ESSA Growth Ammo CLSA Corporate Research

Surya Esa
Rp3,250 - BUY
Snoopin around
Small-caps research

stifanus.sulistyo@clsa.com
+62 21 2554 8819

Energy reform provides growth ammo
ESSA is one of indirect beneficiary of Indonesia energy reform as the
country needs to tackle its energy trade balance issue. ESSA is benefiting
from an upcoming Senoro Toili gas field where it will source the gas for
the ammonia plant, which we expect to fivefold ESSA’s 2013 profit in
2017. Separately, we cut earnings forecast due to 9% lower LPG price
assumption and sequentially cut the TP by only 5%. Post cut, ESSA
growth outlook remains attractive with our TP implies 6x 17CL PE.

Abdullah Hashim
+62 21 2554 8827

LPG price assumption cut, minimal impact to TP

LPG price trades 11% lower than its 10M14 average & 14% lower than 2013,
in-line with oil/energy commodities price weakness. We trimmed our 14-15CL
earnings by 11-13% on 11-9% lower LPG price assumption; earnings impact
relatively mild for a commodity business due to the gas-linked purchase price.
Our model suggests ~7% & ~2% 15CL & 17CL earnings sensitivity for every
5% movements in LPG price.

28 October 2014

Indonesia
Petro/Chems
Reuters
Bloomberg

ESSA.JK
ESSA IJ

Priced on 23 October 2014
Jakarta Comp @ 5,024.3
12M hi/lo


Asia ammonia shortage gives advantages to the Asian producers
Ammonia price (Middle East index) is strong, trades ~19% higher than its
2014ytd avg due to supply disruption; however its mid-longer term outlook is
not that bullish as crops prices are weak that lead to less planting area by the
farmers and eventually less fertilizers. Nevertheless, as a net importer, Asian
ammonia producers have some advantages as the region is a net importer.
This makes the Asian producers as one of the last one to go out of market in
case of further ammonia weakness.

Rp3,550/1,600

12M price target
±% potential

Rp4,050
+25%

Shares in issue
Free float (est.)


1,100.0m
40.9%

Market cap

US$295m

Energy reform derivative – reserve ammo
ESSA is one of the indirect beneficiaries of energy reform in Indonesia; we
can look at ESSA as the derivative of it. Indo energy trade balance is heading
to negative territory if Indo doesn’t fast-track the O&G production. When
Indonesia increases its oil & gas production, petrochemical producers like
ESSA could benefit by getting more resources allocation, more businesses

3M average daily volume

Rp0.5bn

(US$0.0m)


Major shareholders

Trinugraha Akarya Sejahtera
30.0%
Ramaduta Teltaka 20.0%

1M

3M

12M

New TP implies 6x 17CL PE, 25% upside; BUY
Our SOTP valuation model suggests ESSA’s fair value at Rp4050/sh, 5% lower
than previous TP. We continue to like ESSA on the back of its solid execution
track-record, savvy management team and upcoming ammonia project. As a
petrochemical producer, we think there are upside risks in form of more
projects / resources allocation when Indonesia increases its O&G outputs.


Absolute
Relative

(3.0)
(0.9)

47.1
48.9

35.4
23.5

Financials

Abs (US$)

(3.7)

40.6


24.7

Year to 31 December

Stock performance (%)

(Rp)

(% )

150

3,600

100

3,025

12A


13A

14CL

15CL

40

42

37

48

119

Rev forecast change (%)

-


-

(10.7)

(8.6)

(3.8)

Net profit (US$m)

7

13

10

15

25


NP forecast change (%)

-

-

(11.3)

(12.7)

(8.3)

0.76

1.24

0.89

1.38


2.25

-

62.7

(28.4)

55.5

62.7

45.5

25.1

30.7

21.1


13.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

15.3

19.4

10.6

14.5

19.8

Net debt/equity (%)

1.9

(17.7)

31.9

149.4

224.7

PB (x)

7.1

3.9

3.1

2.9

2.3

Revenue (US$m)

EPS (US¢)

2,450

50
1,875

EPS growth (% YoY)
PE (x)

1,300
Oct -12 Apr-13 Oct -13 Apr-14
Surya Esa (LHS)
Rel to Co mp (RH S)

Source: Bloomberg

www.clsa.com

0

Dividend yield (%)
ROE (%)

16CL

Source: CLSA

Find CLSA research on Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, Factset and CapitalIQ - and profit from our evalu@tor proprietary database at clsa.com

Company update

Growth ammo

Stifanus Sulistyo

Surya Esa - BUY

Growth ammo

LPG price assumptions cut, minimal impact to TP
At Arab Gulf LPG Propane & Butane price of US$735/mt & US$765/mt, LPG
price trades at 11% lower than its 10M14 average and 14% lower than 2013.
The price weakness is in-line with oil/energy commodities weakness; LPG
price has relatively high degree of correlation (0.95x) with the oil price. We
trimmed our 14-16CL earnings by 8-13% mainly on the back of lower
LPG price assumption.
Our model suggests ~7% 15CL earnings sensitivity for every ~5% LPG price
movements. For 17CL onwards, our model suggests ~2% & ~4% earnings
sensitivity for every 5% & 5% movements in LPG & Ammonia prices.
Figure 1

Figure 2

LPG & Brent prices

LPG Price assumption

(US$/mt)

1,200 (US$/tons)

1,400

CP Aramco Price Average

1,100
y = 7.1275x + 78.78
R² = 0.9082

1,200

1,000

1,000

900850
800

868
800

800

600

805

782

829

854

880

906

933

961

990

1,020

1,050

700

400

600

200
0
0

50

150 (US$/bbl)

100

Source: CLSA, Bloomberg

500
2012 2013 14CL 15CL 16CL 17CL 18CL 19CL 20CL 21CL 22CL 23CL 24CL 25CL

Source: CLSA, Bloomberg

We trimmed our 14-15CL LPG price assumption by 11-9% to US$800782/mt. Note that ESSA gas purchase prices are linked to the each products
ASP; it has floor price + escalation that linked to ASP. With this scheme, ESSA
should be able to maintain LPG segment gross margin at 66-71% when LPG
prices range from US$700-1000/mt.
Figure 3

We assume LPG price in
October to recover by 3%
by the end of the year

LPG price, 2000-10M14
(US$/t)

LPG

1,150
1,050
950
850
750
650
550
450
350
250
150
J-00

J-01

J-02

J-03

J-04

J-05

J-06

J-07

J-08

J-09

J-10

J-11

J-12

J-13

J-14

Source: CLSA, Bloomberg

Commodity companies’ profitability is very sensitive towards the
commodity price movement as the production cost usually constant;
profit will slump deeper than the revenue due to margin compression.
However, ESSA’s linked gas price purchase has allowed less profitability
volatility compared to commodity companies in general.
28 October 2014

stifanus.sulistyo@clsa.com

2

Surya Esa - BUY

Growth ammo

As 4th week of October, ammonia price (Middle East index) trades at ~19%
higher than 2014ytd average price. The strong Ammonia price in the shortterm is attributable to gas supply disruption in Middle East and Ukraine;
Ammonia mid-longer term outlook is not bullish as crops prices are weak that
lead to less planting area by the farmers and eventually less fertilizers.
However, Asian ammonia producers have some advantages:
Figure 4

Figure 5

Ammonia vs Brent oil, 2000-10M14
(US$/bbl)

Brent

Ammonia vs corn price, 2000-10M14

Mid-East Ammonia (RHS)

(US$/mt)

(US$/bbl)

Corn

Ammonia (RHS)

(US$/mt)

160

1000

900

1000

140

900

800

900

800

700

800

120
700
100

600

80

500
400

60

300
40
20

500
400

200

15Y correlation: 0.8

100

100

Source: CLSA, Fertecon, Bloomberg

400

300

200

0

600

500

5Y correlation: 0.5

0

700

600

0

300
5Y correlation: 0.6

200

15Y correlation: 0.8

100
0

Source: CLSA, Fertecon, Bloomberg

Asia the net ammonia importer
Ammonia price has relatively high degree of correlation with oil in the past
~15years, however the correlation gets lower in the past 5 years (some
argue) due to shale gas development and strong crop (corn) prices. Supply
disruption will also affects short-term prices.
For Asian in particular, the region consumes more than it produces; China and
India are the largest consumers in the region. From the projects in the
pipeline, the East of Suez region (East Asia, Australia) is expected to continue
to become net ammonia importers (figure 7) according to Fertecon. The
region will likely to source its shortage from the Black Sea or Trinidad Tobago.
Figure 6

Figure 7

East of Suez net ammonia trade, 2000-25

East of Suez ammonia trade balance

Source: Fertecon

Source: Fertecon

For Trinidad producers, transportation cost will add significant cost; it could
double the cost, figure 10. For the Black Sea producers, they have higher cost
structure due to gas purchase contract; put them as one of the marginal
producers. Asia net import status has put ammonia price in the Far East (East
Asia) region higher than the prices in the other regions, to close the
transportation cost arbitrage.

28 October 2014

stifanus.sulistyo@clsa.com

3

Surya Esa - BUY

Growth ammo

Figure 8

Figure 9

Asia production & consumption

Ammonia costs, 2014F

(mt)

Consumption

(US$/t)

600

Production

Supply cost

Freight cost to Far East

average

105,000
500

100,000

400

95,000

300

200

90,000

100

85,000
0
Indonesia

80,000
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

Source: Fertecon

ESSA

Ukr other
Ukr
Middle Venezuela Trinidad Middle Chn nat
Chn
Trinidad Russia via Chn anth
plant
Odessa
East low
low
East high gas based thermal
base
Yuzhnyy
coal
plant
coal
based
based

Source: Fertecon, CLSA

The bottom line, Asian producers will be among the last producers
(except for some high cost producers) to go out of the market if the
Ammonia prices weaken significantly.
Figure 10

Figure 11

Ammonia top exporters, 2013

Ammonia top importers, 2013
Latin America
5%

Europe
8%
marginal cost
producers

Latin America
26%

Russia - C IS
18%

N. America
8%

Oceania
4%

Asia
7%

Europe
26%

N. America
33%

Ukraine - C IS
7%
Africa
6%
Middle East
15%

Other C IS
0%

Oceania
0%

Other
Asia
7%

C IS
1%

India Asia
Korea 10%
- Asia
8%

Africa
6%
Middle East
1%

Taiwan - Asia
3%

Source: Fertecon, CLSA

Source: Fertecon, CLSA
Figure 12

Ammonia key trades flow, 2013 (preliminary)

Source: Fertecon

28 October 2014

stifanus.sulistyo@clsa.com

4

Surya Esa - BUY

Growth ammo

As for ESSA, it has competitive production cost compared to the Black Sea
and Trinidad producers + shielded by geographical (transport cost)
advantages to the Asia market.
On the supply side: the key developments to watch is in the American
region, where US is expected to get more ammonia supply that should lead to
reduced import, which predominantly sourced from Trinidad Tobago. This
situation eventually will force Trinidad producers to look for new market in
other regions, most likely to the Far East where it has the biggest ammonia
deficit. However, the freight rate from Trinidad to the Far East market is
almost half of the production cost alone (2013).
We kept the ammonia price assumption. Our ammonia price assumption
is quite conservative as we only assume ammonia price of US$505-495/mt in
2018-2020, lower than 2013A-14F price of US$581-545/mt and current price
of close to US$600/mt. ESSA should be able to maintain ammonia business
gross margin at +45% when ammonia prices is above US$400/t.
Figure 13

Figure 14

Ammonia price assumption, relatively conservative

Ammonia & Brent prices

700

(US$/tons)

(US$/mt)

Ammonia Price Average

1,000
643
650

y = 4.6016x + 22.26
R² = 0.795

900
800
595

600

581
545

550

700

585

580

535
505

515
495

570

560

525

495

500

600
500
400
300
200
100

450
2012 2013 14CL 15CL 16CL 17CL 18CL 19CL 20CL 21CL 22CL 23CL 24CL 25CL

Source: CLSA, Fertecon

0
0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160 (US$/bbl)

Source: CLSA, Bloomberg

Debottlenecking shifted to 4Q14
ESSA postponed its LPG plant debottlenecking process from 3Q14
(September) to 4Q14 (October-November 2014). This resulted in lower profit
in 14CL as previously we expect ESSA to be able to partially enjoy the
additional LPG capacity and higher margin in 4Q14. ESSA has just proceeded
with the debottlenecking process in late October (4th week of October 2014).
We cut 14CL volume assumption by 1% and gross margins by 3% due to
debottlenecking delay & lower LPG price assumption, while we keep the 1516CL volume assumptions. ESSA plans to finish the debottlenecking in 4-6
weeks and we assume the conservative 6 weeks production shut down.
The debottlenecking will increase the ESSA’s LPG production capacity to 170t
per day from 137 ton per day and increase the LPG segment profitability.

28 October 2014

stifanus.sulistyo@clsa.com

5

Surya Esa - BUY

Growth ammo

Figure 15

LPG segment sales volume revision due to debottlenecking delay
(US$mn)
55

LPG revenue old

LPG revenue new

LPG price old

LPG price new

(US$/mt)
1,000

50

950

45

900

40

850

35

800

30

750

25

700
650

20

14CL

15CL

16CL

17CL

18CL

Source: CLSA

All in all, we cut 14-16CL revenue and earnings by 4-11% and 8-13%,
respectively. The cut is predominantly due to change in LPG price assumption
and slight LPG volume cut for 14CL only. We maintain our forecasts for the
ammonia segment.
Figure 16

Changes summary

Revenue
Gross profit
Operating profit
Net profit
.
GP margin
Opt margin
Net margin
.
LPG price avg
Ammonia price avg
.
LPG volume
Ammonia volume

14CL
41
27
19
11

Old
15CL
53
38
29
17

16CL
124
75
60
27

14CL
37
24
18
10

New
15CL
48
34
26
15

16CL
119
71
57
25

14CL
(11%)
(9%)
(9%)
(11%)

change
15CL
(9%)
(10%)
(10%)
(13%)

16CL
(4%)
(5%)
(5%)
(8%)

65%
47%
27%

72%
54%
33%

60%
49%
22%

66%
48%
26%

71%
54%
31%

59%
48%
21%

1%
1%
0%

(1%)
(1%)
(1%)

(1%)
(1%)
(1%)

900
545

863
595

889
585

800
545

782
595

805
585

(11%)
0%

(9%)
0%

(9%)
0%

40,641
-

55,845
-

55,845
124

40,185
-

55,845
-

55,845
124

(1%)
na

0%
na

0%
0%

Source: CLSA

Energy reform derivative – reserve ammo
ESSA is one of the indirect beneficiaries of energy reform in Indonesia; we
can look at ESSA as the derivative of it. We have been talking about the need
of energy reform in Indo in our Energizers report. Indo energy trade balance
is heading towards negative territory (figure 2) if Indo doesn’t fast-track the
oil & gas production. When Indonesia increases its oil & gas production,
petrochemical producers like ESSA could benefit by getting more resources
allocation, more businesses.
Separately, on the global level, ammonia supply shortage in Asia does not
look sustainable and could lead to either demand destruction from a price
sensitive industrial sector or the stimulation of further new projects in
28 October 2014

stifanus.sulistyo@clsa.com

6

Surya Esa - BUY

Growth ammo

the region – Fertecon. Getting the supply from the Trinidad will incur
expensive transport cost and supply from Black Sea has high cost base.
From ESSA side, we see the company has what it takes to execute any
upcoming opportunities. ESSA has good track record, is run by professionals
and backed by reputable financiers; almost all of the necessary ingredients
for successful business ventures. What it needs is just more opportunities.
Indo energy sector dynamic + Asia’s ammonia shortage bode well for ESSA
longer-term outlook.
Figure 17

Figure 18

Indo Gas export value and volume

Indonesia’s total energy trade balance

Source: ESDM, Bloomberg, CLSA

Source: BP, CLSA. We define energy trade balance as net exports of oil,
gas & coal

From Energizers report:
On the energy production side, Indonesia’s energy sector (oil, gas, coal) is
not in good shape. Indonesia is at a critical point of deceleration, where the
value of net energy exports is falling quickly from 3.5% of GDP in 2010 to
0.2% in 2014. Our sector model predicts Indonesia’s energy trade surplus to
come to an end in 2017 as rising, domestic oil consumption finally outstrips
the value of gas and coal exports.
Aside from global factors affecting the prices of these commodities, there is
also a rising push for consumption from domestic industry, which is only likely
to accelerate as the country develops, as we have already outlined. Combined
with declining oil production from a mismanaged sector, these will accelerate
the fall in energy export value.

28 October 2014

stifanus.sulistyo@clsa.com

7

Surya Esa - BUY

Growth ammo

Figure 19

Indonesian energy: stock universe

Source: CLSA

New TP translate to 6x 17CL PE, 25% upside
Our SOTP valuation model suggests ESSA’s fair value at Rp4050/sh, 5% lower
than previous TP. LPG business valuation is cut by 9% on ~9% lower LPG ASP
assumption.
Figure 20

ESSA's SOTP
Valuation – DCF
LPG business
Ammonia business
SOTP
Equity value (Rpbn)
Share outstanding (bn)
Equity value / share (Rp)

US$m
187
201
387

Target price (Rp), rounding

Rpbn
2,147
2,308
4,455
4,455
1.1
4,050
4,050

Source: CLSA

Our new TP implies 16-6x 16-17CL PE and offers 25% upside.
We continue to like ESSA on the back of its solid execution track-record,
savvy management team and upcoming ammonia project. As a petrochemical
producer, we think there are upside risks in form of more projects / resources
allocation when Indonesia increases its O&G outputs. While supply is pending,
the demand is knocking through Asia ammonia supply shortage.
Figure 21

Changes summary
Old
New
change

TP
4250
4050
(5%)

14CL profit
11
10
(11%)

15CL profit
17
15
(13%)

16CL profit
27
25
(8%)

17CL profit
67
65
(3%)

Source: CLSA

28 October 2014

stifanus.sulistyo@clsa.com

8

Surya Esa - BUY

Growth ammo

We use 12% WACC to value the LPG business and 14% CoE to value the
ammonia business. Our LPG business valuation of Rp2.1tn (US$187mn)
implies 12x 15CL PE; ESSA will still makes its earnings from LPG business
only in 2015.
Figure 22

Figure 23

ESSA’s PE band

ESSA’s PB band
Surya Esa- Price to Earnings Bands

Surya Esa - Price to Book Value Bands
max4.30x

0.4

0.4
25.8x

0.4

0.4

3.60x

0.3

0.3

avg21.4x

avg2.90x

0.3
0.3

17.5x

2.19x

0.2

0.2
min13.5x

0.2
min1.49x

0.2
0.1
Jan12

0.1

May12

Sep12

Jan13

May13

Sep13

Jan14

May14

0.1
Jan12

Sep14

Source: CLSA Evalu@tor

May12

Sep12

Jan13

May13

Sep13

Jan14

May14

Sep14

Source: CLSA Evalu@tor

Source: CLSA

Source: CLSA

Figure 24

Comps
P/E
Surya Esa
PTTGC
Shanghai Petrochem
Indorama
Formosa Chem
Petronas Chemicals
Mitsubishi Chemical HC
Showa Denko
BASF
CF Industries holdings
Potash corp of Sask.
Agrium
Average

Ticker
ESSA IJ
PTTGC TB
600688 CH
IVL TB
1326 TT
PCHEM MK
4188 JP
4004 JP
BAS GR
CF US
POT US
AGU US

Market Cap 2014
297
30
8,212
9
5,199
34
3,507
27
13,113
19
14,596
14
7,135
24
1,870
27
79,798
12
12,701
13
26,987
18
12,414
15
20

2015
19
8
23
19
19
13
16
11
11
12
16
11
15

EV/EBITDA
2014 2015
15
11
7
6
20
9
11
10
16
15
7
7
9
7
8
7
7
7
7
7
10
9
9
7
10
9

GP Margin
2014
66%
9%
na
9%
6%
35%
20%
14%
26%
41%
39%
22%
26%

2015
71%
9%
na
9%
6%
36%
21%
14%
27%
42%
45%
24%
28%

EBIT Margin
2014
48%
7%
1%
4%
3%
28%
3%
4%
11%
41%
35%
8%
16%

Net Margin

2015 2014
54% 26%
7%
6%
2%
2%
4%
1%
3%
6%
28% 21%
4%
1%
4%
1%
12%
7%
40% 27%
38% 24%
10%
7%
17% 11%

2015
31%
6%
2%
1%
6%
21%
1%
1%
7%
27%
24%
7%
11%

Source: CLSA, Bloomberg

28 October 2014

stifanus.sulistyo@clsa.com

9

Surya Esa - BUY

Growth ammo

Summary financials
Year to 31 December
2012A
Summary P&L forecast (US$m)
Revenue
40
Op Ebitda
11
Op Ebit
9
Interest income
0
Interest expense
(1)
Other items
(1)
Profit before tax
7
Taxation
(2)
Minorities/Pref divs
2
Net profit
7
Summary cashflow forecast (US$m)
Operating profit
9
Operating adjustments
Depreciation/amortisation
3
Working capital changes
1
Net interest/taxes/other
(6)
Net operating cashflow
7
Capital expenditure
(7)
Free cashflow
0
Acq/inv/disposals
Int, invt & associate div
0
Net investing cashflow
(6)
Increase in loans
(15)
Dividends
0
Net equity raised/other
15
Net financing cashflow
0
Incr/(decr) in net cash
0
Exch rate movements
Opening cash
21
Closing cash
21
Summary balance sheet forecast (US$m)
Cash & equivalents
21
Debtors
5
Inventories
1
Other current assets
1
Fixed assets
25
Intangible assets
Other term assets
29
Total assets
81
Short-term debt
6
Creditors
3
Other current liabs
3
Long-term debt/CBs
16
Provisions/other LT liabs
1
Minorities/other equity
3
Shareholder funds
49
Total liabs & equity
81
Ratio analysis
Revenue growth (% YoY)
Ebitda growth (% YoY)
Ebitda margin (%)
Net profit margin (%)
Dividend payout (%)
Effective tax rate (%)
Ebitda/net int exp (x)
Net debt/equity (%)
ROE (%)
ROIC (%)
EVA®/IC (%)

29.0
18.9
0.0
27.5
16.2
1.9
15.3
11.5
(3.5)

2013A

2014CL

2015CL

2016CL

42
21
18
0
(1)
1
18
(5)
1
13

37
21
18
1
(4)
0
14
(5)
0
10

48
29
26
0
(6)
0
20
(5)
0
15

119
72
57
1
(23)
0
35
(9)
(1)
25

18
3
(2)
(5)
14
(19)
(5)
0
(19)
(6)
0
26
19
15
21
36

18
3
0
(8)
13
(138)
(125)
1
(137)
43
0
58
101
(23)
36
13

26
4
(1)
(11)
17
(324)
(307)
0
(324)
305
0
40
345
38
13
51

57
15
(8)
(32)
33
(252)
(220)
1
(252)
203
0
0
203
(16)
51
34

36
6
1
2
42
32
118
6
2
5
14
1
2
88
118

13
5
1
2
176
32
228
1
2
5
62
1
60
97
228

51
6
1
2
497
32
589
1
3
5
367
1
100
113
589

34
16
3
2
734
32
822
1
7
5
570
1
101
137
822

6.9
87.0
50.7
31.4
0.0
30.3
22.4
(17.7)
19.4
20.0
5.0

(12.5)
(2.0)
56.8
26.5
0.0
32.0
6.1
31.9
10.6
8.5
(6.5)

31.1
40.3
60.8
31.4
0.0
25.0
5.0
149.4
14.5
5.3
(9.7)

146.1
145.1
60.6
20.7
0.0
25.0
3.3
224.7
19.8
6.6
(8.4)

Source: CLSA

28 October 2014

stifanus.sulistyo@clsa.com

10

Surya Esa - BUY

Growth ammo

Companies mentioned
Surya Esa (ESSA IJ - RP3,250 - BUY)

Stock price (Rp)

Recommendation history of Surya Esa Perkasa Tbk ESSA IJ
Stifanus Sulistyo
Other analysts
No coverage

BUY
U-PF
N-R

O-PF
SELL

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000
May 12
Date
09 Sep 2014

Sep 12

Rec
BUY

Jan 13 May 13 Sep 13
Target
4,250.00

Date

Jan 14 May 14
Rec

Sep 14
Target

Source: CLSA

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28 October 2014

stifanus.sulistyo@clsa.com

11