00074918.2011.619050
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies
ISSN: 0007-4918 (Print) 1472-7234 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cbie20
Indonesian politics in 2011: democratic regression
and Yudhoyono's regal incumbency
Greg Fealy
To cite this article: Greg Fealy (2011) Indonesian politics in 2011: democratic regression and
Yudhoyono's regal incumbency, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 47:3, 333-353, DOI:
10.1080/00074918.2011.619050
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2011.619050
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Date: 18 January 2016, At: 19:18
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2011: 333–53
INDONESIAN POLITICS IN 2011:
DEMOCRATIC REGRESSION AND
YUDHOYONO’S REGAL INCUMBENCY
Greg Fealy*
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Australian National University
In 2011, a number of trends in Indonesian politics became clearer. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) has not become a more reformist and risk-taking
president in his second term, contrary to the hopes of many, but has rather become
more cautious, aloof and regal in style. He is irked by criticism and dislikes any
disturbance to the authority of his rule. The political elite, often in concert with the
SBY government, pushed through a range of democratically regressive measures,
including allowing politicians to be appointed to the Elections Commission. The
malaise within the party system deepened, with less than a quarter of the electorate
professing any party afiliation. Most Islamic parties slid closer to the political periphery, and the largest one, PKS, was beset by controversy. Government and community responses to a brutal attack on the Ahmadiyah sect in early 2011 showed the
limits of Indonesia’s much lauded religious tolerance.
Keywords: democratic regression; political Islam; religious intolerance; corruption; presidential incumbency
Indonesia is now in the third year of its quinquennial electoral cycle. The new
parliament was installed in August 2009 and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) began his second term the following month. This is a good juncture at
which to assess political trends for the ive-year period, as the legislature, parties
and government have settled into patterns of behaviour that will probably prevail
till at least the 2014 elections, if not beyond. Of late, Indonesia and SBY have been
basking in the praise of Western political leaders and often, also, the international
media. Indonesia is lauded as a success story of democratisation, religious tolerance and stability in a Muslim-majority nation. It is held up as a beacon both
to the broader Islamic world, where authoritarianism and sectarian conlict are
common, and to other Southeast Asian nations, which tend to be rated as only
This is a revised version of a paper presented to the 29th Indonesia Update conference,
held at the Australian National University, Canberra, on 30 September 2011. The author
would like to thank Ed Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner and Ken Ward for valuable comments
on an earlier draft. Douglas Ramage, the Managing Director of BowerGroupAsia’s Indonesia ofice, acted as discussant of the paper presented at the conference; some of his comments are appended in box 1 at the end of this paper.
*
ISSN 0007-4918 print/ISSN 1472-7234 online/11/030333-21
DOI: 10.1080/00074918.2011.619050
© 2011 Indonesia Project ANU
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Greg Fealy
semi-democratic or undemocratic.1 SBY is cast as a statesman and reformist president whose own values of decency and moderation have imparted greater civility
to Indonesian politics.
The picture I will paint of Indonesia and its president is less lattering, though
by no means bleak. The political system has for several years shown signs of
democratic stagnation and backsliding, a trend examined by a number of scholars, most notably Marcus Mietzner.2 But during 2011, the evidence that political
reforms are being rolled back became much stronger. On the one hand, the political elite is tightening its grip on key oversight institutions, often in a manner that
reduces transparency as well as the public standing and effectiveness of those
institutions. This has the effect of weakening the checks and balances for the exercise of power. On the other hand, the parliamentary and party systems, in which
much of the elite is embedded, are themselves beset by a deepening malaise that
harms their competence and may, over time, undermine conidence in democracy.
Far from being a reformist president, SBY is increasingly conservative, remote
from his cabinet, governed by public opinion and consumed with his own standing and legacy. Moreover, he is as likely as not to tacitly sanction democratically
regressive proposals, even if he does not initiate them. At the same time, Indonesia’s record on religious tolerance is being tarnished by sectarian violence, with
both the state and civil society complicit in the intimidation and victimisation of
unpopular minorities. SBY and his government have contributed to this decline in
religious rights, albeit unintentionally. A pithy summation of my argument might
be: ‘Indonesia: not as good as it seems’.
SBY’S REGAL PRESIDENCY 3
At the beginning of SBY’s second term, some commentators predicted that we
would see a different president from the vacillating, often politically timid igure of the preceding ive years. According to this view, SBY, freed of the burden
of re-election, would pursue bold policies in order to cement his place in Indonesian history as a visionary president committed to change. In fact, the opposite
has been the case. SBY appears to be less concerned with economic and political
reform now than he was in his irst term. Instead, he appears preoccupied with
status and incumbency. The president seems increasingly not so much to rule as
to reign over the country, and he desires to do so serenely. He is acutely sensitive
to criticism and to any breaches of protocol that might be taken as disrespectful.
Every morning, he and his wife, Ani, are said to pore over the newspapers at
breakfast, paying particular attention to critical coverage of the palace or the government. Personal attacks on SBY in the media will often agitate him for hours, if
not days. He is especially perturbed by controversies that force him into the political fray to defend himself or his ministers, or to take swift action; when he appears
1 See, for example, Freedom House’s global democracy rankings, which classify Indonesia
as the only full democracy in Southeast Asia. The 2011 rankings are available at .
2 See Mietzner (2011); see also EIU (2008).
3 Much of the material for this section is drawn from conidential interviews with senior
oficials and politicians in Jakarta conducted during the irst half of 2011.
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Democratic regression and Yudhoyono’s regal incumbency
335
in public he seeks to convey a calm, self-possessed authority. In this sense, he
aspires to be a regal president.
The style of SBY’s leadership of government has also changed during this term,
and not for the better. The president is increasingly aloof from most of his ministers and relies ever more heavily on a small circle of trusted advisers, notably
Hatta Rajasa, the Coordinating Minister for the Economy, Djoko Suyanto, the
Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, and Sudi Silalahi,
the State Secretary and a long-time SBY lieutenant. Substantive discussion of policy issues rarely occurs in cabinet and SBY appears to regard such meetings as an
opportunity to deliver lengthy, often leaden, disquisitions on problems facing the
nation or government. So common has his lecturing become that some ministers
have ruefully nicknamed him ‘The Professor’. Many ministers have never been
granted a face-to-face meeting with the president, and even senior ministers communicate with SBY primarily through Hatta, Djoko or Sudi, or cabinet secretary
Dipo Alam. A number of more resourceful ministers, frustrated with their lack of
direct access and presidential inertia, have persuaded colleagues or sympathetic
journalists to write prominent articles in newspapers such as Kompas or Jawa Pos
in order to gain SBY’s attention and sway him to act on an issue.
Despite his growing detachment, the president remains, as ever, hesitant in his
decision making. One popular joke in Jakarta claims that when asked to choose
between ‘A’ or ‘B’, SBY chooses ‘or’! He is especially susceptible to lobbying by
important igures, and has been known – much to the chagrin of his ministers – to
zig-zag on issues as he comes under pressure from competing forces.
Although SBY’s cautious and increasingly courtly approach to politics does not
lead to daring or innovative decision making, it has nonetheless produced settled
and stable conditions that are conducive to rapid economic growth. By instinct
and personality, SBY is a politician of the ‘middle’. Whenever possible he seeks
to avoid conlict with major political or economic forces and tries not to push
against the tide of public opinion. Before making important decisions, he or his
staff will take soundings from powerful stakeholders in an effort to calculate the
political risks. While this is not unusual behaviour for a politician, SBY will often
stall or prevaricate on key decisions for weeks or months in a manner contrary
to the image of managerial eficiency that he seeks to cultivate. He is particularly
heedful of community attitudes and he studies public opinion surveys intently to
ensure that, where possible, he is in step with popular sentiment. On many contentious issues, SBY has been prepared to decide a matter only after seeing polling
data and has chosen a course of action exactly in accord with the majority view.
While this pattern of behaviour allows him to defuse potentially divisive issues,
it also means that he seldom leads or shapes public opinion and is reluctant to
debate controversial initiatives. The removal of fuel subsidies was one such policy issue. While SBY accepted the need to reduce subsidies, he was unwilling to
announce the decision himself because of its likely unpopularity. Instead, he left
it to his economic ministers to announce and defend the policy.
A further problem is that SBY’s second cabinet has proven to be much weaker
than its predecessor. In his irst cabinet, SBY had ‘can-do’ igures such as Vice
President Jusuf Kalla and the Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare,
Aburizal Bakrie, to drive through policies and legislation and to respond to thorny
issues. There is no comparable igure in the present government. Vice President
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Greg Fealy
Boediono has great integrity and technical expertise but he has little political nous
or clout. Hatta is a savvy strategist and deal maker with broad political connections but he cannot command the vast inancial resources of Bakrie when seeking
to ‘persuade’ parliamentarians to pass important bills. Also, the number of underperforming ministers is much greater than in the preceding government, a situation that relects the president’s own prioritising of political stability and loyalty
over merit and initiative. The relative weakness of cabinet has been highlighted
by the regular ‘report cards’ on ministerial performance issued by the Presidential
Working Unit for Supervision and Management of Development (Unit Kerja Presiden bidang Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan, or UKP4).4
Given the mounting criticism of the government, SBY reshufled his cabinet
in late October. The reshufle was more extensive than predicted: 12 ministries
changed hands, with eight ministers dismissed and four shifted to new portfolios
(table 1). In addition, some 10 new deputy ministers were appointed. In many
ways, the new line-up relected the same compromise between technocratic merit
and political expediency that had marked SBY’s earlier decisions on cabinet composition. While the removal of Mari Pangestu as trade minister was unexpected
given that she was regarded as one of the more competent cabinet members
(Manning and Purnagunawan 2011: 322, in this issue), the appointment of Gita
Wirjawan as her replacement won plaudits from many commentators. The retention of Minister of Finance Agus Martowardojo, who had stood irm against pressure from powerful political and business interests, was a victory for Boediono
and other economic technocrats in the government.
The most controversial aspects of the reshufle were the failure to remove two
ministers embroiled in corruption scandals, the Minister for Manpower and Transmigration, Muhaimin Iskandar, and the Minister for Youth and Sports Affairs,
Andi Mallarangeng; and the appointment of SBY loyalists in the president’s Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat, or PD) to strategic portfolios such as energy and
transportation. The appointments of Jero Wacik to the Ministry of Energy and
Natural Resources and of E.E. Mangindaan to the Ministry of Transportation were
widely criticised given that the new ministers had no relevant expertise. The decision appeared to relect PD’s determination to secure greater funding for the 2014
elections from money-rich ministries.5
DEMOCRATIC REGRESSION
For several years, political observers have been warning of the risk of reversal of
Indonesia’s democratisation process (Aspinall 2010; Haris 2011; Mietzner 2011).
Mietzner, for example, has argued strongly that most of Indonesia’s signiicant
reforms took place before 2006, with stagnation and some roll-back of democracy evident since then. Indications of this regressive trend became far more
pronounced during 2011, with the four most salient forms being: the deliberate
undermining of key oversight institutions whose primary purpose is to ensure
the transparency and integrity of political, economic and bureaucratic processes;
4 ‘UKP4: ministries with “red marks” evenly distributed’, Indonesia Today, 28/9/2011.
5 ‘SBY controls “lucrative” posts’, Jakarta Post, 19/10/2011.
Democratic regression and Yudhoyono’s regal incumbency
337
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TABLE 1 Cabinet Changes Announced in October 2011 a
Ministry/Agency
Outgoing Minister
(Party Afiliation/
Career Background)
New Minister
(Party Afiliation/
Career Background)
Ministry of Trade
Mari Elka Pangestu
(academic economist)
Gita Wirjawan
(businessman and head of
Investment Coordinating
Board, BKPM)
Ministry of Justice and
Human Rights
Patrialis Akbar
(PAN)
Amir Syamsuddin
(PD, lawyer)
Ministry for State
Enterprises
Mustafa Abubakar
(former Aceh governor
and former Bulog head)
Dahlan Iskan
(PLN director and media
owner)
Ministry for Public
Housing
Suharso Monoarfa
(PPP)
Djan Faridz
(PPP, Jakarta businessman
and member of the DPD)
State Intelligence Agency
Sutanto
(former police chief)
Marciano Norman
(general)
Ministry for State
Apparatus and
Administrative Reforms
E.E. Mangindaan
(PD, former general
and former governor of
North Sulawesi)
Azwar Abubakar
(PAN, former Aceh
governor)
Ministry for the
Environment
Gusti Muhammad Hatta
(academic)
Berth Kambuaya
(academic)
Ministry of Tourism and
Creative Economy
Jero Wacik
(PD)
Mari Elka Pangestu
(moved from Ministry of
Trade)
Ministry of Transportation
Freddy Numberi
(former Papua governor
and former vice admiral)
E.E. Mangindaan
(moved from Ministry
for State Apparatus and
Administrative Reforms)
Ministry for Research and
Technology
Suharna Surapranata
(PKS, scientist)
Gusti Muhammad Hatta
(moved from Ministry for
the Environment)
Ministry of Maritime
Affairs and Fisheries
Fadel Muhammad
(Golkar, former governor
of Gorontalo)
Syarif Cicip Sutardjo
(Golkar)
Ministry of Energy and
Natural Resources
Darwin Zahedy Saleh
(PD, academic)
Jero Wacik
(moved from Ministry
of Tourism and Creative
Economy)
a PLN: Perusahaan Listrik Negara (the state electricity company); DPD: Dewan Perwakilan Daerah
(Regional Representatives Council); see text and footnote 12 for an explanation of other abbreviations.
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Greg Fealy
the winding back of regional elections and local democracy; the deepening problems in the functioning of parties and the legislature; and the failure to protect
minority rights (discussed in the inal section of this article).
In many instances the government and the major political parties act in concert to initiate regressive measures, with both sharing a common interest either
in lessening scrutiny of their actions, particularly the risk of malfeasance being
exposed, or in expanding their inluence over political processes. The institutions most commonly targeted by the political elite are the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, or KPK) and the Elections
Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, or KPU), but other bodies such as the
Supreme Audit Agency (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, or BPK) and the Judicial
Commission (Komisi Yudisial) have not been immune.
Together with the Constitutional Court, the KPK has been the most successful
new institution of the post-Soeharto era. Since its establishment in 2003, the KPK
has investigated more than a thousand corruption cases, many of them involving ministers, governors, mayors, parliamentarians, senior bureaucrats and other
prominent igures. In mid-2011, the Minister for Home Affairs informed parliament that the KPK was investigating 155 regional government heads, including
17 governors. Over the past six years more than two dozen parliamentarians have
been found guilty of graft and gaoled. Although the KPK’s public approval rating
has slipped from 58% to 41% over the past year, it remains one of the more trusted
institutions.6
The KPK’s success in uncovering corruption and bringing high-proile politicians and oficials to justice has earned it the wrath of many in elite circles. The
parliament has repeatedly sought to curtail the Commission’s investigative and
prosecutorial powers, and to appoint less credible or more compliant commissioners. For the most part, pressure from the KPK, civil society groups and the
media has forced parliament to refrain from making sweeping changes to the
KPK’s powers, but attacks on the Commission continue (Butt 2011, in this issue).
Fahri Hamzah, a senior parliamentarian from the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai
Keadilan Sejahtera, or PKS), recently called for the KPK’s disbandment, claiming that it was acting undemocratically.7 A parliamentary committee is currently
vetting a short-list of nominees for the KPK leadership, with a view to making
a recommendation to the president on the inal composition of the Commission
(Schütte 2011, in this issue).
The composition and reporting requirements of the Elections Commission, the
KPU, have also been the subject of heated debate between political parties on the
one hand and NGOs and commentators on the other. In 2011, the major parties
pushed through legislation that allowed politicians to serve on the KPU board,
provided they irst resigned from their parties. The politicians argued that parties were legitimate stakeholders in the electoral system and should therefore be
represented on the KPU board. They also pointed to the poor performance of the
outgoing board, which was composed largely of ex-bureaucrats and academics
with technocratic backgrounds. Undoubtedly many parties were keen to expand
6 ‘Empat alasan kepercayaan public menurun terhadap KPU [Four reasons for falling
public trust in KPU]’, Media Indonesia, 7/8/2011.
7 ‘House corners KPK, threatens its dismissal’, Jakarta Post, 4/10/2011.
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Democratic regression and Yudhoyono’s regal incumbency
339
their inluence within the KPU so that decisions on the conduct of the 2014 elections could be manipulated to favour their interests.
The new law also obliged the KPU to consult and collaborate with the parliament and government on technical election-management issues.8 Academics as
well as NGOs such as Cetro and Formappi criticised the new law for increasing
the risk of the KPU becoming politicised. They argued that the perceived neutrality and competence of the Commission would be critical in the upcoming elections, particularly if the result was close and the integrity of the election process
came into dispute.9 Party representatives were last allowed on the KPU board for
the 1999 elections; that commission was widely viewed as the most shambolic of
the post-Soeharto era. By contrast, the most effective commission was the one that
oversaw the 2004 elections; it was made up mainly of specialists from academic
and NGO circles.
The Andi Nurpati case serves as another warning about the downside of having KPU oficials who are too close to political parties. Andi Nurpati, a former
KPU board member, stands accused of involvement in the fabrication of a Constitutional Court ruling on the allocation of a parliamentary seat in the 2009 election, although she denies the charge. She is suspected of having conspired with
the Court’s clerical staff to alter the ruling in order to deliver the seat to Dewi
Yasin Limpo from the People’s Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, or
Hanura). Last year, Andi caused a stir when she resigned from the KPU to join the
board of PD in order to pursue her own political career. Questions are now being
raised about whether another six MPs may have gained their seats fraudulently.10
Regional elections were another area where the parliament and the government combined to push for the scaling back of democratic processes. The government has long argued that the popular election of governors, and to a lesser extent
district and deputy district heads, is harmful to the quality of regional administration and to eficient and harmonious relations between the central government
and the regions. There is also widespread concern about the cost, disruption and
sometimes conlict caused by the succession of local elections. In 2010, Minister
for Home Affairs Gamawan Fauzi announced that the government wanted to
eliminate gubernatorial elections and return to the pre-reformasi system of local
legislatures electing governors and deputy governors. He also called for the abolition of the paired candidate system for district head elections. In subsequent
elections only the district head would be popularly elected, and would select
the deputy from the ranks of the bureaucracy.11 The minister claimed that the
8 ‘KPU wajib konsultasi dengan DPR [KPU obliged to consult parliament]’, Kompas,
10/8/2011; ‘House passes KPU bill into law’, Jakarta Post, 21/9/2011; ‘Peran partai politik
dominan; UU segera diuji [The dominant role of political parties; law soon to be tested]’,
Kompas, 21/9/2011.
9 ‘Kemandirian KPU harus dijaga [KPU’s independence must be guarded]’, Kompas,
6/4/2011.
10 ‘Kursi tidak sah di DPR [Parliamentary seats invalid]’, Kompas, 14/9/2011.
11 ‘Partai harus biayai calon kepala daerah [Parties have to fund district head candidates]’, Kompas, 25/1/2011; ‘Wakil kepala daerah ditunjuk kepala daerah terpilih dari PNS
[Deputy district heads appointed from bureaucracy by elected district heads]’, Jawa Pos
Online, 26/4/2010.
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Greg Fealy
changes would make the system cheaper, more administratively streamlined and
less prone to corruption. But although reducing the number of regional elections
would undoubtedly save money, it would also crimp local democracy and invest
greater power in the parties and elites that dominate regional politics. The bill to
amend local elections is still to come before parliament.
The trend with these institutional and electoral changes is to cement and
expand the power of the current political elite by allowing it to dominate key
decision-making processes and limit independent monitoring of its activities. In a
political system in which access to vast sums of money is increasingly important
to electoral success, all major parties have an interest in being able to use parliamentary and ministerial positions to generate funds. The Nazaruddin scandal,
described below, provides a graphic example of how parties and ambitious politicians depend on accumulating the inancial reserves needed to fund high-proile
campaigns. With nearly all these regressive institutional ‘reforms’, the space for
civil society is diminished and the scope for elite control extended.
Not only are political leaders undermining the integrity of democratic institutions, they are also failing to address mounting problems within the party system.
During 2011, more evidence emerged of the slide in public conidence in parties and in willingness to afiliate with them. Surveys conducted by the respected
Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, or LSI) show that only
20% of respondents regard themselves as ‘close’ to a particular party, down from
86% in 1999 (LSI 2011: 30). This implies that some 80% of the electorate is willing
to change its vote. Coupled with this is the declining vote for major parties and
the increase in the number of small parties. In 1999 there were ive parties exceeding 3% of the vote; in 2004 this expanded to seven and in 2009 to nine. The shares
of the ive ‘big’ parties in 1999 – PDI–P, Golkar, PKB, PPP and PAN12 – dropped
on average by 9% over the next two elections. The result is a more complex political constellation, which inevitably gives rise to a more variegated ruling coalition
with the attendant risk of declining coherence. Despite widespread publicity for
such indings and lobbying of political leaders to embark on reforms, few parties
have shown any interest in doing so, and most remain preoccupied with their
immediate electoral prospects. The only initiative undertaken by the major parties has been to raise the threshold for parliamentary representation above the
present level of 2.5% of the vote (probably to 3–5%), in a bid to prevent smaller
parties from gaining seats and thereby maximise by default their own parliamentary representation.13
SBY has contributed to this gradual democratic reversal, most commonly by
refusing to defend the country’s democratic institutions unless prompted to do so
by public opinion, but also, at times, by directly undermining them. For example,
he appears to approve of the plans to scrap gubernatorial elections, seemingly
because he believes that governors elected by local legislatures rather than by the
12 PDI–P: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle); Golkar: Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar Party); PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa
(National Awakening Party); PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development
Party); PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party).
13 ‘Partai masih beda pendapat [Parties still of different views]’, Kompas, 7/1/2011; ‘Ancaman ambang batas [The threat of threshold limits]’, Kompas, 13/9/2011.
Democratic regression and Yudhoyono’s regal incumbency
341
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people will be more compliant to the wishes of the central government. Similarly,
he has raised no objections to the presence of party politicians on the KPU board.
Pointedly, SBY has at times joined in criticism of the Commission, claiming that
it has ‘extraordinary powers’ and seems ‘answerable only to God’. He was also
slow to act on the attempted prosecution of two KPK chairs in 2009 – until polling
showed that most voters wanted the charges against them dropped.14
THE NAZARUDDIN SCANDAL AND DEMOCRAT PARTY DIVISIONS
As in every year since Soeharto’s downfall, 2011 has produced a string of corruption scandals that have captured media and public attention. The Minister for
Manpower and Transmigration, Muhaimin Iskandar, has been embroiled in graft
allegations involving several of his subordinates and is currently under questioning from the KPK and facing calls to step down,15 while the Minister for Social Services in the previous government, Bachtiar Chamsyah, was gaoled for 20 months
for his role in a corrupt deal. The Bank Century scandal that so dominated politics
in 2010 continues to generate occasional headlines, though little progress has been
made in uncovering unlawful activity by those involved. But the scandal which
caused the greatest sensation was that surrounding Muhammad Nazaruddin, a
33-year-old parliamentarian and, until recently, the national treasurer of PD.
The story irst broke in April 2011, when the KPK arrested a number of oficials and business people, including the secretary of the Ministry for Youth and
Sports Affairs, Waid Muharram, over $360,000 in bribes paid to secure the contract to build the athletes’ dormitory for the Southeast Asian Games, which are to
be staged in Palembang in late 2011. Among those detained was an employee of
one of Nazaruddin’s companies who told the KPK that Nazaruddin had received
a 13% ‘fee’ for arranging the contract. Waid also revealed that the Minister for
Youth and Sports Affairs, Andi Mallarangeng, had been present at the meeting
at which the contractor had been decided and had voiced no objection to the
arrangement.16
The scandal spread quickly from there. Nazaruddin denied all of the allegations and retaliated by threatening to reveal the involvement in corrupt behaviour of many PD colleagues and other parliamentarians. At a meeting at SBY’s
residence in May, for example, it is said that he brazenly told the president that
his son, Edhie Baskoro Yudhoyono, together with Andi Mallarangeng and Andi’s
brother, the trusted PD political consultant Zulkarnain ‘Choel’ Mallarangeng,
were all implicated in corruption, and threatened to release evidence to support
14 ‘SBY’s commitment to graft eradication questioned’, Jakarta Post, 29/6/2009; ‘Indonesian
president will not interfere in corruption ighters’ detention’, Jakarta Globe, 31/10/2009;
‘President’s inaction only hurts him’, Jakarta Post, 13/11/2009.
15 ‘Dirjen tahu soal uang 1.5 milyar [Director general knows about the 1.5 billion issue]’,
Kompas, 13/9/2011; ‘Minister, budget committee leaders face KPK questioning’, Jakarta
Post, 4/10/2011.
16 ‘Graft suspect implicates Democratic Party politician’, Jakarta Post, 29/4/2011; ‘Kader
berulah, Demokrat babak belur [Cadres misbehave, Democrats black and blue]’, Gatra,
22/6/2011.
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Greg Fealy
his claim.17 He later accused the chair of PD, Anas Urbaningrum, of also being
party to inancial misdealings.
The Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, Mahfud MD, then revealed
that Nazaruddin had paid S$120,000 as a ‘friendship gift’ to the Court’s secretary general in late 2010. When the oficial tried to return the money, Nazaruddin
reportedly said that he would ‘trash’ the Court’s reputation if the payment was
returned. Although Mahfud informed the president about the ‘gift’, no action was
taken against Nazaruddin. Other cases of dubious Nazaruddin dealings began to
emerge – most notably his involvement in education ministry corruption – and
his wife also came under investigation for graft.18
The Nazaruddin case exposed, for the irst time, the deep cleavages within PD.
The main polarity was between the factions centred on SBY, who chairs the party’s
Patrons Council, and supporters of Anas Urbaningrum. Relations between SBY
and Anas had been strained since the PD Congress in early 2010, when the latter had defeated the president’s preferred candidate, Andi Mallarangeng, for the
position of chair. Nazaruddin was a key inancial supporter of Anas’s campaign
and had arranged much of the funding for his extensive travel and generous disbursements to regional branches in the run-up to the congress. An indication of
Anas’s gratitude to and trust in Nazaruddin came immediately after the congress,
when the new chair ignored the wishes of the president’s wife that an SBY loyalist
become treasurer and instead appointed Nazaruddin to the position. Anas clearly
expected that Nazaruddin would continue to raise large sums of money both for
the party and for his own tilt at the 2014 presidential elections, as either a presidential or a vice-presidential candidate. The vast lows of money passing through
the parliament were the main source of Nazaruddin’s funds. His free-wheeling
fund-raising activities were well known within the party and he had developed a
reputation as a brash, often imprudent, political entrepreneur.
Relations between Anas and the palace deteriorated markedly from late 2010,
when the chair ignored SBY’s wishes on a succession of party issues. The president and his wife had indicated that they wanted the governor of North Sulawesi
to become the next provincial chair but Anas threw his weight behind the mayor
of Manado, who was eventually successful. He has similarly nominated loyalists
to party positions in Java and Sumatra, much to the chagrin of SBY. This seems to
have conirmed the view within the palace that Anas cannot be trusted to protect
the interests of the president’s family after 2014, so it is now actively undermining
him.
This, then, is the context for the Nazaruddin scandal. The anti-Anas forces
wanted immediate disciplinary action against Nazaruddin, knowing that this
would weaken Anas, perhaps irretrievably, while Anas’s circle strove initially to
defend Nazaruddin on the grounds that nothing had been proven against him
and he had been an energetic supporter of the party. The more outspoken leaders
17 ‘Karena Nazar tak mau sendiri [Because Nazar does not want to go alone]’, Tempo,
30/5/2011; ‘Nazaruddin tak ingin pulang [Nazaruddin does not want to return home]’,
Kompas, 2/7/2011.
18 ‘Nazaruddin membangkang, Demokrat gamang [Nazaruddin objects, Democrats in a
faint]’, Gatra, 8/6/2011; ‘Kader berulah, Demokrat babak belur [Cadres misbehave, Democrats are black and blue]’, Gatra, 22/6/2011.
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Democratic regression and Yudhoyono’s regal incumbency
343
from each camp openly attacked each other and the press was illed with reports
on the growing rancour within the PD elite. Some Anas supporters were convinced that their enemies within PD had leaked details of the Nazaruddin case
just to harm their leader. Inevitably SBY won the day, and Nazaruddin was dismissed as party treasurer on 23 May, though he retained his seat in parliament.19
Nazaruddin responded deiantly to his sacking. He slipped out of Indonesia
for Singapore on 23 May, just hours before he was to be barred from leaving the
country. Attempts to persuade him to return to Indonesia failed. While on the
run he kept up a series of interviews and press statements denying the allegations against him and accusing other party colleagues and parliamentarians of
involvement in graft. He was eventually arrested in a luxury resort in Colombia
on 9 August and deported to Indonesia for prosecution.20 The fallout from the
Nazaruddin case has been considerable. It has tarnished the reputation of PD as
a coherent and professional party. To some extent it has also harmed SBY’s standing, with the president clearly unable to persuade the warring factions to conine
their differences to the party. The fall in public approval for PD over the past three
months is testimony to the impact of the scandal. The issures in the party during
2011 suggest that it may struggle to maintain unity and purpose after SBY ceases
to be president.
Even greater harm has been wrought to the prospects of Anas Urbaningrum
and Andi Mallarangeng, two promising young politicians who were seen as possible future presidential candidates. According to surveys, Anas in particular had
some prospect of being a credible presidential or vice-presidential nominee in
2014. He is an astute political operator; he is ethnically Javanese (almost a necessity for serious candidates); and he has Islamic credibility as a former chair of
Indonesia’s largest Muslim student organisation, Himpunan Mahasisiwa Islam
(HMI). But he is now tainted and without his main inancial benefactor. As the
Nazaruddin saga and inevitable trial drag on over the next year or so, Anas is
unlikely to be able to escape further damage to his reputation. Similarly, Andi
is facing continuing investigation of his own and his department’s role in the
scandal, and is also under pressure over delays in preparations for the Southeast
Asian Games.
THE CONTINUING SLIDE OF POLITICAL ISLAM
Another major development in the 2009 general election was the continuing
decline of Islamic parties. The nine Islamic parties that contested the election
gained 29.3% of the national vote, the lowest total ‘Islamic vote’ in any of Indonesia’s democratic elections since 1955. Of the four main Islamic parties – PKB,
PPP, PAN and PKS – all but PKS suffered falls in support. Even in the case of
PKS the igure rose by only 0.5%, despite its leaders’ conidence that the party’s
vote would rise by a third or more. The reasons for the parties’ poor performance
included internal ructions, lacklustre or incompetent leadership, perceived lack of
economic competence and friction with core constituencies (Fealy 2009; Mietzner
19 ‘Kader berulah, Demokrat babak belur [Cadres misbehave, Democrats are black and
blue]’, Gatra, 22/6/2011.
20 ‘Indonesian fugitive arrested in Colombia’, Straits Times, 9/8/2011.
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Greg Fealy
2009). Many commentators and Islamic leaders have warned the Islamic parties
that they will need to rethink their strategies and behaviour if they are to avoid
sliding into electoral oblivion over the next decade. With parliamentary thresholds likely to rise in 2014, PKB, PPP and PAN face the possibility of not gaining
any seats at the next election.
In the past two years, Islamic parties have done little to respond to the challenges they face and many display symptoms of irretrievable decay. PKB continues to suffer internal strife and has made little headway in efforts to improve
relations with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s largest Islamic organisation
and the main basis for its support. PKB’s chair, Muhaimin Iskandar, who is also
Minister for Manpower and Transmigration, has been discredited by his ministry’s mishandling of foreign worker issues and corruption allegations relating to
his personal staff. PPP is also languishing. Its lacklustre chair, Suryadharma Ali,
who is also the Minister for Religious Affairs, was re-elected party chair at the PPP
Congress in 2011, seemingly for his capacity to dispense patronage rather than for
any vision or distinguishing leadership qualities. No substantive policy initiatives
emerged from the congress and the event closed early, as if there were no signiicant problems requiring discussion. PAN’s situation is similar to that of PKB and
PPP. Its chair, Hatta Rajasa, is preoccupied with his tasks as Coordinating Minister
for the Economy and conidant to SBY, and relations between PAN and its main
constituency in Indonesia’s largest modernist Islamic organisation, Muhammadiyah, are cool.
The leaders of PKB, PPP and PAN do not appear able to generate ideas to
recapture the imagination or trust of the Islamic community; nor are they capable
of making a compelling case as to why overtly Islamic parties are more worthy of
Muslims’ support than religiously neutral parties such as PD, Golkar and PDI–P.
Indeed, the central tactic for political survival of all three parties is participation in
the ruling coalition, as this brings access to inancial resources and opportunities
to dispense patronage. Not surprisingly, polling conducted by LSI in May 2011
indicates continuing slippage in Islamic party support, with PKB on 4.5%, PKS on
4.1%, PPP on 4.0% and PAN on 2.4%, giving a total Islamic party vote of just 15%
(LSI 2011: 16).
The Islamic party that has arguably fared worst over the past year is PKS,
though the nature of its problems differs from that of the three parties just mentioned. Many in PKS regard 2011 as an annus horribilis in which the party has been
beset by a succession of controversies that have greatly tarnished its standing
as a ‘clean’, reformist and morally exemplary party. PKS began the year in the
uncomfortable position of having to defend one of its star recruits to parliament,
the former deputy national police chief, Adang Daradjatun, who refused to disclose the whereabouts of his fugitive wife, Nunun Nurbaeti. Nunun conveniently
developed amnesia and sought treatment in Singapore when it emerged that she
was being investigated for bribing MPs to ensure the appointment of Miranda S.
Goeltom as Bank Indonesia’s senior deputy governor in 2004.21
In March, the party was buffeted when one of its elders, a wizened, wispyhaired preacher called Yusuf Supendi, went public with allegations of corruption
21 ‘PKS legislator refuses to say where fugitive wife is hiding’, Jakarta Globe, 30/5/2011;
‘Sakit lupa ingat belanja [Amnesia but remembers to shop]’, Gatra, 8/6/2011.
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Democratic regression and Yudhoyono’s regal incumbency
345
and unethical behaviour by the PKS elite. Among his many allegations were
claims that the party secretary general, Anis Matta, had misused some $1.25 million of campaign funds in 2009; that PKS had breached the election law in 1999 by
accepting funding from overseas, to wit the Middle East; that Anis and the party’s
paramount leader, Hilmi Aminuddin, had received payments from former armed
forces commander Wiranto in 2004 to secure party support for his presidential
nomination; and that party president Luthi Hasan Isyaaq had accepted $4.25
million from former Vice President Jusuf Kalla during the latter’s presidential
campaign.22 Supendi later submitted documents to the KPK and iled a lawsuit
against 11 senior PKS leaders. His allegations caused consternation in party ranks,
as he had a reputation for humility and moral rectitude and was known to be a
stickler for detail. While there had previously been occasional reporting of divisions and malfeasance within PKS, this was the irst time that a senior igure had
been willing to make detailed claims. Supendi’s allegations sparked several weeks
of damaging media revelations about the high-living lifestyles of the PKS elite.23
The following month PKS was again in the headlines when one of its MPs,
Ariinto, was photographed watching pornography on his tablet computer during a plenary session of parliament. He initially denied that he had intentionally accessed an adult website but subsequent photographs clearly showed him
browsing a menu of pornographic sites.24 Ariinto agreed to resign a few days
later, but attracted more unlattering headlines when it was revealed that he was
still drawing a parliamentary salary in September.25 The Ariinto case was acutely
embarrassing for PKS because the party, and in particular its outspoken Minister
for Information and Communication, Tifatul Sembiring, had led a controversial
campaign to block access to pornographic websites in Indonesia. Ariinto himself had been a co-founder of Sabili magazine, for many years the highest-selling
Islamist magazine and a regular fulminator against the evils of pornography.
Upon hearing of Ariinto’s actions, PKS parliamentarian Nasir Jamil probably
summed up the views of many party cadres when he exclaimed: ‘My! PKS’s
image is ruined again’.26
The most recent blow for the party came with a series of Tempo articles exposing the involvement of senior PKS leaders in the brokering of meat imports.
According to Tempo, two of PKS’s most powerful igures, Hilmi Aminuddin and
Suripto, had been pressuring staff at the Ministry of Agriculture to issue meat
22 ‘Top PKS politicians face embezzlement allegations’, Jakarta Globe, 15/3/2011; ‘Presiden PKS dilaporkan ke BK DPR [PKS president reported to parliament’s Ethics Board]’,
Republika, 17/3/2011; ‘Adil di sini, sejahtera di sana [Just here, prosperous there]’, Tempo,
28/3/2011; ‘Urgently needed: truly clean and caring party’, Jakarta Post, 15/4/2011.
23 See, for example, ‘Deciphering the inluence of PKS puppet-master Hilmi’, Jakarta Post,
30/3/2011.
24 ‘Ariinto: paripurna sudah dalam kondisi jenuh [Ariinto: I was already fed up with the
plenary session]’, Media Indonesia Online, 8/4/2011; ‘PKS member trapped by anti-porn
stance’, Jakarta Post, 9/4/2011; ‘Fotografer punya 60 frame foto Ariinto nonton video porno [Photographer has 60 photo frames of Ariinto watching porn]’, detikNews, 10/4/2011.
25 ‘PKS porn scandal lawmaker still in house’, Jakarta Globe, 8/9/2011.
26 ‘Nasir Jamil: waduh … PKS ancur lagi [Nasir Jamil: My … PKS ruined again]’, Media
Indonesia, 9/4/2011.
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Greg Fealy
import licences to business people connected to the party, and to approve meat
shipments from India despite the risk of disease entering the country. One of the
brokers reportedly pushing for access to the lucrative permits was Hilmi’s youngest son, Ridwan Hakim.27 The Minister for Agriculture is Suswono, a PKS leader,
and the party has been systematically entrenching its cadres in key positions
within the ministry since it irst gained control of it in 2004.
The revelations and accusations concerning PKS have a broader signiicance
for Islamic politics. Numerous observers have warned that PKS seems to be creating a new kind of political Islam in Indonesia, one that is more ideologically
driven, puritanical and transnational than the creed of any other Islamic party.
With its Muslim Brotherhood-derived doctrine and organisational principles,
PKS has been seen as a harbinger of a more Middle Eastern form of Islamism.
Certainly the party’s internal discourse abounds with the rhetoric of social and
political transformation undergirded by Islamic values (Bubalo and Fealy 2005:
ch. 4). Some writers have gone so far as to describe PKS as an insidious and ultimately undemocratic force, based on the assumption that if it gained power, it
would replace popular sovereignty with a theocracy.28
But developments over the past year suggest that PKS is not so much transforming Indonesian politics as being transformed by it. The low ethical standards
of much of Indonesia’s political elite, its vaulting rent seeking, its nepotism and
its disdain for grassroots sentiment are now evident in the upper levels of PKS,
though certainly not to the degree found in other parties. It seems likely that the
imperatives of electoral politics in Indonesia will continue to erode the principles
and rectitude of the party. PKS won a dramatic increase in its vote in 2004, partly
because it was seen as a fresh alternative voice in Indonesian politics. By 2014,
PKS may appear rather too similar to other run-of-the-mill Islamic parties.
AHMADIYAH AND THE LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE
‘Moderate Muslim’ is probably the term most frequently used by international
leaders to describe contemporary Indonesia, and many Indonesian leaders trade
heavily on their nation’s reputation as one of the most tolerant Muslim-majority
countries. SBY, himself, makes regular reference to religious moderation when
addressing foreign audiences, often suggesting that other parts of the Muslim
world could learn from Indonesia’s example. For a genuine democracy, religious pluralism and the protection of minority rights are core elements. Mature
democracies should have detailed statutes enshrining religious rights, while also
ensuring that law enforcement agencies uphold the sanctity of such laws without
prejudice.
Despite perceptions within Indonesia and internationally, the incidence of religious sectarianism has been growing for several years, often with the connivance or indifference of state authorities. This intolerance takes numerous forms,
27 ‘Impor renyah “daging berjanggut” [Soft and crunchy imports of “bearded meat”]’,
Tempo, 14/3/2011; ‘Pemain daging Partai Sejahtera [Prosperous Party’s meat players]’,
Tempo, 14/3/2011; ‘Partai putih di pusaran impor daging [Pure party at centre of meat
imports]’, Tempo, 6/6/2011.
28 See, for example, Dhume (2005).
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Democratic regression and Yudhoyono’s regal incumbency
347
from low-level harassment and legal restrictions to damage of property, enforced
relocation and bloody violence. The most frequent form relates to prohibitions on
the building of houses of worship, most commonly churches but also on occasion
mosques and Buddhist temples. One widely reported case concerns the refusal of
the Bogor municipality to agree to the construction of a church despite a Supreme
Court r
ISSN: 0007-4918 (Print) 1472-7234 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cbie20
Indonesian politics in 2011: democratic regression
and Yudhoyono's regal incumbency
Greg Fealy
To cite this article: Greg Fealy (2011) Indonesian politics in 2011: democratic regression and
Yudhoyono's regal incumbency, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 47:3, 333-353, DOI:
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Date: 18 January 2016, At: 19:18
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2011: 333–53
INDONESIAN POLITICS IN 2011:
DEMOCRATIC REGRESSION AND
YUDHOYONO’S REGAL INCUMBENCY
Greg Fealy*
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Australian National University
In 2011, a number of trends in Indonesian politics became clearer. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) has not become a more reformist and risk-taking
president in his second term, contrary to the hopes of many, but has rather become
more cautious, aloof and regal in style. He is irked by criticism and dislikes any
disturbance to the authority of his rule. The political elite, often in concert with the
SBY government, pushed through a range of democratically regressive measures,
including allowing politicians to be appointed to the Elections Commission. The
malaise within the party system deepened, with less than a quarter of the electorate
professing any party afiliation. Most Islamic parties slid closer to the political periphery, and the largest one, PKS, was beset by controversy. Government and community responses to a brutal attack on the Ahmadiyah sect in early 2011 showed the
limits of Indonesia’s much lauded religious tolerance.
Keywords: democratic regression; political Islam; religious intolerance; corruption; presidential incumbency
Indonesia is now in the third year of its quinquennial electoral cycle. The new
parliament was installed in August 2009 and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) began his second term the following month. This is a good juncture at
which to assess political trends for the ive-year period, as the legislature, parties
and government have settled into patterns of behaviour that will probably prevail
till at least the 2014 elections, if not beyond. Of late, Indonesia and SBY have been
basking in the praise of Western political leaders and often, also, the international
media. Indonesia is lauded as a success story of democratisation, religious tolerance and stability in a Muslim-majority nation. It is held up as a beacon both
to the broader Islamic world, where authoritarianism and sectarian conlict are
common, and to other Southeast Asian nations, which tend to be rated as only
This is a revised version of a paper presented to the 29th Indonesia Update conference,
held at the Australian National University, Canberra, on 30 September 2011. The author
would like to thank Ed Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner and Ken Ward for valuable comments
on an earlier draft. Douglas Ramage, the Managing Director of BowerGroupAsia’s Indonesia ofice, acted as discussant of the paper presented at the conference; some of his comments are appended in box 1 at the end of this paper.
*
ISSN 0007-4918 print/ISSN 1472-7234 online/11/030333-21
DOI: 10.1080/00074918.2011.619050
© 2011 Indonesia Project ANU
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Greg Fealy
semi-democratic or undemocratic.1 SBY is cast as a statesman and reformist president whose own values of decency and moderation have imparted greater civility
to Indonesian politics.
The picture I will paint of Indonesia and its president is less lattering, though
by no means bleak. The political system has for several years shown signs of
democratic stagnation and backsliding, a trend examined by a number of scholars, most notably Marcus Mietzner.2 But during 2011, the evidence that political
reforms are being rolled back became much stronger. On the one hand, the political elite is tightening its grip on key oversight institutions, often in a manner that
reduces transparency as well as the public standing and effectiveness of those
institutions. This has the effect of weakening the checks and balances for the exercise of power. On the other hand, the parliamentary and party systems, in which
much of the elite is embedded, are themselves beset by a deepening malaise that
harms their competence and may, over time, undermine conidence in democracy.
Far from being a reformist president, SBY is increasingly conservative, remote
from his cabinet, governed by public opinion and consumed with his own standing and legacy. Moreover, he is as likely as not to tacitly sanction democratically
regressive proposals, even if he does not initiate them. At the same time, Indonesia’s record on religious tolerance is being tarnished by sectarian violence, with
both the state and civil society complicit in the intimidation and victimisation of
unpopular minorities. SBY and his government have contributed to this decline in
religious rights, albeit unintentionally. A pithy summation of my argument might
be: ‘Indonesia: not as good as it seems’.
SBY’S REGAL PRESIDENCY 3
At the beginning of SBY’s second term, some commentators predicted that we
would see a different president from the vacillating, often politically timid igure of the preceding ive years. According to this view, SBY, freed of the burden
of re-election, would pursue bold policies in order to cement his place in Indonesian history as a visionary president committed to change. In fact, the opposite
has been the case. SBY appears to be less concerned with economic and political
reform now than he was in his irst term. Instead, he appears preoccupied with
status and incumbency. The president seems increasingly not so much to rule as
to reign over the country, and he desires to do so serenely. He is acutely sensitive
to criticism and to any breaches of protocol that might be taken as disrespectful.
Every morning, he and his wife, Ani, are said to pore over the newspapers at
breakfast, paying particular attention to critical coverage of the palace or the government. Personal attacks on SBY in the media will often agitate him for hours, if
not days. He is especially perturbed by controversies that force him into the political fray to defend himself or his ministers, or to take swift action; when he appears
1 See, for example, Freedom House’s global democracy rankings, which classify Indonesia
as the only full democracy in Southeast Asia. The 2011 rankings are available at .
2 See Mietzner (2011); see also EIU (2008).
3 Much of the material for this section is drawn from conidential interviews with senior
oficials and politicians in Jakarta conducted during the irst half of 2011.
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Democratic regression and Yudhoyono’s regal incumbency
335
in public he seeks to convey a calm, self-possessed authority. In this sense, he
aspires to be a regal president.
The style of SBY’s leadership of government has also changed during this term,
and not for the better. The president is increasingly aloof from most of his ministers and relies ever more heavily on a small circle of trusted advisers, notably
Hatta Rajasa, the Coordinating Minister for the Economy, Djoko Suyanto, the
Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, and Sudi Silalahi,
the State Secretary and a long-time SBY lieutenant. Substantive discussion of policy issues rarely occurs in cabinet and SBY appears to regard such meetings as an
opportunity to deliver lengthy, often leaden, disquisitions on problems facing the
nation or government. So common has his lecturing become that some ministers
have ruefully nicknamed him ‘The Professor’. Many ministers have never been
granted a face-to-face meeting with the president, and even senior ministers communicate with SBY primarily through Hatta, Djoko or Sudi, or cabinet secretary
Dipo Alam. A number of more resourceful ministers, frustrated with their lack of
direct access and presidential inertia, have persuaded colleagues or sympathetic
journalists to write prominent articles in newspapers such as Kompas or Jawa Pos
in order to gain SBY’s attention and sway him to act on an issue.
Despite his growing detachment, the president remains, as ever, hesitant in his
decision making. One popular joke in Jakarta claims that when asked to choose
between ‘A’ or ‘B’, SBY chooses ‘or’! He is especially susceptible to lobbying by
important igures, and has been known – much to the chagrin of his ministers – to
zig-zag on issues as he comes under pressure from competing forces.
Although SBY’s cautious and increasingly courtly approach to politics does not
lead to daring or innovative decision making, it has nonetheless produced settled
and stable conditions that are conducive to rapid economic growth. By instinct
and personality, SBY is a politician of the ‘middle’. Whenever possible he seeks
to avoid conlict with major political or economic forces and tries not to push
against the tide of public opinion. Before making important decisions, he or his
staff will take soundings from powerful stakeholders in an effort to calculate the
political risks. While this is not unusual behaviour for a politician, SBY will often
stall or prevaricate on key decisions for weeks or months in a manner contrary
to the image of managerial eficiency that he seeks to cultivate. He is particularly
heedful of community attitudes and he studies public opinion surveys intently to
ensure that, where possible, he is in step with popular sentiment. On many contentious issues, SBY has been prepared to decide a matter only after seeing polling
data and has chosen a course of action exactly in accord with the majority view.
While this pattern of behaviour allows him to defuse potentially divisive issues,
it also means that he seldom leads or shapes public opinion and is reluctant to
debate controversial initiatives. The removal of fuel subsidies was one such policy issue. While SBY accepted the need to reduce subsidies, he was unwilling to
announce the decision himself because of its likely unpopularity. Instead, he left
it to his economic ministers to announce and defend the policy.
A further problem is that SBY’s second cabinet has proven to be much weaker
than its predecessor. In his irst cabinet, SBY had ‘can-do’ igures such as Vice
President Jusuf Kalla and the Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare,
Aburizal Bakrie, to drive through policies and legislation and to respond to thorny
issues. There is no comparable igure in the present government. Vice President
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Greg Fealy
Boediono has great integrity and technical expertise but he has little political nous
or clout. Hatta is a savvy strategist and deal maker with broad political connections but he cannot command the vast inancial resources of Bakrie when seeking
to ‘persuade’ parliamentarians to pass important bills. Also, the number of underperforming ministers is much greater than in the preceding government, a situation that relects the president’s own prioritising of political stability and loyalty
over merit and initiative. The relative weakness of cabinet has been highlighted
by the regular ‘report cards’ on ministerial performance issued by the Presidential
Working Unit for Supervision and Management of Development (Unit Kerja Presiden bidang Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan, or UKP4).4
Given the mounting criticism of the government, SBY reshufled his cabinet
in late October. The reshufle was more extensive than predicted: 12 ministries
changed hands, with eight ministers dismissed and four shifted to new portfolios
(table 1). In addition, some 10 new deputy ministers were appointed. In many
ways, the new line-up relected the same compromise between technocratic merit
and political expediency that had marked SBY’s earlier decisions on cabinet composition. While the removal of Mari Pangestu as trade minister was unexpected
given that she was regarded as one of the more competent cabinet members
(Manning and Purnagunawan 2011: 322, in this issue), the appointment of Gita
Wirjawan as her replacement won plaudits from many commentators. The retention of Minister of Finance Agus Martowardojo, who had stood irm against pressure from powerful political and business interests, was a victory for Boediono
and other economic technocrats in the government.
The most controversial aspects of the reshufle were the failure to remove two
ministers embroiled in corruption scandals, the Minister for Manpower and Transmigration, Muhaimin Iskandar, and the Minister for Youth and Sports Affairs,
Andi Mallarangeng; and the appointment of SBY loyalists in the president’s Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat, or PD) to strategic portfolios such as energy and
transportation. The appointments of Jero Wacik to the Ministry of Energy and
Natural Resources and of E.E. Mangindaan to the Ministry of Transportation were
widely criticised given that the new ministers had no relevant expertise. The decision appeared to relect PD’s determination to secure greater funding for the 2014
elections from money-rich ministries.5
DEMOCRATIC REGRESSION
For several years, political observers have been warning of the risk of reversal of
Indonesia’s democratisation process (Aspinall 2010; Haris 2011; Mietzner 2011).
Mietzner, for example, has argued strongly that most of Indonesia’s signiicant
reforms took place before 2006, with stagnation and some roll-back of democracy evident since then. Indications of this regressive trend became far more
pronounced during 2011, with the four most salient forms being: the deliberate
undermining of key oversight institutions whose primary purpose is to ensure
the transparency and integrity of political, economic and bureaucratic processes;
4 ‘UKP4: ministries with “red marks” evenly distributed’, Indonesia Today, 28/9/2011.
5 ‘SBY controls “lucrative” posts’, Jakarta Post, 19/10/2011.
Democratic regression and Yudhoyono’s regal incumbency
337
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TABLE 1 Cabinet Changes Announced in October 2011 a
Ministry/Agency
Outgoing Minister
(Party Afiliation/
Career Background)
New Minister
(Party Afiliation/
Career Background)
Ministry of Trade
Mari Elka Pangestu
(academic economist)
Gita Wirjawan
(businessman and head of
Investment Coordinating
Board, BKPM)
Ministry of Justice and
Human Rights
Patrialis Akbar
(PAN)
Amir Syamsuddin
(PD, lawyer)
Ministry for State
Enterprises
Mustafa Abubakar
(former Aceh governor
and former Bulog head)
Dahlan Iskan
(PLN director and media
owner)
Ministry for Public
Housing
Suharso Monoarfa
(PPP)
Djan Faridz
(PPP, Jakarta businessman
and member of the DPD)
State Intelligence Agency
Sutanto
(former police chief)
Marciano Norman
(general)
Ministry for State
Apparatus and
Administrative Reforms
E.E. Mangindaan
(PD, former general
and former governor of
North Sulawesi)
Azwar Abubakar
(PAN, former Aceh
governor)
Ministry for the
Environment
Gusti Muhammad Hatta
(academic)
Berth Kambuaya
(academic)
Ministry of Tourism and
Creative Economy
Jero Wacik
(PD)
Mari Elka Pangestu
(moved from Ministry of
Trade)
Ministry of Transportation
Freddy Numberi
(former Papua governor
and former vice admiral)
E.E. Mangindaan
(moved from Ministry
for State Apparatus and
Administrative Reforms)
Ministry for Research and
Technology
Suharna Surapranata
(PKS, scientist)
Gusti Muhammad Hatta
(moved from Ministry for
the Environment)
Ministry of Maritime
Affairs and Fisheries
Fadel Muhammad
(Golkar, former governor
of Gorontalo)
Syarif Cicip Sutardjo
(Golkar)
Ministry of Energy and
Natural Resources
Darwin Zahedy Saleh
(PD, academic)
Jero Wacik
(moved from Ministry
of Tourism and Creative
Economy)
a PLN: Perusahaan Listrik Negara (the state electricity company); DPD: Dewan Perwakilan Daerah
(Regional Representatives Council); see text and footnote 12 for an explanation of other abbreviations.
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Greg Fealy
the winding back of regional elections and local democracy; the deepening problems in the functioning of parties and the legislature; and the failure to protect
minority rights (discussed in the inal section of this article).
In many instances the government and the major political parties act in concert to initiate regressive measures, with both sharing a common interest either
in lessening scrutiny of their actions, particularly the risk of malfeasance being
exposed, or in expanding their inluence over political processes. The institutions most commonly targeted by the political elite are the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, or KPK) and the Elections
Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, or KPU), but other bodies such as the
Supreme Audit Agency (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, or BPK) and the Judicial
Commission (Komisi Yudisial) have not been immune.
Together with the Constitutional Court, the KPK has been the most successful
new institution of the post-Soeharto era. Since its establishment in 2003, the KPK
has investigated more than a thousand corruption cases, many of them involving ministers, governors, mayors, parliamentarians, senior bureaucrats and other
prominent igures. In mid-2011, the Minister for Home Affairs informed parliament that the KPK was investigating 155 regional government heads, including
17 governors. Over the past six years more than two dozen parliamentarians have
been found guilty of graft and gaoled. Although the KPK’s public approval rating
has slipped from 58% to 41% over the past year, it remains one of the more trusted
institutions.6
The KPK’s success in uncovering corruption and bringing high-proile politicians and oficials to justice has earned it the wrath of many in elite circles. The
parliament has repeatedly sought to curtail the Commission’s investigative and
prosecutorial powers, and to appoint less credible or more compliant commissioners. For the most part, pressure from the KPK, civil society groups and the
media has forced parliament to refrain from making sweeping changes to the
KPK’s powers, but attacks on the Commission continue (Butt 2011, in this issue).
Fahri Hamzah, a senior parliamentarian from the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai
Keadilan Sejahtera, or PKS), recently called for the KPK’s disbandment, claiming that it was acting undemocratically.7 A parliamentary committee is currently
vetting a short-list of nominees for the KPK leadership, with a view to making
a recommendation to the president on the inal composition of the Commission
(Schütte 2011, in this issue).
The composition and reporting requirements of the Elections Commission, the
KPU, have also been the subject of heated debate between political parties on the
one hand and NGOs and commentators on the other. In 2011, the major parties
pushed through legislation that allowed politicians to serve on the KPU board,
provided they irst resigned from their parties. The politicians argued that parties were legitimate stakeholders in the electoral system and should therefore be
represented on the KPU board. They also pointed to the poor performance of the
outgoing board, which was composed largely of ex-bureaucrats and academics
with technocratic backgrounds. Undoubtedly many parties were keen to expand
6 ‘Empat alasan kepercayaan public menurun terhadap KPU [Four reasons for falling
public trust in KPU]’, Media Indonesia, 7/8/2011.
7 ‘House corners KPK, threatens its dismissal’, Jakarta Post, 4/10/2011.
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Democratic regression and Yudhoyono’s regal incumbency
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their inluence within the KPU so that decisions on the conduct of the 2014 elections could be manipulated to favour their interests.
The new law also obliged the KPU to consult and collaborate with the parliament and government on technical election-management issues.8 Academics as
well as NGOs such as Cetro and Formappi criticised the new law for increasing
the risk of the KPU becoming politicised. They argued that the perceived neutrality and competence of the Commission would be critical in the upcoming elections, particularly if the result was close and the integrity of the election process
came into dispute.9 Party representatives were last allowed on the KPU board for
the 1999 elections; that commission was widely viewed as the most shambolic of
the post-Soeharto era. By contrast, the most effective commission was the one that
oversaw the 2004 elections; it was made up mainly of specialists from academic
and NGO circles.
The Andi Nurpati case serves as another warning about the downside of having KPU oficials who are too close to political parties. Andi Nurpati, a former
KPU board member, stands accused of involvement in the fabrication of a Constitutional Court ruling on the allocation of a parliamentary seat in the 2009 election, although she denies the charge. She is suspected of having conspired with
the Court’s clerical staff to alter the ruling in order to deliver the seat to Dewi
Yasin Limpo from the People’s Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, or
Hanura). Last year, Andi caused a stir when she resigned from the KPU to join the
board of PD in order to pursue her own political career. Questions are now being
raised about whether another six MPs may have gained their seats fraudulently.10
Regional elections were another area where the parliament and the government combined to push for the scaling back of democratic processes. The government has long argued that the popular election of governors, and to a lesser extent
district and deputy district heads, is harmful to the quality of regional administration and to eficient and harmonious relations between the central government
and the regions. There is also widespread concern about the cost, disruption and
sometimes conlict caused by the succession of local elections. In 2010, Minister
for Home Affairs Gamawan Fauzi announced that the government wanted to
eliminate gubernatorial elections and return to the pre-reformasi system of local
legislatures electing governors and deputy governors. He also called for the abolition of the paired candidate system for district head elections. In subsequent
elections only the district head would be popularly elected, and would select
the deputy from the ranks of the bureaucracy.11 The minister claimed that the
8 ‘KPU wajib konsultasi dengan DPR [KPU obliged to consult parliament]’, Kompas,
10/8/2011; ‘House passes KPU bill into law’, Jakarta Post, 21/9/2011; ‘Peran partai politik
dominan; UU segera diuji [The dominant role of political parties; law soon to be tested]’,
Kompas, 21/9/2011.
9 ‘Kemandirian KPU harus dijaga [KPU’s independence must be guarded]’, Kompas,
6/4/2011.
10 ‘Kursi tidak sah di DPR [Parliamentary seats invalid]’, Kompas, 14/9/2011.
11 ‘Partai harus biayai calon kepala daerah [Parties have to fund district head candidates]’, Kompas, 25/1/2011; ‘Wakil kepala daerah ditunjuk kepala daerah terpilih dari PNS
[Deputy district heads appointed from bureaucracy by elected district heads]’, Jawa Pos
Online, 26/4/2010.
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Greg Fealy
changes would make the system cheaper, more administratively streamlined and
less prone to corruption. But although reducing the number of regional elections
would undoubtedly save money, it would also crimp local democracy and invest
greater power in the parties and elites that dominate regional politics. The bill to
amend local elections is still to come before parliament.
The trend with these institutional and electoral changes is to cement and
expand the power of the current political elite by allowing it to dominate key
decision-making processes and limit independent monitoring of its activities. In a
political system in which access to vast sums of money is increasingly important
to electoral success, all major parties have an interest in being able to use parliamentary and ministerial positions to generate funds. The Nazaruddin scandal,
described below, provides a graphic example of how parties and ambitious politicians depend on accumulating the inancial reserves needed to fund high-proile
campaigns. With nearly all these regressive institutional ‘reforms’, the space for
civil society is diminished and the scope for elite control extended.
Not only are political leaders undermining the integrity of democratic institutions, they are also failing to address mounting problems within the party system.
During 2011, more evidence emerged of the slide in public conidence in parties and in willingness to afiliate with them. Surveys conducted by the respected
Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, or LSI) show that only
20% of respondents regard themselves as ‘close’ to a particular party, down from
86% in 1999 (LSI 2011: 30). This implies that some 80% of the electorate is willing
to change its vote. Coupled with this is the declining vote for major parties and
the increase in the number of small parties. In 1999 there were ive parties exceeding 3% of the vote; in 2004 this expanded to seven and in 2009 to nine. The shares
of the ive ‘big’ parties in 1999 – PDI–P, Golkar, PKB, PPP and PAN12 – dropped
on average by 9% over the next two elections. The result is a more complex political constellation, which inevitably gives rise to a more variegated ruling coalition
with the attendant risk of declining coherence. Despite widespread publicity for
such indings and lobbying of political leaders to embark on reforms, few parties
have shown any interest in doing so, and most remain preoccupied with their
immediate electoral prospects. The only initiative undertaken by the major parties has been to raise the threshold for parliamentary representation above the
present level of 2.5% of the vote (probably to 3–5%), in a bid to prevent smaller
parties from gaining seats and thereby maximise by default their own parliamentary representation.13
SBY has contributed to this gradual democratic reversal, most commonly by
refusing to defend the country’s democratic institutions unless prompted to do so
by public opinion, but also, at times, by directly undermining them. For example,
he appears to approve of the plans to scrap gubernatorial elections, seemingly
because he believes that governors elected by local legislatures rather than by the
12 PDI–P: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle); Golkar: Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar Party); PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa
(National Awakening Party); PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development
Party); PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party).
13 ‘Partai masih beda pendapat [Parties still of different views]’, Kompas, 7/1/2011; ‘Ancaman ambang batas [The threat of threshold limits]’, Kompas, 13/9/2011.
Democratic regression and Yudhoyono’s regal incumbency
341
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people will be more compliant to the wishes of the central government. Similarly,
he has raised no objections to the presence of party politicians on the KPU board.
Pointedly, SBY has at times joined in criticism of the Commission, claiming that
it has ‘extraordinary powers’ and seems ‘answerable only to God’. He was also
slow to act on the attempted prosecution of two KPK chairs in 2009 – until polling
showed that most voters wanted the charges against them dropped.14
THE NAZARUDDIN SCANDAL AND DEMOCRAT PARTY DIVISIONS
As in every year since Soeharto’s downfall, 2011 has produced a string of corruption scandals that have captured media and public attention. The Minister for
Manpower and Transmigration, Muhaimin Iskandar, has been embroiled in graft
allegations involving several of his subordinates and is currently under questioning from the KPK and facing calls to step down,15 while the Minister for Social Services in the previous government, Bachtiar Chamsyah, was gaoled for 20 months
for his role in a corrupt deal. The Bank Century scandal that so dominated politics
in 2010 continues to generate occasional headlines, though little progress has been
made in uncovering unlawful activity by those involved. But the scandal which
caused the greatest sensation was that surrounding Muhammad Nazaruddin, a
33-year-old parliamentarian and, until recently, the national treasurer of PD.
The story irst broke in April 2011, when the KPK arrested a number of oficials and business people, including the secretary of the Ministry for Youth and
Sports Affairs, Waid Muharram, over $360,000 in bribes paid to secure the contract to build the athletes’ dormitory for the Southeast Asian Games, which are to
be staged in Palembang in late 2011. Among those detained was an employee of
one of Nazaruddin’s companies who told the KPK that Nazaruddin had received
a 13% ‘fee’ for arranging the contract. Waid also revealed that the Minister for
Youth and Sports Affairs, Andi Mallarangeng, had been present at the meeting
at which the contractor had been decided and had voiced no objection to the
arrangement.16
The scandal spread quickly from there. Nazaruddin denied all of the allegations and retaliated by threatening to reveal the involvement in corrupt behaviour of many PD colleagues and other parliamentarians. At a meeting at SBY’s
residence in May, for example, it is said that he brazenly told the president that
his son, Edhie Baskoro Yudhoyono, together with Andi Mallarangeng and Andi’s
brother, the trusted PD political consultant Zulkarnain ‘Choel’ Mallarangeng,
were all implicated in corruption, and threatened to release evidence to support
14 ‘SBY’s commitment to graft eradication questioned’, Jakarta Post, 29/6/2009; ‘Indonesian
president will not interfere in corruption ighters’ detention’, Jakarta Globe, 31/10/2009;
‘President’s inaction only hurts him’, Jakarta Post, 13/11/2009.
15 ‘Dirjen tahu soal uang 1.5 milyar [Director general knows about the 1.5 billion issue]’,
Kompas, 13/9/2011; ‘Minister, budget committee leaders face KPK questioning’, Jakarta
Post, 4/10/2011.
16 ‘Graft suspect implicates Democratic Party politician’, Jakarta Post, 29/4/2011; ‘Kader
berulah, Demokrat babak belur [Cadres misbehave, Democrats black and blue]’, Gatra,
22/6/2011.
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Greg Fealy
his claim.17 He later accused the chair of PD, Anas Urbaningrum, of also being
party to inancial misdealings.
The Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, Mahfud MD, then revealed
that Nazaruddin had paid S$120,000 as a ‘friendship gift’ to the Court’s secretary general in late 2010. When the oficial tried to return the money, Nazaruddin
reportedly said that he would ‘trash’ the Court’s reputation if the payment was
returned. Although Mahfud informed the president about the ‘gift’, no action was
taken against Nazaruddin. Other cases of dubious Nazaruddin dealings began to
emerge – most notably his involvement in education ministry corruption – and
his wife also came under investigation for graft.18
The Nazaruddin case exposed, for the irst time, the deep cleavages within PD.
The main polarity was between the factions centred on SBY, who chairs the party’s
Patrons Council, and supporters of Anas Urbaningrum. Relations between SBY
and Anas had been strained since the PD Congress in early 2010, when the latter had defeated the president’s preferred candidate, Andi Mallarangeng, for the
position of chair. Nazaruddin was a key inancial supporter of Anas’s campaign
and had arranged much of the funding for his extensive travel and generous disbursements to regional branches in the run-up to the congress. An indication of
Anas’s gratitude to and trust in Nazaruddin came immediately after the congress,
when the new chair ignored the wishes of the president’s wife that an SBY loyalist
become treasurer and instead appointed Nazaruddin to the position. Anas clearly
expected that Nazaruddin would continue to raise large sums of money both for
the party and for his own tilt at the 2014 presidential elections, as either a presidential or a vice-presidential candidate. The vast lows of money passing through
the parliament were the main source of Nazaruddin’s funds. His free-wheeling
fund-raising activities were well known within the party and he had developed a
reputation as a brash, often imprudent, political entrepreneur.
Relations between Anas and the palace deteriorated markedly from late 2010,
when the chair ignored SBY’s wishes on a succession of party issues. The president and his wife had indicated that they wanted the governor of North Sulawesi
to become the next provincial chair but Anas threw his weight behind the mayor
of Manado, who was eventually successful. He has similarly nominated loyalists
to party positions in Java and Sumatra, much to the chagrin of SBY. This seems to
have conirmed the view within the palace that Anas cannot be trusted to protect
the interests of the president’s family after 2014, so it is now actively undermining
him.
This, then, is the context for the Nazaruddin scandal. The anti-Anas forces
wanted immediate disciplinary action against Nazaruddin, knowing that this
would weaken Anas, perhaps irretrievably, while Anas’s circle strove initially to
defend Nazaruddin on the grounds that nothing had been proven against him
and he had been an energetic supporter of the party. The more outspoken leaders
17 ‘Karena Nazar tak mau sendiri [Because Nazar does not want to go alone]’, Tempo,
30/5/2011; ‘Nazaruddin tak ingin pulang [Nazaruddin does not want to return home]’,
Kompas, 2/7/2011.
18 ‘Nazaruddin membangkang, Demokrat gamang [Nazaruddin objects, Democrats in a
faint]’, Gatra, 8/6/2011; ‘Kader berulah, Demokrat babak belur [Cadres misbehave, Democrats are black and blue]’, Gatra, 22/6/2011.
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Democratic regression and Yudhoyono’s regal incumbency
343
from each camp openly attacked each other and the press was illed with reports
on the growing rancour within the PD elite. Some Anas supporters were convinced that their enemies within PD had leaked details of the Nazaruddin case
just to harm their leader. Inevitably SBY won the day, and Nazaruddin was dismissed as party treasurer on 23 May, though he retained his seat in parliament.19
Nazaruddin responded deiantly to his sacking. He slipped out of Indonesia
for Singapore on 23 May, just hours before he was to be barred from leaving the
country. Attempts to persuade him to return to Indonesia failed. While on the
run he kept up a series of interviews and press statements denying the allegations against him and accusing other party colleagues and parliamentarians of
involvement in graft. He was eventually arrested in a luxury resort in Colombia
on 9 August and deported to Indonesia for prosecution.20 The fallout from the
Nazaruddin case has been considerable. It has tarnished the reputation of PD as
a coherent and professional party. To some extent it has also harmed SBY’s standing, with the president clearly unable to persuade the warring factions to conine
their differences to the party. The fall in public approval for PD over the past three
months is testimony to the impact of the scandal. The issures in the party during
2011 suggest that it may struggle to maintain unity and purpose after SBY ceases
to be president.
Even greater harm has been wrought to the prospects of Anas Urbaningrum
and Andi Mallarangeng, two promising young politicians who were seen as possible future presidential candidates. According to surveys, Anas in particular had
some prospect of being a credible presidential or vice-presidential nominee in
2014. He is an astute political operator; he is ethnically Javanese (almost a necessity for serious candidates); and he has Islamic credibility as a former chair of
Indonesia’s largest Muslim student organisation, Himpunan Mahasisiwa Islam
(HMI). But he is now tainted and without his main inancial benefactor. As the
Nazaruddin saga and inevitable trial drag on over the next year or so, Anas is
unlikely to be able to escape further damage to his reputation. Similarly, Andi
is facing continuing investigation of his own and his department’s role in the
scandal, and is also under pressure over delays in preparations for the Southeast
Asian Games.
THE CONTINUING SLIDE OF POLITICAL ISLAM
Another major development in the 2009 general election was the continuing
decline of Islamic parties. The nine Islamic parties that contested the election
gained 29.3% of the national vote, the lowest total ‘Islamic vote’ in any of Indonesia’s democratic elections since 1955. Of the four main Islamic parties – PKB,
PPP, PAN and PKS – all but PKS suffered falls in support. Even in the case of
PKS the igure rose by only 0.5%, despite its leaders’ conidence that the party’s
vote would rise by a third or more. The reasons for the parties’ poor performance
included internal ructions, lacklustre or incompetent leadership, perceived lack of
economic competence and friction with core constituencies (Fealy 2009; Mietzner
19 ‘Kader berulah, Demokrat babak belur [Cadres misbehave, Democrats are black and
blue]’, Gatra, 22/6/2011.
20 ‘Indonesian fugitive arrested in Colombia’, Straits Times, 9/8/2011.
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Greg Fealy
2009). Many commentators and Islamic leaders have warned the Islamic parties
that they will need to rethink their strategies and behaviour if they are to avoid
sliding into electoral oblivion over the next decade. With parliamentary thresholds likely to rise in 2014, PKB, PPP and PAN face the possibility of not gaining
any seats at the next election.
In the past two years, Islamic parties have done little to respond to the challenges they face and many display symptoms of irretrievable decay. PKB continues to suffer internal strife and has made little headway in efforts to improve
relations with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s largest Islamic organisation
and the main basis for its support. PKB’s chair, Muhaimin Iskandar, who is also
Minister for Manpower and Transmigration, has been discredited by his ministry’s mishandling of foreign worker issues and corruption allegations relating to
his personal staff. PPP is also languishing. Its lacklustre chair, Suryadharma Ali,
who is also the Minister for Religious Affairs, was re-elected party chair at the PPP
Congress in 2011, seemingly for his capacity to dispense patronage rather than for
any vision or distinguishing leadership qualities. No substantive policy initiatives
emerged from the congress and the event closed early, as if there were no signiicant problems requiring discussion. PAN’s situation is similar to that of PKB and
PPP. Its chair, Hatta Rajasa, is preoccupied with his tasks as Coordinating Minister
for the Economy and conidant to SBY, and relations between PAN and its main
constituency in Indonesia’s largest modernist Islamic organisation, Muhammadiyah, are cool.
The leaders of PKB, PPP and PAN do not appear able to generate ideas to
recapture the imagination or trust of the Islamic community; nor are they capable
of making a compelling case as to why overtly Islamic parties are more worthy of
Muslims’ support than religiously neutral parties such as PD, Golkar and PDI–P.
Indeed, the central tactic for political survival of all three parties is participation in
the ruling coalition, as this brings access to inancial resources and opportunities
to dispense patronage. Not surprisingly, polling conducted by LSI in May 2011
indicates continuing slippage in Islamic party support, with PKB on 4.5%, PKS on
4.1%, PPP on 4.0% and PAN on 2.4%, giving a total Islamic party vote of just 15%
(LSI 2011: 16).
The Islamic party that has arguably fared worst over the past year is PKS,
though the nature of its problems differs from that of the three parties just mentioned. Many in PKS regard 2011 as an annus horribilis in which the party has been
beset by a succession of controversies that have greatly tarnished its standing
as a ‘clean’, reformist and morally exemplary party. PKS began the year in the
uncomfortable position of having to defend one of its star recruits to parliament,
the former deputy national police chief, Adang Daradjatun, who refused to disclose the whereabouts of his fugitive wife, Nunun Nurbaeti. Nunun conveniently
developed amnesia and sought treatment in Singapore when it emerged that she
was being investigated for bribing MPs to ensure the appointment of Miranda S.
Goeltom as Bank Indonesia’s senior deputy governor in 2004.21
In March, the party was buffeted when one of its elders, a wizened, wispyhaired preacher called Yusuf Supendi, went public with allegations of corruption
21 ‘PKS legislator refuses to say where fugitive wife is hiding’, Jakarta Globe, 30/5/2011;
‘Sakit lupa ingat belanja [Amnesia but remembers to shop]’, Gatra, 8/6/2011.
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Democratic regression and Yudhoyono’s regal incumbency
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and unethical behaviour by the PKS elite. Among his many allegations were
claims that the party secretary general, Anis Matta, had misused some $1.25 million of campaign funds in 2009; that PKS had breached the election law in 1999 by
accepting funding from overseas, to wit the Middle East; that Anis and the party’s
paramount leader, Hilmi Aminuddin, had received payments from former armed
forces commander Wiranto in 2004 to secure party support for his presidential
nomination; and that party president Luthi Hasan Isyaaq had accepted $4.25
million from former Vice President Jusuf Kalla during the latter’s presidential
campaign.22 Supendi later submitted documents to the KPK and iled a lawsuit
against 11 senior PKS leaders. His allegations caused consternation in party ranks,
as he had a reputation for humility and moral rectitude and was known to be a
stickler for detail. While there had previously been occasional reporting of divisions and malfeasance within PKS, this was the irst time that a senior igure had
been willing to make detailed claims. Supendi’s allegations sparked several weeks
of damaging media revelations about the high-living lifestyles of the PKS elite.23
The following month PKS was again in the headlines when one of its MPs,
Ariinto, was photographed watching pornography on his tablet computer during a plenary session of parliament. He initially denied that he had intentionally accessed an adult website but subsequent photographs clearly showed him
browsing a menu of pornographic sites.24 Ariinto agreed to resign a few days
later, but attracted more unlattering headlines when it was revealed that he was
still drawing a parliamentary salary in September.25 The Ariinto case was acutely
embarrassing for PKS because the party, and in particular its outspoken Minister
for Information and Communication, Tifatul Sembiring, had led a controversial
campaign to block access to pornographic websites in Indonesia. Ariinto himself had been a co-founder of Sabili magazine, for many years the highest-selling
Islamist magazine and a regular fulminator against the evils of pornography.
Upon hearing of Ariinto’s actions, PKS parliamentarian Nasir Jamil probably
summed up the views of many party cadres when he exclaimed: ‘My! PKS’s
image is ruined again’.26
The most recent blow for the party came with a series of Tempo articles exposing the involvement of senior PKS leaders in the brokering of meat imports.
According to Tempo, two of PKS’s most powerful igures, Hilmi Aminuddin and
Suripto, had been pressuring staff at the Ministry of Agriculture to issue meat
22 ‘Top PKS politicians face embezzlement allegations’, Jakarta Globe, 15/3/2011; ‘Presiden PKS dilaporkan ke BK DPR [PKS president reported to parliament’s Ethics Board]’,
Republika, 17/3/2011; ‘Adil di sini, sejahtera di sana [Just here, prosperous there]’, Tempo,
28/3/2011; ‘Urgently needed: truly clean and caring party’, Jakarta Post, 15/4/2011.
23 See, for example, ‘Deciphering the inluence of PKS puppet-master Hilmi’, Jakarta Post,
30/3/2011.
24 ‘Ariinto: paripurna sudah dalam kondisi jenuh [Ariinto: I was already fed up with the
plenary session]’, Media Indonesia Online, 8/4/2011; ‘PKS member trapped by anti-porn
stance’, Jakarta Post, 9/4/2011; ‘Fotografer punya 60 frame foto Ariinto nonton video porno [Photographer has 60 photo frames of Ariinto watching porn]’, detikNews, 10/4/2011.
25 ‘PKS porn scandal lawmaker still in house’, Jakarta Globe, 8/9/2011.
26 ‘Nasir Jamil: waduh … PKS ancur lagi [Nasir Jamil: My … PKS ruined again]’, Media
Indonesia, 9/4/2011.
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Greg Fealy
import licences to business people connected to the party, and to approve meat
shipments from India despite the risk of disease entering the country. One of the
brokers reportedly pushing for access to the lucrative permits was Hilmi’s youngest son, Ridwan Hakim.27 The Minister for Agriculture is Suswono, a PKS leader,
and the party has been systematically entrenching its cadres in key positions
within the ministry since it irst gained control of it in 2004.
The revelations and accusations concerning PKS have a broader signiicance
for Islamic politics. Numerous observers have warned that PKS seems to be creating a new kind of political Islam in Indonesia, one that is more ideologically
driven, puritanical and transnational than the creed of any other Islamic party.
With its Muslim Brotherhood-derived doctrine and organisational principles,
PKS has been seen as a harbinger of a more Middle Eastern form of Islamism.
Certainly the party’s internal discourse abounds with the rhetoric of social and
political transformation undergirded by Islamic values (Bubalo and Fealy 2005:
ch. 4). Some writers have gone so far as to describe PKS as an insidious and ultimately undemocratic force, based on the assumption that if it gained power, it
would replace popular sovereignty with a theocracy.28
But developments over the past year suggest that PKS is not so much transforming Indonesian politics as being transformed by it. The low ethical standards
of much of Indonesia’s political elite, its vaulting rent seeking, its nepotism and
its disdain for grassroots sentiment are now evident in the upper levels of PKS,
though certainly not to the degree found in other parties. It seems likely that the
imperatives of electoral politics in Indonesia will continue to erode the principles
and rectitude of the party. PKS won a dramatic increase in its vote in 2004, partly
because it was seen as a fresh alternative voice in Indonesian politics. By 2014,
PKS may appear rather too similar to other run-of-the-mill Islamic parties.
AHMADIYAH AND THE LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE
‘Moderate Muslim’ is probably the term most frequently used by international
leaders to describe contemporary Indonesia, and many Indonesian leaders trade
heavily on their nation’s reputation as one of the most tolerant Muslim-majority
countries. SBY, himself, makes regular reference to religious moderation when
addressing foreign audiences, often suggesting that other parts of the Muslim
world could learn from Indonesia’s example. For a genuine democracy, religious pluralism and the protection of minority rights are core elements. Mature
democracies should have detailed statutes enshrining religious rights, while also
ensuring that law enforcement agencies uphold the sanctity of such laws without
prejudice.
Despite perceptions within Indonesia and internationally, the incidence of religious sectarianism has been growing for several years, often with the connivance or indifference of state authorities. This intolerance takes numerous forms,
27 ‘Impor renyah “daging berjanggut” [Soft and crunchy imports of “bearded meat”]’,
Tempo, 14/3/2011; ‘Pemain daging Partai Sejahtera [Prosperous Party’s meat players]’,
Tempo, 14/3/2011; ‘Partai putih di pusaran impor daging [Pure party at centre of meat
imports]’, Tempo, 6/6/2011.
28 See, for example, Dhume (2005).
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from low-level harassment and legal restrictions to damage of property, enforced
relocation and bloody violence. The most frequent form relates to prohibitions on
the building of houses of worship, most commonly churches but also on occasion
mosques and Buddhist temples. One widely reported case concerns the refusal of
the Bogor municipality to agree to the construction of a church despite a Supreme
Court r