Understanding Creationism Updated Presen
Understanding Creationism and Anti-creationism in the US: Shifting Strategies and the
Dilemma of Sociology
Presentation at the Annual Conference of the British Sociological Association, London, 04/05/13
Tom Kaden, University of Leipzig
I would like to present to you my views on how to best analyse the so-called
creation/evolution controversy that’s been going on in the United States in a professionalized
manner since the 1960s. First, I’d like to sketch some of the things that have been going on in
the US in the last few years that pose problems for professional anti-creationism as well as for
sociology. Namely, it’s becoming increasingly harder for anti-creationists to set and defend
criteria with which to exclude current versions of creationism from science education in
public schools. The main categories that are employed in order to determine the situation are
science and religion, or whether one form of creationism or materialism is scientific or
religious. For sociology, this debate about the nature of science and religion makes it hard to
apply these categories as means of analysis. After explaining those points a bit further, I’d like
to suggest a way to resolve those issues with respect to sociological analysis. I’m going to
propose a model that sidesteps the issue of science and religion while maintaining a sufficient
analytical depth. Finally, I will briefly present an example of how to apply this model as an
interpretive framework for creationist and anti-creationist action in the US.
I. Current Developments within American Creationism
Let me first sketch some developments within the contemporary creationist scene in the US
upon which my argument is based. For my purposes, it is crucial to note that many of the
dynamics of the creation/evolution controversy is based on the issue of defining creationism.
The various actors involved in the controversy define creationism differently and attempt to
enforce this definition in various social fields like the media and the judicial system. This
process is especially virulent with regard to the latest and still most discussed version of
creationism, Intelligent Design. The proponents of Intelligent Design don’t regard it as
creationism, and hence not as religious, but contend that Intelligent Design is a legitimate
scientific paradigm, whereas anti-creationists like the National Center for Science Education
think otherwise.
Indeed, Intelligent Design arguments often manage to resemble at least the style of real
scientific arguments pretty closely, and some of the Intelligent Design proponents tend to
resemble real scientists much more than proponents of other forms of creationism. Some of
them hold PhDs from prestigious universities, and publish in peer-reviewed journals, although
typically the content of these papers has little or nothing to do with Intelligent Design in a
narrow sense.
So doesn’t Intelligent Design as an idea as well as a social practice resemble science proper so
much that it may count as science proper? Isn’t Intelligent Design merely a competing theory
regarding the complexity of life so that it would be perfectly reasonable to have this scientific
controversy taught in public schools? These arguments have been brought forth by proponents
of Intelligent Design, and anti-creationists have made an effort to counter them.
Since the Supreme Court in 1968 ruled it unconstitutional for states to ban the teaching of
evolution in public schools, creationism has evolved towards becoming ever more sciencelike.
This in turn has made it harder for those who would rather not see creationism taught as
science to defend that stance. With respect to Intelligent Design one main anti-creationist
argument is that it must not be considered true science, since it violates the core principle of
1
science, methodological naturalism, that is, the rule to retrace natural causes only to natural
effects.
When we step back and think about who may be right here, we immediately encounter a
problem: depending on the scope of our perspective, both are right. Those who defend
methodological naturalism are certainly right as regards contemporary science. On the other
hand, the history of science tells us that this holds only within this rather small historical
frame of, say, four hundred years. Apart from that, it is impossible to name elements of
science as a thought concept that have always been (or will always be) connected to science
as a social undertaking. For much of European history, the very notion of methodological
materialism was not regarded a sine qua non of science. All this would be rather trivial, and
there would be only minor consequences for sociological analysis, if this problem wouldn’t,
in a classic Spencer Brownian manner, re-enter the very realm in which this distinction is
negotiated. What I mean by that is simply what I have mentioned before: the actors who
struggle to be included in the realm of science (like Intelligent Design proponents) and those
who struggle to exclude other actors (like the National Center for Science Education) both
employ reflections on the nature of science as means of defending their own position. And
here I think we have reached the core of the problem as regards sociological analysis of
creationism. In my view, sociology can never properly analyze the creation/evolution
controversy using the notions of science and religion or anything similar, because these
notions are inherently normative. Describing something, like evolutionary theory, as scientific
is inevitably linked to ideas about what science should be like, and to characterize Intelligent
Design as unscientific is a normative statement about what the social undertaking of science
should not be like. Of course it is possible to limit the scope of these notions by defining
science as the social practice that is being regarded as science at the moment. But at this point,
as a sociologist, one comes dangerously close to representing the very value judgments one
ought to be analyzing.
This situation leaves sociology in a dilemma: While it is clear that we are witnessing a social
conflict in which science and religion play pivotal roles, we cannot use these very notions to
explain what exactly it is we are witnessing. Let me now outline an alternative way of
approaching the creation/evolution controversy at the level of professional organizations that
avoids these problems.
II. Resolving the Science/Religion Dilemma
In order to retain the scope that the notions of science and religion encompass, we may first
ask what is at the bottom of these notions? What concepts are they based on currently?
Apparently, science has to do with nature, or more specifically, with systems of natural effects
and their causation. In their entirety, these systems make up the world in Wittgenstein’s sense
of “everything that is the case”. While this, of course, is not an in-depth definition of science
that would withstand further scrutiny by philosophers of science, it is valid insofar as all the
actors involved in the conflict cannot but refer to nature in this sense in their theories,
refutations, affirmations, etc. If they didn’t, they could by definition not partake in the
controversy. It is an indispensable category for each actor to rely on in arguing their case,
even though, as I said, the notions of nature may vary considerably in their further
specifications by the actors themselves. As regards religion, things aren’t as simple as that at
first glance, since we cannot point to an overarching trait that all forms of religion have in
common. It gets easier if we take into consideration that creationism in the United States is for
the most part a Protestant phenomenon. That doesn’t mean that most Protestants are
creationists, but most creationists are Protestants. Likewise, the actors who confront
2
creationism, in their discussion of its religious aspects refer to Christian concepts, namely the
concept of a personal God. As with nature, the notion of God cannot be suspended by any of
the actors without ceasing to partake in the controversy itself. After all, if there is something
like a creation, it is a result of God’s will. On the other hand, for many, autonomous natural
processes require the absence of God as an intentional actor who intervenes on a whim.
If, for the sake of the argument, you agree with what I said thus far, you may also agree that it
would be useful for any assessment of the creation/evolution controversy to map the different
perspectives on God and nature that the actors advocate. Before I show you my map, I must
first specify what it is exactly that the actors disagree on with respect to God and nature. I
propose to you this central question as the structuring problem of the controversy:
What part has ‘God’ and what part has ‘nature’ in the emergence, development and
conservation of the world?
The different answers given to that question are from this analytical point of view identical
with the different forms of creationism and anti-creationism. These answers may be located in
a field of positions that looks like this:
Fig. 1: Creationist and anti-creationist positions in the US (selection).
3
On the bottom left part of the field there are situated all answers that attribute a minor role to
nature in answering the question, and a major role to God. On the top right area are the
opposite positions, like scientific atheism. Of course, both factors can be combined in thought
concepts that identify the natural process with God’s intention, like theistic evolution
proposes. We can now link the professional creationist and anti-creationist actors with their
respective positions like this:
Fig. 2: Professional creationist and anti-creationist actors in the US (selection). CTNS = Center for Theology
and the Natural Sciences (Berkeley); NA = New Atheism; NCSE = National Center for Science Education
(Oakland); CSC = Center for Science and Culture (Seattle); RTB = Reasons to Believe (Glendora); AiG =
Answers in Genesis (Petersburg); ICR = Institute for Creation Research (El Cajon).
Note that they are actors in that conflict not by chance or by just being around, but by
positioning themselves, and by directly or indirectly referring to other actors and by being
referred to by other actors. Lastly, if we would also include a capital structure in this graphic,
we would arrive at a classic Bourdieuian field. I have some thoughts on that, but my analysis
is still very much work in progress, so I will skip this dimension.
4
Still, I think there are two things to be gained from this approach:
First, we can derive a non-substantialist definition of creationism from it, by which the
sociologist avoids positioning herself within the controversy, and we can even make clear in
what way definitions may differ from one another.
Creationism is every approach to resolve the Question that contains a relatively large
proportion of God-related arguments and also a relatively small proportion of nature-related
arguments.
The advantage of defining creationism like this is that its inherent variability is already
included in its definition, and it avoids references to the concepts of science and religion
which are being used as means of enforcing various definitions of creationism within the field
of conflict.
Secondly, I think this is a neat way to make visible the logic that underlies not only creationist
actions, but that structures also the actions of the anti-creationist antagonists. This shared
logic or nomos, to use a sociological term by Pierre Bourdieu, is hence not only relevant for a
historian of ideas, but it has visible consequences within the creation/evolution controversy.
The actors are involved in the controversy in order to establish their respective view on the
Question as the ruling principle of action. In order to achieve this, they must delegitimize
competing views. When analysing their attempts to do that, one can see that the way they go
about this is dependent on the position they take within this field of ideas. Take, for instance,
the Young Earth creationist organization Answers in Genesis, which you find in the bottom
left corner of the field. They are not only opposed to all the other actors (except the Institute
for Creation Research), but they are opposed to them in a specific way: The role they attribute
to God in answering the Question surpasses all the other actors’ answers. This homogeneity is
expressed in a severe dualist view of the conflict. This can be clearly seen in an image with
which Answers in Genesis describes the conflict at large:
5
Fig. 3: “The Problem”: Graphic representation of the conflict by Answers in Genesis.
Here you can see that an opposition is not only expressed towards secular society with all its
evils, but also towards those Intelligent Design or Theistic Evolutionist Christians who
disband Biblical creationism as a principle of their belief, thereby undermining Christianity
itself. As a contrast, take the aforementioned National Center for Science Education, whose
position is that science and religion are functionally differentiated realms of knowledge. This
leads to the NCSE opposing not only all kinds of creationism, but also those forms of
naturalism that transgress the boundaries of science as they understand it. Thus, far from
facing a uniform opposition like Answers in Genesis, the NCSE is between the extremes. This
rather precarious situation is expressed in their depiction of the conflict at large, which
unfortunately is not quite as entertaining as the previous one and looks like this:
6
Fig. 4: “The Creation/Evolution Continuum”: Graphic representation of the conflict by the National Center for
Science Education.
Since their position does not allow for a dualist reduction of the conflict, we cannot find it in
this graphic. Rather, what we find is a differentiated continuum that allows for multiple ways
of expressing opposition towards different positions. Interestingly enough, Intelligent Design
isn’t even characterized as a distinct form of creationism, but rather as a way of transporting
older variants like Day-Age creationism, which holds that the six days of creation represent
vast ages of time. Much like Answers in Genesis, the NCSE’s position does not allow for a
consideration of the fact that the Intelligent Design movement by now is very much
autonomous, since its aim is to identify Intelligent Design as a form of creationism as clearly
as possible.
As I said above, it may prove useful to also apply Bourdieu’s capital analysis to this field. In
any case I think these examples show that in this dynamic area of the American religious
landscape, sociology of religion should disband dichotomous concepts in favour of
continuums in order to better reflect the complex post-secular situation.
7
Dilemma of Sociology
Presentation at the Annual Conference of the British Sociological Association, London, 04/05/13
Tom Kaden, University of Leipzig
I would like to present to you my views on how to best analyse the so-called
creation/evolution controversy that’s been going on in the United States in a professionalized
manner since the 1960s. First, I’d like to sketch some of the things that have been going on in
the US in the last few years that pose problems for professional anti-creationism as well as for
sociology. Namely, it’s becoming increasingly harder for anti-creationists to set and defend
criteria with which to exclude current versions of creationism from science education in
public schools. The main categories that are employed in order to determine the situation are
science and religion, or whether one form of creationism or materialism is scientific or
religious. For sociology, this debate about the nature of science and religion makes it hard to
apply these categories as means of analysis. After explaining those points a bit further, I’d like
to suggest a way to resolve those issues with respect to sociological analysis. I’m going to
propose a model that sidesteps the issue of science and religion while maintaining a sufficient
analytical depth. Finally, I will briefly present an example of how to apply this model as an
interpretive framework for creationist and anti-creationist action in the US.
I. Current Developments within American Creationism
Let me first sketch some developments within the contemporary creationist scene in the US
upon which my argument is based. For my purposes, it is crucial to note that many of the
dynamics of the creation/evolution controversy is based on the issue of defining creationism.
The various actors involved in the controversy define creationism differently and attempt to
enforce this definition in various social fields like the media and the judicial system. This
process is especially virulent with regard to the latest and still most discussed version of
creationism, Intelligent Design. The proponents of Intelligent Design don’t regard it as
creationism, and hence not as religious, but contend that Intelligent Design is a legitimate
scientific paradigm, whereas anti-creationists like the National Center for Science Education
think otherwise.
Indeed, Intelligent Design arguments often manage to resemble at least the style of real
scientific arguments pretty closely, and some of the Intelligent Design proponents tend to
resemble real scientists much more than proponents of other forms of creationism. Some of
them hold PhDs from prestigious universities, and publish in peer-reviewed journals, although
typically the content of these papers has little or nothing to do with Intelligent Design in a
narrow sense.
So doesn’t Intelligent Design as an idea as well as a social practice resemble science proper so
much that it may count as science proper? Isn’t Intelligent Design merely a competing theory
regarding the complexity of life so that it would be perfectly reasonable to have this scientific
controversy taught in public schools? These arguments have been brought forth by proponents
of Intelligent Design, and anti-creationists have made an effort to counter them.
Since the Supreme Court in 1968 ruled it unconstitutional for states to ban the teaching of
evolution in public schools, creationism has evolved towards becoming ever more sciencelike.
This in turn has made it harder for those who would rather not see creationism taught as
science to defend that stance. With respect to Intelligent Design one main anti-creationist
argument is that it must not be considered true science, since it violates the core principle of
1
science, methodological naturalism, that is, the rule to retrace natural causes only to natural
effects.
When we step back and think about who may be right here, we immediately encounter a
problem: depending on the scope of our perspective, both are right. Those who defend
methodological naturalism are certainly right as regards contemporary science. On the other
hand, the history of science tells us that this holds only within this rather small historical
frame of, say, four hundred years. Apart from that, it is impossible to name elements of
science as a thought concept that have always been (or will always be) connected to science
as a social undertaking. For much of European history, the very notion of methodological
materialism was not regarded a sine qua non of science. All this would be rather trivial, and
there would be only minor consequences for sociological analysis, if this problem wouldn’t,
in a classic Spencer Brownian manner, re-enter the very realm in which this distinction is
negotiated. What I mean by that is simply what I have mentioned before: the actors who
struggle to be included in the realm of science (like Intelligent Design proponents) and those
who struggle to exclude other actors (like the National Center for Science Education) both
employ reflections on the nature of science as means of defending their own position. And
here I think we have reached the core of the problem as regards sociological analysis of
creationism. In my view, sociology can never properly analyze the creation/evolution
controversy using the notions of science and religion or anything similar, because these
notions are inherently normative. Describing something, like evolutionary theory, as scientific
is inevitably linked to ideas about what science should be like, and to characterize Intelligent
Design as unscientific is a normative statement about what the social undertaking of science
should not be like. Of course it is possible to limit the scope of these notions by defining
science as the social practice that is being regarded as science at the moment. But at this point,
as a sociologist, one comes dangerously close to representing the very value judgments one
ought to be analyzing.
This situation leaves sociology in a dilemma: While it is clear that we are witnessing a social
conflict in which science and religion play pivotal roles, we cannot use these very notions to
explain what exactly it is we are witnessing. Let me now outline an alternative way of
approaching the creation/evolution controversy at the level of professional organizations that
avoids these problems.
II. Resolving the Science/Religion Dilemma
In order to retain the scope that the notions of science and religion encompass, we may first
ask what is at the bottom of these notions? What concepts are they based on currently?
Apparently, science has to do with nature, or more specifically, with systems of natural effects
and their causation. In their entirety, these systems make up the world in Wittgenstein’s sense
of “everything that is the case”. While this, of course, is not an in-depth definition of science
that would withstand further scrutiny by philosophers of science, it is valid insofar as all the
actors involved in the conflict cannot but refer to nature in this sense in their theories,
refutations, affirmations, etc. If they didn’t, they could by definition not partake in the
controversy. It is an indispensable category for each actor to rely on in arguing their case,
even though, as I said, the notions of nature may vary considerably in their further
specifications by the actors themselves. As regards religion, things aren’t as simple as that at
first glance, since we cannot point to an overarching trait that all forms of religion have in
common. It gets easier if we take into consideration that creationism in the United States is for
the most part a Protestant phenomenon. That doesn’t mean that most Protestants are
creationists, but most creationists are Protestants. Likewise, the actors who confront
2
creationism, in their discussion of its religious aspects refer to Christian concepts, namely the
concept of a personal God. As with nature, the notion of God cannot be suspended by any of
the actors without ceasing to partake in the controversy itself. After all, if there is something
like a creation, it is a result of God’s will. On the other hand, for many, autonomous natural
processes require the absence of God as an intentional actor who intervenes on a whim.
If, for the sake of the argument, you agree with what I said thus far, you may also agree that it
would be useful for any assessment of the creation/evolution controversy to map the different
perspectives on God and nature that the actors advocate. Before I show you my map, I must
first specify what it is exactly that the actors disagree on with respect to God and nature. I
propose to you this central question as the structuring problem of the controversy:
What part has ‘God’ and what part has ‘nature’ in the emergence, development and
conservation of the world?
The different answers given to that question are from this analytical point of view identical
with the different forms of creationism and anti-creationism. These answers may be located in
a field of positions that looks like this:
Fig. 1: Creationist and anti-creationist positions in the US (selection).
3
On the bottom left part of the field there are situated all answers that attribute a minor role to
nature in answering the question, and a major role to God. On the top right area are the
opposite positions, like scientific atheism. Of course, both factors can be combined in thought
concepts that identify the natural process with God’s intention, like theistic evolution
proposes. We can now link the professional creationist and anti-creationist actors with their
respective positions like this:
Fig. 2: Professional creationist and anti-creationist actors in the US (selection). CTNS = Center for Theology
and the Natural Sciences (Berkeley); NA = New Atheism; NCSE = National Center for Science Education
(Oakland); CSC = Center for Science and Culture (Seattle); RTB = Reasons to Believe (Glendora); AiG =
Answers in Genesis (Petersburg); ICR = Institute for Creation Research (El Cajon).
Note that they are actors in that conflict not by chance or by just being around, but by
positioning themselves, and by directly or indirectly referring to other actors and by being
referred to by other actors. Lastly, if we would also include a capital structure in this graphic,
we would arrive at a classic Bourdieuian field. I have some thoughts on that, but my analysis
is still very much work in progress, so I will skip this dimension.
4
Still, I think there are two things to be gained from this approach:
First, we can derive a non-substantialist definition of creationism from it, by which the
sociologist avoids positioning herself within the controversy, and we can even make clear in
what way definitions may differ from one another.
Creationism is every approach to resolve the Question that contains a relatively large
proportion of God-related arguments and also a relatively small proportion of nature-related
arguments.
The advantage of defining creationism like this is that its inherent variability is already
included in its definition, and it avoids references to the concepts of science and religion
which are being used as means of enforcing various definitions of creationism within the field
of conflict.
Secondly, I think this is a neat way to make visible the logic that underlies not only creationist
actions, but that structures also the actions of the anti-creationist antagonists. This shared
logic or nomos, to use a sociological term by Pierre Bourdieu, is hence not only relevant for a
historian of ideas, but it has visible consequences within the creation/evolution controversy.
The actors are involved in the controversy in order to establish their respective view on the
Question as the ruling principle of action. In order to achieve this, they must delegitimize
competing views. When analysing their attempts to do that, one can see that the way they go
about this is dependent on the position they take within this field of ideas. Take, for instance,
the Young Earth creationist organization Answers in Genesis, which you find in the bottom
left corner of the field. They are not only opposed to all the other actors (except the Institute
for Creation Research), but they are opposed to them in a specific way: The role they attribute
to God in answering the Question surpasses all the other actors’ answers. This homogeneity is
expressed in a severe dualist view of the conflict. This can be clearly seen in an image with
which Answers in Genesis describes the conflict at large:
5
Fig. 3: “The Problem”: Graphic representation of the conflict by Answers in Genesis.
Here you can see that an opposition is not only expressed towards secular society with all its
evils, but also towards those Intelligent Design or Theistic Evolutionist Christians who
disband Biblical creationism as a principle of their belief, thereby undermining Christianity
itself. As a contrast, take the aforementioned National Center for Science Education, whose
position is that science and religion are functionally differentiated realms of knowledge. This
leads to the NCSE opposing not only all kinds of creationism, but also those forms of
naturalism that transgress the boundaries of science as they understand it. Thus, far from
facing a uniform opposition like Answers in Genesis, the NCSE is between the extremes. This
rather precarious situation is expressed in their depiction of the conflict at large, which
unfortunately is not quite as entertaining as the previous one and looks like this:
6
Fig. 4: “The Creation/Evolution Continuum”: Graphic representation of the conflict by the National Center for
Science Education.
Since their position does not allow for a dualist reduction of the conflict, we cannot find it in
this graphic. Rather, what we find is a differentiated continuum that allows for multiple ways
of expressing opposition towards different positions. Interestingly enough, Intelligent Design
isn’t even characterized as a distinct form of creationism, but rather as a way of transporting
older variants like Day-Age creationism, which holds that the six days of creation represent
vast ages of time. Much like Answers in Genesis, the NCSE’s position does not allow for a
consideration of the fact that the Intelligent Design movement by now is very much
autonomous, since its aim is to identify Intelligent Design as a form of creationism as clearly
as possible.
As I said above, it may prove useful to also apply Bourdieu’s capital analysis to this field. In
any case I think these examples show that in this dynamic area of the American religious
landscape, sociology of religion should disband dichotomous concepts in favour of
continuums in order to better reflect the complex post-secular situation.
7