the variation of job rewards between
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Canadian Journal of Sociology
standard and nonstandard jobs — contrasting the average rewards associated
with standard versus nonstandard jobs, and, occasionally, within nonstandard
jobs. Finally, I assess the additive and interactive effects of functional and
numerical lexibilities on extrinsic and extrinsic job rewards. In general, the
paper contributes to a greater understanding of inequalities in job rewards associated with employee lexibilities.
Functional Flexibility and Job Rewards
Functional lexibility, as an alternative strategy to the hierarchical workplace
system, irst attracted the attention of employers and employees during the
960s. “Total quality management,” “industrial democracy,” “team work,”
“high performance work system,” were among the variations responding to
global competition and the declining performance of the United States economy (Simmons and Mares 985). Regardless of their labels, the arrangements
were intended to foster employee organizational commitment, reduce turnover,
transform adversarial labour/management relations, and channel workers’
knowledge toward productivity and eficiency (Halaby and Weakliem 989).
Since then, two sets of theories — one that emphasizes positive consequences
of lexibility (optimistic view) and one that challenges its consequences (pessimistic view) — have been developed to explain functional lexibility and its
association with job rewards.
1. Optimistic Views
Most studies of functional lexibility differ on its development, but agree on its
positive consequences, especially its association with the major job rewards of
opportunities for learning multiple skills, participating in decision making, and
engaging in teamwork. Hirschhorn (984) writes that industrial technology always gives its stamp to the character of work, regardless of the social system in
which the production takes place. This “post-hierarchy” theory posits that the
rigid and ixed-motion constraints of assembly-line technology, typical of the
early stages of industrial capitalism, shaped the hierarchical and bureaucratic
nature of employment arrangements. With the development of the programmable machine, the bureaucratic arrangement of the workplace gradually gave
way to more lexible work arrangements (see also, Belanger et al. 2002; Vallas
999). Within the new workplace arrangement, differentiation of manual from
mental work became obsolete; manual workers, with the theoretical expertise
of advanced technology, exercise more judgment and discretion [functional
lexibility] than ever before. Consequently, workers that hold these emerging
jobs enjoy higher degrees of both extrinsic and intrinsic rewards.
Work Flexibility and its Individual Consequences 345
Unlike Hirschhorn’s technological determinist view, Wright’s (2000: 964)
theory of “positive class compromise” elaborates a neo-Marxist explanation
for functional lexibility. In a democratic capitalist society, “class conlict is
contained through real compromises, involving real concessions, rather than
brute force.” The relations are sustained in signiicant ways through the “active
consent” of people in the subordinate class. Contrary to the logic of traditional
Marxists, workplace relations are no longer treated as a zero-sum game; rather,
both employers and workers can improve their positions through various forms
of active and mutual cooperation. “On the one hand, capitalists have interests
in being able to unilaterally control the labor process . . . and on the other hand,
they have interest in being able to reliably elicit cooperation, initiative, and
responsibility from employees” (Wright 2000: 98). Wright adds that the more
workers are involved in decision making, initiative, and cooperation (functional lexibility), the more job rewards they enjoy. Cappelli (999) calls the
emerging workplace systems the “new deal” in which the lexibility of market-based mechanisms and solutions are increasingly substituted for the rigidity of the bureaucratic and hierarchical production system (see also, Belanger,
Edwards, and Wright 2002).
The main explanatory factor in “post-hierarchical” theory is technology;
in neo-Marxist theories, it is “class compromise.” “Flexible specialization”
theory construes work lexibility by social, political, and technological conditions. The general premise is that technological paradigms require a social-political apparatus outside the irm to secure the necessary conditions for workplace lexibility. Vallas (999: 73) reviews at least three factors underlying the
new conditions: internationalization of trade, the increasing demand for quality goods and services through which “consumers express their distance from
the ‘vulgar’ world of mass production,” and diffusion of information technology which provides opportunities for all production organizations, especially
small irms, to produce diversiied quality goods. Under these conditions, both
“large and small employers begin to converge on a new technological paradigm — lexible specialization — which provides a powerful yet lexible engine of growth that is optimally suited to the new economic conditions.” While
these three theories explain functional lexibility differently, they all agree on
its positive consequences. Functionally lexible jobs offer opportunities for acquiring multiple skills, participation in decision making, and teamwork, all of
which are associated with higher job rewards for workers (Kalleberg 200;
Edwards, Geary, and Sisson 2002), and beneits for owners (Wright, 2000).
Hypothesis : Given the conclusion that workers and their labour unions
welcomed functional lexibility, I hypothesize that functionally lexible jobs offer, on average, signiicantly higher extrinsic and intrinsic rewards net of other
factors, including workers’ characteristics.
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2. Pessimistic Views
Contrary to the optimism of the previous theories, which suggest higher job
rewards for functionally-lexible jobs, a few studies have discussed employee
“exploitation.” They suggest that functional lexibility, while producing job
rewards for some workers, is a new control device in the globalized economy. Graham’s study (995) reveals that a teamwork arrangement served as a
workplace control mechanism, rather than a method of enhancing employees’
autonomy. Baker’s (993) research in a small electronics company found that
self-directed work teams imposed a “concertive control” system in which employees internalized their obligations to managers, even to the extent of policing
each other. Osterman (2000: 77), using 992 and 997 surveys of American
establishments, comes to a conclusion more consistent with a pessimistic view.
He states that high performance work organizations with functionally lexible
jobs “have not delivered on the promise of mutual gains. . . . Hence, if anything,
this check on the robustness of the results leads to even slightly more pessimistic conclusion.” The pessimistic perspective is that functional lexibility directs
employees to collaborate in the intensiication of workload and an escalation of
the pace of work without receiving signiicant beneits. Overall, these studies
suggest that functional lexibility has intensiied workload and responsibilities,
creating more job stress, rather than providing more job rewards.
Hypothesis 2: Consistent with the pessimistic perspective, and contrary
to the argument of optimistic views, functionally lexible jobs should not offer
signiicantly higher extrinsic and intrinsic rewards net of other factors, including workers’ characteristics.
Numerical Flexibility and Job Rewards
During the early 970s, some industrial sociologists and economists, concerned
with workplace inequality and its consequences, proposed a distinction between “primary” and “secondary” labour markets (Bluestone 970; Doeringer
and Piore 97; Harrison 972). The primary labour market offers jobs with
higher security, more income, opportunity for promotion, and more satisfaction than the secondary labour market (Beck, Horan, and Tolbert 978). Recent
concerns with growing numbers of nonstandard jobs — called “contingent”
jobs by Barker and Christensen (998) or “bad jobs” by Kalleberg, Reskin, and
Hudson (2000) — and their individual consequences have focused the attention of many industrial sociologists on workplace stratiication (Blank 998;
Kalleberg et al. 2000). Workers and their labour unions welcome standard jobs,
which are protected at the bargaining table and by federal labour-protection
laws. Nonstandard jobs have been used to contain labour costs and as a “buf-
Work Flexibility and its Individual Consequences 347
fer zone” to protect standard jobs during economic slack times (Kalleberg et
al. 2000). Through the use of nonstandard arrangements, organizations have
successfully implemented numerical lexibility; nonstandard workers, unlike
standard employees, are easily “disposable” (Thomas 994). Nonstandard employment provides organizations with lexible stafing options and cost reductions. Davis-Blake and Uzzi (993: 95) note that externalization (nonstandard
workers) of the workforce is important in understanding workplace inequality because “it actually increases inequality in distribution of rewards, which
can have many important consequences, including lower productivity and increased conlict inside organizations.” Kalleberg et al. (2000: 273), using 995
Current Population Survey (CPS) data, conclude that “every nonstandard work
arrangement we examined is more likely to be associated with bad job characteristics than [any] standard work arrangement.” Low earnings and a lack of
health insurance and pension beneits characterize “bad jobs.” Finally, Barnett
and Miner (992) argue that nonstandard workers may reduce the competition
standard workers face for job rewards, especially promotion; entry of nonstandard employees into an organization has a “rivalry-elimination effect” which
increases promotion chances for regular employees.
Hypothesis 3: Following this line of analysis, signiicant and positive correlations between job rewards and numerical lexibility are expected. That is,
the average rewards associated with standard jobs are expected to be signiicantly higher than the average rewards of nonstandard jobs net of other factors, including workers’ characteristics.
Relationship between Functional and Numerical Flexibility
The preceding discussion on numerical lexibility and job rewards raises a major question: are the higher rewards associated with standard jobs the product
of their higher functional lexibility, or their other characteristics, or both? This
question highlights the signiicance of the relationship between functional and
numerical lexibility. Most organizations in the United States have implemented both numerical and functional lexibility in the workplace. For example,
Kalleberg (2003) shows that 36 percent of US establishments have used both
functional and numerical lexibility using two or more criteria of functional
lexibility (teamwork, multi-tasking, and performance incentives), whereas
about half of US establishments have adopted both lexibilities, using at least
one criterion of functional lexibility. Despite this, confusion and disagreement
still exist as to the nature of the additive and interactive relationship between
functional and numerical lexibility.
Some scholars argue that functional lexibility is a strategy implemented
only within standard jobs. For example, Davis-Blake and Uzzi (993) argue
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that internalization (development of standard jobs with functionally lexibility)
and externalization (recruiting nonstandard workers) serve different, but complementary, functions in the workplace. Internalization enhances control and
stability while externalization promotes lexibility and cost reduction. Thus,
job rewards associated with standard jobs are high and more stable because
of their higher functional lexibility, while externalization (nonstandard jobs)
is associated with limited and unstable job rewards. Smith (994; 200) addresses workplace inequality by contrasting “enabling” and “restrictive” approaches. “Enabling” approaches upgrade standard jobs with more functional
lexibility and higher job rewards within the established Internal Labour Market; “restrictive” approaches lead to “comparative degrading” by externalizing the labour force (nonstandard jobs) with unstable and limited job rewards.
These arguments strongly suggest that higher job rewards for standard jobs, if
any, should be attributed to their higher functional lexibility. Following this
argument:
Hypothesis 4: No signiicant regression coeficients between numerical
lexibility and job rewards are expected, net of functional lexibility and background variables, since higher rewards associated with functional lexibility
would be under control.
Others argue that adopting functional lexibility is not limited only to the
realm of standard jobs; rather, human resource mangers have implemented the
strategy among both standard and nonstandard jobs. Appelbaum (987) notes
that a majority of nonstandard workers no longer perform unskilled tasks;
many are professionals and semi-professionals, such as nurses or accountants,
suggesting that some nonstandard jobs enjoy higher degrees of functional lexibility and thereby job rewards. In other words, functional lexibility is not
exclusively related to standard jobs and nonstandard job holders do not always
suffer from lack of opportunities regarding autonomy, decision making, and
teamwork, or lower job rewards. Therefore, the higher rewards associated with
standard jobs should be attributed to characteristics other than their functional
lexibility, such as the support of labour unions, government legislation (Osterman 994; 2000), and/or implicit promises of long-term employment (DavisBlake and Uzzi 993). Based on these arguments:
Hypothesis 5: Signiicant regression coeficients between numerical lexibility and job rewards are expected, net of functional lexibility and background variables, since the discussion assumes higher rewards associated with
standard jobs as the outcome of factors other than functional lexibility.
Finally, McGovern, Smeaton, and Hill’s work (2004: 243) reveals an interactive relationship between numerical and functional lexibility. They state that
human capital theory is unable to capture the “institutionalized forces” within
standard and nonstandard jobs that affect the variation of job rewards.
Work Flexibility and its Individual Consequences 349
We ind that after controlling for the various indicators of human capital (e.g., education, autonomy or skill) . . . nonstandard jobs are still more likely to have bad conditions
[low pay, no health insurance, and no pension beneits]. We believe that these result
from a structural imbalance in the market capacities of employers and employees and
differences in bargaining power.
Kalleberg et al. (997: 6, emphasis added) compare the quality of standard and
nonstandard jobs, noting “that nonstandard workers, on average, receive lower
wages than regular full time workers with similar personal characteristics and
educational qualiications.” In simple terms, the same level of functional lexibility (multiple skills, autonomy, and teamwork) is compensated differently
within standard and nonstandard jobs. This is similar to the “segmented labour
market” thesis that workers’ human capital is rewarded differently within the
“primary” versus “secondary” labour market (Beck et al. 978). Dickens and
Lang (993) describe this as “unequal pay for equal human capital.” This suggests that the effect of functional lexibility on job rewards depends on the
categories of numerical lexibility (functional lexibility is rewarded differently within standard and nonstandard jobs). A unit of functional lexibility
is rewarded signiicantly more within standard jobs than nonstandard ones. If
this is the case:
Hypothesis 6: Signiicant correlations between the interaction of functional
and numerical lexibility with job rewards are expected, net of additive effects
of functional and structural lexibility as well as workers’ characteristics.
Data, Measures, and Methodology
The major source of data for this study is the 2002 General Social Survey
(GSS). The data are the basic source for functional and numerical lexibility
and their associations with job rewards.4 In addition to the 2002 GSS, Current
Population Survey (CPS) Supplements for 995, 997, 999, and 200 provide
additional information on numerical lexibility and its association with three
more job rewards — health insurance, pension, and median weekly income.
Comparing and contrasting the results of two data sets (GSS and CPS) can verify the validity of the indings and check the robustness of the conclusions (for
more discussion on CPS see, for example, Hipple 998; DiNatale 200). The
2002 GSS includes hundreds of questions related directly to job characteristics
of the respondents, including functional and numerical lexibility. The sample
comprises 785 valid cases (the sample originally contained 2765 cases), in4 For more information on GSS data, which come from a multi-topic survey conducted almost annually by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), see Davis
and Smith (992).
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cluding nearly 30 percent nonstandard (alternative and part-time) employees
and 70 percent standard (full-time regular) workers.
Unit of Analysis
This study is designed to explore individual consequences of employee lexibility, especially job rewards. Job rewards are structured in job positions and
their signiicance depends on the perception of individual employees. Therefore, individual job holders and their jobs are assumed to be the appropriate
unit of analysis. Davis-Blake and Uzzi (993) used both job and establishment as the units of analysis to explain the purpose of using temporary and
independent contractors. Kalleberg (200) prefers a network, deined by the
relationships among the organizations and subcontractors, as the appropriate
unit of analysis for analyzing employee lexibility. This research argues that
identiication of an appropriate unit of analysis depends on the aim(s) of a
study; therefore, worker, jobs, establishment, organization, or network can all
be useful units of analysis. An organization or a irm can be an appropriate unit
of analysis to explore the policy or strategies of an organization on recruiting
standard versus nonstandard employees. A network, as Kalleberg (200) suggested, can be an appropriate unit of analysis if the purpose of a study is to
understand the structure and dynamic of workplace lexibility.
While a job holder is an appropriate unit of analysis for analyzing job rewards (dependent variables), both functional and numerical lexibilities (two
independent variables) are structural features of work organizations. This can
be addressed by reducing the independent variable unit of analysis from an
organizational lexibility to a respondents’ perception of workplace lexibility. Functional lexibility is a novel work arrangement offering a systematic
break with bureaucratic work structure, but its labour-related consequences are
very similar to the traditional empowerment of workers through opportunities
to acquire multiple skills, experience teamwork, and participate in decision
making processes (“re-crafting America”).5 Social psychology theories of the
workplace suggest it is the perception of workplace opportunities, rather than
5 Some may challenge using such measures on the grounds that these characteristics
relect craft types of highly autonomous jobs rather than functional lexibility. There
are three responses to this challenge. First, all jobs covered in this study are organizational — either government employees or private irm workers. Second, as mentioned by Vallas (999), both large and small irms including craftsmen adopted a
“technological paradigm . . . which provides lexible specialization.” Third, the concept of “re-crafting America” clearly suggests that business organizations, following the principles of quality control, are moving toward types of jobs that demand
autonomous craft skills rather than routine mass production jobs (Chicago Tribune,
99, Nov. 6).
Work Flexibility and its Individual Consequences 35
the workplace itself, that affects workers’ responses toward workplace characteristics (Hall 994). Since this study examines the individual consequences
of workplace lexibility, rather than lexibility itself, workers’ perceptions of
lexibility become relevant.
Measurement and Methodology
The GSS data contain one question directly measuring numerical lexibility.
This item taps into work arrangements at one’s main job, and contains the
following categories: “Independent contractor/consultant/freelance worker”
(3.8%); “on-call, work only when called to work” (2.3%); “paid by temporary
agency” (0.8%); “work for contractor who provides workers/services” (2.4%);
and “regular, permanent employee” (.7% part-time, 68.5% full-time, and a
total of 80.2%). The answers have been regrouped into two categories — nonstandard workers (the irst four categories plus part-time regular employment)
and standard workers (the last category minus the part-time regular employment). Nonstandard jobs are also occasionally divided into a few categories
(independent contractors and the other nonstandard job holders) to reveal within group variation and allow comparison with standard jobs.6 Independent contractors, because of their self-determined work pace and autonomy (Rebitzer
995; Kalleberg 200) are growing faster than the other arrangements among
professional and semi-professional jobs. In a national survey, more than 83
percent of independent contractors preferred to keep their jobs, rather than taking a standard job (CPS 200). Their signiicantly higher degree of job autonomy is associated with higher intrinsic job rewards, especially higher degrees
of job satisfaction (Armstrong 97; Kashei 2004).
Functional lexibility has been measured by respondents’ perceptions of
job characteristics attributed to functional lexibility. As discussed in the unit
of analysis, functional lexibility is an organizational level dynamic but its
tangible results are seen in workers’ attitudes and behaviours. Most scholars
in the ield of organizational lexibility agree that functional lexibility provides employees with more participation in decision making (decision-making
lexibility), heavy reliance on teamwork (teamwork lexibility), and multiple
skilled jobs (task lexibility) (e.g., Appelbaum and Batt 994; Kalleberg 200;
Osterman 994; Smith 994; Wood 989; Zuboff 988). Therefore, this paper
6 “Independent contractor” encompasses independent contractors, independent consultants, or freelance workers, whether self-employed or wage and salary workers.
On-call workers work only as needed, although they can be scheduled to work for
several days or weeks in a row. Temporary help agency workers are paid by a temporary help agency, whether or not their job was temporary. Workers provided by
contract irms are employed by a company that provides them or their services to
others under contract, and who are usually assigned to only one customer and usually work at the customer’s worksite (CPS Supplement 200).
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uses those three sets of job characteristics to operationalize functional lexibility, relecting the degrees of functional lexibility implemented. The 2002
GSS data contain many items that tap into functional lexibility. After a careful
theoretical examination, ten items were selected and subjected to exploratory
factor analysis with oblique rotation, which assumes the resulting factors are
correlated with one another.7 Three constructs were extracted. Four items, the
respondent “does numerous things on jobs,” “jobs allow R [Respondents] use
of skills,” “opportunity to develop my ability,” and “job requires R to learn
new things,” exhibited high loadings (0.63 or higher) on the “task lexibility”
factor. Three items, “how often R was allowed to change schedule,” “R has lot
of say in job,” and “a lot of freedom to decide how to do job” indicated high
loadings (0.63 and higher) on the “decision-making lexibility” factor. The last
three items, “R works as part of a team,” “how often R takes part in decisions,”
and “how often R set the way things are done” showed high loadings (0.7
and higher) on the “teamwork lexibility” factor. These three factors, with different labels, are congruent with the three dimensions of functional lexibility
discussed by most previous studies (see, e.g., Belanger et al.’s reports [2002]
on the emerging principles of lexible production organizations —”autonomy
and discretion,” “decreased supervision along with increasing degrees of selfregulation” and “multi-disciplinary teams and horizontal coordination”).
The main method adopted for data analyses entailed several multiple regression equations. All assumptions required for adopting a multiple regression analysis were conirmed.8 To explore the effects of numerical lexibility
on job rewards, it was irst measured as a dummy variable (standard workers=
and nonstandard workers=0). To contrast the standard workers with independent contractors and the other nonstandard workers, two dummy variables were
constructed with the standard workers as the reference group. Numerical lexibility here is a nominal independent variable with three categories (standard
workers, independent contractors, and other nonstandard workers). Standard
workers are chosen for the reference group since it has the highest frequency
(Allison 999). Allison (999: 62) calls the coeficients “adjusted differences in the means of dependent variables.” Therefore, each coeficient for the
dummy variables relects a comparison between “standard workers” with “independent contractors” or with “other nonstandard workers” (for more discussion, see the indings on numerical lexibility). Overall, seven dependent vari7 In an exploratory factor analysis, it is the degree of correlations within subsets of
variables that determines variable clusters (measures of constructs). In a conformity
factor analysis, on the other hand, the researcher speciies the clusters beforehand.
This study followed the former to explore the variables of each cluster based on their
correlations.
8 Assumptions required to conduct a multiple regression were carefully checked; no
multi-collinearity or heterokodastisty was found (“tolerance statistics” for all independent variables were lower than 0.4, indicating no multi-collinearity).
Table 1. Correlation matrix for the measures of functional lexibility and job rewards
Y1
Y2
Y4
Y3
Y5
Y6
Y7
X1
X2
X3
Y1
1
Y2
0.273*** 1
Y3
-0.034
Y4
-0.07*** 0.267*** 0.96*** 1
Y5
-0.052**
Y6
-0.075*** 0.265*** 0.280*** 0.253***
Y7
-0.026
X1
0.88*** 0.272*** 0.262*** 0.474***
0.313*** 0.344*** 0.260*** 1
X2
0.80*** 0.266*** 0.95*** 0.447***
0.329*** 0.341*** 0.232*** 0.796*** 1
X3
0.52
0.25*** 0.265*** 0.177*** 0.680*** 0.307***
X4
0.035
0.147
0.244
10.07
2.07
2.37
3.053
.096
0.850
S.D.
***
0.90*** 1
0.082*** 0.074*** 0.286***
1
0.08*** 1
0.240*** 0.117*** 0.0367*** 0.9*** 0.201*** 1
0.79
***
***
***
0.66
0.245
***
0.348
***
***
.67
0.847
***
0.243
2.87
0.837
0.54
***
2.45
1.047
***
0.174
.68
0.877
0.755
***
6.62
4.93
0.455
***
7.03
2.250
1
0.229*** 1
6.52
2.68
8.93
2.214
* P
Consequences1
Max Kashei
Abstract. The concept of “employee lexibility,” and its implementation, have taken a
central place in industrial sociology and human resources management during the last
several decades. The two types of lexibility most often adopted in the workplace are
functional and numerical. Employees and their labour unions approve of functional
lexibility more often than numerical lexibility, which is usually rejected. This study is
designed to examine the associations between functional and numerical lexibility with
job rewards. Using 2002 General Social Survey (GSS) and Current Population Survey
(CPS) data, the indings reveal signiicantly higher rewards for functionally lexible
jobs while rewards associated with numerically lexible jobs vary signiicantly between
and within two major categories — standard and nonstandard jobs. Among those with
nonstandard jobs, independent contractors have signiicantly better opportunity for job
rewards than other groups, such as regular part-time or on-call workers. The paper
ends with a discussion on the theoretical signiicance of the indings and their policy
implications.
Résumé. Le concept et sa pratique de «la lexibilité de l'employé» prennent une position
centrale dans la sociologue industrielle et la gestion des ressources humaines depuis
plusieurs décennies. Deux types de la lexibilité, celle de fonction et celle de nombre
d'employés, plus que les autres, ont été adoptée dans l'emploi. Les employés et leurs
syndicats ont été accepté avec enthousiasme la lexibilité de fonction tandis qu'ils ont en
majeure partie rejeté la lexibilité de nombre. Pour illustrer les attitudes des employés,
cette étude a comme but d'examiner les rapports entre la lexibilité de fonction et celle
de nombre avec des récompenses du travail. En utilisant les données, du GSS et du CPS,
les recherches révèlent que les emplois formulés à partir du concept de la lexibilité de
fonction donnent sensiblement plus de récompenses que les emplois formulés a base
du concept de la lexibilité de nombre. Les récompenses gagnés par la formulation
de jobs à base du concept de la lexibilité de nombre varient considérablement entre
et à l'intérieur des deux catégories principales, celle des emplois standard et celle des
I am grateful to Dr. Gary Foster, Dr. Craig Eckert and Dr. Kevin Haggerty for their
reading of the earlier drafts of this paper and their suggestions and editorial comments. I also would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of CJS for their invaluable comments. Direct correspondence to: Max Kashei, Department of Sociology/
Anthropology Eastern Illinois University Charleston, IL. 6920; E-mail: mkashei@
eiu.edu
Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie 32(3) 2007
341
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Canadian Journal of Sociology
emplois non-standard. Parmi les travailleurs, les entrepreneurs indépendants ont une
meilleure possibilité des récompenses que les autres groupes d’employés, comme,
par exemple, mi-temps régulier ou sur appeler des ouvriers. Cette étude init par une
discussion de l'importance théorique de ces recherches et de ses implications possibles
sur la formulation de certaines politiques.
During the last few decades, the concept of employee “lexibility,” and its
implementation, has taken a central place in social science research as well
as in workplace management. Social scientists and policymakers are reaching the conclusion that the traditional workplace system, with its bureaucratic
and hierarchical control system, is no longer eficient or compatible with the
dynamic features of a global economy, which is characterized by global price
competition, technological innovation, and network-based production. For an
eficient and competitive economy, management needs lexible employees able
to “switch gears” and respond to new forms of production (e.g., Appelbaum
2002; Belanger, Giles, and Murray 2002; Cappelli 999; Kalleberg, Reskin,
and Hudson 2000; Kalleberg 2003; Osterman 999; 2000; Smith 994; Vallas
999).
A survey of studies reveals that management responses to this ongoing
economic transformation have increasingly involved the adoption of two kinds
of workplace lexibility: functional and numerical.2 Functional lexibility refers to the ability of employers to deploy or redeploy workers from one task to
another with minimal interruption in the work process. Numerical lexibility3
relects employers’ ability to adjust the size of workplace organizations to the
changing economy using contingent, temporary, part-time, or other forms of
“nonstandard” workers, rather than full-time regular employees, categorized as
“standard” employees (Kalleberg et al. 997; Smith 200).
The responses of workers and their labour unions to workplace lexibility are mixed. They often dislike numerical lexibility, since nonstandard jobs
mostly are designated “bad jobs,” measured by the degree of earning, pension,
and heath insurance (Kalleberg 2000). Numerical lexibility threatens job rewards — including security, payment, and fringe beneits — for both nonstan2 Other types of lexibilities, such as “lexible and shift work schedules” (workers
may vary the time they begin or end work), or “pay and wage lexibility” (workers’ wages vary with business luctuation) have been discussed in previous studies.
These, however, have been neither theoretically well developed nor adopted as an
alternative work arrangement in practice.
3 Various labels have been used to represent numerical lexibility, such as “traditional” vs. “alternative” (CPS Supplement 995–200); “primary and secondary” labour
markets (Doeringer and Piore 97); “core and periphery” occupations (Osterman
988); “two-tiered organizations” (Christensen 99); “lexible stafing arrangement” (Houseman 200); “contingent versus regular work” (Blank 998), and
“nonstandard versus standard work arrangement” (Kalleberg et al. 997; Kalleberg
2003).
Work Flexibility and its Individual Consequences 343
dard and regular full-time employees (Davis-Blake and Uzzi 993; Kalleberg
et al. 997; Olsen and Kalleberg 2004). Findings reported by Kalleberg, Reynolds, and Marsden (2003: 545) are consistent with the argument that labour
unions dislike numerical lexibility, “because such arrangements threaten the
job security or compensation package of regular full time employees.” McGovern, Smeaton, and Hill’s (2004) study in Britain suggests that nonstandard
jobs have inferior employment conditions (low pay, no health insurance, and
no pension beneits) because they are less likely represented by labour unions
(one in three for standard and only one in ive for nonstandard jobs). Houseman, Kalleberg, and Erickcek’s (2000: 26) case study in hospitals concludes
that the increasing use of temporary help agencies (nonstandard jobs) offered
several disadvantages, including “. . . wage discrimination in favor of new entrants, and lower costs of hiring risky workers” as well as “reduced pressure on
companies to raise wages in [a] tight labor market.” Finally, Kalleberg (2000:
359), reviewing the literature on nonstandard jobs, concludes that “there is
substantial agreement . . . that nonstandard work arrangements are associated
with the lack of health insurance, pensions, and other fringe beneits, this is
particularly problematic in the United States since employment is the main
source of these beneits.”
Workers and their labour unions have, however, embraced functional lexibility. Appelbaum (2002) reported that 70 percent of surveyed workers at the
Ford Escort Plant liked their jobs after adopting functional lexibility, especially the teamwork arrangement. In addition, 73 percent of them reported beneiting from a functionally lexible work arrangement. Batt and Appelbaum (995)
found that over 75 percent of traditional workers said that they would volunteer
for teamwork arrangements, given the opportunity. By contrast, less than 0
percent of the workers who hold functionally lexible jobs said that they would
prefer their traditional supervisory work arrangement. Finally, Belanger and
his colleagues (2002: 62) suggested changing roles and interests for labour
unions in functionally lexible organizations. With functional lexibility, labour
unions become “more focused on co-operation and problem solving around
integrative issues.” Their bargaining mode shifts to organizational innovations,
such as “lexibility and cross-trades co-operation on a continuous, rather than
a periodic basis.” Overall, such interest in functionally lexible jobs should be
attributed to their intrinsic and extrinsic rewards: for instance, workers can participate in the decision-making process and achieve higher degrees of work autonomy, which increases job satisfaction (Belanger et al. 2002; Wright 2000).
This paper updates and extends the discussions of job rewards associated
with functional and numerical lexibility in three ways. First, I use General
Social Survey (GSS) 2002 data to examine the relationships between functional lexibility and several extrinsic and intrinsic job rewards — some of them
unique to this study. Second, I examine the variation of job rewards between
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Canadian Journal of Sociology
standard and nonstandard jobs — contrasting the average rewards associated
with standard versus nonstandard jobs, and, occasionally, within nonstandard
jobs. Finally, I assess the additive and interactive effects of functional and
numerical lexibilities on extrinsic and extrinsic job rewards. In general, the
paper contributes to a greater understanding of inequalities in job rewards associated with employee lexibilities.
Functional Flexibility and Job Rewards
Functional lexibility, as an alternative strategy to the hierarchical workplace
system, irst attracted the attention of employers and employees during the
960s. “Total quality management,” “industrial democracy,” “team work,”
“high performance work system,” were among the variations responding to
global competition and the declining performance of the United States economy (Simmons and Mares 985). Regardless of their labels, the arrangements
were intended to foster employee organizational commitment, reduce turnover,
transform adversarial labour/management relations, and channel workers’
knowledge toward productivity and eficiency (Halaby and Weakliem 989).
Since then, two sets of theories — one that emphasizes positive consequences
of lexibility (optimistic view) and one that challenges its consequences (pessimistic view) — have been developed to explain functional lexibility and its
association with job rewards.
1. Optimistic Views
Most studies of functional lexibility differ on its development, but agree on its
positive consequences, especially its association with the major job rewards of
opportunities for learning multiple skills, participating in decision making, and
engaging in teamwork. Hirschhorn (984) writes that industrial technology always gives its stamp to the character of work, regardless of the social system in
which the production takes place. This “post-hierarchy” theory posits that the
rigid and ixed-motion constraints of assembly-line technology, typical of the
early stages of industrial capitalism, shaped the hierarchical and bureaucratic
nature of employment arrangements. With the development of the programmable machine, the bureaucratic arrangement of the workplace gradually gave
way to more lexible work arrangements (see also, Belanger et al. 2002; Vallas
999). Within the new workplace arrangement, differentiation of manual from
mental work became obsolete; manual workers, with the theoretical expertise
of advanced technology, exercise more judgment and discretion [functional
lexibility] than ever before. Consequently, workers that hold these emerging
jobs enjoy higher degrees of both extrinsic and intrinsic rewards.
Work Flexibility and its Individual Consequences 345
Unlike Hirschhorn’s technological determinist view, Wright’s (2000: 964)
theory of “positive class compromise” elaborates a neo-Marxist explanation
for functional lexibility. In a democratic capitalist society, “class conlict is
contained through real compromises, involving real concessions, rather than
brute force.” The relations are sustained in signiicant ways through the “active
consent” of people in the subordinate class. Contrary to the logic of traditional
Marxists, workplace relations are no longer treated as a zero-sum game; rather,
both employers and workers can improve their positions through various forms
of active and mutual cooperation. “On the one hand, capitalists have interests
in being able to unilaterally control the labor process . . . and on the other hand,
they have interest in being able to reliably elicit cooperation, initiative, and
responsibility from employees” (Wright 2000: 98). Wright adds that the more
workers are involved in decision making, initiative, and cooperation (functional lexibility), the more job rewards they enjoy. Cappelli (999) calls the
emerging workplace systems the “new deal” in which the lexibility of market-based mechanisms and solutions are increasingly substituted for the rigidity of the bureaucratic and hierarchical production system (see also, Belanger,
Edwards, and Wright 2002).
The main explanatory factor in “post-hierarchical” theory is technology;
in neo-Marxist theories, it is “class compromise.” “Flexible specialization”
theory construes work lexibility by social, political, and technological conditions. The general premise is that technological paradigms require a social-political apparatus outside the irm to secure the necessary conditions for workplace lexibility. Vallas (999: 73) reviews at least three factors underlying the
new conditions: internationalization of trade, the increasing demand for quality goods and services through which “consumers express their distance from
the ‘vulgar’ world of mass production,” and diffusion of information technology which provides opportunities for all production organizations, especially
small irms, to produce diversiied quality goods. Under these conditions, both
“large and small employers begin to converge on a new technological paradigm — lexible specialization — which provides a powerful yet lexible engine of growth that is optimally suited to the new economic conditions.” While
these three theories explain functional lexibility differently, they all agree on
its positive consequences. Functionally lexible jobs offer opportunities for acquiring multiple skills, participation in decision making, and teamwork, all of
which are associated with higher job rewards for workers (Kalleberg 200;
Edwards, Geary, and Sisson 2002), and beneits for owners (Wright, 2000).
Hypothesis : Given the conclusion that workers and their labour unions
welcomed functional lexibility, I hypothesize that functionally lexible jobs offer, on average, signiicantly higher extrinsic and intrinsic rewards net of other
factors, including workers’ characteristics.
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Canadian Journal of Sociology
2. Pessimistic Views
Contrary to the optimism of the previous theories, which suggest higher job
rewards for functionally-lexible jobs, a few studies have discussed employee
“exploitation.” They suggest that functional lexibility, while producing job
rewards for some workers, is a new control device in the globalized economy. Graham’s study (995) reveals that a teamwork arrangement served as a
workplace control mechanism, rather than a method of enhancing employees’
autonomy. Baker’s (993) research in a small electronics company found that
self-directed work teams imposed a “concertive control” system in which employees internalized their obligations to managers, even to the extent of policing
each other. Osterman (2000: 77), using 992 and 997 surveys of American
establishments, comes to a conclusion more consistent with a pessimistic view.
He states that high performance work organizations with functionally lexible
jobs “have not delivered on the promise of mutual gains. . . . Hence, if anything,
this check on the robustness of the results leads to even slightly more pessimistic conclusion.” The pessimistic perspective is that functional lexibility directs
employees to collaborate in the intensiication of workload and an escalation of
the pace of work without receiving signiicant beneits. Overall, these studies
suggest that functional lexibility has intensiied workload and responsibilities,
creating more job stress, rather than providing more job rewards.
Hypothesis 2: Consistent with the pessimistic perspective, and contrary
to the argument of optimistic views, functionally lexible jobs should not offer
signiicantly higher extrinsic and intrinsic rewards net of other factors, including workers’ characteristics.
Numerical Flexibility and Job Rewards
During the early 970s, some industrial sociologists and economists, concerned
with workplace inequality and its consequences, proposed a distinction between “primary” and “secondary” labour markets (Bluestone 970; Doeringer
and Piore 97; Harrison 972). The primary labour market offers jobs with
higher security, more income, opportunity for promotion, and more satisfaction than the secondary labour market (Beck, Horan, and Tolbert 978). Recent
concerns with growing numbers of nonstandard jobs — called “contingent”
jobs by Barker and Christensen (998) or “bad jobs” by Kalleberg, Reskin, and
Hudson (2000) — and their individual consequences have focused the attention of many industrial sociologists on workplace stratiication (Blank 998;
Kalleberg et al. 2000). Workers and their labour unions welcome standard jobs,
which are protected at the bargaining table and by federal labour-protection
laws. Nonstandard jobs have been used to contain labour costs and as a “buf-
Work Flexibility and its Individual Consequences 347
fer zone” to protect standard jobs during economic slack times (Kalleberg et
al. 2000). Through the use of nonstandard arrangements, organizations have
successfully implemented numerical lexibility; nonstandard workers, unlike
standard employees, are easily “disposable” (Thomas 994). Nonstandard employment provides organizations with lexible stafing options and cost reductions. Davis-Blake and Uzzi (993: 95) note that externalization (nonstandard
workers) of the workforce is important in understanding workplace inequality because “it actually increases inequality in distribution of rewards, which
can have many important consequences, including lower productivity and increased conlict inside organizations.” Kalleberg et al. (2000: 273), using 995
Current Population Survey (CPS) data, conclude that “every nonstandard work
arrangement we examined is more likely to be associated with bad job characteristics than [any] standard work arrangement.” Low earnings and a lack of
health insurance and pension beneits characterize “bad jobs.” Finally, Barnett
and Miner (992) argue that nonstandard workers may reduce the competition
standard workers face for job rewards, especially promotion; entry of nonstandard employees into an organization has a “rivalry-elimination effect” which
increases promotion chances for regular employees.
Hypothesis 3: Following this line of analysis, signiicant and positive correlations between job rewards and numerical lexibility are expected. That is,
the average rewards associated with standard jobs are expected to be signiicantly higher than the average rewards of nonstandard jobs net of other factors, including workers’ characteristics.
Relationship between Functional and Numerical Flexibility
The preceding discussion on numerical lexibility and job rewards raises a major question: are the higher rewards associated with standard jobs the product
of their higher functional lexibility, or their other characteristics, or both? This
question highlights the signiicance of the relationship between functional and
numerical lexibility. Most organizations in the United States have implemented both numerical and functional lexibility in the workplace. For example,
Kalleberg (2003) shows that 36 percent of US establishments have used both
functional and numerical lexibility using two or more criteria of functional
lexibility (teamwork, multi-tasking, and performance incentives), whereas
about half of US establishments have adopted both lexibilities, using at least
one criterion of functional lexibility. Despite this, confusion and disagreement
still exist as to the nature of the additive and interactive relationship between
functional and numerical lexibility.
Some scholars argue that functional lexibility is a strategy implemented
only within standard jobs. For example, Davis-Blake and Uzzi (993) argue
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Canadian Journal of Sociology
that internalization (development of standard jobs with functionally lexibility)
and externalization (recruiting nonstandard workers) serve different, but complementary, functions in the workplace. Internalization enhances control and
stability while externalization promotes lexibility and cost reduction. Thus,
job rewards associated with standard jobs are high and more stable because
of their higher functional lexibility, while externalization (nonstandard jobs)
is associated with limited and unstable job rewards. Smith (994; 200) addresses workplace inequality by contrasting “enabling” and “restrictive” approaches. “Enabling” approaches upgrade standard jobs with more functional
lexibility and higher job rewards within the established Internal Labour Market; “restrictive” approaches lead to “comparative degrading” by externalizing the labour force (nonstandard jobs) with unstable and limited job rewards.
These arguments strongly suggest that higher job rewards for standard jobs, if
any, should be attributed to their higher functional lexibility. Following this
argument:
Hypothesis 4: No signiicant regression coeficients between numerical
lexibility and job rewards are expected, net of functional lexibility and background variables, since higher rewards associated with functional lexibility
would be under control.
Others argue that adopting functional lexibility is not limited only to the
realm of standard jobs; rather, human resource mangers have implemented the
strategy among both standard and nonstandard jobs. Appelbaum (987) notes
that a majority of nonstandard workers no longer perform unskilled tasks;
many are professionals and semi-professionals, such as nurses or accountants,
suggesting that some nonstandard jobs enjoy higher degrees of functional lexibility and thereby job rewards. In other words, functional lexibility is not
exclusively related to standard jobs and nonstandard job holders do not always
suffer from lack of opportunities regarding autonomy, decision making, and
teamwork, or lower job rewards. Therefore, the higher rewards associated with
standard jobs should be attributed to characteristics other than their functional
lexibility, such as the support of labour unions, government legislation (Osterman 994; 2000), and/or implicit promises of long-term employment (DavisBlake and Uzzi 993). Based on these arguments:
Hypothesis 5: Signiicant regression coeficients between numerical lexibility and job rewards are expected, net of functional lexibility and background variables, since the discussion assumes higher rewards associated with
standard jobs as the outcome of factors other than functional lexibility.
Finally, McGovern, Smeaton, and Hill’s work (2004: 243) reveals an interactive relationship between numerical and functional lexibility. They state that
human capital theory is unable to capture the “institutionalized forces” within
standard and nonstandard jobs that affect the variation of job rewards.
Work Flexibility and its Individual Consequences 349
We ind that after controlling for the various indicators of human capital (e.g., education, autonomy or skill) . . . nonstandard jobs are still more likely to have bad conditions
[low pay, no health insurance, and no pension beneits]. We believe that these result
from a structural imbalance in the market capacities of employers and employees and
differences in bargaining power.
Kalleberg et al. (997: 6, emphasis added) compare the quality of standard and
nonstandard jobs, noting “that nonstandard workers, on average, receive lower
wages than regular full time workers with similar personal characteristics and
educational qualiications.” In simple terms, the same level of functional lexibility (multiple skills, autonomy, and teamwork) is compensated differently
within standard and nonstandard jobs. This is similar to the “segmented labour
market” thesis that workers’ human capital is rewarded differently within the
“primary” versus “secondary” labour market (Beck et al. 978). Dickens and
Lang (993) describe this as “unequal pay for equal human capital.” This suggests that the effect of functional lexibility on job rewards depends on the
categories of numerical lexibility (functional lexibility is rewarded differently within standard and nonstandard jobs). A unit of functional lexibility
is rewarded signiicantly more within standard jobs than nonstandard ones. If
this is the case:
Hypothesis 6: Signiicant correlations between the interaction of functional
and numerical lexibility with job rewards are expected, net of additive effects
of functional and structural lexibility as well as workers’ characteristics.
Data, Measures, and Methodology
The major source of data for this study is the 2002 General Social Survey
(GSS). The data are the basic source for functional and numerical lexibility
and their associations with job rewards.4 In addition to the 2002 GSS, Current
Population Survey (CPS) Supplements for 995, 997, 999, and 200 provide
additional information on numerical lexibility and its association with three
more job rewards — health insurance, pension, and median weekly income.
Comparing and contrasting the results of two data sets (GSS and CPS) can verify the validity of the indings and check the robustness of the conclusions (for
more discussion on CPS see, for example, Hipple 998; DiNatale 200). The
2002 GSS includes hundreds of questions related directly to job characteristics
of the respondents, including functional and numerical lexibility. The sample
comprises 785 valid cases (the sample originally contained 2765 cases), in4 For more information on GSS data, which come from a multi-topic survey conducted almost annually by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), see Davis
and Smith (992).
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Canadian Journal of Sociology
cluding nearly 30 percent nonstandard (alternative and part-time) employees
and 70 percent standard (full-time regular) workers.
Unit of Analysis
This study is designed to explore individual consequences of employee lexibility, especially job rewards. Job rewards are structured in job positions and
their signiicance depends on the perception of individual employees. Therefore, individual job holders and their jobs are assumed to be the appropriate
unit of analysis. Davis-Blake and Uzzi (993) used both job and establishment as the units of analysis to explain the purpose of using temporary and
independent contractors. Kalleberg (200) prefers a network, deined by the
relationships among the organizations and subcontractors, as the appropriate
unit of analysis for analyzing employee lexibility. This research argues that
identiication of an appropriate unit of analysis depends on the aim(s) of a
study; therefore, worker, jobs, establishment, organization, or network can all
be useful units of analysis. An organization or a irm can be an appropriate unit
of analysis to explore the policy or strategies of an organization on recruiting
standard versus nonstandard employees. A network, as Kalleberg (200) suggested, can be an appropriate unit of analysis if the purpose of a study is to
understand the structure and dynamic of workplace lexibility.
While a job holder is an appropriate unit of analysis for analyzing job rewards (dependent variables), both functional and numerical lexibilities (two
independent variables) are structural features of work organizations. This can
be addressed by reducing the independent variable unit of analysis from an
organizational lexibility to a respondents’ perception of workplace lexibility. Functional lexibility is a novel work arrangement offering a systematic
break with bureaucratic work structure, but its labour-related consequences are
very similar to the traditional empowerment of workers through opportunities
to acquire multiple skills, experience teamwork, and participate in decision
making processes (“re-crafting America”).5 Social psychology theories of the
workplace suggest it is the perception of workplace opportunities, rather than
5 Some may challenge using such measures on the grounds that these characteristics
relect craft types of highly autonomous jobs rather than functional lexibility. There
are three responses to this challenge. First, all jobs covered in this study are organizational — either government employees or private irm workers. Second, as mentioned by Vallas (999), both large and small irms including craftsmen adopted a
“technological paradigm . . . which provides lexible specialization.” Third, the concept of “re-crafting America” clearly suggests that business organizations, following the principles of quality control, are moving toward types of jobs that demand
autonomous craft skills rather than routine mass production jobs (Chicago Tribune,
99, Nov. 6).
Work Flexibility and its Individual Consequences 35
the workplace itself, that affects workers’ responses toward workplace characteristics (Hall 994). Since this study examines the individual consequences
of workplace lexibility, rather than lexibility itself, workers’ perceptions of
lexibility become relevant.
Measurement and Methodology
The GSS data contain one question directly measuring numerical lexibility.
This item taps into work arrangements at one’s main job, and contains the
following categories: “Independent contractor/consultant/freelance worker”
(3.8%); “on-call, work only when called to work” (2.3%); “paid by temporary
agency” (0.8%); “work for contractor who provides workers/services” (2.4%);
and “regular, permanent employee” (.7% part-time, 68.5% full-time, and a
total of 80.2%). The answers have been regrouped into two categories — nonstandard workers (the irst four categories plus part-time regular employment)
and standard workers (the last category minus the part-time regular employment). Nonstandard jobs are also occasionally divided into a few categories
(independent contractors and the other nonstandard job holders) to reveal within group variation and allow comparison with standard jobs.6 Independent contractors, because of their self-determined work pace and autonomy (Rebitzer
995; Kalleberg 200) are growing faster than the other arrangements among
professional and semi-professional jobs. In a national survey, more than 83
percent of independent contractors preferred to keep their jobs, rather than taking a standard job (CPS 200). Their signiicantly higher degree of job autonomy is associated with higher intrinsic job rewards, especially higher degrees
of job satisfaction (Armstrong 97; Kashei 2004).
Functional lexibility has been measured by respondents’ perceptions of
job characteristics attributed to functional lexibility. As discussed in the unit
of analysis, functional lexibility is an organizational level dynamic but its
tangible results are seen in workers’ attitudes and behaviours. Most scholars
in the ield of organizational lexibility agree that functional lexibility provides employees with more participation in decision making (decision-making
lexibility), heavy reliance on teamwork (teamwork lexibility), and multiple
skilled jobs (task lexibility) (e.g., Appelbaum and Batt 994; Kalleberg 200;
Osterman 994; Smith 994; Wood 989; Zuboff 988). Therefore, this paper
6 “Independent contractor” encompasses independent contractors, independent consultants, or freelance workers, whether self-employed or wage and salary workers.
On-call workers work only as needed, although they can be scheduled to work for
several days or weeks in a row. Temporary help agency workers are paid by a temporary help agency, whether or not their job was temporary. Workers provided by
contract irms are employed by a company that provides them or their services to
others under contract, and who are usually assigned to only one customer and usually work at the customer’s worksite (CPS Supplement 200).
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Canadian Journal of Sociology
uses those three sets of job characteristics to operationalize functional lexibility, relecting the degrees of functional lexibility implemented. The 2002
GSS data contain many items that tap into functional lexibility. After a careful
theoretical examination, ten items were selected and subjected to exploratory
factor analysis with oblique rotation, which assumes the resulting factors are
correlated with one another.7 Three constructs were extracted. Four items, the
respondent “does numerous things on jobs,” “jobs allow R [Respondents] use
of skills,” “opportunity to develop my ability,” and “job requires R to learn
new things,” exhibited high loadings (0.63 or higher) on the “task lexibility”
factor. Three items, “how often R was allowed to change schedule,” “R has lot
of say in job,” and “a lot of freedom to decide how to do job” indicated high
loadings (0.63 and higher) on the “decision-making lexibility” factor. The last
three items, “R works as part of a team,” “how often R takes part in decisions,”
and “how often R set the way things are done” showed high loadings (0.7
and higher) on the “teamwork lexibility” factor. These three factors, with different labels, are congruent with the three dimensions of functional lexibility
discussed by most previous studies (see, e.g., Belanger et al.’s reports [2002]
on the emerging principles of lexible production organizations —”autonomy
and discretion,” “decreased supervision along with increasing degrees of selfregulation” and “multi-disciplinary teams and horizontal coordination”).
The main method adopted for data analyses entailed several multiple regression equations. All assumptions required for adopting a multiple regression analysis were conirmed.8 To explore the effects of numerical lexibility
on job rewards, it was irst measured as a dummy variable (standard workers=
and nonstandard workers=0). To contrast the standard workers with independent contractors and the other nonstandard workers, two dummy variables were
constructed with the standard workers as the reference group. Numerical lexibility here is a nominal independent variable with three categories (standard
workers, independent contractors, and other nonstandard workers). Standard
workers are chosen for the reference group since it has the highest frequency
(Allison 999). Allison (999: 62) calls the coeficients “adjusted differences in the means of dependent variables.” Therefore, each coeficient for the
dummy variables relects a comparison between “standard workers” with “independent contractors” or with “other nonstandard workers” (for more discussion, see the indings on numerical lexibility). Overall, seven dependent vari7 In an exploratory factor analysis, it is the degree of correlations within subsets of
variables that determines variable clusters (measures of constructs). In a conformity
factor analysis, on the other hand, the researcher speciies the clusters beforehand.
This study followed the former to explore the variables of each cluster based on their
correlations.
8 Assumptions required to conduct a multiple regression were carefully checked; no
multi-collinearity or heterokodastisty was found (“tolerance statistics” for all independent variables were lower than 0.4, indicating no multi-collinearity).
Table 1. Correlation matrix for the measures of functional lexibility and job rewards
Y1
Y2
Y4
Y3
Y5
Y6
Y7
X1
X2
X3
Y1
1
Y2
0.273*** 1
Y3
-0.034
Y4
-0.07*** 0.267*** 0.96*** 1
Y5
-0.052**
Y6
-0.075*** 0.265*** 0.280*** 0.253***
Y7
-0.026
X1
0.88*** 0.272*** 0.262*** 0.474***
0.313*** 0.344*** 0.260*** 1
X2
0.80*** 0.266*** 0.95*** 0.447***
0.329*** 0.341*** 0.232*** 0.796*** 1
X3
0.52
0.25*** 0.265*** 0.177*** 0.680*** 0.307***
X4
0.035
0.147
0.244
10.07
2.07
2.37
3.053
.096
0.850
S.D.
***
0.90*** 1
0.082*** 0.074*** 0.286***
1
0.08*** 1
0.240*** 0.117*** 0.0367*** 0.9*** 0.201*** 1
0.79
***
***
***
0.66
0.245
***
0.348
***
***
.67
0.847
***
0.243
2.87
0.837
0.54
***
2.45
1.047
***
0.174
.68
0.877
0.755
***
6.62
4.93
0.455
***
7.03
2.250
1
0.229*** 1
6.52
2.68
8.93
2.214
* P