J00758
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 1
TRAUMATIC EVENTS AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
Aloysius Soesilo
FAKULTAS PSIKOLOGI
UNIVERSITAS KRISTEN SATYA WACANA
SALATIGA
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 2
ABSTRAK
Tulisan ini berupaya untuk membahas hubungan antara pengalaman traumatik dengan
memori autobiografis. Memori traumatik berbeda dari memori pada umumnya yang tidak
berhubungan dengan peristiwa trauma. Perbedaan itu nampak di dalam tiga perspektif
yang dikemukakan dalam artikel ini, yakni, memori intrusif, teori representasi ganda dan
model self-memory-system. Selanjutnya, memori autobiografis serta ketiga fungsinya (self,
sosial, dan direktif) dibahas. Emosi mempunyai peranan yang amat penting dalam
memori, khususnya di dalam pengaruhnya atas apa yang diingat dan bagaimana apa yang
dingat kemudian direkonstruksikan dalam naratif. Di dalam kontruksi memori
autobiografis ada tiga komponen pokok yang dibahas, yakni tujuan, proses dan produk.
Oleh karena memori autobiografis dan naratif bukan merupakan suatu phenomenon yang
terlepas dari konteksnya, maka hubungan resiprokal yang dinamis antara keduanya dan
konteks sosial-kultural harus diperhatikan. Naratif traumatis adalah upaya oleh individu
untuk mengkontruksikan kembali dirinya dan dunianya setelah peristiwa trauma. Dengan
demikian memori autobiografis dan naratif trauma menyediakan pintu masuk bagi studi
tentang fenomena penting dalam praktek-praktek kekerasan yang menjadi salah satu ciri
dari kehidupan sosial-politis modern.
Kata kunci: Traumatic events, autobiographical memory, emotions, construction of self
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 3
TRAUMATIC EVENTS AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
Exposure to a wide variety of violent and life-threatening events occurs with a
relative frequency has been experienced by many people across the globe. The growing
number of autobiographical and biographical accounts of victims of human inflictred
trauma attest to the fact that traumatic memories can be remarkably enduring. An
emotional reliving of the traumatic experience demonstrate the lasting emotional salience
in these people‟s recollection years after the event. This paper attempts to study
autobiographical memory (AM), in its relation to traumatic events, taking into account the
psychological, social, and cultural-historic context in which it occurs. It will discuss first
the effect of trauma on memory, to what ends AM is used by individuals, and how it is
constructed. The primary concern is with why and how individuals remember both
mundane and significant life events, especially traumatic ones. Its concern is not with how
much or how well they remember their personal past, although admittedly, these features
often play some role in memory. Autobiographical memory and narrative are situated in a
social-cultural context, and its dynamic reciprocal relationships among these factors are
explored. Accordingly, the construction and understanding of AM cannot be independent
of this context. Narratives eventually open the window for us to understand not only how
trauma survivors have attempted to reconstruct themselves and share their life stories, but
also to understand the often unspeakably violent practices of modern social-political
consciousness.
MEMORIES FOR TRAUMATIC EVENTS
The way people process a trauma after the occurrence is critical for the stressor
event to configured or not. The stressor stimulus is not the only factor in the
characterization of an event as trauma. This characterization also depends on the
perceptive processing during and after the trauma event and on the representation patterns
of reality in the experience. It then becomes obvious that memory plays a significant role
in this process (Brewin, 2003). Many studies concur in assuming that the processing, re-
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 4
experiencing, and representation of traumatic symptoms are encoded and organized in
memory, and then retrieved.
Traumatic experiences and memories have been investigated in greater number in
literature associated with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and with patients with
depression (e.g., Brewin, 1998;Sotgiu & Mormont, 2008)). There is a large group of
traumatized people, however, that do not meet the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000) criteria for PTSD and other psychiatric disorders. Examples of events
meeting the clinical criteria for trauma are natural disaster, interpersonal violence and
torture, and road traffic accidents. The individual experiences or witnesses actual or
threatened death, serious injury or threat to one‟s or others‟ integrity. In other words, the
individual needs to experiences an intense negative emotional reaction at the time of the
traumatic event. Several typical symptoms that emerge as a consequence of this
experience are delineated in the DSM-IV. These include re-experiencing of the traumatic
event, avoidance behavior related to the trauma, and symptoms of hyperarousal (e.g.,
startle response, sleeping problems, and a general emotional numbing response). Reexperiencing of the trauma emerges in the form of intrusive traumatic memories,
nightmares and distress in reaction to trauma reminders.
Intrusive memories
Intrusive trauma memories are characterized by “rich multi-model mental images
of highly detailed sensory impressions of the traumatic event including sights, sounds,
feelings and bodily sensations” (Krans, Näring, Becker, & Holmes, 2009, p. 1077). In
contrast to deliberate recall, this type of memory comes into consciousness unbidden. The
individual often feels he or she has no power or control over this intrusion. Some features
of intrusive images may be similar for experiencing actual trauma or witnessing trauma
(Berntsen, 2009). Brewin (1998) found that compared to non-clinical samples, patients
with PTSD or depression reported memories that intruded more frequently, were more
distressing, and sometimes had unusual characteristics, such as the sensation of reliving
the event at the present moment. According to Mace (2007), intrusive memories can be
found in everyday mental life as part of psychological disorders as well. Intrusive trauma
memories may manifest in a variety of degrees from mildly distressing images to full-
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 5
blown flashbacks. In the most severe form, the individual is completely engulfed, so to
speak, in the memory and temporarily loses touch with the reality of the here-and-now.
The survivor often reports feeling like a different person after the event. This
personal change relates to what Pillemer ( 1998) terms “originating events.” Death-related
events, although not necessarily traumatic, can often be regarded originating events. As
such, these events are perceived as a cause or reason for profound life changes. Several
studies, however, have shown that trauma victims have also reported “posttraumatic
growth”, that is, positive outcomes from the struggle with trauma that surpass the pretrauma level (e.g., Joseph & Linley, 2008; Wilson, 2006).
Ehlers, Hackmann, and Michael (3004) propose that the majority of intrusive
memories can interpreted as re-experiencing of warning signals, i.e., stimuli that signaled
the onset of the trauma or of moments when the meaning of the events changed for worse.
Accordingly, the content of intrusive memories do not appear to be random fragments
(Ehlers et al., 2002). The warning signals seem to consist of markers of the situational
context in which the traumatic event took place. In prolonged traumatic experience, there
may be several crucial moments when meanings of the events change for worse, each of
which can be represented in re-experiencing. Ehlers contends that moments with the
largest emotional impact do not necessarily happen during the trauma itself, but may
emerge later when the survivor realizes what could have happened to him or her, or when
something gives the traumatic situation a more personal meaning.
Based on their theory of intrusive trauma memories, Ehlers, Hackmann, and
Michael (2003) have identified several functions of intrusive trauma memory. First, it
aims at the emotional processing of a traumatic event. Information of sensory and
physiological details may not be available through deliberate recall. Second, intrusive
memories may provide information about impending danger by way of an associated
feeling of current threat. As a result, the individual may becomes more prepared for action.
Third, it provides protection for the status quo of the self‟s goal structure and selfcoherence.
Ehlers, Hackmann, and Michael also suggest several efficient ways of updating
trauma memories and putting them into their context. First, identification of the moments
during the trauma that create the greatest distress and sense of “newness” during recall
through imaginal reliving. This imaginal reliving can be accomplished through writing a
narrative. Second, identification of information that updates the impression the person had
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 6
at the time by identifying the course, circumstances, and outcome of the trauma. And
finally, actively incorporating of the information using verbal and imagery technique.
These therapeutic implications suggested by the authors set the stage for this paper to
highlight the importance of autobiographical narratives that will be discussed later.
Dual representation theory of trauma
Another theoretical perspective about the relationship between trauma and memory
is proposed by the Dual Representation theory (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996). This
theory assumes that traumatic information after early childhood is encoded in two
different memory system: verbally accessible memory (VAM) and situational accessible
memory (SAM). These different types of memory systems are used to explain the complex
phenomenology of PTSD, including re-experiencing traumatic events and emotional
processing of the trauma. The dual representations in memory of traumatic experiences
constitute the minimum cognitive architecture within which the complexity of traumamemory can be understood.
One representation will be of the person‟s conscious experience of the trauma.
This presentation is called VAM because it can in principle be deliberately retrieved from
the store of autobiographical experiences. VAMs contain some information about the
sensory features of the situation, the emotional and physiological reactions experienced,
and the perceived meaning of the event. Immediately after trauma, these memories are
likely to be dominated by detailed information concerning the conscious perception of
sensory reactions. Repeated recall of certain aspects of the traumatic experience may lead
to some features while other features may be harder to be remembered.
The second representation, which cannot be deliberately accessed, is the output of
the more extensive nonconscious processing of the traumatic situation. It is termed SAM
because the representations may be accessed automatically when the person is in a context
in which the physical features or meaning are similar to those of the traumatic situation.
This context may be internal, such as consciously thinking about the trauma, or external,
such as hearing about a similar trauma on television. Brewin, Dalgleish and Joseph
propose that the sensory, physiological, and motor aspects of the traumatic experiences are
represented in SAM in the form of analogical codes that enable the original experience to
be recreated. These codes would be part of an overall representation that contains (a)
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 7
stimulus information automatically coded for its ability to discriminate the trauma from
other nontraumatic events; (b) meaning derived from prior learning and from innate
appraisal mechanisms concerned with the achievement of universal goals; and (c)
information about the person‟s state of consciousness. The trauma survivor may only
become aware that these representations have been accessed when they experience
symptoms such as motor impulses, emotional arousal, dissociation, or intrusive images.
Ideally, SAMs are integrated with VAMs to form a coherent and elaborate trauma
narrative. Under extremely negative emotional experience, however, the conscious
processing that leads to VAMs is impaired. As a result, Brewin et al., explain that there is
relatively more trauma information encoded in the SAM system and very little in the
VAM system. Accordingly, intrusive trauma memories occur because VAMs does not
inhibit the cue-activation of SAMs.
As has been briefly described above, SAMs contain a great amount of detailed
information that is not available to conscious processing. Like implicit memories, SAMs
cannot be deliberately retrieved, edited and are repetitive (as in flashbacks) and difficult to
modify. In contrast, VAMs, like explicit memories, are less detailed and easy to be edited
in various ways to control affect by emphasizing positive or negative aspects or by
creating more or less detailed representation of the trauma. These characteristics lead to
the prediction that verbal descriptions of the trauma should be different, depending upon
whether the corresponding SAMs have been activated. “Verbal accounts that are
unaccompanied by the subjective experience of intense fear or of reliving the trauma
should be more variable and should contain less detail than verbal accounts accompanied
by the sensation of reliving the trauma. Whereas the former should become more
schematic and less specific over time, the latter should remain highly consistent, even after
many years” (p. 682).
The self-memory-system model
The other alternative theoretical perspective to complement the previous ones is
called the self-memory-system model of autobiographical memory (Conway, 2003
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Williams, Conway & Cohen, 2008). Conway et al.
suggests that intrusive trauma memories are encoded in the episodic memory system as
episodic memory.
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 8
It should be noted here that the conceptualization of episodic memory in this model is
slightly different from that of Tulving (1972). Tulving originally made a distinction
between episodic memory and semantic memory and considered each as a separate and
distinct memory system. For Tulving, episodic memory consists of personal experiences
and the specific objects, people, and events that have been experienced at a particular time
and place. Semantic knowledge consists of general knowledge and facts about the world.
Tulving himself in his 1993 article (quoted in Pellimer, 1998) updated his conception of
episodic memory by stressing conscious awareness in remembering. In his words:
“Episodic memory. . . makes it possible for a person to be consciously aware of an earlier
experience in a certain situation at a certain time . . . The act of remembering a personally
experienced event, that is, consciously recollecting it, is characterized by a distinctive,
unique awareness of reexperiencing here and now something that happened before, at
another time and place” (in Pellimer, 1998, p. 49).
For Conway et al., episodic and semantic knowledges are not two separate,
compartmentalized structures, but are in an interactive and interdependent relationship.
Semantic knowledge is derived from personal experiences by a process of abstraction and
generalization. Episodic memories are interpreted and classified by Conway in terms of
general semantic knowledge in the forms of schemas and scripts. More about the schemas
and scripts will be discussed later.
Episodic memories are detailed “experience-near” records that are rich in sensoryperceptual detail. If these memories become attached to durable pre-existing long-term
knowledge, or if they lead to the formation of such knowledge, these episodic memories
are then retained for longer periods. Accordingly, episodic memories are a sort of
“sample” of past experience or a sample of a past self that created the episodic record
(Conway, 2003). What is encoded during a traumatic event is determined by what is called
the working self. The working self is a complex goal hierarchy that organizes information
in line with currently active goals. It is comparable to the central executive function in
Baddeley‟s (1986) model of working memory.Sensory-perceptual-affective knowledge is
abstracted from experiences. Conway postulates that when a working self goal hierarchical
structure changes (e.g., from doing a class assigment to going fishing, or from feeling
exicted to feeling disappointed, that at that point an episodic memory, or possibly a set of
episodic memories, is formed.
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 9
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) propose that the instantiation of memories in
consciousness and their incorporation into ongoing processing sequences is modulated by
central or executive control process. Episodic memories are activated by cues that bear
perceptual resemblances with the memory. If not lost, episodic memories are slowly
integrated with more abstract levels of autobiographical knowledge, which hinders cuedactivation of unwanted intrusion of the specific episodic memory. The working self
controls access to the autobiographical knowledge base, which is made of conceptual
knowledge from two broad areas: lifetime periods and general events.
Life-time periods contain general knowledge of significant others, common
locations, activities, plans and goals that represent characteristics of a period. In other
words, a life-time period represents thematic knowledge about common features of that
period. General events are more heterogeneous and at the same time more specific than
life-time periods. Both repeated events and single events are characteristic of general
events. Organization of autobiographical knowledge at the level of general events is
extensive and it appears virtually always to refer to progress in the attainment of highly
self-relevant goals. One prominent feature of general events that Conway has identified is
that they feature vivid memories of events relating to the attainment or failure to attain
personal goals. General events then contain knowledge about locations, others, activities,
feelings, and goals. General event knowledge can be used to access certain lifetime
periods that contain associated knowledge.
In addition to this autobiographical knowledge, the SMS model contains episodic
memories as mentioned above. The involvement of these two systems in remembering
form specific autobiographical memories. Within this conceptualization of
autobiographical memory, the self is both the experience and the product of the
experiences.
Williams, Conway and Cohen (2008) state that the defining characteristic of
autobiographical memory is its relationship to the self. A person remembers events
because they have personal significance and what is remembered as personally significant
makes up the database from which the self is constructed. Thus, the SMS model of
memory organization provides a fluent model of how working memory, autobiographical
knowledge, and the self interact to influence why people remember what they do from
their everyday experiences.
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 10
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
Autobiographical memory (AM) refers to the memories a person has of his or her
own life experiences (Robinson, 1988). The beginning of systematic empirical research on
AM can be traced back to Francis Galton and Sigmund Freud. Francis Galton and
Sigmund Freud have emerged from the Ebbinghausian tradition of learning and memory
research as two prominent figures who favored the direct study o personal recollections
(Boring, 1950, and Robinson, 1988, for review). Interest in biographical memory has also
emerged in cognitive psychology, pioneered by Neisser. Based on his review of the work
on AM by these scholars, Robinson concludes that people use memories of personal
experiences to plan, solve problems, instruct and guide others, and justify and explain their
actions to themselves and others. “Autobiographical memory is not only a record, it is a
resource” (p. 23).
AM implicitly involves thinking about the past in the present (Bluck, 2003). Bluck
and Alea (2002) summarize several views of AM as including event-specific details and
images, complete memories for particular events, lifetime periods and life themes, and
one‟s entire life story. Brewer (1986) used the term personal memory to refer to AM,
while Pillemer (1998) favored the term personal event memory. The characteristics of
personal event memory in Pellimer are actually an expansion of Tulving conception of
episodic memory, Brewer‟s personal memory, and Nelson‟s (1993) autobiographical
memory.
Brewer‟s conception of personal memory itself is an expansion of the concept of
episodic memory. He defines personal memory as “a recollection of a particular episode
from an individual‟s past” (Brewer, 1986, p. 34). It is personal memory because it is
memory for information relating to the self and an analysis of AM in terms of the self
provides an internally consistent account of the topic. A personal memory approximates a
“reliving” of the person‟s phenomenal experience during that earlier moment; it usually
involves visual imagery and affect; it represents an experience that occurring at a specific
time and place, whether or not the event can be dated retrospectively or located precisely;
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 11
and it is accompanied by a belief that the memory is a veridical record of the event that
was personally experienced.
Nelson (1993, in Pillemer, 1998) asserted that as a subcategory of episodic
memory, AM contains certain events that have a privileged status in memory that matter to
the person‟s evolving life story. She defines AM as “specific, personal, long-lasting, and
(usually) of significance to the self-system . . . it forms one‟s personal life history” (p. 50).
In line with Brewer‟s position, event representations need not be accurate to qualify as
autobiographical memories. “Memories do not need to be true or correct to be part of that
system” (p. 50). In agreement with this position, Pillemer (1998) states: “If a life story can
be truthful even if it does not conform perfectly to the historical past, then personal
memories composing a life history are psychologically valid objects of analysis in their
own right.” This is also the position taken by this paper in the understanding of AM and its
interaction with traumatic experience.
After a brief discussion of each of theoretical perspectives upon which Pillemer
(1998) has expanded his conceptualization of personal event memory, now the defining
characteristics of this type of memory will be quoted at length:
The memory represents a specific event that took place at a particular time and place, rather
than a general event or an extended series of related happenings.
at the time of the event.
The memory contains a detailed account of the rememberer‟s own personal circumstances
The verbal narrative account of the event is accompanied by sensory images, including
visual, auditory, olfactory images or bodily sensations, that contribute to the feeling of
“reexperiencing” or “reliving.”
Memory details and sensory images correspond to a particular moment or moments of
phenomenal experiences.
The rememberer believes that the memory is a truthful representation of what transpired.
(Pillemer, 1998, pp. 51-52; italics original).
Pillemer further explains that two levels of representation, that is, image and narrative,
are involved in personal event memories. Also, these memories document not only central
themes or meaning of past episodes, they also bear idiosyncratic peripheral details of
personal circumstances. Following Nigro and Neisser (1983), Conway (1996) has
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 12
identified that autobiographical memories may be represented from an observer or from a
field perspective. Research by Nigro and Neisser (in Conway, 1996; see also Williams,
Conway & Cohen, 2008) showed that when their memories, some were remembered from
the field perspective, i.e., from the original viewpoint of the experience. However, a larger
number of memories were found to be viewed from the outside, i.e., from the point of
view of an external observer. Nigro and Neisser contended that the second type of
memories cannot be merely copies of the original perception; they must have been
reconstructed. These researchers found that older memories were more likely to be
reconstructed ones, while recent memories were more likely to be copy-type memories
experienced from the field perspective.
THREE FUNCTIONS OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
Before proceeding further, clarification of the term function is in order. According
to Bluck and Alea (2002), function has two meanings that are related to each other,
connoting either use or adaptive function. Identification of two different senses of function
was actually already put forth by Bruce (1989, in Pillemer, 1998). In his conceptualization,
function refers to “real-world usefulness or adaptive significance of memory
mechanisms”(p.16). An analysis of real-world usefulness focuses on how personal event
memories influence one‟s daily life, for better or for worse, whereas an analysis of
adaptive significance focuses on how and why memory would have evolved into its
current state.
Several researchers have discussed the theoretical functions of the human ability to
remember the past and the benefits of a functional approach to memory (e.g., Baddeley,
1987; Bluck, 2003; Bluck & Alea, 2002; Kihlstrom, 2009; Pillemer, 2003). While
different researchers may have a different focus on this topic, most of the theoretical
discussion on the functions of AM fits has converged on three main positions as
represented by Pillemer (1992). These three functions are self (self-continuity,
psychodynamic integrity), directive (planning for present and future behaviors), and
communicative (social bonding). Bluck (2003) has expanded this formulation and referred
to these three functions as self, social, and directive functions. Although these functions
have been made into discrete categories, they frequently overlap in real-world
circumstances, and the same memory can serve multiple functions (Pillemer, 2009). Their
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 13
utility may then lie more in the way in which we organize our thinking about the functions
of AM rather than in applying specific episodic recall. Furthermore, as Conway (2003)
points out, these self, social, and directive functions are mediated by cognitive-affective
mechanisms and processes that underlie the varied used of AM.
Self-function
In his notion of psychodynamic function, Pillemer emphasizes the emotional and
psychological importance for the self of recalling one‟s own past. A variety of
formulations on the function of AM in the continuity of the self have been suggested by
many researchers, although these formulations are not necessarily presented in the
psychodynamic tradition. Barclay (1996) emphasizes the preservation of a sense of being a
coherent person over time. He refers this functions as the “intrapsychic function” of AM.
The other function is to establish and maintain personal and meaningful relationships with
others. This function is referred to as the “interpsychic function”, and it is perceptual and
sociopsychological in nature. In addition to these two, Barclay also proposes two more
functions, that is, “social-cultural” function, and “construction/reconstruction and
production/reproduction of history” function. More will be said about the last two
functions in the discussion of narratives.
Conway (1996) claims that there are some active sets of plans and goals in the
autobiographical knowledge base and these reflect personally meaningful and self-relevant
themes. Themes arise in response to discrepancies between the current or “working” self
concept and some desired or even feared self. This characterization of themes stems from
discrepancies between different self states (for example, between the actual self and the
ideal self), and these discrepancies in turn generate motives and affective experiences.
Within this view, themes directly influence the encoding of autobiographical memories.
Accordingly, autobiographical knowledge is a record of past selves in the sense that
retained knowledge and its particular organization, reflects the operation of the encoding
of the themes of a (past) active or working self. Conway also remarks that aspects of
memory that suggest life themes and detailed and fluent accounts of personally critical
moments are most evident in individuals who have suffered trauma. Robinson (1986)
concurs that when the self is in adverse conditions, such as in trauma, requiring selfchange, autobiographical knowledge becomes especially important.
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 14
In various studies the dynamic link between self and (autobiographical) memory
has received increasing attention. Wilson and Ross (2003), for instance, discuss the
interdependent and reciprocal relations between the self and AM. These researchers
provide an operationalization of two functions that memory serves for the self: providing a
coherent view of self and a largely favorable view of the self. Their findings show that
people self-enhance by evaluating past selves as inferior to their current one. This work
highlights the truly autobiographical nature of AM because an autobiography is now
conceived of, not only as a series of events, but also a record of a series of selves across
time (Bluck, 2003). In turn, remembered events can have implications for the current self,
including current affects and feelings of satisfaction with life.
How self-continuity or coherent sense of self develops from childhood, through
adolescence, to adulthood have been investigated by several researchers (e.g. Beike, 2004;
Brewer, 1986; Fivush & Haden, 2003; Graft & Ohta, 2002; Rubin, Wetzler, & Nebes,
1986). Discussion of the development of and continuity of the self throughout stages of
human development is beyond the scope of this paper.
Social Function
The social importance of AM in developing, maintaining, and strengthening social
bonds has been noted (e.g., Pillermer, 1998), and this function has been linked to its
evolutionary adaptive value (Nelson, 1993, 203). Even Neisser (in Pillemer, 1998) claims
that the social function of AM is the most fundamental one. The social function can be
divided into three fundamental categories: social interaction, empathy, and social bonding
Alea & Bluck (2002). AM provides material for social conversation and allows people to
better understand and empathize with others. It offers a channel for instruction and
information (Pillemer, 1998), and that way, it is developmentally important for
relationships between parents and children (Fivush & Haden, 2003). Impairment in
episodic memory may adversely affect social interaction.
How social functions are served when people share their memories have been the
focus of the studies by Alea and Bluck (2002, 2003). They provide two interrelated
definitions of their model of social function as outcome variable. The first definition
refers to the uses of memory: memory has been put to in use in different social situations
such as intimacy maintenance, teaching, and eliciting empathy, or, which function is
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 15
served? The second idea of function involves adaptivity : to what extent memory serves
various social conditions (e.g., to what extent memory sharing would result in an increase
in intimacy). In other words, adaptivity refers to the extent to which the use of memory
results in adaptive or maladaptive outcomes. For example, the use of AMs to develop
intimacy in relationships is adaptive when intimacy is enhanced when AMs are shared.
In their conceptual model, Alea and Bluck (2003) incorporate several components
that include lifespan contextual influences, the qualitative characteristics of memory
(emotionality and level of detail recalled), the person‟s characteristics (age, gender, and
personality), the familiarity of and similarity of the person to the listener, the level of
responsiveness during the memory-sharing process, and the nature of the social
relationship in which the memory sharing takes place (valence and length of the
relationship). All these components have been shown to influence the uses and adaptivity
of the social functions of AMs. A brief description of each component is provided below,
following Alea and Bluck (2003).
The lifespan context constitutes a context that can directly influence how (well)
AMs are used for social purposes. Taking a lifespan perspective helps us understand how
changes in one‟s chronological age and their life context impact the uses and adaptation of
AM. Emotionality and level of detail recalled are included here because they influence
how meaningful memories are encoded. Memories of specific episode that are rich in
emotion and vividness communicate “meaning over and above the particular informational
content of the memories, and thereby help[s] the speaker achieve important interpersonal
goals” (Pellimer, 1992, p. 242, quoted in Alea and Buck, p. 169). Enduring characteristics
such as age, gender and personality, affect the way a person recalls significant events,
thereby affecting the extent to which social functions are served. The person who
constructs memories in conversational remembering also takes into account his or her
listener or audience. How well the person knows the listener and how similar that person
is with the listener in terms of age, gender, and personality influence the amount of
information or vividness of memories shared. Numerous studies reviewed by Alea and
Buck have shown that sharing memories with similar and known others influences the
emotional quality and detail of the memory shared and should thereby affect the degree to
which social functions are served.
The authors explain that responsiveness can be an indicator for attentiveness and
comprehension, and a further signal for more contribution to the social exchange.
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 16
Responsiveness influences the type and extent of personal self-disclosure between both
parties. In turn, responsive listening influences how memories are shared. Finally, two
relationship qualities, valence and length, can influence the social functions of AM. A
person with a poor valence (e.g, avoidant) discloses lower levels of positive emotional
information during social interaction than those with positive valence (e.g., secure).
Length of relationship relates to the use of the personal past during the initial stage of a
social interaction. In those situations, AMs are likely to be employed to create intimacy,
while in continuing relationships, AMs are used for maintaining intimacy.
Directive Function
While Neisser claims the primacy of social functions, Pillemer‟ primary focus is
more on the directive function of AM. Pillemer characterizes this function as “the guiding
power of the specific episode” as the subtitle of his 2003 article. He argues that “directive
functions of personal event memories are not secondary in importance to self and social
functions. Rather, they are among the most basic and elemental functions served by
autobiographical memory, appearing early in human history and tied closely to survival
pressures” (p. 194). Here, he intends to emphasize the evolutionary significance and
practical importance of the directive function. Using examples of everyday and traumatic
memories, he finds out that people recollect specific events or moments of personal
significance and use these memories of both everyday and traumatic experiences as a
guide towards successful functioning and a lesson about repeated failure.
The role of AM in problem solving and in the formation of opinions and attitude as
guides for behavior has also been pointed out by other researchers (e.g., Baddeley, 1987;
Conway, 1996, 2003). Also, Lockhart (1989, quoted in Bluck, 2003) has claimed that the
major role of AM is to provide flexibility in the construction and updating of rules that
allow one to comprehend the past experiences and predict future outcomes.
Pillemer has reviewed numerous directive functions of AM in his work (1998,
2003, 2009). Pillemer points out that the memory of a life-threatening experience can be a
good example of how a directive function serves, because this kind of experience captures
in vivid detail what is safe and what is to be avoided in the future. Personally significant
events or emotionally charged ones continue to influence the trauma survivors for many
months or years in part because they repeatedly revisit the events in memory and adjust
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 17
their current behaviors accordingly. The use of a traumatic memory as an example should
not imply that memory directives are invariably associated with negative emotional
events. As noted earlier about posttraumatic growth, positive moments or unexpected
successes may provide inspiration and guidance in the pursuit of a particular life course.
According to Pillemer (1998), most cognitive psychologist have located the
predictive and directive functions of memory in abstract structures, such as scripts,
schemas, rules, or plans. In other words, the knowledge is represented in semantic rather
than in episodic memory. As a consequence, it is general and broadly applicable rather
than specific and idiosyncratic. The emphasis on abstract knowledge structures has
obscured the predictive and directive functions that vivid memories of particular episodes
provide. In contrast, autobiographical memory has its own value, with its representations
of particular instances, that may not be captured by the general memory function of
prediction and preparation for future events.
In describing how specific memories are laid down and retrieved when mental
processing falls, Pillemer (1998) quotes Schank‟s (1980) statement: “when we have failed
to predict accurately what will happen next is when we are most in need of a specific
memory to help us through the rough spots. To do this, our index of memories must be in
terms of their relationship to processing prediction failures” (p. 88). In concluding our
disccusion of Pellimer‟s conceptualization of the directive functions of autobiographical
memory, his position is presented here in his own words:
Understanding of current situations is enhanced, and guidelines for behavior are
unearthed, by recalling relevant prior episodes of learning. Personal event
memories
also support a sirective function that operates at a higher, meta-cognitive level.
Memorable episodes provide an organization skeleton for the production of
extended autobiographical memory narratives; they guide or “direct” the
reconstruction and retelling of life histories. Narrative representations of a person‟s life are
built around highly salient and memorable episodic nodes.
Constructing a coherent, temporally ordered life history depends on having
access not only to the meaning of momentous past events, but also to the imagistic
components of personal event memories. As the narrative unfolds, the rememberer
mentally moves from scene to concrete scene; general descriptions of “how things
were” are punctuated with specific descriptions of particular instances. The
extended narrative is anchored by concrete, perceptual landmarks. Moving from
landmark to
Landmark, the temporally ordered life story unfolds (1998, pp. 95-96)
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 18
Pillemer‟s work, in Bluck‟s (2003) view, has revitalized research on how people
use specific personal memories, consciously or not, to guide and direct the behavior.
Another interest for further research, besides specific episode, would include life domains
or themes and the life story or narrative to find out if each of these areas has similar power
in directing one‟s future plans and behavior.
EMOTIONS IN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
Memory for past emotion plays a vital role in daily life, and emotions are elicited
by experiences that matter to us. A central feature of AM is its relation to emotion
(Holland & Kensinger, 2010; Sotgiu & Mormont, 2008 ;Welzer & Markowitsch, 2005).
However, there is no simple relation between emotion and memory. Some research
findings have shown that emotions, especially negative and unpleasant ones, impair
memory, but other findings lead to generally detail, accurate and persistent memory.
Indeed, people are more likely to remember emotion-arousing events than neutral,
everyday events. They may even report near-perfect memories for circumstances
surrounding unique emotionally charged events (Christianson & Safer, 1995; Holland &
Kensinger, 2010, for review)). However, there are cases in which victims of crimes may
show a temporary inability to remember a traumatic event. There are also reports of early
traumatic childhood experiences that are blocked until adulthood or never recovered, but
which have profound effects on developing anxiety, depression, and dissociative
symptoms in later life (Brewin, Andrews, & Gotlib, 1993, in Christianson & Safer, 1995).
Brewin (2009) points out that the idea that there is a fundamentally distinct type of
memory for traumatic events dates back as far as Pierre Janet. Janet distingusihed
traumatic memory from ordinary or narrative memory. Extreme life-threatening
experiences made people unable to assimilate these experiences into their ordinary beliefs
or assumptions and meaning structures. In Janet‟s view, this type of memory would be
stored in a different form, dissociated from conscious awareness and voluntary control.
Traumatic memory was inflexible and fixed, whereas narrative memory was adaptable to
current circumstances. Janet believed that a dissociative process rendered a memory less
accessible to voluntary retrieval but more prone to be automatically evoked by reminders
A different position is taken by Shobe and Kihlstrom (1997) who argued that
trauma was extremely well remembered and research evidence was in favor of emotion
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 19
enhancing rather than impairing memory. Brewin (2009) has reviewed numerous studies
and concluded that the trauma memories of PTSD patients are distinguished from those of
of non-PTSD samples in terms of them containing prominent perceptual features, being
highly emotional, and involving an intense reliving of the event in the present. Memories
of non-PTSD individuals are more likely to have an external observer perspective rather
than a field perspective. Furthermore, PTSD patients recall more emotion and physical
sensations, whereas those who report observer memories recall more spatial information,
self-observations, and peripheral, as opposed to central, details.
In discussing memory for emotional events, Christianson and Safer (1995) suggest
that we differentiate between situations where the to-be-remembered (TBR) event is
accompanied by emotional arousal that is evoked by the TBR material proper on one hand,
and situations where the source of the arousal is dissociated from the TBR event on the
other hand. It is natural that in autobiographical memories, the emotional arousal is evoked
by the TBR event.
Despite the fact that witnessing a genuine trauma is far more emotionally arousing
than witnessing a simulated event in a laboratory setting, Christianson and Safer observe
that laboratory setting do not necessarily produce qualitatively different memories than
does witnessing real-life trauma events. Moreover, recent laboratory findings in many
ways mimic various phenomena observed from real-life settings.
There are two phenomena related to the issue of how one‟s emotional feelings
affect what is stored in or retrieved from memory: state-dependent effect and mood
congruence effect. “State-dependent effects (state-dependent learning or state-dependent
retrieval) refers to an impairment in performance when there is a mismatch between
physical or mental states at learning and at retrieval. The state-dependent effect assumes
that mood acts as a critical context cue, no matter what the nature is of the information
being learned and retrieved. The state-dependent effect is similar to a dissociative effect,
wherein existing memories may, under certain circumstances, be unavailable to
consciousness” (Christianson & Safer, 1995, p. 228). Another type of state-dependent
phenomena is context-dependent effects. These effects become apparent when information
learned in one context may be hard to remember in another context. Christianson & Safer
illustrate this in the case of victims of crime returned to the crime scene to help them
remember details that they could no otherwise recall.
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 20
About the second phenomenon, Christianson and Safer state that “mood
congruence effects occur when stimuli agreeing in affective valence with one‟s mood are
learned and retrieved better than stimuli of different affective valence” (p. 229). Mood
congruence effects occur, for example, in a typical experiment where subjects are asked to
recall recent autobiographical memories. Those who are induced to feel happy tended to
recall more happy than sad memories, whereas the reverse is true for subjects who are
induced to feel sad.
Another useful formulation of implicit and explicit memories of emotion has been
presented by Levine, Lench and Safer (2009). They point out that emotions are
represented in these two forms in memory with different properties. Explicit memories
refer to “representations of specific experiences (episodic memory) or facts (semantic
memory) that can be deliberately retrieved and verbally recounted to others” (p. 1060).
These memories are accessible by a conscious feeling of remembering (episodic) and
knowing (semantic) across situations. The other form is implicit memory which refers to
“representations of past experience that are not accessible to conscious awareness but
nonetheless influence current feelings, thoughts, or behavior” (p.1060). Implicit memories
are elicited involuntarily by specific retrieval cues.
Explicit memory allows people to consciously retrieve and reconstruct their
emotion of the past based on memory for prior cognitions, episodic and semantic
information. Implicit memory for emotion is accessible without deliberation in the
presence of retrieval cues that resemble the situation in which the emotion was originally
experienced. And when it becomes accessible, the resulting experience shares many of the
properties of the original emotional experience. Representation of past emotional
experiences persist in the implicit memory and thereby influence current feelings and
behaviors, even when there is no recollection of the original experience.
What functions do remembering emotion serve? Levine, Lench and Safer (2009)
suggest that “remembered emotion informs individuals‟ decisions about whether to seek
out or avoid similar situations in the future. Remembered emotions also help the
individual maintain a coherent sense of self over time. . . Moreover, shared memories of
emotion may guide group members towards decisions that benefit the larger cultural
group. These functions are consistent with theories holding that autobiographical
memories serve future-directive, self-defining, and social functions…(p. 1067).
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 21
CONSTRUCTION OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
A particular memory, which is the building block of AMs, has an internal structure
of its own. Accordingly, AMs are not just a collection of particular memories, but are
organized and indexed so that they can be retrieved on demand (Williams, Conway,
Cohen, 2008). The defining characteristic of AM is its relationship to the self. Events that
are remembered are of personal significance and form the database from which the self is
constructed. Moreover, personally significant memories are fundamental elements of one‟s
personal identity. The self is represented as either the agent or object of some action, or as
the experience of some state (Kihlstrom, 2009). As such, the person‟s cognitive,
motivational and emotional state at the time of the event is also represented in AM.
Because AMs are also episodic memories, there should be some sense of how one episode
is related to each other in the flow of personal time. Kihlstrom (2009) points out that the
sequence of events makes a difference to their meaning, and every person has their own
particular ways of sequencing their life-events. Wilson and Ross (2003) have reviewed
evidence that people‟s memories of their personal pasts (both what and when) are
malleable and may be influenced by current self-identity and self-motives. Individuals‟
current self-views, beliefs, and goals influence their recollections and appraisals of former
selves. People‟s current self-views, in turn, are influenced by what they remember about
their personal past, as well as how they remember earlier selves and episodes. Likewise,
their reconstruction of memories and perceived distance from past experiences have
implications for how the past influences the present.
Under the subtopic of Self-Function in this paper, the intrapsychic and interpsychic
TRAUMATIC EVENTS AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
Aloysius Soesilo
FAKULTAS PSIKOLOGI
UNIVERSITAS KRISTEN SATYA WACANA
SALATIGA
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 2
ABSTRAK
Tulisan ini berupaya untuk membahas hubungan antara pengalaman traumatik dengan
memori autobiografis. Memori traumatik berbeda dari memori pada umumnya yang tidak
berhubungan dengan peristiwa trauma. Perbedaan itu nampak di dalam tiga perspektif
yang dikemukakan dalam artikel ini, yakni, memori intrusif, teori representasi ganda dan
model self-memory-system. Selanjutnya, memori autobiografis serta ketiga fungsinya (self,
sosial, dan direktif) dibahas. Emosi mempunyai peranan yang amat penting dalam
memori, khususnya di dalam pengaruhnya atas apa yang diingat dan bagaimana apa yang
dingat kemudian direkonstruksikan dalam naratif. Di dalam kontruksi memori
autobiografis ada tiga komponen pokok yang dibahas, yakni tujuan, proses dan produk.
Oleh karena memori autobiografis dan naratif bukan merupakan suatu phenomenon yang
terlepas dari konteksnya, maka hubungan resiprokal yang dinamis antara keduanya dan
konteks sosial-kultural harus diperhatikan. Naratif traumatis adalah upaya oleh individu
untuk mengkontruksikan kembali dirinya dan dunianya setelah peristiwa trauma. Dengan
demikian memori autobiografis dan naratif trauma menyediakan pintu masuk bagi studi
tentang fenomena penting dalam praktek-praktek kekerasan yang menjadi salah satu ciri
dari kehidupan sosial-politis modern.
Kata kunci: Traumatic events, autobiographical memory, emotions, construction of self
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 3
TRAUMATIC EVENTS AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
Exposure to a wide variety of violent and life-threatening events occurs with a
relative frequency has been experienced by many people across the globe. The growing
number of autobiographical and biographical accounts of victims of human inflictred
trauma attest to the fact that traumatic memories can be remarkably enduring. An
emotional reliving of the traumatic experience demonstrate the lasting emotional salience
in these people‟s recollection years after the event. This paper attempts to study
autobiographical memory (AM), in its relation to traumatic events, taking into account the
psychological, social, and cultural-historic context in which it occurs. It will discuss first
the effect of trauma on memory, to what ends AM is used by individuals, and how it is
constructed. The primary concern is with why and how individuals remember both
mundane and significant life events, especially traumatic ones. Its concern is not with how
much or how well they remember their personal past, although admittedly, these features
often play some role in memory. Autobiographical memory and narrative are situated in a
social-cultural context, and its dynamic reciprocal relationships among these factors are
explored. Accordingly, the construction and understanding of AM cannot be independent
of this context. Narratives eventually open the window for us to understand not only how
trauma survivors have attempted to reconstruct themselves and share their life stories, but
also to understand the often unspeakably violent practices of modern social-political
consciousness.
MEMORIES FOR TRAUMATIC EVENTS
The way people process a trauma after the occurrence is critical for the stressor
event to configured or not. The stressor stimulus is not the only factor in the
characterization of an event as trauma. This characterization also depends on the
perceptive processing during and after the trauma event and on the representation patterns
of reality in the experience. It then becomes obvious that memory plays a significant role
in this process (Brewin, 2003). Many studies concur in assuming that the processing, re-
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 4
experiencing, and representation of traumatic symptoms are encoded and organized in
memory, and then retrieved.
Traumatic experiences and memories have been investigated in greater number in
literature associated with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and with patients with
depression (e.g., Brewin, 1998;Sotgiu & Mormont, 2008)). There is a large group of
traumatized people, however, that do not meet the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000) criteria for PTSD and other psychiatric disorders. Examples of events
meeting the clinical criteria for trauma are natural disaster, interpersonal violence and
torture, and road traffic accidents. The individual experiences or witnesses actual or
threatened death, serious injury or threat to one‟s or others‟ integrity. In other words, the
individual needs to experiences an intense negative emotional reaction at the time of the
traumatic event. Several typical symptoms that emerge as a consequence of this
experience are delineated in the DSM-IV. These include re-experiencing of the traumatic
event, avoidance behavior related to the trauma, and symptoms of hyperarousal (e.g.,
startle response, sleeping problems, and a general emotional numbing response). Reexperiencing of the trauma emerges in the form of intrusive traumatic memories,
nightmares and distress in reaction to trauma reminders.
Intrusive memories
Intrusive trauma memories are characterized by “rich multi-model mental images
of highly detailed sensory impressions of the traumatic event including sights, sounds,
feelings and bodily sensations” (Krans, Näring, Becker, & Holmes, 2009, p. 1077). In
contrast to deliberate recall, this type of memory comes into consciousness unbidden. The
individual often feels he or she has no power or control over this intrusion. Some features
of intrusive images may be similar for experiencing actual trauma or witnessing trauma
(Berntsen, 2009). Brewin (1998) found that compared to non-clinical samples, patients
with PTSD or depression reported memories that intruded more frequently, were more
distressing, and sometimes had unusual characteristics, such as the sensation of reliving
the event at the present moment. According to Mace (2007), intrusive memories can be
found in everyday mental life as part of psychological disorders as well. Intrusive trauma
memories may manifest in a variety of degrees from mildly distressing images to full-
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 5
blown flashbacks. In the most severe form, the individual is completely engulfed, so to
speak, in the memory and temporarily loses touch with the reality of the here-and-now.
The survivor often reports feeling like a different person after the event. This
personal change relates to what Pillemer ( 1998) terms “originating events.” Death-related
events, although not necessarily traumatic, can often be regarded originating events. As
such, these events are perceived as a cause or reason for profound life changes. Several
studies, however, have shown that trauma victims have also reported “posttraumatic
growth”, that is, positive outcomes from the struggle with trauma that surpass the pretrauma level (e.g., Joseph & Linley, 2008; Wilson, 2006).
Ehlers, Hackmann, and Michael (3004) propose that the majority of intrusive
memories can interpreted as re-experiencing of warning signals, i.e., stimuli that signaled
the onset of the trauma or of moments when the meaning of the events changed for worse.
Accordingly, the content of intrusive memories do not appear to be random fragments
(Ehlers et al., 2002). The warning signals seem to consist of markers of the situational
context in which the traumatic event took place. In prolonged traumatic experience, there
may be several crucial moments when meanings of the events change for worse, each of
which can be represented in re-experiencing. Ehlers contends that moments with the
largest emotional impact do not necessarily happen during the trauma itself, but may
emerge later when the survivor realizes what could have happened to him or her, or when
something gives the traumatic situation a more personal meaning.
Based on their theory of intrusive trauma memories, Ehlers, Hackmann, and
Michael (2003) have identified several functions of intrusive trauma memory. First, it
aims at the emotional processing of a traumatic event. Information of sensory and
physiological details may not be available through deliberate recall. Second, intrusive
memories may provide information about impending danger by way of an associated
feeling of current threat. As a result, the individual may becomes more prepared for action.
Third, it provides protection for the status quo of the self‟s goal structure and selfcoherence.
Ehlers, Hackmann, and Michael also suggest several efficient ways of updating
trauma memories and putting them into their context. First, identification of the moments
during the trauma that create the greatest distress and sense of “newness” during recall
through imaginal reliving. This imaginal reliving can be accomplished through writing a
narrative. Second, identification of information that updates the impression the person had
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 6
at the time by identifying the course, circumstances, and outcome of the trauma. And
finally, actively incorporating of the information using verbal and imagery technique.
These therapeutic implications suggested by the authors set the stage for this paper to
highlight the importance of autobiographical narratives that will be discussed later.
Dual representation theory of trauma
Another theoretical perspective about the relationship between trauma and memory
is proposed by the Dual Representation theory (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996). This
theory assumes that traumatic information after early childhood is encoded in two
different memory system: verbally accessible memory (VAM) and situational accessible
memory (SAM). These different types of memory systems are used to explain the complex
phenomenology of PTSD, including re-experiencing traumatic events and emotional
processing of the trauma. The dual representations in memory of traumatic experiences
constitute the minimum cognitive architecture within which the complexity of traumamemory can be understood.
One representation will be of the person‟s conscious experience of the trauma.
This presentation is called VAM because it can in principle be deliberately retrieved from
the store of autobiographical experiences. VAMs contain some information about the
sensory features of the situation, the emotional and physiological reactions experienced,
and the perceived meaning of the event. Immediately after trauma, these memories are
likely to be dominated by detailed information concerning the conscious perception of
sensory reactions. Repeated recall of certain aspects of the traumatic experience may lead
to some features while other features may be harder to be remembered.
The second representation, which cannot be deliberately accessed, is the output of
the more extensive nonconscious processing of the traumatic situation. It is termed SAM
because the representations may be accessed automatically when the person is in a context
in which the physical features or meaning are similar to those of the traumatic situation.
This context may be internal, such as consciously thinking about the trauma, or external,
such as hearing about a similar trauma on television. Brewin, Dalgleish and Joseph
propose that the sensory, physiological, and motor aspects of the traumatic experiences are
represented in SAM in the form of analogical codes that enable the original experience to
be recreated. These codes would be part of an overall representation that contains (a)
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 7
stimulus information automatically coded for its ability to discriminate the trauma from
other nontraumatic events; (b) meaning derived from prior learning and from innate
appraisal mechanisms concerned with the achievement of universal goals; and (c)
information about the person‟s state of consciousness. The trauma survivor may only
become aware that these representations have been accessed when they experience
symptoms such as motor impulses, emotional arousal, dissociation, or intrusive images.
Ideally, SAMs are integrated with VAMs to form a coherent and elaborate trauma
narrative. Under extremely negative emotional experience, however, the conscious
processing that leads to VAMs is impaired. As a result, Brewin et al., explain that there is
relatively more trauma information encoded in the SAM system and very little in the
VAM system. Accordingly, intrusive trauma memories occur because VAMs does not
inhibit the cue-activation of SAMs.
As has been briefly described above, SAMs contain a great amount of detailed
information that is not available to conscious processing. Like implicit memories, SAMs
cannot be deliberately retrieved, edited and are repetitive (as in flashbacks) and difficult to
modify. In contrast, VAMs, like explicit memories, are less detailed and easy to be edited
in various ways to control affect by emphasizing positive or negative aspects or by
creating more or less detailed representation of the trauma. These characteristics lead to
the prediction that verbal descriptions of the trauma should be different, depending upon
whether the corresponding SAMs have been activated. “Verbal accounts that are
unaccompanied by the subjective experience of intense fear or of reliving the trauma
should be more variable and should contain less detail than verbal accounts accompanied
by the sensation of reliving the trauma. Whereas the former should become more
schematic and less specific over time, the latter should remain highly consistent, even after
many years” (p. 682).
The self-memory-system model
The other alternative theoretical perspective to complement the previous ones is
called the self-memory-system model of autobiographical memory (Conway, 2003
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Williams, Conway & Cohen, 2008). Conway et al.
suggests that intrusive trauma memories are encoded in the episodic memory system as
episodic memory.
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 8
It should be noted here that the conceptualization of episodic memory in this model is
slightly different from that of Tulving (1972). Tulving originally made a distinction
between episodic memory and semantic memory and considered each as a separate and
distinct memory system. For Tulving, episodic memory consists of personal experiences
and the specific objects, people, and events that have been experienced at a particular time
and place. Semantic knowledge consists of general knowledge and facts about the world.
Tulving himself in his 1993 article (quoted in Pellimer, 1998) updated his conception of
episodic memory by stressing conscious awareness in remembering. In his words:
“Episodic memory. . . makes it possible for a person to be consciously aware of an earlier
experience in a certain situation at a certain time . . . The act of remembering a personally
experienced event, that is, consciously recollecting it, is characterized by a distinctive,
unique awareness of reexperiencing here and now something that happened before, at
another time and place” (in Pellimer, 1998, p. 49).
For Conway et al., episodic and semantic knowledges are not two separate,
compartmentalized structures, but are in an interactive and interdependent relationship.
Semantic knowledge is derived from personal experiences by a process of abstraction and
generalization. Episodic memories are interpreted and classified by Conway in terms of
general semantic knowledge in the forms of schemas and scripts. More about the schemas
and scripts will be discussed later.
Episodic memories are detailed “experience-near” records that are rich in sensoryperceptual detail. If these memories become attached to durable pre-existing long-term
knowledge, or if they lead to the formation of such knowledge, these episodic memories
are then retained for longer periods. Accordingly, episodic memories are a sort of
“sample” of past experience or a sample of a past self that created the episodic record
(Conway, 2003). What is encoded during a traumatic event is determined by what is called
the working self. The working self is a complex goal hierarchy that organizes information
in line with currently active goals. It is comparable to the central executive function in
Baddeley‟s (1986) model of working memory.Sensory-perceptual-affective knowledge is
abstracted from experiences. Conway postulates that when a working self goal hierarchical
structure changes (e.g., from doing a class assigment to going fishing, or from feeling
exicted to feeling disappointed, that at that point an episodic memory, or possibly a set of
episodic memories, is formed.
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 9
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) propose that the instantiation of memories in
consciousness and their incorporation into ongoing processing sequences is modulated by
central or executive control process. Episodic memories are activated by cues that bear
perceptual resemblances with the memory. If not lost, episodic memories are slowly
integrated with more abstract levels of autobiographical knowledge, which hinders cuedactivation of unwanted intrusion of the specific episodic memory. The working self
controls access to the autobiographical knowledge base, which is made of conceptual
knowledge from two broad areas: lifetime periods and general events.
Life-time periods contain general knowledge of significant others, common
locations, activities, plans and goals that represent characteristics of a period. In other
words, a life-time period represents thematic knowledge about common features of that
period. General events are more heterogeneous and at the same time more specific than
life-time periods. Both repeated events and single events are characteristic of general
events. Organization of autobiographical knowledge at the level of general events is
extensive and it appears virtually always to refer to progress in the attainment of highly
self-relevant goals. One prominent feature of general events that Conway has identified is
that they feature vivid memories of events relating to the attainment or failure to attain
personal goals. General events then contain knowledge about locations, others, activities,
feelings, and goals. General event knowledge can be used to access certain lifetime
periods that contain associated knowledge.
In addition to this autobiographical knowledge, the SMS model contains episodic
memories as mentioned above. The involvement of these two systems in remembering
form specific autobiographical memories. Within this conceptualization of
autobiographical memory, the self is both the experience and the product of the
experiences.
Williams, Conway and Cohen (2008) state that the defining characteristic of
autobiographical memory is its relationship to the self. A person remembers events
because they have personal significance and what is remembered as personally significant
makes up the database from which the self is constructed. Thus, the SMS model of
memory organization provides a fluent model of how working memory, autobiographical
knowledge, and the self interact to influence why people remember what they do from
their everyday experiences.
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 10
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
Autobiographical memory (AM) refers to the memories a person has of his or her
own life experiences (Robinson, 1988). The beginning of systematic empirical research on
AM can be traced back to Francis Galton and Sigmund Freud. Francis Galton and
Sigmund Freud have emerged from the Ebbinghausian tradition of learning and memory
research as two prominent figures who favored the direct study o personal recollections
(Boring, 1950, and Robinson, 1988, for review). Interest in biographical memory has also
emerged in cognitive psychology, pioneered by Neisser. Based on his review of the work
on AM by these scholars, Robinson concludes that people use memories of personal
experiences to plan, solve problems, instruct and guide others, and justify and explain their
actions to themselves and others. “Autobiographical memory is not only a record, it is a
resource” (p. 23).
AM implicitly involves thinking about the past in the present (Bluck, 2003). Bluck
and Alea (2002) summarize several views of AM as including event-specific details and
images, complete memories for particular events, lifetime periods and life themes, and
one‟s entire life story. Brewer (1986) used the term personal memory to refer to AM,
while Pillemer (1998) favored the term personal event memory. The characteristics of
personal event memory in Pellimer are actually an expansion of Tulving conception of
episodic memory, Brewer‟s personal memory, and Nelson‟s (1993) autobiographical
memory.
Brewer‟s conception of personal memory itself is an expansion of the concept of
episodic memory. He defines personal memory as “a recollection of a particular episode
from an individual‟s past” (Brewer, 1986, p. 34). It is personal memory because it is
memory for information relating to the self and an analysis of AM in terms of the self
provides an internally consistent account of the topic. A personal memory approximates a
“reliving” of the person‟s phenomenal experience during that earlier moment; it usually
involves visual imagery and affect; it represents an experience that occurring at a specific
time and place, whether or not the event can be dated retrospectively or located precisely;
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 11
and it is accompanied by a belief that the memory is a veridical record of the event that
was personally experienced.
Nelson (1993, in Pillemer, 1998) asserted that as a subcategory of episodic
memory, AM contains certain events that have a privileged status in memory that matter to
the person‟s evolving life story. She defines AM as “specific, personal, long-lasting, and
(usually) of significance to the self-system . . . it forms one‟s personal life history” (p. 50).
In line with Brewer‟s position, event representations need not be accurate to qualify as
autobiographical memories. “Memories do not need to be true or correct to be part of that
system” (p. 50). In agreement with this position, Pillemer (1998) states: “If a life story can
be truthful even if it does not conform perfectly to the historical past, then personal
memories composing a life history are psychologically valid objects of analysis in their
own right.” This is also the position taken by this paper in the understanding of AM and its
interaction with traumatic experience.
After a brief discussion of each of theoretical perspectives upon which Pillemer
(1998) has expanded his conceptualization of personal event memory, now the defining
characteristics of this type of memory will be quoted at length:
The memory represents a specific event that took place at a particular time and place, rather
than a general event or an extended series of related happenings.
at the time of the event.
The memory contains a detailed account of the rememberer‟s own personal circumstances
The verbal narrative account of the event is accompanied by sensory images, including
visual, auditory, olfactory images or bodily sensations, that contribute to the feeling of
“reexperiencing” or “reliving.”
Memory details and sensory images correspond to a particular moment or moments of
phenomenal experiences.
The rememberer believes that the memory is a truthful representation of what transpired.
(Pillemer, 1998, pp. 51-52; italics original).
Pillemer further explains that two levels of representation, that is, image and narrative,
are involved in personal event memories. Also, these memories document not only central
themes or meaning of past episodes, they also bear idiosyncratic peripheral details of
personal circumstances. Following Nigro and Neisser (1983), Conway (1996) has
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 12
identified that autobiographical memories may be represented from an observer or from a
field perspective. Research by Nigro and Neisser (in Conway, 1996; see also Williams,
Conway & Cohen, 2008) showed that when their memories, some were remembered from
the field perspective, i.e., from the original viewpoint of the experience. However, a larger
number of memories were found to be viewed from the outside, i.e., from the point of
view of an external observer. Nigro and Neisser contended that the second type of
memories cannot be merely copies of the original perception; they must have been
reconstructed. These researchers found that older memories were more likely to be
reconstructed ones, while recent memories were more likely to be copy-type memories
experienced from the field perspective.
THREE FUNCTIONS OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
Before proceeding further, clarification of the term function is in order. According
to Bluck and Alea (2002), function has two meanings that are related to each other,
connoting either use or adaptive function. Identification of two different senses of function
was actually already put forth by Bruce (1989, in Pillemer, 1998). In his conceptualization,
function refers to “real-world usefulness or adaptive significance of memory
mechanisms”(p.16). An analysis of real-world usefulness focuses on how personal event
memories influence one‟s daily life, for better or for worse, whereas an analysis of
adaptive significance focuses on how and why memory would have evolved into its
current state.
Several researchers have discussed the theoretical functions of the human ability to
remember the past and the benefits of a functional approach to memory (e.g., Baddeley,
1987; Bluck, 2003; Bluck & Alea, 2002; Kihlstrom, 2009; Pillemer, 2003). While
different researchers may have a different focus on this topic, most of the theoretical
discussion on the functions of AM fits has converged on three main positions as
represented by Pillemer (1992). These three functions are self (self-continuity,
psychodynamic integrity), directive (planning for present and future behaviors), and
communicative (social bonding). Bluck (2003) has expanded this formulation and referred
to these three functions as self, social, and directive functions. Although these functions
have been made into discrete categories, they frequently overlap in real-world
circumstances, and the same memory can serve multiple functions (Pillemer, 2009). Their
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 13
utility may then lie more in the way in which we organize our thinking about the functions
of AM rather than in applying specific episodic recall. Furthermore, as Conway (2003)
points out, these self, social, and directive functions are mediated by cognitive-affective
mechanisms and processes that underlie the varied used of AM.
Self-function
In his notion of psychodynamic function, Pillemer emphasizes the emotional and
psychological importance for the self of recalling one‟s own past. A variety of
formulations on the function of AM in the continuity of the self have been suggested by
many researchers, although these formulations are not necessarily presented in the
psychodynamic tradition. Barclay (1996) emphasizes the preservation of a sense of being a
coherent person over time. He refers this functions as the “intrapsychic function” of AM.
The other function is to establish and maintain personal and meaningful relationships with
others. This function is referred to as the “interpsychic function”, and it is perceptual and
sociopsychological in nature. In addition to these two, Barclay also proposes two more
functions, that is, “social-cultural” function, and “construction/reconstruction and
production/reproduction of history” function. More will be said about the last two
functions in the discussion of narratives.
Conway (1996) claims that there are some active sets of plans and goals in the
autobiographical knowledge base and these reflect personally meaningful and self-relevant
themes. Themes arise in response to discrepancies between the current or “working” self
concept and some desired or even feared self. This characterization of themes stems from
discrepancies between different self states (for example, between the actual self and the
ideal self), and these discrepancies in turn generate motives and affective experiences.
Within this view, themes directly influence the encoding of autobiographical memories.
Accordingly, autobiographical knowledge is a record of past selves in the sense that
retained knowledge and its particular organization, reflects the operation of the encoding
of the themes of a (past) active or working self. Conway also remarks that aspects of
memory that suggest life themes and detailed and fluent accounts of personally critical
moments are most evident in individuals who have suffered trauma. Robinson (1986)
concurs that when the self is in adverse conditions, such as in trauma, requiring selfchange, autobiographical knowledge becomes especially important.
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 14
In various studies the dynamic link between self and (autobiographical) memory
has received increasing attention. Wilson and Ross (2003), for instance, discuss the
interdependent and reciprocal relations between the self and AM. These researchers
provide an operationalization of two functions that memory serves for the self: providing a
coherent view of self and a largely favorable view of the self. Their findings show that
people self-enhance by evaluating past selves as inferior to their current one. This work
highlights the truly autobiographical nature of AM because an autobiography is now
conceived of, not only as a series of events, but also a record of a series of selves across
time (Bluck, 2003). In turn, remembered events can have implications for the current self,
including current affects and feelings of satisfaction with life.
How self-continuity or coherent sense of self develops from childhood, through
adolescence, to adulthood have been investigated by several researchers (e.g. Beike, 2004;
Brewer, 1986; Fivush & Haden, 2003; Graft & Ohta, 2002; Rubin, Wetzler, & Nebes,
1986). Discussion of the development of and continuity of the self throughout stages of
human development is beyond the scope of this paper.
Social Function
The social importance of AM in developing, maintaining, and strengthening social
bonds has been noted (e.g., Pillermer, 1998), and this function has been linked to its
evolutionary adaptive value (Nelson, 1993, 203). Even Neisser (in Pillemer, 1998) claims
that the social function of AM is the most fundamental one. The social function can be
divided into three fundamental categories: social interaction, empathy, and social bonding
Alea & Bluck (2002). AM provides material for social conversation and allows people to
better understand and empathize with others. It offers a channel for instruction and
information (Pillemer, 1998), and that way, it is developmentally important for
relationships between parents and children (Fivush & Haden, 2003). Impairment in
episodic memory may adversely affect social interaction.
How social functions are served when people share their memories have been the
focus of the studies by Alea and Bluck (2002, 2003). They provide two interrelated
definitions of their model of social function as outcome variable. The first definition
refers to the uses of memory: memory has been put to in use in different social situations
such as intimacy maintenance, teaching, and eliciting empathy, or, which function is
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 15
served? The second idea of function involves adaptivity : to what extent memory serves
various social conditions (e.g., to what extent memory sharing would result in an increase
in intimacy). In other words, adaptivity refers to the extent to which the use of memory
results in adaptive or maladaptive outcomes. For example, the use of AMs to develop
intimacy in relationships is adaptive when intimacy is enhanced when AMs are shared.
In their conceptual model, Alea and Bluck (2003) incorporate several components
that include lifespan contextual influences, the qualitative characteristics of memory
(emotionality and level of detail recalled), the person‟s characteristics (age, gender, and
personality), the familiarity of and similarity of the person to the listener, the level of
responsiveness during the memory-sharing process, and the nature of the social
relationship in which the memory sharing takes place (valence and length of the
relationship). All these components have been shown to influence the uses and adaptivity
of the social functions of AMs. A brief description of each component is provided below,
following Alea and Bluck (2003).
The lifespan context constitutes a context that can directly influence how (well)
AMs are used for social purposes. Taking a lifespan perspective helps us understand how
changes in one‟s chronological age and their life context impact the uses and adaptation of
AM. Emotionality and level of detail recalled are included here because they influence
how meaningful memories are encoded. Memories of specific episode that are rich in
emotion and vividness communicate “meaning over and above the particular informational
content of the memories, and thereby help[s] the speaker achieve important interpersonal
goals” (Pellimer, 1992, p. 242, quoted in Alea and Buck, p. 169). Enduring characteristics
such as age, gender and personality, affect the way a person recalls significant events,
thereby affecting the extent to which social functions are served. The person who
constructs memories in conversational remembering also takes into account his or her
listener or audience. How well the person knows the listener and how similar that person
is with the listener in terms of age, gender, and personality influence the amount of
information or vividness of memories shared. Numerous studies reviewed by Alea and
Buck have shown that sharing memories with similar and known others influences the
emotional quality and detail of the memory shared and should thereby affect the degree to
which social functions are served.
The authors explain that responsiveness can be an indicator for attentiveness and
comprehension, and a further signal for more contribution to the social exchange.
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 16
Responsiveness influences the type and extent of personal self-disclosure between both
parties. In turn, responsive listening influences how memories are shared. Finally, two
relationship qualities, valence and length, can influence the social functions of AM. A
person with a poor valence (e.g, avoidant) discloses lower levels of positive emotional
information during social interaction than those with positive valence (e.g., secure).
Length of relationship relates to the use of the personal past during the initial stage of a
social interaction. In those situations, AMs are likely to be employed to create intimacy,
while in continuing relationships, AMs are used for maintaining intimacy.
Directive Function
While Neisser claims the primacy of social functions, Pillemer‟ primary focus is
more on the directive function of AM. Pillemer characterizes this function as “the guiding
power of the specific episode” as the subtitle of his 2003 article. He argues that “directive
functions of personal event memories are not secondary in importance to self and social
functions. Rather, they are among the most basic and elemental functions served by
autobiographical memory, appearing early in human history and tied closely to survival
pressures” (p. 194). Here, he intends to emphasize the evolutionary significance and
practical importance of the directive function. Using examples of everyday and traumatic
memories, he finds out that people recollect specific events or moments of personal
significance and use these memories of both everyday and traumatic experiences as a
guide towards successful functioning and a lesson about repeated failure.
The role of AM in problem solving and in the formation of opinions and attitude as
guides for behavior has also been pointed out by other researchers (e.g., Baddeley, 1987;
Conway, 1996, 2003). Also, Lockhart (1989, quoted in Bluck, 2003) has claimed that the
major role of AM is to provide flexibility in the construction and updating of rules that
allow one to comprehend the past experiences and predict future outcomes.
Pillemer has reviewed numerous directive functions of AM in his work (1998,
2003, 2009). Pillemer points out that the memory of a life-threatening experience can be a
good example of how a directive function serves, because this kind of experience captures
in vivid detail what is safe and what is to be avoided in the future. Personally significant
events or emotionally charged ones continue to influence the trauma survivors for many
months or years in part because they repeatedly revisit the events in memory and adjust
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 17
their current behaviors accordingly. The use of a traumatic memory as an example should
not imply that memory directives are invariably associated with negative emotional
events. As noted earlier about posttraumatic growth, positive moments or unexpected
successes may provide inspiration and guidance in the pursuit of a particular life course.
According to Pillemer (1998), most cognitive psychologist have located the
predictive and directive functions of memory in abstract structures, such as scripts,
schemas, rules, or plans. In other words, the knowledge is represented in semantic rather
than in episodic memory. As a consequence, it is general and broadly applicable rather
than specific and idiosyncratic. The emphasis on abstract knowledge structures has
obscured the predictive and directive functions that vivid memories of particular episodes
provide. In contrast, autobiographical memory has its own value, with its representations
of particular instances, that may not be captured by the general memory function of
prediction and preparation for future events.
In describing how specific memories are laid down and retrieved when mental
processing falls, Pillemer (1998) quotes Schank‟s (1980) statement: “when we have failed
to predict accurately what will happen next is when we are most in need of a specific
memory to help us through the rough spots. To do this, our index of memories must be in
terms of their relationship to processing prediction failures” (p. 88). In concluding our
disccusion of Pellimer‟s conceptualization of the directive functions of autobiographical
memory, his position is presented here in his own words:
Understanding of current situations is enhanced, and guidelines for behavior are
unearthed, by recalling relevant prior episodes of learning. Personal event
memories
also support a sirective function that operates at a higher, meta-cognitive level.
Memorable episodes provide an organization skeleton for the production of
extended autobiographical memory narratives; they guide or “direct” the
reconstruction and retelling of life histories. Narrative representations of a person‟s life are
built around highly salient and memorable episodic nodes.
Constructing a coherent, temporally ordered life history depends on having
access not only to the meaning of momentous past events, but also to the imagistic
components of personal event memories. As the narrative unfolds, the rememberer
mentally moves from scene to concrete scene; general descriptions of “how things
were” are punctuated with specific descriptions of particular instances. The
extended narrative is anchored by concrete, perceptual landmarks. Moving from
landmark to
Landmark, the temporally ordered life story unfolds (1998, pp. 95-96)
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 18
Pillemer‟s work, in Bluck‟s (2003) view, has revitalized research on how people
use specific personal memories, consciously or not, to guide and direct the behavior.
Another interest for further research, besides specific episode, would include life domains
or themes and the life story or narrative to find out if each of these areas has similar power
in directing one‟s future plans and behavior.
EMOTIONS IN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
Memory for past emotion plays a vital role in daily life, and emotions are elicited
by experiences that matter to us. A central feature of AM is its relation to emotion
(Holland & Kensinger, 2010; Sotgiu & Mormont, 2008 ;Welzer & Markowitsch, 2005).
However, there is no simple relation between emotion and memory. Some research
findings have shown that emotions, especially negative and unpleasant ones, impair
memory, but other findings lead to generally detail, accurate and persistent memory.
Indeed, people are more likely to remember emotion-arousing events than neutral,
everyday events. They may even report near-perfect memories for circumstances
surrounding unique emotionally charged events (Christianson & Safer, 1995; Holland &
Kensinger, 2010, for review)). However, there are cases in which victims of crimes may
show a temporary inability to remember a traumatic event. There are also reports of early
traumatic childhood experiences that are blocked until adulthood or never recovered, but
which have profound effects on developing anxiety, depression, and dissociative
symptoms in later life (Brewin, Andrews, & Gotlib, 1993, in Christianson & Safer, 1995).
Brewin (2009) points out that the idea that there is a fundamentally distinct type of
memory for traumatic events dates back as far as Pierre Janet. Janet distingusihed
traumatic memory from ordinary or narrative memory. Extreme life-threatening
experiences made people unable to assimilate these experiences into their ordinary beliefs
or assumptions and meaning structures. In Janet‟s view, this type of memory would be
stored in a different form, dissociated from conscious awareness and voluntary control.
Traumatic memory was inflexible and fixed, whereas narrative memory was adaptable to
current circumstances. Janet believed that a dissociative process rendered a memory less
accessible to voluntary retrieval but more prone to be automatically evoked by reminders
A different position is taken by Shobe and Kihlstrom (1997) who argued that
trauma was extremely well remembered and research evidence was in favor of emotion
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 19
enhancing rather than impairing memory. Brewin (2009) has reviewed numerous studies
and concluded that the trauma memories of PTSD patients are distinguished from those of
of non-PTSD samples in terms of them containing prominent perceptual features, being
highly emotional, and involving an intense reliving of the event in the present. Memories
of non-PTSD individuals are more likely to have an external observer perspective rather
than a field perspective. Furthermore, PTSD patients recall more emotion and physical
sensations, whereas those who report observer memories recall more spatial information,
self-observations, and peripheral, as opposed to central, details.
In discussing memory for emotional events, Christianson and Safer (1995) suggest
that we differentiate between situations where the to-be-remembered (TBR) event is
accompanied by emotional arousal that is evoked by the TBR material proper on one hand,
and situations where the source of the arousal is dissociated from the TBR event on the
other hand. It is natural that in autobiographical memories, the emotional arousal is evoked
by the TBR event.
Despite the fact that witnessing a genuine trauma is far more emotionally arousing
than witnessing a simulated event in a laboratory setting, Christianson and Safer observe
that laboratory setting do not necessarily produce qualitatively different memories than
does witnessing real-life trauma events. Moreover, recent laboratory findings in many
ways mimic various phenomena observed from real-life settings.
There are two phenomena related to the issue of how one‟s emotional feelings
affect what is stored in or retrieved from memory: state-dependent effect and mood
congruence effect. “State-dependent effects (state-dependent learning or state-dependent
retrieval) refers to an impairment in performance when there is a mismatch between
physical or mental states at learning and at retrieval. The state-dependent effect assumes
that mood acts as a critical context cue, no matter what the nature is of the information
being learned and retrieved. The state-dependent effect is similar to a dissociative effect,
wherein existing memories may, under certain circumstances, be unavailable to
consciousness” (Christianson & Safer, 1995, p. 228). Another type of state-dependent
phenomena is context-dependent effects. These effects become apparent when information
learned in one context may be hard to remember in another context. Christianson & Safer
illustrate this in the case of victims of crime returned to the crime scene to help them
remember details that they could no otherwise recall.
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 20
About the second phenomenon, Christianson and Safer state that “mood
congruence effects occur when stimuli agreeing in affective valence with one‟s mood are
learned and retrieved better than stimuli of different affective valence” (p. 229). Mood
congruence effects occur, for example, in a typical experiment where subjects are asked to
recall recent autobiographical memories. Those who are induced to feel happy tended to
recall more happy than sad memories, whereas the reverse is true for subjects who are
induced to feel sad.
Another useful formulation of implicit and explicit memories of emotion has been
presented by Levine, Lench and Safer (2009). They point out that emotions are
represented in these two forms in memory with different properties. Explicit memories
refer to “representations of specific experiences (episodic memory) or facts (semantic
memory) that can be deliberately retrieved and verbally recounted to others” (p. 1060).
These memories are accessible by a conscious feeling of remembering (episodic) and
knowing (semantic) across situations. The other form is implicit memory which refers to
“representations of past experience that are not accessible to conscious awareness but
nonetheless influence current feelings, thoughts, or behavior” (p.1060). Implicit memories
are elicited involuntarily by specific retrieval cues.
Explicit memory allows people to consciously retrieve and reconstruct their
emotion of the past based on memory for prior cognitions, episodic and semantic
information. Implicit memory for emotion is accessible without deliberation in the
presence of retrieval cues that resemble the situation in which the emotion was originally
experienced. And when it becomes accessible, the resulting experience shares many of the
properties of the original emotional experience. Representation of past emotional
experiences persist in the implicit memory and thereby influence current feelings and
behaviors, even when there is no recollection of the original experience.
What functions do remembering emotion serve? Levine, Lench and Safer (2009)
suggest that “remembered emotion informs individuals‟ decisions about whether to seek
out or avoid similar situations in the future. Remembered emotions also help the
individual maintain a coherent sense of self over time. . . Moreover, shared memories of
emotion may guide group members towards decisions that benefit the larger cultural
group. These functions are consistent with theories holding that autobiographical
memories serve future-directive, self-defining, and social functions…(p. 1067).
Traumatic events and autobiographical memory 21
CONSTRUCTION OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
A particular memory, which is the building block of AMs, has an internal structure
of its own. Accordingly, AMs are not just a collection of particular memories, but are
organized and indexed so that they can be retrieved on demand (Williams, Conway,
Cohen, 2008). The defining characteristic of AM is its relationship to the self. Events that
are remembered are of personal significance and form the database from which the self is
constructed. Moreover, personally significant memories are fundamental elements of one‟s
personal identity. The self is represented as either the agent or object of some action, or as
the experience of some state (Kihlstrom, 2009). As such, the person‟s cognitive,
motivational and emotional state at the time of the event is also represented in AM.
Because AMs are also episodic memories, there should be some sense of how one episode
is related to each other in the flow of personal time. Kihlstrom (2009) points out that the
sequence of events makes a difference to their meaning, and every person has their own
particular ways of sequencing their life-events. Wilson and Ross (2003) have reviewed
evidence that people‟s memories of their personal pasts (both what and when) are
malleable and may be influenced by current self-identity and self-motives. Individuals‟
current self-views, beliefs, and goals influence their recollections and appraisals of former
selves. People‟s current self-views, in turn, are influenced by what they remember about
their personal past, as well as how they remember earlier selves and episodes. Likewise,
their reconstruction of memories and perceived distance from past experiences have
implications for how the past influences the present.
Under the subtopic of Self-Function in this paper, the intrapsychic and interpsychic