Manajemen | Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji 2004 3
UNION BIRTH, GROWTH AND
DEATH: THE IMPACT OF THE STATE,
MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNITY AT THE
LITHGOW IRONWORKS, 1900–1914
GREG PATMORE*
A
ustralian trade union membership grew dramatically from 1900 to 1914. While
there is recognition that compulsory arbitration played an important role, there
are a range of factors that may explain the growth. There is also a focus in this debate
on unions that grew rather than those that collapsed and a neglect of the workplace in
the debate. Through an analysis of the Lithgow Ironworks this paper hopes to broaden
the debate about union growth. It attempts to explain why iron and steel unionism
arose, briefly collapsed and re-organised at the Ironworks and it focuses on the state,
management and community or locality as explanatory factors.
INTRODUCTION
While Australian trade union membership grew dramatically in the period from
1900 to 1914, there were examples of unions that did not survive in this favourable
climate. Writers concerned with explaining this growth have overlooked examples
of union decline and demise in this period. Although the introduction of
compulsory arbitration might have played an important role, qualitative and
quantitative studies have highlighted a range of factors that may explain the
growth and provide insights into why some unions did not survive. Writers also
tend to focus on the industry, state and national level rather than the level of the
workplace (Bain & Elsheikh 1976: 94–100; Cooper 1996; Markey 1989: 171–2;
Patmore 1991: 120–1, 122–6; Sheldon 1995).
Through an analysis of unionism at the Lithgow Ironworks this paper hopes
to broaden the debate about union growth in this particular period, and in
general. Federal and state governments saw iron and steel as crucial to national
development and provided assistance through tariffs and bonuses. The Lithgow
plant had operated since 1876, but underwent major capital investment during
this period. The Lithgow workers unionised in September 1902 (Patmore 1999;
62–4).1 Despite the presence of compulsory arbitration legislation the plant-based
union collapsed and workers ultimately joined a union with national coverage.
The difficulties of the plant union indicate that compulsory arbitration is an
* Work and Organisational Studies, School of Business, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia.
Email: g.patmore@econ.usyd.edu.au
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insufficient explanation for the growth of the Australian trade union movement
from 1900 to 1914 and highlight a need to look for other explanatory factors.
The paper presented here begins with an evaluation of the literature concerning
trade union membership data and trade union growth. Problems with data on
union membership lead to a qualitative rather than quantitative approach. While
the union growth literature suggests a range of variables that may explain
the experience at Lithgow, this paper examines three factors suggested by
the surviving archival sources. These factors are the state, management and
community or locality. The paper then provides a narrative history of labour
organisation at the Lithgow Ironworks. It finally analyses the impact of the
state, management and community or locality on iron and steel unionism at
the plant.
DATA
AND CONCEPTS
Trade union growth models are only as good as the data on which they are based.
Trade union density, which is the number of union members as a percentage of
the number of potential members, is the dependent variable in these models.
There are two main ways of producing statistics for union membership. One is
to obtain estimates from trade union officials. These estimates tend to be inflated
by the inclusion of multiple job holders, the unemployed, retired and unfinancials.
There are also doubts that the management information systems of unions
can provide accurate data due to insufficient resources or minimal interest. Unions
may inflate membership to gain greater representation on union peak councils
or to create an impression of strength. They may understate membership to
reduce affiliation fees. The other way to provide data on union membership
is through general surveys of employees. While surveys are viewed as the
more accurate method of data collection, errors can arise if the interviewers
fail to obtain union status from the retired or unemployed. Defining potential
union membership is also difficult. Are employers, the self-employed, the retired
and the unemployed to be considered potential union members? Researchers
rely on uncertain labour force data to provide a measure of potential union
membership (Bain & Price 1980: 6–9; Chaison & Rose 1991: 6–8; Patmore 1992:
225–6; Plowman 1983: 524; Western 1997: 96).
Trade union density data, whether based on trade union reports or on surveys,
pose problems for the case study examined in this research. The collection and
publication of trade union statistics in Australia was haphazard before the First
World War. In Australia, statistics are available from 1891 but they are not totally
satisfactory because they relate only to those unions registered with the Colonial
and State Registrars of Trade Unions and Friendly Societies. Reliable national
figures began in 1912 with the publication of the annual Labour Report. The
Australian Bureau of Statistics did not conduct the first employee surveys for trade
union membership until 1976. For Australia, the labour force data at both the
national and state levels available from 1911 up to the Second World War were
based only on the almost decennial census (Bain & Price 1980: ch. 4–5).
There are particular problems with trade union density when undertaking
research at the enterprise level. Trade union statistics focus on the national, state
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or industry levels. Official statistics are not kept for individual workplaces,
towns or regions. Although contemporary researchers may be able to undertake
surveys at these levels, this option is not available to the historian. Union archives
may provide data for particular branches of the union, but it is unlikely that
workplace membership data would have been collected or retained. It is
more likely that these figures will survive if the union branch corresponded
to the workplace or if a particular union only had members in one workplace
(Bain & Price 1980: 3; Martin et al. 1996: 19–20).
While the absence of detailed data on union membership can prevent quantitative analysis, there are still sufficient documents available to undertake a qualitative study of a workplace. These sources include local newspapers, company
records and government archives. They indicate the general trends in union
membership and highlight variables that may be significant in explaining the
varying fortunes of organised labour in a particular plant.
A range of factors can explain variations in trade union membership. Some
relate to macroeconomic variables, such as the level of unemployment. There
are structural explanations. The shift in employment away from highly unionised
manual sectors, such as manufacturing, towards the poorly organised services
sector. The increase in forms of ‘precarious’ employment, such as external
contracting and casual labour, has hampered union efforts to recruit new
members. Researchers, whether using econometric or non-econometric
techniques, disagree over the relative importance of these variables. Chaison
and Rose (1991: 36), in their review of the macro-determinants of union
growth and density, conclude that structural shifts in employment and public
opinion are not primary determinants of union growth at a national level and
contribute little to an understanding of international trends. They found that
public policy and employer opposition to unionism were important factors in
understanding national differences, but recognised that the lines of causation
between the two were unclear.
While a range of variables are cited to explain shifts in trade union membership, surviving archival sources suggest three factors that may help to explain the
levels of unionism in the Lithgow Ironworks: the state; management; and the
community or locality.
There has been a long-standing recognition that a sympathetic state may
provide a favourable climate for union formation and growth. The state is a ‘locus
of power’ which includes a range of institutions such as parliament, statutory
authorities, the police, the courts and the military (Garton & McCallum 1996:
117). Western (1997: 66–93, 114, 119–120) claims that the presence of working
class political parties in government had a positive impact on union organisation
from 1950 to 1990 in 18 capitalist countries. As Bain and Elsheikh (1976: 41)
have noted, however, there is a circular argument: union growth is explained by
a sympathetic government; a sympathetic government is explained by union
growth.
Industrial relations scholars have attached importance to particular labor
legislation as playing a crucial role in promoting union growth. Howard (1977)
developed the ‘dependency thesis’ of Australian unions, arguing that they were
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in many ways a product of the system of compulsory arbitration. Some historians
have supported this thesis by claiming that compulsory arbitration and wages
boards made a major contribution to the growth of Australian trade unions
between 1900 and 1914. Econometric models of Australian trade union growth
incorporate a dummy variable, which has a value of one in a specified period and
zero at other times, for compulsory arbitration to account partially for union
growth between 1907 and 1913. Compulsory arbitration required workers to form
unions to bring grievances before industrial tribunals. The registered unions
gained corporate status and monopoly over organisation in certain industries.
There were provisions for a common rule and preference to unionists (Bain &
Elsheikh 1976: 40–2; Patmore 1991: 120–1). Even though there was no provision
for unionism in the wages board system, some labour historians such as Sutcliffe
(1920: 142) have argued that unions grew because workers cooperated to lobby
for wages boards, elect representatives, ensure uniform arguments and watch for
breaches of awards.
There have been criticisms of the emphasis on compulsory arbitration as
an explanation for Australian trade union growth between 1900 and 1914.
Arbitration was not a single entity as it varied from state to state and even
within states over time in this period. NSW unions perceived the 1908 Industrial
Disputes Act as more hostile to their interests than the original 1901 compulsory
arbitration legislation. The Australian Workers’ Union and other unions wanted
the federal court strengthened to ensure uniform national working conditions,
escape inadequate state jurisdictions and benefit from the favourable decisions
of Mr Justice Higgins, especially after the Harvester Judgement of 1907 (Patmore
1991: 82, 111). The various econometric studies provide an ad hoc estimate of
the impact of arbitration and do not explain the relationship between union
growth and arbitration. There is also evidence that some unions collapsed under
the strain of the costs associated with arbitration, while registration did not
protect unionists from employer victimisation (Cooper 1996: 57–9; Sheldon
1993: 385). Cooper has correctly criticised the ‘dependency thesis’ for ignoring
‘the agency of trade unionist activists in building working class organisation’ and
seeing ‘unions instead as mere products of their environment’ (1996: 62).
Critics have argued that other factors, such as the economy and favourable
public opinion, provide more significant explanations for union growth in this
period. Following the severe depression in the 1890s, there was a brief return to
prosperity during 1900–1. However, drought prolonged the stagnation of
the economy until 1906. After this there was strong economic growth, which
culminated in a boom between 1909 and 1913. In the metals and engineering
component of manufacturing, employment doubled between 1905 and 1913
(Markey 1994: 66; Patmore 1991: 141–2). Given the favourable economic
climate, union membership would have probably grown anyway without
arbitration. Indeed, Sheldon (1998) argues that union activism in a favourable
economic climate rather than arbitration underlayed recruitment for four
maritime-related unions in NSW from 1900 to 1912.
Markey (2002: 37–8) takes a more long-term approach by viewing the 1890s
as a ‘brief aberration’ in the process of unionisation that began in the 1880s
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without the benefit of arbitration. He notes that unions operated in a climate
of ‘public sympathy and social conscience’ in the early 1900s, which created a
political climate that removed state impediments to unionism and encouraged
union growth. Markey also draws parallels with the United States in the 1930s
and the introduction of the Wagner Act.
This public sympathy came from several sources. The hardship of the 1890s
depression and the significant conflicts between labour and capital during the
early 1890s fuelled disillusionment with the market economy and calls for greater
state intervention to redress injustices. A group of liberals played an important
role in this push for reform. This group included Alfred Deakin, Charles Cameron
Kingston, Bernhard Ringrose Wise and Henry Bournes Higgins. They were
lawyers who rejected the traditional liberal view that the role of the state should
be restricted to maximise the freedom of the individual. These liberals believed
the state could facilitate individual freedom by removing the social and economic
restrictions on it. They also emphasised the ‘community’ as the overriding
social entity, which parliament should protect from the conflicts between
labour and capital. The liberals did not seek to end the existing capitalist wage
relationship, but wanted to eliminate abuses of that relationship. The major
role already played by the state in Australian economic development and labour
discipline assisted the liberals’ call for state intervention in labour relations.
This public sympathy underlay compulsory arbitration and the broader notion
of ‘New Protection’, which linked tariff protection to ‘fair’ wages (Patmore 1991:
101–102, 115).
The attitudes and behaviour of employers towards unions are crucial factors
in assisting or hindering trade union growth. Employer attitudes to unions can
be influenced by ideology, the economic climate and the legal environment. In
recent years, the spread of free market ideologies that view unions as impediments
to the successful operation of the labour market have intensified employer’s antiunion activities. Employers can weaken trade unionism through either peaceful
competition or forcible opposition. The tactics of peaceful competition include
offering better wages than the union standard during a union recruitment
campaign, establishing elaborate grievance procedures that exclude unions and
encouraging company unions. Forcible opposition includes the victimisation
of union activists and discrimination against union members in promotion and
pay rises. Employers may also engage in repression to contain the possibility of
collective action through the use of measures such as blacklists. They may also
defy the law. During the past 30 years US employers have shown an increasing
willingness to thwart National Labor Relations Board elections by dismissing
trade union activists (Bain 1970: 131–5; Chaison & Rose 1991: 22–4; Freeman
1986: 60–2; Kelly 1998: 56–8; Peetz 1998: 13–15).
The community or local context of the workplace can also have an impact on
unionism. Industrial sociologists, labour historians and economic geographers
have recognised that the incidence of both industrial action and trade unionism
have a spatial dimension. There have been major disagreements as to the
patterns. Kerr and Siegel (1954) developed a crude ‘isolated mass’ hypothesis
whereby workers in isolated and close-knit communities were more likely to strike
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than workers in cosmopolitan urban centres. Shorter and Tilly (1974: 238) argued
from their study of strikes in France between 1915 and 1935 that that labour
agitation was more likely to occur in large diverse cities than in small oneindustry towns because workers lived in communities that acquired ‘habits of
joint action’. Stromquist (1987) attempted to show that there were differences
in response to strikes among the smaller communities. His study of the high level
of industrial conflict on the United States railways during the last decades of
the 19th century distinguished between ‘market cities’ and ‘railway towns’. He
examined Burlington, Iowa, as an example of the former, and Creston, Iowa, as
an example of the latter. Burlington preceded railway development and had a
broad economic base. Burlington’s elite identified closely with the railway
company and its prosperity grew as the railway expanded. Railway workers
were dispersed within a larger community and received minimal community
support in industrial disputes. Creston relied on the railway for its existence. The
town’s elite were retailers, whose prosperity depended on the railway’s freight
rates. They were concerned by the company’s monopoly power and sympathised
with striking workers, who formed a sizeable group in the town and had considerable purchasing power. While these basic typologies may be useful for discussion
purposes, they overlook evidence that strike action varies among similar types of
communities due to differing traditions. Also, ‘community’ as a social construction
varies over time and overlooks internal divisions and exclusions (Martin et al. 1996:
146–51; Patmore 1994).
The workers’ geographic location, the operation of local labour markets
and the local industrial/political traditions can lead to variations in industrial
behaviour in specific locations, even where there is the same employer, labour
processes, industrial agreement and trade union. Differences in the industrial
employment structure between localities are not sufficient to explain spatial
differences in strike rates. In areas where there has been a long history of
union organisation, a tradition of ‘union culture’ may develop that assists labour
organisation and encourages a greater acceptance of unions by local employers.
While it should not be assumed that union culture remains unchanged over time
or is locally homogeneous (Herod 1998; 24–8; Martin et al. 1993: 55; Martin
et al. 1996: 141–51; Wills 1996), locally based traditions, once established, ‘can
exhibit a high degree of socio-institutional persistence over time, and, at the very
least, influence the nature of subsequent changes and developments’ (Martin,
Sunley and Wills, 1996: 16). The spatial organisation of classes in a particular
location can also have an impact. Where workers and their employers live in
close proximity there may be a greater probability of class alliances or
‘labour-community coalitions’ in dealing with external threats or opportunities
(Patmore 1997).
Ellem and Shields (1999: 537), however, note that there may be a number of
spatial levels, such as workplace, local, regional and national, which interrelate
and are not distinct. The locality is not completely isolated from the broader
political and economic context and the external environment may have a
significant impact. While there is sympathy for organised labour in particular
locations, there maybe little sympathy at the regional or national level. Anti-union
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legislation may allow a belligerent employer to defeat organised labour despite
local community sympathy (Patmore 2000: 54).
The paper presented here will now examine the impact of the state, employers
and the community on unionism in the iron and steel plants at Lithgow.
The state, particularly through Labor governments, and the community had
a positive impact on Lithgow plant unionism. The benefits of compulsory
arbitration appear exaggerated. Lithgow management was not hostile to trade
unionism before 1907 and the climate changed with the purchase of the plant
by the Hoskins family.
OVERVIEW
OF THE IRON AND STEEL PLANT AT
LITHGOW, 1900–1914
The iron and steel industry was operating in the Lithgow valley before 1900 but
it had a volatile history. Coal and the demand of the NSW Government Railways
for iron rails had prompted a group of non-resident entrepreneurs to establish
a blast furnace at Lithgow in 1876. However, cheaper imports, high freight
charges and poor quality iron ore contributed to financial difficulties and the
owners demolished the blast furnace in 1884. The owners initially leased the
ironworks to a worker cooperative, which re-rolled rails, and in 1887 transferred
the lease to William Sandford. He had experience managing ironworks in the
United Kingdom and had come to Australia in 1883 to manage a wire-netting
plant for John Lysaght in Melbourne. In 1892, Sandford bought the Ironworks
and by 1898 the Lithgow plant employed approximately 200 workers (Patmore
1999: 62).2
From 1900 to 1914 the Lithgow Ironworks underwent major capital investment. Sandford installed a steel furnace in 1900 and re-established a blast furnace
in 1907 on the basis of a guaranteed NSW government contract for steel rails.
The capital investment in the new blast furnace overextended Sandford’s finances
and the Commercial Bank of Sydney foreclosed on him in December 1907.
G & C Hoskins Ltd, which manufactured iron pipes in Sydney and was a
Table 1
Lithgow bonuses and economic performance, 1908–1914
Year ending
November
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
Federal government
bonus (£)
Profit/loss
(£, includes bonus)
N/A
N/A
28 542
*
19 016
28 147
47 708
-8074
-693
+1676
*
-6943
+20 266
+46 452
*Data not available.
Source: BHP Billiton Archives D168/S037/002: Minutes AGM, G & C Hoskins, dated 14/03/1910;
10/03/1911; 27/08/1913; 03/09/1914; and 28/07/1915.
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major customer of the Lithgow Ironworks, purchased the plant. The Hoskins
family benefited from the NSW government contract for rails. They also gained
from the federal government bounties introduced for steel production in 1909.
As shown in Table 1, the Lithgow plant, with the assistance of the bonuses and
a booming economy, shifted from losses in 1909 to profits by 1914. The adverse
result in 1912 arose from the impact of a prolonged strike and the cancellation
of the NSW government contract for rails on the grounds of price and the substitution of inferior imported German steel. The improving financial position led
Hoskins to complete a second blast furnace in 1913. The expansion of the iron
and steel works resulted in a dramatic growth in employment and contributed
to Lithgow’s overall population growth. By 1911 the total number of employees
at the plant was 1052. The town’s population increased from 5268 in 1901 to
8196 in 1911 (Jack & Cremin 1994: 114–5; Patmore 1999: 62–3).
The Lithgow Ironworks workforce ranged from unskilled labourers to craft
workers. While there were sufficient supplies of unskilled labour locally by the
early 20th century, Lithgow management found it necessary to recruit overseas
to obtain specific ironworking and steel manufacturing skills. In 1900 Sandford
directly recruited two Welsh furnacemen to operate his new steel furnace.
Between 1905 and 1910 Sandford and Hoskins imported under contract 37 British
iron and steelworkers, including blast furnacemen, puddlers and sheet rollers to
provide the skills needed for the expansion of the Lithgow plant. There were
also skilled tradesmen such as fitters and blacksmiths. They tended to remain
members of their own specific unions and formed local branches when there
were sufficient numbers. In June 1906, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers
formed a Lithgow branch, which had members employed at the Ironworks. The
re-establishment of the blast furnace created another dimension to the workforce.
These workers held a strategic position in the production process as the blast
furnace required continuous operation to avoid considerable expenditure on
repairs. Their separate identity from the other ironworkers was reinforced by
the blast furnace site being 1 km from the rest of the ironworks (Patmore 2000:
60, 62)3. As will be seen later, blast furnace workers were active in establishing
unions at the Lithgow plant.
Table 2
Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association membership, 1903–1909
Year
Union
membership
Employment
Union
density (%)
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
102
107
107
142
241
357
282
340
309
351
490
835
632
950
30
35
30
29
29
56
30
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As Markey (2002: 37) notes generally, unionisation commenced at the
Lithgow Ironworks in the 1880s and was disrupted by the 1890s depression. There
was a strong tradition of unionism at the plant. The first Eskbank Ironworkers’
Association had been formed in 1882 and was revived on several subsequent occasions before the early 1900s. The Eskbank Ironworkers saw tariff protection as
a way to preserve their jobs. As early as July 1885, the union participated in a
Sydney conference organised by the NSW Land and Industrial Alliance, which
promoted protectionism. The financial problems of the plant hindered the
continuity of union organisation. By the start of 1893 approximately two-thirds
of the Lithgow Ironworks employees were unemployed and those still with jobs
faced a one-third wage-cut during that year. Employment prospects at the
Lithgow Ironworks were so poor that some ironworkers migrated to New Zealand
to establish a short-lived cooperative at the Onehunga Ironworks near Auckland.
The union had again collapsed by early 1894 and did not revive for another
8 years. Unfortunately no records of these early unions survived. However,
according the records relating to the union’s affiliation with the Sydney Trades
and Labour Council, the number of financial members was only 33 in July 1891,
42 in January 1892 and 25 in July 1892. This would indicate on the basis of
surviving employment data a minimum union density varying between 16 and
28 per cent (Patmore 2000: 62; Patmore 2001: 187).4
There were two phases of trade unionism at Lithgow between 1902 and the
outbreak of World War I. From 1902 to 1910 the most significant union was the
Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association, which changed its name in March 1909 to
the Eskbank Iron and Steel Workers’ Association. This union covered only the
Lithgow plant and membership figures (Table 2) are derived from its returns to
the NSW Registrar of Trade Unions and Friendly Societies for the period from
1903 to 1909. There is a series of employment data available for the plant from
1903 to 1908, which are derived from the Annual Reports of the NSW
Department of Mines. However, it is difficult to construct union density data
because of inconsistencies. The employment data are expressed as an annual
average, while the trade union membership data are shown for 31 December
of the particular year. The employment data may include the Lithgow Ironworks
Colliery, which was covered by the Western Miners’ Union, and employment
data are adjusted where this is explicitly stated. A 1909 employment figure is
derived from a company return to the Commonwealth Collector of Customs
(Patmore 1999: 63–4).
Mill and forge workers at the Lithgow Ironworks reformed the Eskbank
Ironworkers’ Association on 13 September 1902. While the desire to obtain access
to the fledgling arbitration system was a major motivation for the re-formation
of the union, its members continued with the pre-Depression concern of tariff
protection for the industry. They wanted to gain the broader support of the labour
movement for a federal bonus bill. The union won the support of the Lithgow
Municipal Council in February 1904 for a joint approach to the Prime Minister
to have a bonus on iron production. The union obtained management recognition. It fought wage reductions in 1903 and negotiated an agreement with
Sandford. While the agreement upheld his wage reductions, it provided for a
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joint union/management conciliation board to handle grievances, a sliding scale
linking wages to product prices and preference to unionists. In June 1904, the
union obtained the intervention of the NSW Arbitration Court when it ratified
the agreement as an award and provided penalties for breaches. Although there
appears to be an increase in union density in 1904, the award and preference to
unionists did not provide any permanent basis for growth before 1908 (Patmore
2000: 62).5
The Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association experienced unprecedented growth
during 1908 before its eventual collapse by the end of 1910. The success was set
against the efforts by Hoskins to make the plant solvent. Worker discontent
increased as Hoskins restructured work to reduce labour costs and challenged
established customs such as smoking at work. Between March 1908 and April
1909 there were four disputes over wages and work organisation. To increase
industrial strength the union began actively recruiting workers at the blast
furnace in January 1908. The blast furnace workers had previously attempted to
form their own union in October 1907. The Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association
refused to accept wage cuts and Hoskins initiated a lockout on 9 July 1908.
Full production, with the exception of the bolt shop, did not recommence
until 4 November 1908. The union successfully applied for a wages board under
the NSW Industrial Disputes Act, which consisted of a judge as chair and an
equal number of employee and employer representatives from the Lithgow
Ironworks. It obtained a disappointing outcome in March 1909. The award upheld
some of Hoskins’s wages cuts and his preference for time-based rates rather than
tonnage rates. The award did retain a preference to unionists clause, but this did
not prevent a serious decline in membership in 1909. The union was moribund
by the end of 1910 despite an attempt by the Sydney NSW Iron Trades Council
to revive it in September (Johnston-Liik et al. 1998: 120–8; Patmore 1999: 63;
Patmore 2001: 196).6
The second phase of unionism at the Lithgow plant had commenced by at
least August 1910 when workers at the blast furnace again formed their own Blast
Furnace Workers’ Association. This union, which had only 92 members, decided
in January 1911 to expand its coverage of the union by affiliating with the
nationally organised Federated Ironworkers’ Association (FIA), thereby gaining
access to federal arbitration rather than registering under the unpopular NSW
Industrial Disputes Act. The union began actively recruiting other Lithgow ironworkers. This organising ensured the success of the union in the longest dispute
in the history of the Lithgow Valley, which occurred at the Lithgow Ironworks
from July 1911 to April 1912. It arose from the victimisation of a union delegate
at the Lithgow Ironworks Tunnel Colliery. The strike settlement forced
Hoskins to reinstate the dismissed delegate. Unfortunately, there is no data
series available for union membership at the Lithgow Ironworks after 1909
(Patmore 1999: 64–74).7
Overall, the Lithgow iron and steel workers were unionised from 1902 to 1914
with the exception of a brief period. The next three sections of this paper will
look at factors that may help explain the Lithgow experience. These are the state,
management and the local community context.
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OF THE STATE
While during this period both the federal and NSW governments in Australia
introduced compulsory arbitration legislation to regulate industrial relations, it
brought mixed blessings for the Lithgow Ironworks workers. The Australian
legislation in principle assisted unionisation by assuming that workers would
prefer union representation. The 1901 NSW Arbitration allowed registered
industrial unions to unilaterally bring employers on any ‘industrial dispute’ or
‘industrial matter’ before a Court of Arbitration. Registered unions gained
corporate status and some security against rival unions trying to organise the
same workers. The legally enforceable award of the Court could prescribe a
minimum rate of wages and preference to unionists. There was also provision
for industrial agreements between unions and employers which could have the
same effect as a Court award. Bernhard Ringrose Wise, the NSW AttorneyGeneral and architect of the Act, hoped that compulsory arbitration would
stimulate and supplement collective bargaining rather than replace it. The
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1904, which applied to
interstate industrial disputes, similarly provided for union registration and
preference to unionists (Patmore 1991: 109–110, 115, 125).
The conservative Wade Liberal Reform Government in NSW replaced the
expiring 1901 legislation in 1908 with the Industrial Disputes Act. The new law
provided for wages boards consisting of a chairman from outside the industry
and an equal number of employee and employer representatives drawn from
industry. There was an Industrial Court which was presided over by a Supreme
or District Court judge. It could recommend to the Minister for Labour the
constitution of wages boards and act as a court of final appeal for their decisions.
This legislation created an outcry within the NSW trade union movement.
Unionists criticised its extensive penal powers for enforcing awards and preventing
strikes. They also condemned the legislation for undermining trade unionism,
since it allowed associations of at least 20 workers, as well as registered industrial
unions, to apply for wages boards. The Labor Council of NSW tried unsuccessfully to enforce a boycott of the legislation because unions rushed to the Court
to prevent rivals obtaining exclusive representation on wages boards and awards
(Patmore 1991: 111).
The arbitration Acts clearly influenced both the formation and shape of
unionism at the Lithgow Ironworks. Access to the NSW arbitration system
was one of the major motivations underlying the formation of the Eskbank
Ironworkers’ Association in October 1902. The Blast Furnace Workers’
Association’s decision in January 1911 to affiliate with the FIA was prompted by
a desire to gain access to federal arbitration rather than registering under the
unpopular NSW Industrial Disputes Act. There is, however, no evidence that the
Lithgow plant unions used the preference to unionists’ clause in their awards to
promote membership. The 1904 and 1909 awards were also associated with
decline in union membership. These awards may have contributed to worker
disillusionment with arbitration as a union strategy. Both awards upheld wage
cuts by employers and the 1909 award supported Hoskins’s preference for time-
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based rates. Registration within the industrial arbitration system and preference
to unionists in the 1909 award did not prevent the collapse of the Eskbank
Ironworkers’ Association in 1910. Through arbitration the state did not assist
union survival but appears to have aided union decline and collapse.8
The Lithgow workers benefited from a sympathetic political climate after
1910 with both federal and NSW Labor governments. The Labor Party gained
control of Lithgow Municipal Council for the first time on 28 January 1911,
winning eight of 12 seats. An important part of Labor Party policy was the
nationalisation of monopolies such as the Lithgow Ironworks. During the
1911–12 Lithgow Ironworks strike the Lithgow Council was generally
sympathetic to the strikers, authorising a public meeting in Lithgow Park and
inspecting strike-breakers’ barracks for breaches of health and housing regulations.
The federal and state Labor governments intervened in the strike to Hoskins’s
detriment (Patmore 1999: 64–6, 70). From the outset, Labor parliamentarians
criticised Hoskins, the NSW Minister for Labor and Industry alleging that he
‘must accept responsibility for this trouble’.9 Hoskins further angered the
Labor Party by sending a telegram of support to the NSW Leader of the
Opposition during a political crisis, when the Labor Party lost its narrow
majority in the Legislative Assembly in late July. The NSW Labor Government
failed to resolve the dispute through the establishment of a special wages
board and the direct intervention of Premier McGowen and Labor Ministers.
Hoskins refused to meet the strikers’ demand that all strike-breakers be removed
(Patmore 1999: 69).
The federal and state Labor governments moved against Hoskins. On
30 September 1911, the NSW Attorney-General released John Dixon, the
secretary of the Lithgow Branch of the FIA, after 11 days in Darlinghurst goal.
He had been sentenced to 2 months hard labour by the Industrial Court for
breaching the anti-strike provisions of the 1908 Industrial Disputes Act. The NSW
Government also set up a Royal Commission to investigate whether Hoskins’s
government contracts were in the public interest and to explore the future
prospects of the NSW iron and steel industry. Hoskins criticised the closed
hearings of the Commission and walked out of the inquiry in protest at its
procedures. The Royal Commission found that Hoskins had breached the government contracts by substituting German steel for steel made from Australian iron
ore and the NSW Government cancelled his contracts on 29 November 1911.
The Federal Labor Government also embarrassed Hoskins by investigating his
pig iron bonus claims and temporarily suspended the bonus after concluding that
he unlawfully had obtained approximately £10 252 in bonus. Charles Hoskins
came to believe that the federal and state governments were trying to destroy
his firm (Patmore 1999: 68–9).
MANAGEMENT
Management was sympathetic to trade unions at the Lithgow plant before 1908.
William Sandford and William Thornley (who joined the firm from the NSW
Government Railways in April 1902 and became general manager in December
1902) were willing to recognise the Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association. There
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is no evidence that they victimised union activists. Sandford’s tolerance of
the union continued despite his concern over the financial viability of the
plant, particularly the construction of a new blast furnace, and his belief that
his workers’ wages were too high to survive import competition. Sandford
was aware of the growing power of the Labor Party, which he hoped would
nationalise the plant and introduce protection to ease his financial worries.
Thornley was a long-standing member of the Amalgamated Society of
Engineers and had informed Sandford upon his appointment that he was a
‘trade unionist’.10
Hoskins, who purchased the bankrupt Lithgow plant in December 1907,
disliked unions and compulsory arbitration. He was an ‘advocate of the open
shop, non-union labour and day-wages’ (Wills 1948: 62). Hoskins was hostile to
the Labor Party and its policy of nationalising monopolies such as the Lithgow
Ironworks. The resignation of Thornley as general manager in April 1908
further reduced the sympathy of the Lithgow plant management for unionism.
As noted previously, Charles Hoskins’s efforts to make the Lithgow plant
solvent increased worker discontent and contributed to the growth of the
Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association in 1908. His lockout in July 1908 failed to
defeat the union and led to a fine from the NSW Industrial Court (Patmore 1999:
63, 66–8). 11
Unable to defeat unionism in the public arena, Hoskins intensified his
victimisation of union activists. He contributed to the collapse of the Eskbank
Ironworkers’ Association by harassing unionists such as Herbert Bladon
senior. Bladon had been head roller at the Lithgow Ironworks for about 14 years,
served as treasurer of the union and was the worker representative on the
wages board. Hoskins believed that Bladon’s mill was over-staffed and threatened
Bladon repeatedly with dismissal if he did not keep his mill tidy. Bladon resigned
from the Ironworks in August 1908, but remained employee representative on
the wages board until he left Lithgow in April 1909. Hoskins also attempted to
weaken the fledgling Lithgow branch of the FIA by refusing to re-employ the
branch secretary and denying him entry to the plant after a strike at the blast
furnace in February 1911. Several other strikers were denied re-employment.
Hoskins’s dismissal of a union delegate from the Lithgow Ironworks Tunnel
Colliery for attending Western Miners’ Union meeting led to the 1911–12
Lithgow Ironworks strike. During this strike, Hoskins did not discourage
strike-breakers from forming their own union, which briefly obtained registration under the NSW Trade Union Act. There are no recorded incidents of
victimisation after the strike (Johnston-Liik et al. 1998: 123; Patmore 1999:
66–8, 72).12
The Lithgow branch of the FIA survived the strike and Hoskins had to
continue to deal with a state Labor Government before the First World War.
Indeed, despite his opposition to nationalisation, he approached the NSW Labor
Government following its re-election in December 1913 to propose the sale of
his Lithgow Ironworks. He depended on federal subsidies for his profits and
his domestic monopoly was being challenged through the construction of the
Newcastle steelworks by BHP (Patmore 1999: 72).
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CONTEXT
The Lithgow iron and steel workers enjoyed a supportive community environment. Resistance by landowners at the western end of the Lithgow Valley to the
‘unwarranted expansion’ of Lithgow reduced the availability of land for housing
in the town. The local elite could not obtain large plots of land and had to live
in close proximity to the workers. There was no pre-industrial elite because the
town developed from industrialisation. The town’s business and social elite were
concerned with its narrow economic base and the fragility of local industries.
They supported the idea that Lithgow would become the ‘Birmingham of
Australia’. Lithgow had the potential to become a major manufacturing centre
with a significantly larger population. Economic growth would benefit the town’s
businesses, increase revenue for the Lithgow Council and improve job security.
There was a long tradition of unionism in the Lithgow Valley. Coalminers formed
their first lodge in 1875. As noted previously, the first Eskbank Ironworkers’
Association had been formed in 1882. This tradition encouraged the local elite
to work with trade union leaders in coalitions to promote the town and be sympathetic to workers’ grievances. During the first decade of the 20th century the
8-hour day holiday procession became an important part of the social life in
Lithgow with local businesses joining the celebration of labour’s achievements.
This union tradition in Lithgow provided a favourable climate for labour organisation (Patmore 2000: 56, 62, 66).
The business elite and labour leaders particularly focussed on the iron and
steel industry to promote economic prosperity. In February 1904, Lithgow
Council agreed to cooperate with the Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association in an
approach to the Prime Minister to have a bonus on iron production. When
the Commercial Banking Company foreclosed on Sandford’s mortgage and
retrenched most of his workers in December 1907, the Lithgow Council,
the Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association and Lithgow Progress Association
participated in a public meeting and organised a deputation to the Premier
(Patmore 2000: 66).
The gap between Hoskins and the local community can be seen in their
respective responses to the failure of federal parliament to pass the Bonus Bill
in June 1908. Hoskins proposed reductions in wages until the Bill was passed
and threatened to shut the blast furnaces and steel furnaces if his employees did
not accept the cuts. He latter modified his position by allowing the reductions
to be refunded if the Bill was passed. The Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association
refused to accept these terms and blamed Hoskins for not being active enough
in ensuring the passage of the legislation. A ballot of employees also rejected the
wage cuts. Hoskins’ subsequent lockout lasted from 9 July 1908 to 4 November
1908 (Patmore 2001: 196).
The Eskbank Ironworkers pursued the passage of the Bill by forming an alliance
with the local business community. James Ryan, the editor of the Lithgow Mercury,
was sympathetic with their fight against wage cuts and feared that the lockout
would become a permanent closure. Retailers were also made aware of their
dependence on the Ironworks through the loss of worker income and expenditure
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during the dispute. With the re-introduction of the Bonus Bill into federal
parliament in September 1908, the Mayor of Lithgow called a public meeting
to organise a campaign to ensure its passage, which was attended by union representatives. The meeting established a committee to work in cooperation with
the union. This committee provided financial assistance for a union deputation
and Ryan to go to Melbourne to lobby parliamentarians by obtaining donations
largely from the local business community. In October 1908, the committee and
the union jointly produced a four–page pamphlet calling for the passage of a Bonus
Bill, which was circulated to federal parliamentarians. The pamphlet claimed that
the bonus was necessary to maintain existing wage rates, attract capital investment
and create a considerable number of new jobs. The committee also published a
union statement supporting the Bonus Bill, which again emphasised the link
between the bonus and the maintenance of existing wage rates. This tradition of
cooperation clashed with the anti-unionism of Hoskins, who continued to make
separate representations to federal parliament until the Bill was finally passed in
December 1908 (Patmore 2001: 196–7).
The retailers and professionals were sympathetic to workers during the 1911–12
Ironworks Strike. Prior to the dispute, the local press criticised Charles
Hoskins for his hardline approach to industrial relations and his treatment
of workers. Lithgow labour and business leaders considered him to be an
‘outsider’, who failed to understand local custom and practice. During the
strike, local cinemas held benefit nights. Relief coupons issued by the union
defence committee were accepted by 30 retailers and professionals. Towards
the end of the strike, the Lithgow Mercury and prominent citizens had
joined the call for the nationalisation of the Lithgow Ironworks (Patmore 1999:
67, 70).
CONCLUSION
The paper presented here focuses on the fortunes of trade unionism at the
Lithgow Ironworks from 1900 to 1914. In the absence of systematic and reliable
quantitative data the study uses documentary sources to explain the varying
experience of unionism at the plant. While there may be a variety of causes
that explain trade union growth, surviving archival sources required a focus
on three issues: state, management and community or locality.
Overall, the state had a positive impact on trade unionism at the Lithgow plant.
Labor governments provided a sympathetic political climate for the Lithgow
branch of the FIA, particularly during the crucial 1911–12 strike. Labor
ministers publicly criticised Hoskins and directly intervened to release the
FIA Lithgow Branch secretary from jail. Hoskins was financially weakened
by the cancellation of the NSW Government contract.
The Lithgow experience reinforces the view that the benefits of compulsory
arbitration for union growth have been exaggerated. Features of compulsory
arbitration such as preference to unionists appear to have had little impact on
membership. Compulsory arbitration did not guarantee the survival of the
Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association. However, compulsory arbitration was a
major impetus for the formation of unions and decisions concerning coverage.
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The experience of the Lithgow plant emphasises the need to look at
the impact of management attitudes towards unions on union growth. The
Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association was established in a climate of sympathetic
management. While there may be questionable motives, such as Sandford’s
desire to have the Labor Party ease his financial burdens through nationalisation
or protection, Sandford and Thornley persisted with their positive view of
unionism at the Lithgow plant despite their financial concerns. Hoskins was
unsympathetic and sought to destroy the union through victimisation.
Nevertheless, there were limitations on management at Lithgow. During the
1911–12 strike, Hoskins’s attempt to destroy the FIA was thwarted by Labor
governments. Indeed, in the wake of the strike, Hoskins became less belligerent
towards the FIA as he tried to persuade the NSW Labor Government to
nationalise his plant.
Finally, this paper highlights the spatial dimension o
DEATH: THE IMPACT OF THE STATE,
MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNITY AT THE
LITHGOW IRONWORKS, 1900–1914
GREG PATMORE*
A
ustralian trade union membership grew dramatically from 1900 to 1914. While
there is recognition that compulsory arbitration played an important role, there
are a range of factors that may explain the growth. There is also a focus in this debate
on unions that grew rather than those that collapsed and a neglect of the workplace in
the debate. Through an analysis of the Lithgow Ironworks this paper hopes to broaden
the debate about union growth. It attempts to explain why iron and steel unionism
arose, briefly collapsed and re-organised at the Ironworks and it focuses on the state,
management and community or locality as explanatory factors.
INTRODUCTION
While Australian trade union membership grew dramatically in the period from
1900 to 1914, there were examples of unions that did not survive in this favourable
climate. Writers concerned with explaining this growth have overlooked examples
of union decline and demise in this period. Although the introduction of
compulsory arbitration might have played an important role, qualitative and
quantitative studies have highlighted a range of factors that may explain the
growth and provide insights into why some unions did not survive. Writers also
tend to focus on the industry, state and national level rather than the level of the
workplace (Bain & Elsheikh 1976: 94–100; Cooper 1996; Markey 1989: 171–2;
Patmore 1991: 120–1, 122–6; Sheldon 1995).
Through an analysis of unionism at the Lithgow Ironworks this paper hopes
to broaden the debate about union growth in this particular period, and in
general. Federal and state governments saw iron and steel as crucial to national
development and provided assistance through tariffs and bonuses. The Lithgow
plant had operated since 1876, but underwent major capital investment during
this period. The Lithgow workers unionised in September 1902 (Patmore 1999;
62–4).1 Despite the presence of compulsory arbitration legislation the plant-based
union collapsed and workers ultimately joined a union with national coverage.
The difficulties of the plant union indicate that compulsory arbitration is an
* Work and Organisational Studies, School of Business, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia.
Email: g.patmore@econ.usyd.edu.au
THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 46, NO. 1, MARCH 2004, 21–38
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insufficient explanation for the growth of the Australian trade union movement
from 1900 to 1914 and highlight a need to look for other explanatory factors.
The paper presented here begins with an evaluation of the literature concerning
trade union membership data and trade union growth. Problems with data on
union membership lead to a qualitative rather than quantitative approach. While
the union growth literature suggests a range of variables that may explain
the experience at Lithgow, this paper examines three factors suggested by
the surviving archival sources. These factors are the state, management and
community or locality. The paper then provides a narrative history of labour
organisation at the Lithgow Ironworks. It finally analyses the impact of the
state, management and community or locality on iron and steel unionism at
the plant.
DATA
AND CONCEPTS
Trade union growth models are only as good as the data on which they are based.
Trade union density, which is the number of union members as a percentage of
the number of potential members, is the dependent variable in these models.
There are two main ways of producing statistics for union membership. One is
to obtain estimates from trade union officials. These estimates tend to be inflated
by the inclusion of multiple job holders, the unemployed, retired and unfinancials.
There are also doubts that the management information systems of unions
can provide accurate data due to insufficient resources or minimal interest. Unions
may inflate membership to gain greater representation on union peak councils
or to create an impression of strength. They may understate membership to
reduce affiliation fees. The other way to provide data on union membership
is through general surveys of employees. While surveys are viewed as the
more accurate method of data collection, errors can arise if the interviewers
fail to obtain union status from the retired or unemployed. Defining potential
union membership is also difficult. Are employers, the self-employed, the retired
and the unemployed to be considered potential union members? Researchers
rely on uncertain labour force data to provide a measure of potential union
membership (Bain & Price 1980: 6–9; Chaison & Rose 1991: 6–8; Patmore 1992:
225–6; Plowman 1983: 524; Western 1997: 96).
Trade union density data, whether based on trade union reports or on surveys,
pose problems for the case study examined in this research. The collection and
publication of trade union statistics in Australia was haphazard before the First
World War. In Australia, statistics are available from 1891 but they are not totally
satisfactory because they relate only to those unions registered with the Colonial
and State Registrars of Trade Unions and Friendly Societies. Reliable national
figures began in 1912 with the publication of the annual Labour Report. The
Australian Bureau of Statistics did not conduct the first employee surveys for trade
union membership until 1976. For Australia, the labour force data at both the
national and state levels available from 1911 up to the Second World War were
based only on the almost decennial census (Bain & Price 1980: ch. 4–5).
There are particular problems with trade union density when undertaking
research at the enterprise level. Trade union statistics focus on the national, state
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or industry levels. Official statistics are not kept for individual workplaces,
towns or regions. Although contemporary researchers may be able to undertake
surveys at these levels, this option is not available to the historian. Union archives
may provide data for particular branches of the union, but it is unlikely that
workplace membership data would have been collected or retained. It is
more likely that these figures will survive if the union branch corresponded
to the workplace or if a particular union only had members in one workplace
(Bain & Price 1980: 3; Martin et al. 1996: 19–20).
While the absence of detailed data on union membership can prevent quantitative analysis, there are still sufficient documents available to undertake a qualitative study of a workplace. These sources include local newspapers, company
records and government archives. They indicate the general trends in union
membership and highlight variables that may be significant in explaining the
varying fortunes of organised labour in a particular plant.
A range of factors can explain variations in trade union membership. Some
relate to macroeconomic variables, such as the level of unemployment. There
are structural explanations. The shift in employment away from highly unionised
manual sectors, such as manufacturing, towards the poorly organised services
sector. The increase in forms of ‘precarious’ employment, such as external
contracting and casual labour, has hampered union efforts to recruit new
members. Researchers, whether using econometric or non-econometric
techniques, disagree over the relative importance of these variables. Chaison
and Rose (1991: 36), in their review of the macro-determinants of union
growth and density, conclude that structural shifts in employment and public
opinion are not primary determinants of union growth at a national level and
contribute little to an understanding of international trends. They found that
public policy and employer opposition to unionism were important factors in
understanding national differences, but recognised that the lines of causation
between the two were unclear.
While a range of variables are cited to explain shifts in trade union membership, surviving archival sources suggest three factors that may help to explain the
levels of unionism in the Lithgow Ironworks: the state; management; and the
community or locality.
There has been a long-standing recognition that a sympathetic state may
provide a favourable climate for union formation and growth. The state is a ‘locus
of power’ which includes a range of institutions such as parliament, statutory
authorities, the police, the courts and the military (Garton & McCallum 1996:
117). Western (1997: 66–93, 114, 119–120) claims that the presence of working
class political parties in government had a positive impact on union organisation
from 1950 to 1990 in 18 capitalist countries. As Bain and Elsheikh (1976: 41)
have noted, however, there is a circular argument: union growth is explained by
a sympathetic government; a sympathetic government is explained by union
growth.
Industrial relations scholars have attached importance to particular labor
legislation as playing a crucial role in promoting union growth. Howard (1977)
developed the ‘dependency thesis’ of Australian unions, arguing that they were
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in many ways a product of the system of compulsory arbitration. Some historians
have supported this thesis by claiming that compulsory arbitration and wages
boards made a major contribution to the growth of Australian trade unions
between 1900 and 1914. Econometric models of Australian trade union growth
incorporate a dummy variable, which has a value of one in a specified period and
zero at other times, for compulsory arbitration to account partially for union
growth between 1907 and 1913. Compulsory arbitration required workers to form
unions to bring grievances before industrial tribunals. The registered unions
gained corporate status and monopoly over organisation in certain industries.
There were provisions for a common rule and preference to unionists (Bain &
Elsheikh 1976: 40–2; Patmore 1991: 120–1). Even though there was no provision
for unionism in the wages board system, some labour historians such as Sutcliffe
(1920: 142) have argued that unions grew because workers cooperated to lobby
for wages boards, elect representatives, ensure uniform arguments and watch for
breaches of awards.
There have been criticisms of the emphasis on compulsory arbitration as
an explanation for Australian trade union growth between 1900 and 1914.
Arbitration was not a single entity as it varied from state to state and even
within states over time in this period. NSW unions perceived the 1908 Industrial
Disputes Act as more hostile to their interests than the original 1901 compulsory
arbitration legislation. The Australian Workers’ Union and other unions wanted
the federal court strengthened to ensure uniform national working conditions,
escape inadequate state jurisdictions and benefit from the favourable decisions
of Mr Justice Higgins, especially after the Harvester Judgement of 1907 (Patmore
1991: 82, 111). The various econometric studies provide an ad hoc estimate of
the impact of arbitration and do not explain the relationship between union
growth and arbitration. There is also evidence that some unions collapsed under
the strain of the costs associated with arbitration, while registration did not
protect unionists from employer victimisation (Cooper 1996: 57–9; Sheldon
1993: 385). Cooper has correctly criticised the ‘dependency thesis’ for ignoring
‘the agency of trade unionist activists in building working class organisation’ and
seeing ‘unions instead as mere products of their environment’ (1996: 62).
Critics have argued that other factors, such as the economy and favourable
public opinion, provide more significant explanations for union growth in this
period. Following the severe depression in the 1890s, there was a brief return to
prosperity during 1900–1. However, drought prolonged the stagnation of
the economy until 1906. After this there was strong economic growth, which
culminated in a boom between 1909 and 1913. In the metals and engineering
component of manufacturing, employment doubled between 1905 and 1913
(Markey 1994: 66; Patmore 1991: 141–2). Given the favourable economic
climate, union membership would have probably grown anyway without
arbitration. Indeed, Sheldon (1998) argues that union activism in a favourable
economic climate rather than arbitration underlayed recruitment for four
maritime-related unions in NSW from 1900 to 1912.
Markey (2002: 37–8) takes a more long-term approach by viewing the 1890s
as a ‘brief aberration’ in the process of unionisation that began in the 1880s
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without the benefit of arbitration. He notes that unions operated in a climate
of ‘public sympathy and social conscience’ in the early 1900s, which created a
political climate that removed state impediments to unionism and encouraged
union growth. Markey also draws parallels with the United States in the 1930s
and the introduction of the Wagner Act.
This public sympathy came from several sources. The hardship of the 1890s
depression and the significant conflicts between labour and capital during the
early 1890s fuelled disillusionment with the market economy and calls for greater
state intervention to redress injustices. A group of liberals played an important
role in this push for reform. This group included Alfred Deakin, Charles Cameron
Kingston, Bernhard Ringrose Wise and Henry Bournes Higgins. They were
lawyers who rejected the traditional liberal view that the role of the state should
be restricted to maximise the freedom of the individual. These liberals believed
the state could facilitate individual freedom by removing the social and economic
restrictions on it. They also emphasised the ‘community’ as the overriding
social entity, which parliament should protect from the conflicts between
labour and capital. The liberals did not seek to end the existing capitalist wage
relationship, but wanted to eliminate abuses of that relationship. The major
role already played by the state in Australian economic development and labour
discipline assisted the liberals’ call for state intervention in labour relations.
This public sympathy underlay compulsory arbitration and the broader notion
of ‘New Protection’, which linked tariff protection to ‘fair’ wages (Patmore 1991:
101–102, 115).
The attitudes and behaviour of employers towards unions are crucial factors
in assisting or hindering trade union growth. Employer attitudes to unions can
be influenced by ideology, the economic climate and the legal environment. In
recent years, the spread of free market ideologies that view unions as impediments
to the successful operation of the labour market have intensified employer’s antiunion activities. Employers can weaken trade unionism through either peaceful
competition or forcible opposition. The tactics of peaceful competition include
offering better wages than the union standard during a union recruitment
campaign, establishing elaborate grievance procedures that exclude unions and
encouraging company unions. Forcible opposition includes the victimisation
of union activists and discrimination against union members in promotion and
pay rises. Employers may also engage in repression to contain the possibility of
collective action through the use of measures such as blacklists. They may also
defy the law. During the past 30 years US employers have shown an increasing
willingness to thwart National Labor Relations Board elections by dismissing
trade union activists (Bain 1970: 131–5; Chaison & Rose 1991: 22–4; Freeman
1986: 60–2; Kelly 1998: 56–8; Peetz 1998: 13–15).
The community or local context of the workplace can also have an impact on
unionism. Industrial sociologists, labour historians and economic geographers
have recognised that the incidence of both industrial action and trade unionism
have a spatial dimension. There have been major disagreements as to the
patterns. Kerr and Siegel (1954) developed a crude ‘isolated mass’ hypothesis
whereby workers in isolated and close-knit communities were more likely to strike
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than workers in cosmopolitan urban centres. Shorter and Tilly (1974: 238) argued
from their study of strikes in France between 1915 and 1935 that that labour
agitation was more likely to occur in large diverse cities than in small oneindustry towns because workers lived in communities that acquired ‘habits of
joint action’. Stromquist (1987) attempted to show that there were differences
in response to strikes among the smaller communities. His study of the high level
of industrial conflict on the United States railways during the last decades of
the 19th century distinguished between ‘market cities’ and ‘railway towns’. He
examined Burlington, Iowa, as an example of the former, and Creston, Iowa, as
an example of the latter. Burlington preceded railway development and had a
broad economic base. Burlington’s elite identified closely with the railway
company and its prosperity grew as the railway expanded. Railway workers
were dispersed within a larger community and received minimal community
support in industrial disputes. Creston relied on the railway for its existence. The
town’s elite were retailers, whose prosperity depended on the railway’s freight
rates. They were concerned by the company’s monopoly power and sympathised
with striking workers, who formed a sizeable group in the town and had considerable purchasing power. While these basic typologies may be useful for discussion
purposes, they overlook evidence that strike action varies among similar types of
communities due to differing traditions. Also, ‘community’ as a social construction
varies over time and overlooks internal divisions and exclusions (Martin et al. 1996:
146–51; Patmore 1994).
The workers’ geographic location, the operation of local labour markets
and the local industrial/political traditions can lead to variations in industrial
behaviour in specific locations, even where there is the same employer, labour
processes, industrial agreement and trade union. Differences in the industrial
employment structure between localities are not sufficient to explain spatial
differences in strike rates. In areas where there has been a long history of
union organisation, a tradition of ‘union culture’ may develop that assists labour
organisation and encourages a greater acceptance of unions by local employers.
While it should not be assumed that union culture remains unchanged over time
or is locally homogeneous (Herod 1998; 24–8; Martin et al. 1993: 55; Martin
et al. 1996: 141–51; Wills 1996), locally based traditions, once established, ‘can
exhibit a high degree of socio-institutional persistence over time, and, at the very
least, influence the nature of subsequent changes and developments’ (Martin,
Sunley and Wills, 1996: 16). The spatial organisation of classes in a particular
location can also have an impact. Where workers and their employers live in
close proximity there may be a greater probability of class alliances or
‘labour-community coalitions’ in dealing with external threats or opportunities
(Patmore 1997).
Ellem and Shields (1999: 537), however, note that there may be a number of
spatial levels, such as workplace, local, regional and national, which interrelate
and are not distinct. The locality is not completely isolated from the broader
political and economic context and the external environment may have a
significant impact. While there is sympathy for organised labour in particular
locations, there maybe little sympathy at the regional or national level. Anti-union
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D E AT H
legislation may allow a belligerent employer to defeat organised labour despite
local community sympathy (Patmore 2000: 54).
The paper presented here will now examine the impact of the state, employers
and the community on unionism in the iron and steel plants at Lithgow.
The state, particularly through Labor governments, and the community had
a positive impact on Lithgow plant unionism. The benefits of compulsory
arbitration appear exaggerated. Lithgow management was not hostile to trade
unionism before 1907 and the climate changed with the purchase of the plant
by the Hoskins family.
OVERVIEW
OF THE IRON AND STEEL PLANT AT
LITHGOW, 1900–1914
The iron and steel industry was operating in the Lithgow valley before 1900 but
it had a volatile history. Coal and the demand of the NSW Government Railways
for iron rails had prompted a group of non-resident entrepreneurs to establish
a blast furnace at Lithgow in 1876. However, cheaper imports, high freight
charges and poor quality iron ore contributed to financial difficulties and the
owners demolished the blast furnace in 1884. The owners initially leased the
ironworks to a worker cooperative, which re-rolled rails, and in 1887 transferred
the lease to William Sandford. He had experience managing ironworks in the
United Kingdom and had come to Australia in 1883 to manage a wire-netting
plant for John Lysaght in Melbourne. In 1892, Sandford bought the Ironworks
and by 1898 the Lithgow plant employed approximately 200 workers (Patmore
1999: 62).2
From 1900 to 1914 the Lithgow Ironworks underwent major capital investment. Sandford installed a steel furnace in 1900 and re-established a blast furnace
in 1907 on the basis of a guaranteed NSW government contract for steel rails.
The capital investment in the new blast furnace overextended Sandford’s finances
and the Commercial Bank of Sydney foreclosed on him in December 1907.
G & C Hoskins Ltd, which manufactured iron pipes in Sydney and was a
Table 1
Lithgow bonuses and economic performance, 1908–1914
Year ending
November
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
Federal government
bonus (£)
Profit/loss
(£, includes bonus)
N/A
N/A
28 542
*
19 016
28 147
47 708
-8074
-693
+1676
*
-6943
+20 266
+46 452
*Data not available.
Source: BHP Billiton Archives D168/S037/002: Minutes AGM, G & C Hoskins, dated 14/03/1910;
10/03/1911; 27/08/1913; 03/09/1914; and 28/07/1915.
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major customer of the Lithgow Ironworks, purchased the plant. The Hoskins
family benefited from the NSW government contract for rails. They also gained
from the federal government bounties introduced for steel production in 1909.
As shown in Table 1, the Lithgow plant, with the assistance of the bonuses and
a booming economy, shifted from losses in 1909 to profits by 1914. The adverse
result in 1912 arose from the impact of a prolonged strike and the cancellation
of the NSW government contract for rails on the grounds of price and the substitution of inferior imported German steel. The improving financial position led
Hoskins to complete a second blast furnace in 1913. The expansion of the iron
and steel works resulted in a dramatic growth in employment and contributed
to Lithgow’s overall population growth. By 1911 the total number of employees
at the plant was 1052. The town’s population increased from 5268 in 1901 to
8196 in 1911 (Jack & Cremin 1994: 114–5; Patmore 1999: 62–3).
The Lithgow Ironworks workforce ranged from unskilled labourers to craft
workers. While there were sufficient supplies of unskilled labour locally by the
early 20th century, Lithgow management found it necessary to recruit overseas
to obtain specific ironworking and steel manufacturing skills. In 1900 Sandford
directly recruited two Welsh furnacemen to operate his new steel furnace.
Between 1905 and 1910 Sandford and Hoskins imported under contract 37 British
iron and steelworkers, including blast furnacemen, puddlers and sheet rollers to
provide the skills needed for the expansion of the Lithgow plant. There were
also skilled tradesmen such as fitters and blacksmiths. They tended to remain
members of their own specific unions and formed local branches when there
were sufficient numbers. In June 1906, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers
formed a Lithgow branch, which had members employed at the Ironworks. The
re-establishment of the blast furnace created another dimension to the workforce.
These workers held a strategic position in the production process as the blast
furnace required continuous operation to avoid considerable expenditure on
repairs. Their separate identity from the other ironworkers was reinforced by
the blast furnace site being 1 km from the rest of the ironworks (Patmore 2000:
60, 62)3. As will be seen later, blast furnace workers were active in establishing
unions at the Lithgow plant.
Table 2
Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association membership, 1903–1909
Year
Union
membership
Employment
Union
density (%)
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
102
107
107
142
241
357
282
340
309
351
490
835
632
950
30
35
30
29
29
56
30
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As Markey (2002: 37) notes generally, unionisation commenced at the
Lithgow Ironworks in the 1880s and was disrupted by the 1890s depression. There
was a strong tradition of unionism at the plant. The first Eskbank Ironworkers’
Association had been formed in 1882 and was revived on several subsequent occasions before the early 1900s. The Eskbank Ironworkers saw tariff protection as
a way to preserve their jobs. As early as July 1885, the union participated in a
Sydney conference organised by the NSW Land and Industrial Alliance, which
promoted protectionism. The financial problems of the plant hindered the
continuity of union organisation. By the start of 1893 approximately two-thirds
of the Lithgow Ironworks employees were unemployed and those still with jobs
faced a one-third wage-cut during that year. Employment prospects at the
Lithgow Ironworks were so poor that some ironworkers migrated to New Zealand
to establish a short-lived cooperative at the Onehunga Ironworks near Auckland.
The union had again collapsed by early 1894 and did not revive for another
8 years. Unfortunately no records of these early unions survived. However,
according the records relating to the union’s affiliation with the Sydney Trades
and Labour Council, the number of financial members was only 33 in July 1891,
42 in January 1892 and 25 in July 1892. This would indicate on the basis of
surviving employment data a minimum union density varying between 16 and
28 per cent (Patmore 2000: 62; Patmore 2001: 187).4
There were two phases of trade unionism at Lithgow between 1902 and the
outbreak of World War I. From 1902 to 1910 the most significant union was the
Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association, which changed its name in March 1909 to
the Eskbank Iron and Steel Workers’ Association. This union covered only the
Lithgow plant and membership figures (Table 2) are derived from its returns to
the NSW Registrar of Trade Unions and Friendly Societies for the period from
1903 to 1909. There is a series of employment data available for the plant from
1903 to 1908, which are derived from the Annual Reports of the NSW
Department of Mines. However, it is difficult to construct union density data
because of inconsistencies. The employment data are expressed as an annual
average, while the trade union membership data are shown for 31 December
of the particular year. The employment data may include the Lithgow Ironworks
Colliery, which was covered by the Western Miners’ Union, and employment
data are adjusted where this is explicitly stated. A 1909 employment figure is
derived from a company return to the Commonwealth Collector of Customs
(Patmore 1999: 63–4).
Mill and forge workers at the Lithgow Ironworks reformed the Eskbank
Ironworkers’ Association on 13 September 1902. While the desire to obtain access
to the fledgling arbitration system was a major motivation for the re-formation
of the union, its members continued with the pre-Depression concern of tariff
protection for the industry. They wanted to gain the broader support of the labour
movement for a federal bonus bill. The union won the support of the Lithgow
Municipal Council in February 1904 for a joint approach to the Prime Minister
to have a bonus on iron production. The union obtained management recognition. It fought wage reductions in 1903 and negotiated an agreement with
Sandford. While the agreement upheld his wage reductions, it provided for a
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joint union/management conciliation board to handle grievances, a sliding scale
linking wages to product prices and preference to unionists. In June 1904, the
union obtained the intervention of the NSW Arbitration Court when it ratified
the agreement as an award and provided penalties for breaches. Although there
appears to be an increase in union density in 1904, the award and preference to
unionists did not provide any permanent basis for growth before 1908 (Patmore
2000: 62).5
The Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association experienced unprecedented growth
during 1908 before its eventual collapse by the end of 1910. The success was set
against the efforts by Hoskins to make the plant solvent. Worker discontent
increased as Hoskins restructured work to reduce labour costs and challenged
established customs such as smoking at work. Between March 1908 and April
1909 there were four disputes over wages and work organisation. To increase
industrial strength the union began actively recruiting workers at the blast
furnace in January 1908. The blast furnace workers had previously attempted to
form their own union in October 1907. The Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association
refused to accept wage cuts and Hoskins initiated a lockout on 9 July 1908.
Full production, with the exception of the bolt shop, did not recommence
until 4 November 1908. The union successfully applied for a wages board under
the NSW Industrial Disputes Act, which consisted of a judge as chair and an
equal number of employee and employer representatives from the Lithgow
Ironworks. It obtained a disappointing outcome in March 1909. The award upheld
some of Hoskins’s wages cuts and his preference for time-based rates rather than
tonnage rates. The award did retain a preference to unionists clause, but this did
not prevent a serious decline in membership in 1909. The union was moribund
by the end of 1910 despite an attempt by the Sydney NSW Iron Trades Council
to revive it in September (Johnston-Liik et al. 1998: 120–8; Patmore 1999: 63;
Patmore 2001: 196).6
The second phase of unionism at the Lithgow plant had commenced by at
least August 1910 when workers at the blast furnace again formed their own Blast
Furnace Workers’ Association. This union, which had only 92 members, decided
in January 1911 to expand its coverage of the union by affiliating with the
nationally organised Federated Ironworkers’ Association (FIA), thereby gaining
access to federal arbitration rather than registering under the unpopular NSW
Industrial Disputes Act. The union began actively recruiting other Lithgow ironworkers. This organising ensured the success of the union in the longest dispute
in the history of the Lithgow Valley, which occurred at the Lithgow Ironworks
from July 1911 to April 1912. It arose from the victimisation of a union delegate
at the Lithgow Ironworks Tunnel Colliery. The strike settlement forced
Hoskins to reinstate the dismissed delegate. Unfortunately, there is no data
series available for union membership at the Lithgow Ironworks after 1909
(Patmore 1999: 64–74).7
Overall, the Lithgow iron and steel workers were unionised from 1902 to 1914
with the exception of a brief period. The next three sections of this paper will
look at factors that may help explain the Lithgow experience. These are the state,
management and the local community context.
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31
OF THE STATE
While during this period both the federal and NSW governments in Australia
introduced compulsory arbitration legislation to regulate industrial relations, it
brought mixed blessings for the Lithgow Ironworks workers. The Australian
legislation in principle assisted unionisation by assuming that workers would
prefer union representation. The 1901 NSW Arbitration allowed registered
industrial unions to unilaterally bring employers on any ‘industrial dispute’ or
‘industrial matter’ before a Court of Arbitration. Registered unions gained
corporate status and some security against rival unions trying to organise the
same workers. The legally enforceable award of the Court could prescribe a
minimum rate of wages and preference to unionists. There was also provision
for industrial agreements between unions and employers which could have the
same effect as a Court award. Bernhard Ringrose Wise, the NSW AttorneyGeneral and architect of the Act, hoped that compulsory arbitration would
stimulate and supplement collective bargaining rather than replace it. The
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1904, which applied to
interstate industrial disputes, similarly provided for union registration and
preference to unionists (Patmore 1991: 109–110, 115, 125).
The conservative Wade Liberal Reform Government in NSW replaced the
expiring 1901 legislation in 1908 with the Industrial Disputes Act. The new law
provided for wages boards consisting of a chairman from outside the industry
and an equal number of employee and employer representatives drawn from
industry. There was an Industrial Court which was presided over by a Supreme
or District Court judge. It could recommend to the Minister for Labour the
constitution of wages boards and act as a court of final appeal for their decisions.
This legislation created an outcry within the NSW trade union movement.
Unionists criticised its extensive penal powers for enforcing awards and preventing
strikes. They also condemned the legislation for undermining trade unionism,
since it allowed associations of at least 20 workers, as well as registered industrial
unions, to apply for wages boards. The Labor Council of NSW tried unsuccessfully to enforce a boycott of the legislation because unions rushed to the Court
to prevent rivals obtaining exclusive representation on wages boards and awards
(Patmore 1991: 111).
The arbitration Acts clearly influenced both the formation and shape of
unionism at the Lithgow Ironworks. Access to the NSW arbitration system
was one of the major motivations underlying the formation of the Eskbank
Ironworkers’ Association in October 1902. The Blast Furnace Workers’
Association’s decision in January 1911 to affiliate with the FIA was prompted by
a desire to gain access to federal arbitration rather than registering under the
unpopular NSW Industrial Disputes Act. There is, however, no evidence that the
Lithgow plant unions used the preference to unionists’ clause in their awards to
promote membership. The 1904 and 1909 awards were also associated with
decline in union membership. These awards may have contributed to worker
disillusionment with arbitration as a union strategy. Both awards upheld wage
cuts by employers and the 1909 award supported Hoskins’s preference for time-
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based rates. Registration within the industrial arbitration system and preference
to unionists in the 1909 award did not prevent the collapse of the Eskbank
Ironworkers’ Association in 1910. Through arbitration the state did not assist
union survival but appears to have aided union decline and collapse.8
The Lithgow workers benefited from a sympathetic political climate after
1910 with both federal and NSW Labor governments. The Labor Party gained
control of Lithgow Municipal Council for the first time on 28 January 1911,
winning eight of 12 seats. An important part of Labor Party policy was the
nationalisation of monopolies such as the Lithgow Ironworks. During the
1911–12 Lithgow Ironworks strike the Lithgow Council was generally
sympathetic to the strikers, authorising a public meeting in Lithgow Park and
inspecting strike-breakers’ barracks for breaches of health and housing regulations.
The federal and state Labor governments intervened in the strike to Hoskins’s
detriment (Patmore 1999: 64–6, 70). From the outset, Labor parliamentarians
criticised Hoskins, the NSW Minister for Labor and Industry alleging that he
‘must accept responsibility for this trouble’.9 Hoskins further angered the
Labor Party by sending a telegram of support to the NSW Leader of the
Opposition during a political crisis, when the Labor Party lost its narrow
majority in the Legislative Assembly in late July. The NSW Labor Government
failed to resolve the dispute through the establishment of a special wages
board and the direct intervention of Premier McGowen and Labor Ministers.
Hoskins refused to meet the strikers’ demand that all strike-breakers be removed
(Patmore 1999: 69).
The federal and state Labor governments moved against Hoskins. On
30 September 1911, the NSW Attorney-General released John Dixon, the
secretary of the Lithgow Branch of the FIA, after 11 days in Darlinghurst goal.
He had been sentenced to 2 months hard labour by the Industrial Court for
breaching the anti-strike provisions of the 1908 Industrial Disputes Act. The NSW
Government also set up a Royal Commission to investigate whether Hoskins’s
government contracts were in the public interest and to explore the future
prospects of the NSW iron and steel industry. Hoskins criticised the closed
hearings of the Commission and walked out of the inquiry in protest at its
procedures. The Royal Commission found that Hoskins had breached the government contracts by substituting German steel for steel made from Australian iron
ore and the NSW Government cancelled his contracts on 29 November 1911.
The Federal Labor Government also embarrassed Hoskins by investigating his
pig iron bonus claims and temporarily suspended the bonus after concluding that
he unlawfully had obtained approximately £10 252 in bonus. Charles Hoskins
came to believe that the federal and state governments were trying to destroy
his firm (Patmore 1999: 68–9).
MANAGEMENT
Management was sympathetic to trade unions at the Lithgow plant before 1908.
William Sandford and William Thornley (who joined the firm from the NSW
Government Railways in April 1902 and became general manager in December
1902) were willing to recognise the Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association. There
U N I O N B I RT H , G R O W T H
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is no evidence that they victimised union activists. Sandford’s tolerance of
the union continued despite his concern over the financial viability of the
plant, particularly the construction of a new blast furnace, and his belief that
his workers’ wages were too high to survive import competition. Sandford
was aware of the growing power of the Labor Party, which he hoped would
nationalise the plant and introduce protection to ease his financial worries.
Thornley was a long-standing member of the Amalgamated Society of
Engineers and had informed Sandford upon his appointment that he was a
‘trade unionist’.10
Hoskins, who purchased the bankrupt Lithgow plant in December 1907,
disliked unions and compulsory arbitration. He was an ‘advocate of the open
shop, non-union labour and day-wages’ (Wills 1948: 62). Hoskins was hostile to
the Labor Party and its policy of nationalising monopolies such as the Lithgow
Ironworks. The resignation of Thornley as general manager in April 1908
further reduced the sympathy of the Lithgow plant management for unionism.
As noted previously, Charles Hoskins’s efforts to make the Lithgow plant
solvent increased worker discontent and contributed to the growth of the
Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association in 1908. His lockout in July 1908 failed to
defeat the union and led to a fine from the NSW Industrial Court (Patmore 1999:
63, 66–8). 11
Unable to defeat unionism in the public arena, Hoskins intensified his
victimisation of union activists. He contributed to the collapse of the Eskbank
Ironworkers’ Association by harassing unionists such as Herbert Bladon
senior. Bladon had been head roller at the Lithgow Ironworks for about 14 years,
served as treasurer of the union and was the worker representative on the
wages board. Hoskins believed that Bladon’s mill was over-staffed and threatened
Bladon repeatedly with dismissal if he did not keep his mill tidy. Bladon resigned
from the Ironworks in August 1908, but remained employee representative on
the wages board until he left Lithgow in April 1909. Hoskins also attempted to
weaken the fledgling Lithgow branch of the FIA by refusing to re-employ the
branch secretary and denying him entry to the plant after a strike at the blast
furnace in February 1911. Several other strikers were denied re-employment.
Hoskins’s dismissal of a union delegate from the Lithgow Ironworks Tunnel
Colliery for attending Western Miners’ Union meeting led to the 1911–12
Lithgow Ironworks strike. During this strike, Hoskins did not discourage
strike-breakers from forming their own union, which briefly obtained registration under the NSW Trade Union Act. There are no recorded incidents of
victimisation after the strike (Johnston-Liik et al. 1998: 123; Patmore 1999:
66–8, 72).12
The Lithgow branch of the FIA survived the strike and Hoskins had to
continue to deal with a state Labor Government before the First World War.
Indeed, despite his opposition to nationalisation, he approached the NSW Labor
Government following its re-election in December 1913 to propose the sale of
his Lithgow Ironworks. He depended on federal subsidies for his profits and
his domestic monopoly was being challenged through the construction of the
Newcastle steelworks by BHP (Patmore 1999: 72).
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CONTEXT
The Lithgow iron and steel workers enjoyed a supportive community environment. Resistance by landowners at the western end of the Lithgow Valley to the
‘unwarranted expansion’ of Lithgow reduced the availability of land for housing
in the town. The local elite could not obtain large plots of land and had to live
in close proximity to the workers. There was no pre-industrial elite because the
town developed from industrialisation. The town’s business and social elite were
concerned with its narrow economic base and the fragility of local industries.
They supported the idea that Lithgow would become the ‘Birmingham of
Australia’. Lithgow had the potential to become a major manufacturing centre
with a significantly larger population. Economic growth would benefit the town’s
businesses, increase revenue for the Lithgow Council and improve job security.
There was a long tradition of unionism in the Lithgow Valley. Coalminers formed
their first lodge in 1875. As noted previously, the first Eskbank Ironworkers’
Association had been formed in 1882. This tradition encouraged the local elite
to work with trade union leaders in coalitions to promote the town and be sympathetic to workers’ grievances. During the first decade of the 20th century the
8-hour day holiday procession became an important part of the social life in
Lithgow with local businesses joining the celebration of labour’s achievements.
This union tradition in Lithgow provided a favourable climate for labour organisation (Patmore 2000: 56, 62, 66).
The business elite and labour leaders particularly focussed on the iron and
steel industry to promote economic prosperity. In February 1904, Lithgow
Council agreed to cooperate with the Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association in an
approach to the Prime Minister to have a bonus on iron production. When
the Commercial Banking Company foreclosed on Sandford’s mortgage and
retrenched most of his workers in December 1907, the Lithgow Council,
the Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association and Lithgow Progress Association
participated in a public meeting and organised a deputation to the Premier
(Patmore 2000: 66).
The gap between Hoskins and the local community can be seen in their
respective responses to the failure of federal parliament to pass the Bonus Bill
in June 1908. Hoskins proposed reductions in wages until the Bill was passed
and threatened to shut the blast furnaces and steel furnaces if his employees did
not accept the cuts. He latter modified his position by allowing the reductions
to be refunded if the Bill was passed. The Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association
refused to accept these terms and blamed Hoskins for not being active enough
in ensuring the passage of the legislation. A ballot of employees also rejected the
wage cuts. Hoskins’ subsequent lockout lasted from 9 July 1908 to 4 November
1908 (Patmore 2001: 196).
The Eskbank Ironworkers pursued the passage of the Bill by forming an alliance
with the local business community. James Ryan, the editor of the Lithgow Mercury,
was sympathetic with their fight against wage cuts and feared that the lockout
would become a permanent closure. Retailers were also made aware of their
dependence on the Ironworks through the loss of worker income and expenditure
U N I O N B I RT H , G R O W T H
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35
during the dispute. With the re-introduction of the Bonus Bill into federal
parliament in September 1908, the Mayor of Lithgow called a public meeting
to organise a campaign to ensure its passage, which was attended by union representatives. The meeting established a committee to work in cooperation with
the union. This committee provided financial assistance for a union deputation
and Ryan to go to Melbourne to lobby parliamentarians by obtaining donations
largely from the local business community. In October 1908, the committee and
the union jointly produced a four–page pamphlet calling for the passage of a Bonus
Bill, which was circulated to federal parliamentarians. The pamphlet claimed that
the bonus was necessary to maintain existing wage rates, attract capital investment
and create a considerable number of new jobs. The committee also published a
union statement supporting the Bonus Bill, which again emphasised the link
between the bonus and the maintenance of existing wage rates. This tradition of
cooperation clashed with the anti-unionism of Hoskins, who continued to make
separate representations to federal parliament until the Bill was finally passed in
December 1908 (Patmore 2001: 196–7).
The retailers and professionals were sympathetic to workers during the 1911–12
Ironworks Strike. Prior to the dispute, the local press criticised Charles
Hoskins for his hardline approach to industrial relations and his treatment
of workers. Lithgow labour and business leaders considered him to be an
‘outsider’, who failed to understand local custom and practice. During the
strike, local cinemas held benefit nights. Relief coupons issued by the union
defence committee were accepted by 30 retailers and professionals. Towards
the end of the strike, the Lithgow Mercury and prominent citizens had
joined the call for the nationalisation of the Lithgow Ironworks (Patmore 1999:
67, 70).
CONCLUSION
The paper presented here focuses on the fortunes of trade unionism at the
Lithgow Ironworks from 1900 to 1914. In the absence of systematic and reliable
quantitative data the study uses documentary sources to explain the varying
experience of unionism at the plant. While there may be a variety of causes
that explain trade union growth, surviving archival sources required a focus
on three issues: state, management and community or locality.
Overall, the state had a positive impact on trade unionism at the Lithgow plant.
Labor governments provided a sympathetic political climate for the Lithgow
branch of the FIA, particularly during the crucial 1911–12 strike. Labor
ministers publicly criticised Hoskins and directly intervened to release the
FIA Lithgow Branch secretary from jail. Hoskins was financially weakened
by the cancellation of the NSW Government contract.
The Lithgow experience reinforces the view that the benefits of compulsory
arbitration for union growth have been exaggerated. Features of compulsory
arbitration such as preference to unionists appear to have had little impact on
membership. Compulsory arbitration did not guarantee the survival of the
Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association. However, compulsory arbitration was a
major impetus for the formation of unions and decisions concerning coverage.
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The experience of the Lithgow plant emphasises the need to look at
the impact of management attitudes towards unions on union growth. The
Eskbank Ironworkers’ Association was established in a climate of sympathetic
management. While there may be questionable motives, such as Sandford’s
desire to have the Labor Party ease his financial burdens through nationalisation
or protection, Sandford and Thornley persisted with their positive view of
unionism at the Lithgow plant despite their financial concerns. Hoskins was
unsympathetic and sought to destroy the union through victimisation.
Nevertheless, there were limitations on management at Lithgow. During the
1911–12 strike, Hoskins’s attempt to destroy the FIA was thwarted by Labor
governments. Indeed, in the wake of the strike, Hoskins became less belligerent
towards the FIA as he tried to persuade the NSW Labor Government to
nationalise his plant.
Finally, this paper highlights the spatial dimension o