Directory UMM :Data Elmu:jurnal:I:International Journal of Educational Management:Vol13.Issue3.1999:Emerald Library Table of Contents_files:
The role of the head of department in managing
performance in UK universities
Michael P. Jackson
University of Stirling, Stirling, Scotland
Keywords
Academic staff, Managers,
Performance management,
United Kingdom, Universities
Introduction
UK universities have been subject to external
audit increasingly in recent years. In part
Abstract
this has been designed to ensure minimum
The increasing scrutiny of universtandards. In part though it has been desities has led to increasing pressigned to measure performance. This is most
sure on heads of department to
clearly the case with the Research Assessdeliver increased performance.
This paper presents 14 case stument Exercise and Teaching Quality Assessdies from UK institutions examinment. The former has had the greatest
ing in detail and in context how
impact. High scores have made reputations.
heads of department manage perHigh scores also have had significant finanformance. It establishes that
heads of department have often
cial consequences. While for most universistruggled due to a lack of options ties research funding is still less important
and possibilities to influence perthan funding for teaching the marginal
formance and a lack of management training to help them achieve benefit resulting from a high rating has been
it. The paper concludes that the
considerable. Teaching quality assessment,
real problem facing universities in while it might not have had the same effect as
this area arises from the fact that
Research Assessment, has been important
the change in role of head of
department has not been thought nonetheless. Universities regularly use high
through but has been a reaction to assessments as recruiting tools and in some
external pressure, leading to amparts of the UK teaching quality assessments
biguity and confusion.
have brought financial reward. All of this has
taken place against a background of general
financial restrictions. The Dearing Committee report (National Committee of Inquiry
into Higher Education, 1997) noted that the
unit of resource in higher education declined
by 40 per cent between 1976 and 1995.
Such developments have led universities to
look much more critically at what they do
and the way they do it. Universities that have
performed less well in external assessments
than they believed they would often have
reacted initially by criticising the assessment, the methods used, the individuals
The research reported in
this article was funded by
involved in making it. However, in most
the Nuffield Foundation and cases this initial reaction has quickly given
I am most grateful for their
way to a critical internal examination of
support.
what went wrong. In universities that have
performed as well as or better than expected
the initial reaction occasionally has been to
bask in a self-satisfied glow. Again, though,
The International Journal of
this has usually quickly given way to a
Educational Management
13/3 [1999] 142±149
recognition that competitors will be re-dou# MCB University Press
bling their efforts and that they must do so as
[ISSN 0951-354X]
well if they are to retain their position.
[ 142 ]
The external measurement of performance,
then, inevitably has had internal consequences. The way that institutions are managed, the way they deal with their staff, has
changed. The publication of the Jarratt
Report (1985) in some ways marked a milestone for the management of UK universities.
In that report universities were encouraged
to look at and use the best examples from
systems employed in the private sector.
While the report was controversial, and some
of its recommendations were resisted, over
the following years practice started to
change. The pressure from the external
measurement of performance, however, has
taken this need for change a significant step
further forward. It has led to heightened
recognition of the importance of effectively
managing staff (see Warner and Crosthwaite,
1992, 1993). This has had particular consequences for the university equivalent of the
``line manager'' the head of department (in
some universities different titles are used,
such as head of school).
Increasingly, heads of department are
being expected to manage the performance of
their staff. Departments are setting or being
set performance targets, usually through an
annual planning round, and heads of department are being expected to deliver against
those targets. It should not be pretended that
all of the targets are tight with clear milestones. Frequently the target will be as
general as raising the research performance
of the department. In such circumstances
there may be some milestones (external grant
income, for example) but the real assessment
against target will come with the external
research assessment which may be many
years away. Nevertheless, the head of department usually will be much more aware
than in the past that the performance of their
department will be critically evaluated and
in turn that they will be judged, in part at
least, against the performance of their
department.
Michael P. Jackson
The role of the head of
department in managing
performance in UK
universities
The International Journal of
Educational Management
13/3 [1999] 142±149
Previous studies have tried to sketch out
the role of the head of department. The range
of formal responsibilities of the head of
department seems remarkably similar in a
number of different national settings (see, for
example, Tucker, 1984, for details on USA and
Moses and Roe, 1990, for details on Australia)
although there appear to be more differences
between disciplines (Tucker, 1984). Further,
Middlehurst (1993) suggests that there may
be differences between heads of departments
themselves, and members of staff of departments, in terms of which functions are rated
as most important. For example, heads of
departments rated staff selection and evaluating performance as the most important
whereas members of departments tend to
place emphasis on acting as an advocate for
the department, considering staff views and
developing long-range plans. Middlehurst
went on to emphasise the ambiguity of the
head of department's role. This ambiguity
arises from the dual identity afforded to the
position, one of which is manager/leader, the
other of which is academic colleague.
A number of commentators have noted
how the recent developments in higher
education, many of which have been noted
above, have placed greater pressure on the
head of department's role. Thus, Kogan et al.
(1994) have argued that the ambiguity and
tension associated with being head of department have increased as the result of the
moves towards ``managerialism''. ``These
moves are the result of the increased demands on academics to meet the demands for
evaluation and defined quality, to reorganise
the delivery of the curriculum and to compete for resources'' (Kogan et al., 1994, p. 60).
A similar line of argument has been put
forward by Sizer, particularly with regard to
the way in which institutions have addressed
increasing financial pressures:
The roles of Chairman and Heads of Departments changed substantially as a result of the
financial reductions. They were under constant, and at times conflicting, pressures from
the administration and their own staff. They
became more involved in planning and resource allocation issues and in protecting
their department's interests. Their staff
management role became more demanding
and critical. Their own teaching, scholarship
and research inevitably suffered. Some were
unable to cope with the extra demands and
additional stress (Sizer, 1987, p. 127).
Similar comments were made by Thomas
(1997), specifically in relation to financial
devolution. In a later commentary, Sizer
notes that heads of department are ``being
pressurized to move from a collegial and
consensus style of management'' (Sizer, 1998,
p. 87).
Middlehurst takes this line of argument
further. She recognises that the ``potential for
role conflict has greatly increased as heads
find themselves simultaneously expected to
act as agents of institutional management,
required to deliver according to institutional
objectives, and to act as first among equals in
a unit where all are engaged in a collective
enterprise'' (Middlehurst, 1993, p. 138). However, she also argues that heads of departments feel themselves ill equipped to deal
with the new managerial challenges. Thus
quoting from the results of her own research,
she says:
Many heads express concern about the power
and authority at their disposal and the
difficulties of managing academics.
Many academics do not see themselves as
belonging to a structure that has to be
managed at all.
The problem is in managing academics; they
are highly individualistic with no strong
sense of corporate identity either to the
department or to the University.
Heads of departments in universities have
no effective managerial power and operate by
inspiring or engineering consent (Middlehurst, 1993, p. 138).
Outline of the research
The research reported in this article sought
to examine the way that heads of department
in UK universities manage performance. It
took the form of a series of case studies, 14 in
all. The value of case studies is that they
allow specific issues to be examined in detail,
and in context.
It is not claimed that the universities
selected were a representative sample.
Nevertheless, an attempt was made to ensure
that examples of universities from different
parts of the sector and with different characteristics were included. Thus, there was a
mix of ancient, old and new universities; they
were from different parts of the UK, they
varied in size from some of the largest to
some of the smallest. The approach taken was
to seek interviews with key individuals (the
individuals varied according to the structure
of institution but the aim was to see those
who could reflect the perspectives of the
administrative and of the academic sides of
the university) and to supplement this with
documentary information. The information
obtained is not used to suggest a picture of all
UK universities. This would be impossible
given the basis of the research. Instead it will
be used to illustrate points and issues.
Reference will be made as appropriate, to
information obtained from other sources (for
example, national agreements governing
terms and conditions of employment) and to
[ 143 ]
Michael P. Jackson
The role of the head of
department in managing
performance in UK
universities
other research, so that the case studies can be
set in a broader context.
The International Journal of
Educational Management
13/3 [1999] 142±149
The changing role of the head of
department
It has been argued above that in the last few
years heads of department have been required to take a more general interest in the
performance of all staff. Many, of course, still
only deal with exceptional performance, but
as the performance of the department as a
whole has been subject to external scrutiny
so more heads of department have felt
required to be more interventionist. However, in attempting to be more interventionist they have faced a number of problems.
One of the problems, as Middlehurst (1993)
noted, is the levers that they have to allow
them to influence performance. Heads of
department can recommend that staff who
perform well (either in absolute terms or in
meeting the specific goals of the department)
should be rewarded, but in none of the
universities that were looked at in this
research did they have the power to determine reward themselves. Their recommendations are not just subject to review but
need not be the deciding factor. Promotion in
the old universities is a particular case in
point. In all of the old universities looked at
the decisions on promotion were taken by a
university level committee and it was not
simply that the head of department's recommendation had to pass through a number of
filters: their recommendation would be only
one of a number of pieces of evidence looked
at by the central committee (others include
external references, given particular weight
in the case of research). Further, in such
universities promotion sometimes was not
seen in terms of management interest but
was seen much more as a reward for
academic excellence (of which research was
the key driver). In some cases a member of
staff could apply for promotion directly and
would not have to rely on the head of
department's nomination. Promotion is
handled differently in new universities but
the award of titles (Reader, Professor) which
are highly sought after rewards, are judged,
much as in the old universities, primarily on
the basis of academic merit.
Universities vary in their treatment of
financial reward. A number of the universities looked at had systems that allowed
performance to be monitored and financial
reward to be offered (often lump sums or
discretionary rewards). In practice examples
of such systems were found in both old
and new universities and the most
[ 144 ]
comprehensively developed scheme encountered was in an old university. In the old
universities the schemes had a history in the
discretionary pay introduced first in the
1980s as a result of government policy (for a
discussion of the use of discretionary pay in
the old universities, see Jackson, 1997). In the
new universities the origins of the schemes
were more varied and the schemes themselves sometimes were less comprehensive
(in one instance, for example, they only
applied to Deans and senior management).
Such schemes of financial reward, whether
in the old or new universities, were not
carefully codified and final responsibility for
any reward did not lie with the head of
department. Nevertheless, the head of department's view was a key factor, partly
because other evidence (for example, references) was not sought.
Rewards, of course, need not be financial.
There are a variety of rewards, some much
prized by members of staff in universities,
which are not financial. These vary from
support for conference attendance, to the
provision of secretarial help, to the purchase
of computing and other equipment, to more
mundane matters like the allocation of office
accommodation. None of these non-financial
rewards should be under-estimated and some
heads of department may use them systematically to encourage performance. However,
in some departments the allocation of some of
these resources is not in the hands of the
heads of department but is delegated to
another member of the department or a
committee.
If the system of rewards available to be
used by a head of department is limited and
constrained, then so is the action that they
can take in the case of poor performance. In
the universities looked at in this research the
head of department had a role in both
discipline and grievance. In particular, they
were always the first point of contact for an
aggrieved member of staff or student and
sometimes they would be involved in the
initial stages of any disciplinary action.
However, while the head of department may
be involved at the initial stages and may be
the originator of disciplinary action, a variety of patterns was recorded when formal
action is to be taken. Some were able to issue
a first written warning, though by no means
all, and none could go beyond that stage on
their own. Further, and more importantly,
the use of the disciplinary procedure for
academic staff is unusual and while the
grievance procedure is more frequently used,
most departments never experience activity
in either area over a prolonged period.
Michael P. Jackson
The role of the head of
department in managing
performance in UK
universities
The International Journal of
Educational Management
13/3 [1999] 142±149
In practice, anyway, the concern of most
heads of department will not be with action
for which the disciplinary procedure would
be appropriate but will be with poor performance. Such performance will be short, often
well short, of what could be seen as a failure
to carry out required duties.
The action that a head of department can
take to deal with poor performance, rather
than indiscipline, is limited. The member of
staff will be entitled to annual increments
until they reach the top of their current scale
(none of the universities covered made
progression dependent on adequate performance although movement to the discretionary points on some scales was constrained in
that way). A head of department may be able
to insist on a member of staff taking a heavier
teaching load if they are not productive in
research. The new universities all work on
the basis of an annual hours formula and this
allows a head of a department considerable
(in principle) discretion to arrange duties as
they see fit. The old universities do not have
such a formal system. However, a number of
departments within them that were looked at
have devised systems that permit heads of
department to allocate workloads according
to departmental needs and individual abilities. The importance of controlling the
allocation of workloads should not be underestimated but it is a blunt instrument when it
comes to taking action against under-performance, especially if the under-performance is
in all areas of activity, rather than just one.
The most significant attempt to deal systematically with under-performance has occurred in the area of research. The
introduction of the Research Selectivity Exercise, and in particular the requirement that
universities identify research active staff,
has focused attention on the contribution of
individuals to the university's reputation.
The proportion of staff submitted as research
active was considerably higher in the old
than the new universities and as a result it is
in the old universities that the most concerted action against individuals who were
not seen to be contributing significantly to
the research activity has been taken. In a
number of the old universities covered in
this research this has involved action by
senior management in the university. In one
case all staff who were not submitted as
research active were interviewed by a senior
manager and as a result of that interview
judged whether they had the potential to
contribute to research in the future. In cases
where the judgement was that they did not
have a contribution to make then they were
either allocated to non-research responsibilities (where these existed and were
appropriate) or encouraged to consider early
retirement. Most of those in the last category
subsequently left. A further round of interviews has commenced with those remaining.
This particular approach was mirrored in a
number of other universities, although the
details differed. It suggests that although the
levers available to deal with under-performance in the area of research are limited,
they can be effective if pursued vigorously.
However, they rely on pressure rather than
sanctions and it is important to emphasise
that in the cases outlined above the pressure
has been exerted by very senior managers,
not by the head of department. In fact, the
head of department has been only minimally
involved, and in some instances has been bypassed altogether. The belief of some (though
not all) of the old universities covered in this
research of the need for senior management
action may itself be taken as an indicator of
concern that the head of department had
either insufficient commitment to undertake
the exercise or insufficient power to exercise
the pressure required to bring the desired
result.
The levers at the disposal of a head of
department appear to be greatest in the case
of new appointees in the old universities,
where almost universally a three-year probationary system operates. In such circumstances the head of department is expected to
monitor and report on the performance of a
member of staff in some detail and in all of
the old universities looked at the probationary system is now being operated much more
tightly than in the past. The head of department may observe teaching, review student
responses to teaching, evaluate research
performance (which may mean no more than
a reference to the impact of the journals
published in, but which may be a much more
thorough ongoing analysis). However, as
with promotion and financial reward systems, the head of department does not have
the ability to take the final decision. The
decisions of the Commissioners appointed
consequent on the 1988 Education Reform Act
have made termination of employment of a
member of staff deemed not to have satisfactorily completed probation a complex matter,
with review at the highest level in the
university essential.
Many of the universities looked at in this
research had a staff appraisal system. The
formal descriptions differed, as did the practice, but many universities had some system
for discussing performance with members of
staff. In the old universities the system was
almost always the result of the requirement
of a national pay deal. National survey
evidence (Low, 1995) suggests a variety of
[ 145 ]
Michael P. Jackson
The role of the head of
department in managing
performance in UK
universities
The International Journal of
Educational Management
13/3 [1999] 142±149
[ 146 ]
different approaches in such schemes: some
emphasising staff development and others
emphasising performance. The confusion
and tension surrounding appraisal is largely
a consequence of the way it was established
(Townley, 1990, has described the way in
which the national guidelines were deliberately left vague to allow both the unions and
university management to sign an agreement). In practice in the old universities
looked at in this research the appraisal
scheme was largely developmental in orientation. In some it was explicitly stated that
there was no link between the appraisal
system and reward or discipline. In the new
universities the schemes differed somewhat
but the focus similarly was on staff development rather than performance. This was
given added emphasis in some schemes
where the appraisee had the right to choose
their appraiser. In some schemes the documentation was confidential to the appraisee
and appraiser and the Personnel Department
had no record of whether or not the appraisal
had taken place. A number of the directors of
Personnel and senior managers interviewed
questioned the effectiveness of the present
schemes and noted that they intended to
review the objectives and operation of their
schemes. However, in this context, the important point is that what on the surface
might appear to be a lever through which the
head of department can influence performance, in practice seems to have much less
significance.
It is not, though, just the absence of levers
that makes the head of department's ability
to manage performance difficult: it is also, as
Sizer (1988) and Tapper and Palfreyman
(1998), note the persistence of a view of
professionalism and collegiality which often
challenges the right of the head of department to judge. In some of the universities
looked at, as mentioned above, the teaching
of probationary members of staff is observed.
However, except where there is a particular
problem which has surfaced publicly or
where there is a claim for excellence in
teaching which is being used as the basis for
promotion (in some universities, in such
instances, reports on observation of teaching
are obligatory), it is rare for teaching to be
observed by another member of staff and
such observation (if characterised as such) is
considered by some to be an infringement on
professional freedom. There are pressures for
more intervention, particularly when a department is preparing for teaching quality
assessment, but that may not overcome a
nervousness about such matters.
Historically the same position has held for
research as well as teaching. In the new
universities historically there was no contractual requirement to undertake research
and so it was difficult to justify too close a
scrutiny of such activity. In the old universities research was a contractual requirement but in practice was also treated as an
individual responsibility and often driven
more by curiosity than any contractual term.
The position has changed over the last
decade with the introduction of external
judgement of research through research
selectivity exercises. Research income, and
particularly research output, has become an
explicit concern of all old and most new
universities. Members of staff in all universities are likely to be called to account, at
least in the most general of fashions, for the
time spent on research (see Hughes and
Tight, 1995; McNay, 1997; Tomlin, 1988). In
some of the universities looked at this is an
annual exercise. Research targets are set
(sometimes agreed but sometimes pressure is
put on to agree to a certain target) and
performance is measured against targets.
However, this was not true in all cases. In
some there was simply a consensus in a
department about the need to meet certain
kinds of research targets and individuals
were exhorted to play their part in meeting
them. Further, there was evidence that in a
number of the old universities the traditions
of academic freedom remain potent and the
right to follow academic curiosity is still
cherished.
In a number of the universities looked at
disappointment at the results of the last
Research Assessment Exercise led directly to
significant internal structural change. One
particular instance might be quoted as an
example. In this case the university moved
from a structure of faculties (with no departments) to one where departments were
created and given a critical management
role. They were seen as the vehicle for the
more effective organisation and prosecution
of research and heads of department were
seen to have a key role. Heads of department
were appointed, rather than elected and were
given comprehensive job descriptions. It is
too early to assess how effective this move
will be. However, if it is effective it will not be
because heads of department have been given
new responsibilities because in practice they
still have to rely on the same kind of levers
available to comparators in other old universities but it may be the result of a clear
statement that they have a managerial role
and are managerial appointments.
One of the other problems facing heads of
department in managing performance is that
in many cases they have not been appointed
because of their managerial abilities, they
Michael P. Jackson
The role of the head of
department in managing
performance in UK
universities
The International Journal of
Educational Management
13/3 [1999] 142±149
would not necessarily claim any and they
have not been trained to any significant
extent in such matters. There is a clear
difference in such matters between the old
and the new universities, although in the
universities looked at in this research the
differences were not as extreme as often
claimed. In the old universities heads of
department were appointed from within on a
fixed term basis. In some cases this was a
managerial appointment but in others it
followed some kind of consultative process
(in some cases an election but in others
something less formal). Especially when
appointed following a consultative process,
their role was more one of chairing a group of
colleagues than managing a department. As
Weiner (1996) has noted, in many cases the
head of department does not see the appointment as a career move (on occasions it can
help when applying for promotion but it will
rarely be the determining factor). They are
more likely to see the pursuit of their
research as the key to enhancing their career
prospects and being head of department will
actually hinder research output (Sizer, 1987).
Inevitably, this often colours their attitude to
the job. Some nevertheless see performance
management as important and despite the
short tenure of their office, seek to influence
performance in a measurable way. Others see
this less as individual responsibility and
more as collegiate responsibility.
In the new universities the position of head
of department has been different. It has been
seen as a substantive appointment, usually
following external advertisement, and carrying a not insubstantial salary premium. They
have been seen as line managers, allocating
duties within the overall workload agreement. However, even within the new universities the role of the head of department
has been very different from that of line
manager in industry. The collegiate emphasis may not be as great as in the old
universities, but it is not absent, and the
professional status of academic staff has
restricted the head of department's role.
One of the key variables influencing the
approach taken by the head of department
may be the basis of their appointment.
Certainly the informants consulted for this
research routinely argued that heads of
department appointed as the result of a
managerial decision were more likely to
adopt a managerial approach (and to be given
more explicit powers and responsibilities)
than if they were appointed as the result of an
election. Further, in a number of instances
the relationship between the dean and the
head of department, and the decision as to
who should be given the main managerial
responsibility, seemed to be strongly influenced by the method of appointment.
In the new universities appointments as
head of department are commonly permanent (though not always ± in some cases the
option remains to return to a full-time
teaching and research career). However, in
the new universities looked at in this
research the criteria for appointment as head
of department emphasised a mixture of
academic and managerial qualities and,
while the separation of titles from positions
(professorships from headship of departments) enabled managerial qualities to be
highlighted more than they might have been,
some still looked for a mix and stipulated
academic criteria as a minimum.
Bone and Bowner (1998) found that about
half of all universities they surveyed offered
a training course for new heads of departments. However, in most cases such courses
were voluntary. In all of the universities
looked at in this research some training was
offered to heads of department. The extent
and type of training, though, varied greatly.
In some the training amounted to no more
than a basic introduction to university
policies and procedures. In others, training
was offered regularly, throughout a term of
office. In still others it was in-house though
some used outside trainers and some joined
together as a consortium of institutions.
However, the amount of training offered in
all cases was limited and few senior managers claimed that it was designed to do
much more than alert and sensitise. It would
be difficult to argue that it was training them
to be managers as such or designed to rectify
a gap in management skills recognised on
appointment and some heads of department
anyway would have resisted such a notion.
Discussion
Staff, particularly academic staff in universities, traditionally have been given considerable autonomy. They have been viewed as
professionals who can be relied on to deliver
the performance needed because of their
personal interest in and commitment to their
subject. The autonomous model has been
most clearly seen in the old universities, but
it has not been without influence in the new
universities as well. The autonomy given to
academic staff has been mirrored by the
collegiate system. Again, this has been at its
strongest in the old but by no means absent
in the new universities. Heads of department
have had a limited role to play. This has
varied from, at one extreme in many old
universities, acting as little more than a
[ 147 ]
Michael P. Jackson
The role of the head of
department in managing
performance in UK
universities
The International Journal of
Educational Management
13/3 [1999] 142±149
[ 148 ]
chair for a group of colleagues, to the other
extreme in some new universities where
heads of department have had significant
administrative responsibilities, including
organising the allocation of teaching duties.
However, in few cases, traditionally, were
heads of department called on, in any significant way, to manage performance.
The traditional picture, and role of the
head of department, started to change around
a decade ago. It has been argued earlier that
this was in part a response to universities
paying much more attention to management,
following the Jarratt report (see Sizer, 1988),
but more importantly a response to pressures
felt by universities as the result of national
attempts to measure their performance, in
teaching and research (see Kogan et al., 1994).
The role of the head of department has
changed, though not as the result of a serious
consideration and debate about that role. In
few universities looked at, the research
reported here, have they systematically considered the role of head of department as
such; rather the role of the head of department has changed as a result of the pressures
placed on the university itself. In one of the
universities looked at management consultants were engaged to review the structure
and operation of the institution. In a key
passage in their report they described the
devolution of responsibilities to the head of
department as ``haphazard'' rather than
planned. Such a comment undoubtedly could
be applied well beyond the example from
which it has been taken.
In this article attention has centred on the
way that the national assessments of teaching and research have fed through to the role
of the head of department. In other areas as
well, though, the same has been happening.
As budgets have been devolved, so heads of
department have been called on to exercise
more financial expertise and responsibility
(Sizer, 1987). As legislation has been introduced on equal opportunities and health and
safety, so heads of department have been
called on to pay more attention to such
matters (Hall, 1996).
If the changes to the role of the head of the
department had occurred because of a systematic consideration of that role rather than
because of the indirect consequences of other
pressures, then one might have expected
changes to the role to be reflected in the
selection and training of holders of the post
and in the range of levers made available to
them. In fact, because of the way the changes
have occurred, little seems to have happened
in this regard. It would be misleading to
claim that nothing has happened. In the old
universities when members of a department
are nominating or electing one of their
members to act as head of department and in
the new universities when a new appointment as head of department is being made,
then more attention may be paid to their
management/administrative skills. However, this may be only one among a range of
considerations. Similarly, in all of the universities looked at for the research reported
in this article there was an attempt to offer at
least some training to heads of department,
but the training is limited and sometimes
offers little more than a guide to institutional
policy.
The way in which the role of the head of
department has changed has also meant that
little thought has been given to the levers
they need to be able to use to do their job,
particularly as far as performance management is concerned. In many examples reviewed in this article they only had limited
ability to measure ongoing performance ±
such is the continuing hold of the professional model. Further, even if they encounter
markedly poor or good performance they
have to rely on others to implement any
recommendations they might make. Persuasion and encouragement are likely to be the
mainstay of the head of department's
armoury.
The result of such developments is to
further increase ambiguity and tension already present in the role. The head of
department frequently is seen as a manager
of performance but he/she rarely has the
skills, training or levers to carry out this
function. Some of course do so, but this is
more the result of chance (the personality of
the individual concerned) than a deliberate
strategy on the part of the university. The
ambiguity and tension are exacerbated in the
old universities where the position of head of
department is normally temporary and a
career route is likely to be one seen as best
pursued through research (which will be
hindered rather than helped by taking the
role of head of department).
References
Bone, A. and Bowner, T. (1998), ``Developing
university managers'', Higher Education
Quarterly, Vol. 52 No. 3, pp. 283-99.
Hall, A. (1996), ``Personnel management'' in Warner, D. and Palfreyman, D. (Eds), Higher
Education Management, Open University
Press, Buckingham.
Hughes, C. and Tight, T. (1995), ``Linking university teaching and research'', Higher Education Review, Vol. 28 No. 1, pp. 51-65.
Jackson, M.P. (1997), ``The impact of discretionary
pay in UK universities'', Higher Education
Management, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 99-114.
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The role of the head of
department in managing
performance in UK
universities
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Educational Management
13/3 [1999] 142±149
Jarratt Report (1985), Report of the Steering
Committee for Efficiency Studies in Universities, CVCP, London.
Kogan, M., El Khawas and Moses, I. (1994),
Staffing in Higher Education, OECD, London.
Low, S. (1995), An Evaluation of Appraisal Systems
in Universities, MBA Thesis, Heriot-Watt
University.
McNay, I. (1997), ``The impact of the 1992 research
assessment exercise in English universities'',
Higher Education Review, Vol. 29 No. 2,
pp. 34-43.
Middlehurst, R. (1993), Leading Academics, Open
University Press, Buckingham.
Moses, I. and Roe, E. (1990), Heads and Chairs:
Managing Academic Departments, Queensland University Press, Brisbane.
National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education (1997), Higher Education in the Learning Society, HMSO, London.
Sizer, J. (1987), Institutional Responses to Financial Reductions within the University Sector,
Part II, Department of Education and Science,
London.
Sizer, J. (1988), ``The management of institutional
adaptation and change under conditions of
financial stringency'', in Eggins, H. (Ed.),
Restructuring Higher Education, Open University Press, Buckingham, pp. 80-92.
Tapper, T. and Palfreyman, D. (1998), ``Continuity
and change in collegial traditions'', Higher
Education Quarterly, Vol. 32 No. 2, pp. 142-61.
Thomas, H.G. (1997), ``The unexpected consequences of financial devolution'', Higher
Education Review, Vol. 29 No. 3, pp. 7-22.
Tomlin, R. (1988), ``Research league tables: is
there a better way?'', Higher Education Quarterly, Vol. 52 No. 2, pp. 204-20.
Townley, B. (1990), ``The politics of appraisal:
lessons of the introduction of appraisal into
UK universities'', Human Resource Management Journal, Vol. 1, pp. 37-44.
Tucker, A. (1984), Chairing the Academic Department, Macmillan, New York, NY.
Warner, D. and Crosthwaite, E. (1992), ``Principals
and people'', Education, July, pp. 12-13.
Warner, D. and Crosthwaite, E. (1993), ``Human
resource management in higher education'',
Current Business Research, Vol. 1 No. 3,
pp. 48-70.
Weiner, G. (1996), ``Which of us has a brilliant
career?'' in Cuthbert, R. (Ed.), Working in
Higher Education, Open University Press,
Buckingham, pp. 58-68.
[ 149 ]
performance in UK universities
Michael P. Jackson
University of Stirling, Stirling, Scotland
Keywords
Academic staff, Managers,
Performance management,
United Kingdom, Universities
Introduction
UK universities have been subject to external
audit increasingly in recent years. In part
Abstract
this has been designed to ensure minimum
The increasing scrutiny of universtandards. In part though it has been desities has led to increasing pressigned to measure performance. This is most
sure on heads of department to
clearly the case with the Research Assessdeliver increased performance.
This paper presents 14 case stument Exercise and Teaching Quality Assessdies from UK institutions examinment. The former has had the greatest
ing in detail and in context how
impact. High scores have made reputations.
heads of department manage perHigh scores also have had significant finanformance. It establishes that
heads of department have often
cial consequences. While for most universistruggled due to a lack of options ties research funding is still less important
and possibilities to influence perthan funding for teaching the marginal
formance and a lack of management training to help them achieve benefit resulting from a high rating has been
it. The paper concludes that the
considerable. Teaching quality assessment,
real problem facing universities in while it might not have had the same effect as
this area arises from the fact that
Research Assessment, has been important
the change in role of head of
department has not been thought nonetheless. Universities regularly use high
through but has been a reaction to assessments as recruiting tools and in some
external pressure, leading to amparts of the UK teaching quality assessments
biguity and confusion.
have brought financial reward. All of this has
taken place against a background of general
financial restrictions. The Dearing Committee report (National Committee of Inquiry
into Higher Education, 1997) noted that the
unit of resource in higher education declined
by 40 per cent between 1976 and 1995.
Such developments have led universities to
look much more critically at what they do
and the way they do it. Universities that have
performed less well in external assessments
than they believed they would often have
reacted initially by criticising the assessment, the methods used, the individuals
The research reported in
this article was funded by
involved in making it. However, in most
the Nuffield Foundation and cases this initial reaction has quickly given
I am most grateful for their
way to a critical internal examination of
support.
what went wrong. In universities that have
performed as well as or better than expected
the initial reaction occasionally has been to
bask in a self-satisfied glow. Again, though,
The International Journal of
this has usually quickly given way to a
Educational Management
13/3 [1999] 142±149
recognition that competitors will be re-dou# MCB University Press
bling their efforts and that they must do so as
[ISSN 0951-354X]
well if they are to retain their position.
[ 142 ]
The external measurement of performance,
then, inevitably has had internal consequences. The way that institutions are managed, the way they deal with their staff, has
changed. The publication of the Jarratt
Report (1985) in some ways marked a milestone for the management of UK universities.
In that report universities were encouraged
to look at and use the best examples from
systems employed in the private sector.
While the report was controversial, and some
of its recommendations were resisted, over
the following years practice started to
change. The pressure from the external
measurement of performance, however, has
taken this need for change a significant step
further forward. It has led to heightened
recognition of the importance of effectively
managing staff (see Warner and Crosthwaite,
1992, 1993). This has had particular consequences for the university equivalent of the
``line manager'' the head of department (in
some universities different titles are used,
such as head of school).
Increasingly, heads of department are
being expected to manage the performance of
their staff. Departments are setting or being
set performance targets, usually through an
annual planning round, and heads of department are being expected to deliver against
those targets. It should not be pretended that
all of the targets are tight with clear milestones. Frequently the target will be as
general as raising the research performance
of the department. In such circumstances
there may be some milestones (external grant
income, for example) but the real assessment
against target will come with the external
research assessment which may be many
years away. Nevertheless, the head of department usually will be much more aware
than in the past that the performance of their
department will be critically evaluated and
in turn that they will be judged, in part at
least, against the performance of their
department.
Michael P. Jackson
The role of the head of
department in managing
performance in UK
universities
The International Journal of
Educational Management
13/3 [1999] 142±149
Previous studies have tried to sketch out
the role of the head of department. The range
of formal responsibilities of the head of
department seems remarkably similar in a
number of different national settings (see, for
example, Tucker, 1984, for details on USA and
Moses and Roe, 1990, for details on Australia)
although there appear to be more differences
between disciplines (Tucker, 1984). Further,
Middlehurst (1993) suggests that there may
be differences between heads of departments
themselves, and members of staff of departments, in terms of which functions are rated
as most important. For example, heads of
departments rated staff selection and evaluating performance as the most important
whereas members of departments tend to
place emphasis on acting as an advocate for
the department, considering staff views and
developing long-range plans. Middlehurst
went on to emphasise the ambiguity of the
head of department's role. This ambiguity
arises from the dual identity afforded to the
position, one of which is manager/leader, the
other of which is academic colleague.
A number of commentators have noted
how the recent developments in higher
education, many of which have been noted
above, have placed greater pressure on the
head of department's role. Thus, Kogan et al.
(1994) have argued that the ambiguity and
tension associated with being head of department have increased as the result of the
moves towards ``managerialism''. ``These
moves are the result of the increased demands on academics to meet the demands for
evaluation and defined quality, to reorganise
the delivery of the curriculum and to compete for resources'' (Kogan et al., 1994, p. 60).
A similar line of argument has been put
forward by Sizer, particularly with regard to
the way in which institutions have addressed
increasing financial pressures:
The roles of Chairman and Heads of Departments changed substantially as a result of the
financial reductions. They were under constant, and at times conflicting, pressures from
the administration and their own staff. They
became more involved in planning and resource allocation issues and in protecting
their department's interests. Their staff
management role became more demanding
and critical. Their own teaching, scholarship
and research inevitably suffered. Some were
unable to cope with the extra demands and
additional stress (Sizer, 1987, p. 127).
Similar comments were made by Thomas
(1997), specifically in relation to financial
devolution. In a later commentary, Sizer
notes that heads of department are ``being
pressurized to move from a collegial and
consensus style of management'' (Sizer, 1998,
p. 87).
Middlehurst takes this line of argument
further. She recognises that the ``potential for
role conflict has greatly increased as heads
find themselves simultaneously expected to
act as agents of institutional management,
required to deliver according to institutional
objectives, and to act as first among equals in
a unit where all are engaged in a collective
enterprise'' (Middlehurst, 1993, p. 138). However, she also argues that heads of departments feel themselves ill equipped to deal
with the new managerial challenges. Thus
quoting from the results of her own research,
she says:
Many heads express concern about the power
and authority at their disposal and the
difficulties of managing academics.
Many academics do not see themselves as
belonging to a structure that has to be
managed at all.
The problem is in managing academics; they
are highly individualistic with no strong
sense of corporate identity either to the
department or to the University.
Heads of departments in universities have
no effective managerial power and operate by
inspiring or engineering consent (Middlehurst, 1993, p. 138).
Outline of the research
The research reported in this article sought
to examine the way that heads of department
in UK universities manage performance. It
took the form of a series of case studies, 14 in
all. The value of case studies is that they
allow specific issues to be examined in detail,
and in context.
It is not claimed that the universities
selected were a representative sample.
Nevertheless, an attempt was made to ensure
that examples of universities from different
parts of the sector and with different characteristics were included. Thus, there was a
mix of ancient, old and new universities; they
were from different parts of the UK, they
varied in size from some of the largest to
some of the smallest. The approach taken was
to seek interviews with key individuals (the
individuals varied according to the structure
of institution but the aim was to see those
who could reflect the perspectives of the
administrative and of the academic sides of
the university) and to supplement this with
documentary information. The information
obtained is not used to suggest a picture of all
UK universities. This would be impossible
given the basis of the research. Instead it will
be used to illustrate points and issues.
Reference will be made as appropriate, to
information obtained from other sources (for
example, national agreements governing
terms and conditions of employment) and to
[ 143 ]
Michael P. Jackson
The role of the head of
department in managing
performance in UK
universities
other research, so that the case studies can be
set in a broader context.
The International Journal of
Educational Management
13/3 [1999] 142±149
The changing role of the head of
department
It has been argued above that in the last few
years heads of department have been required to take a more general interest in the
performance of all staff. Many, of course, still
only deal with exceptional performance, but
as the performance of the department as a
whole has been subject to external scrutiny
so more heads of department have felt
required to be more interventionist. However, in attempting to be more interventionist they have faced a number of problems.
One of the problems, as Middlehurst (1993)
noted, is the levers that they have to allow
them to influence performance. Heads of
department can recommend that staff who
perform well (either in absolute terms or in
meeting the specific goals of the department)
should be rewarded, but in none of the
universities that were looked at in this
research did they have the power to determine reward themselves. Their recommendations are not just subject to review but
need not be the deciding factor. Promotion in
the old universities is a particular case in
point. In all of the old universities looked at
the decisions on promotion were taken by a
university level committee and it was not
simply that the head of department's recommendation had to pass through a number of
filters: their recommendation would be only
one of a number of pieces of evidence looked
at by the central committee (others include
external references, given particular weight
in the case of research). Further, in such
universities promotion sometimes was not
seen in terms of management interest but
was seen much more as a reward for
academic excellence (of which research was
the key driver). In some cases a member of
staff could apply for promotion directly and
would not have to rely on the head of
department's nomination. Promotion is
handled differently in new universities but
the award of titles (Reader, Professor) which
are highly sought after rewards, are judged,
much as in the old universities, primarily on
the basis of academic merit.
Universities vary in their treatment of
financial reward. A number of the universities looked at had systems that allowed
performance to be monitored and financial
reward to be offered (often lump sums or
discretionary rewards). In practice examples
of such systems were found in both old
and new universities and the most
[ 144 ]
comprehensively developed scheme encountered was in an old university. In the old
universities the schemes had a history in the
discretionary pay introduced first in the
1980s as a result of government policy (for a
discussion of the use of discretionary pay in
the old universities, see Jackson, 1997). In the
new universities the origins of the schemes
were more varied and the schemes themselves sometimes were less comprehensive
(in one instance, for example, they only
applied to Deans and senior management).
Such schemes of financial reward, whether
in the old or new universities, were not
carefully codified and final responsibility for
any reward did not lie with the head of
department. Nevertheless, the head of department's view was a key factor, partly
because other evidence (for example, references) was not sought.
Rewards, of course, need not be financial.
There are a variety of rewards, some much
prized by members of staff in universities,
which are not financial. These vary from
support for conference attendance, to the
provision of secretarial help, to the purchase
of computing and other equipment, to more
mundane matters like the allocation of office
accommodation. None of these non-financial
rewards should be under-estimated and some
heads of department may use them systematically to encourage performance. However,
in some departments the allocation of some of
these resources is not in the hands of the
heads of department but is delegated to
another member of the department or a
committee.
If the system of rewards available to be
used by a head of department is limited and
constrained, then so is the action that they
can take in the case of poor performance. In
the universities looked at in this research the
head of department had a role in both
discipline and grievance. In particular, they
were always the first point of contact for an
aggrieved member of staff or student and
sometimes they would be involved in the
initial stages of any disciplinary action.
However, while the head of department may
be involved at the initial stages and may be
the originator of disciplinary action, a variety of patterns was recorded when formal
action is to be taken. Some were able to issue
a first written warning, though by no means
all, and none could go beyond that stage on
their own. Further, and more importantly,
the use of the disciplinary procedure for
academic staff is unusual and while the
grievance procedure is more frequently used,
most departments never experience activity
in either area over a prolonged period.
Michael P. Jackson
The role of the head of
department in managing
performance in UK
universities
The International Journal of
Educational Management
13/3 [1999] 142±149
In practice, anyway, the concern of most
heads of department will not be with action
for which the disciplinary procedure would
be appropriate but will be with poor performance. Such performance will be short, often
well short, of what could be seen as a failure
to carry out required duties.
The action that a head of department can
take to deal with poor performance, rather
than indiscipline, is limited. The member of
staff will be entitled to annual increments
until they reach the top of their current scale
(none of the universities covered made
progression dependent on adequate performance although movement to the discretionary points on some scales was constrained in
that way). A head of department may be able
to insist on a member of staff taking a heavier
teaching load if they are not productive in
research. The new universities all work on
the basis of an annual hours formula and this
allows a head of a department considerable
(in principle) discretion to arrange duties as
they see fit. The old universities do not have
such a formal system. However, a number of
departments within them that were looked at
have devised systems that permit heads of
department to allocate workloads according
to departmental needs and individual abilities. The importance of controlling the
allocation of workloads should not be underestimated but it is a blunt instrument when it
comes to taking action against under-performance, especially if the under-performance is
in all areas of activity, rather than just one.
The most significant attempt to deal systematically with under-performance has occurred in the area of research. The
introduction of the Research Selectivity Exercise, and in particular the requirement that
universities identify research active staff,
has focused attention on the contribution of
individuals to the university's reputation.
The proportion of staff submitted as research
active was considerably higher in the old
than the new universities and as a result it is
in the old universities that the most concerted action against individuals who were
not seen to be contributing significantly to
the research activity has been taken. In a
number of the old universities covered in
this research this has involved action by
senior management in the university. In one
case all staff who were not submitted as
research active were interviewed by a senior
manager and as a result of that interview
judged whether they had the potential to
contribute to research in the future. In cases
where the judgement was that they did not
have a contribution to make then they were
either allocated to non-research responsibilities (where these existed and were
appropriate) or encouraged to consider early
retirement. Most of those in the last category
subsequently left. A further round of interviews has commenced with those remaining.
This particular approach was mirrored in a
number of other universities, although the
details differed. It suggests that although the
levers available to deal with under-performance in the area of research are limited,
they can be effective if pursued vigorously.
However, they rely on pressure rather than
sanctions and it is important to emphasise
that in the cases outlined above the pressure
has been exerted by very senior managers,
not by the head of department. In fact, the
head of department has been only minimally
involved, and in some instances has been bypassed altogether. The belief of some (though
not all) of the old universities covered in this
research of the need for senior management
action may itself be taken as an indicator of
concern that the head of department had
either insufficient commitment to undertake
the exercise or insufficient power to exercise
the pressure required to bring the desired
result.
The levers at the disposal of a head of
department appear to be greatest in the case
of new appointees in the old universities,
where almost universally a three-year probationary system operates. In such circumstances the head of department is expected to
monitor and report on the performance of a
member of staff in some detail and in all of
the old universities looked at the probationary system is now being operated much more
tightly than in the past. The head of department may observe teaching, review student
responses to teaching, evaluate research
performance (which may mean no more than
a reference to the impact of the journals
published in, but which may be a much more
thorough ongoing analysis). However, as
with promotion and financial reward systems, the head of department does not have
the ability to take the final decision. The
decisions of the Commissioners appointed
consequent on the 1988 Education Reform Act
have made termination of employment of a
member of staff deemed not to have satisfactorily completed probation a complex matter,
with review at the highest level in the
university essential.
Many of the universities looked at in this
research had a staff appraisal system. The
formal descriptions differed, as did the practice, but many universities had some system
for discussing performance with members of
staff. In the old universities the system was
almost always the result of the requirement
of a national pay deal. National survey
evidence (Low, 1995) suggests a variety of
[ 145 ]
Michael P. Jackson
The role of the head of
department in managing
performance in UK
universities
The International Journal of
Educational Management
13/3 [1999] 142±149
[ 146 ]
different approaches in such schemes: some
emphasising staff development and others
emphasising performance. The confusion
and tension surrounding appraisal is largely
a consequence of the way it was established
(Townley, 1990, has described the way in
which the national guidelines were deliberately left vague to allow both the unions and
university management to sign an agreement). In practice in the old universities
looked at in this research the appraisal
scheme was largely developmental in orientation. In some it was explicitly stated that
there was no link between the appraisal
system and reward or discipline. In the new
universities the schemes differed somewhat
but the focus similarly was on staff development rather than performance. This was
given added emphasis in some schemes
where the appraisee had the right to choose
their appraiser. In some schemes the documentation was confidential to the appraisee
and appraiser and the Personnel Department
had no record of whether or not the appraisal
had taken place. A number of the directors of
Personnel and senior managers interviewed
questioned the effectiveness of the present
schemes and noted that they intended to
review the objectives and operation of their
schemes. However, in this context, the important point is that what on the surface
might appear to be a lever through which the
head of department can influence performance, in practice seems to have much less
significance.
It is not, though, just the absence of levers
that makes the head of department's ability
to manage performance difficult: it is also, as
Sizer (1988) and Tapper and Palfreyman
(1998), note the persistence of a view of
professionalism and collegiality which often
challenges the right of the head of department to judge. In some of the universities
looked at, as mentioned above, the teaching
of probationary members of staff is observed.
However, except where there is a particular
problem which has surfaced publicly or
where there is a claim for excellence in
teaching which is being used as the basis for
promotion (in some universities, in such
instances, reports on observation of teaching
are obligatory), it is rare for teaching to be
observed by another member of staff and
such observation (if characterised as such) is
considered by some to be an infringement on
professional freedom. There are pressures for
more intervention, particularly when a department is preparing for teaching quality
assessment, but that may not overcome a
nervousness about such matters.
Historically the same position has held for
research as well as teaching. In the new
universities historically there was no contractual requirement to undertake research
and so it was difficult to justify too close a
scrutiny of such activity. In the old universities research was a contractual requirement but in practice was also treated as an
individual responsibility and often driven
more by curiosity than any contractual term.
The position has changed over the last
decade with the introduction of external
judgement of research through research
selectivity exercises. Research income, and
particularly research output, has become an
explicit concern of all old and most new
universities. Members of staff in all universities are likely to be called to account, at
least in the most general of fashions, for the
time spent on research (see Hughes and
Tight, 1995; McNay, 1997; Tomlin, 1988). In
some of the universities looked at this is an
annual exercise. Research targets are set
(sometimes agreed but sometimes pressure is
put on to agree to a certain target) and
performance is measured against targets.
However, this was not true in all cases. In
some there was simply a consensus in a
department about the need to meet certain
kinds of research targets and individuals
were exhorted to play their part in meeting
them. Further, there was evidence that in a
number of the old universities the traditions
of academic freedom remain potent and the
right to follow academic curiosity is still
cherished.
In a number of the universities looked at
disappointment at the results of the last
Research Assessment Exercise led directly to
significant internal structural change. One
particular instance might be quoted as an
example. In this case the university moved
from a structure of faculties (with no departments) to one where departments were
created and given a critical management
role. They were seen as the vehicle for the
more effective organisation and prosecution
of research and heads of department were
seen to have a key role. Heads of department
were appointed, rather than elected and were
given comprehensive job descriptions. It is
too early to assess how effective this move
will be. However, if it is effective it will not be
because heads of department have been given
new responsibilities because in practice they
still have to rely on the same kind of levers
available to comparators in other old universities but it may be the result of a clear
statement that they have a managerial role
and are managerial appointments.
One of the other problems facing heads of
department in managing performance is that
in many cases they have not been appointed
because of their managerial abilities, they
Michael P. Jackson
The role of the head of
department in managing
performance in UK
universities
The International Journal of
Educational Management
13/3 [1999] 142±149
would not necessarily claim any and they
have not been trained to any significant
extent in such matters. There is a clear
difference in such matters between the old
and the new universities, although in the
universities looked at in this research the
differences were not as extreme as often
claimed. In the old universities heads of
department were appointed from within on a
fixed term basis. In some cases this was a
managerial appointment but in others it
followed some kind of consultative process
(in some cases an election but in others
something less formal). Especially when
appointed following a consultative process,
their role was more one of chairing a group of
colleagues than managing a department. As
Weiner (1996) has noted, in many cases the
head of department does not see the appointment as a career move (on occasions it can
help when applying for promotion but it will
rarely be the determining factor). They are
more likely to see the pursuit of their
research as the key to enhancing their career
prospects and being head of department will
actually hinder research output (Sizer, 1987).
Inevitably, this often colours their attitude to
the job. Some nevertheless see performance
management as important and despite the
short tenure of their office, seek to influence
performance in a measurable way. Others see
this less as individual responsibility and
more as collegiate responsibility.
In the new universities the position of head
of department has been different. It has been
seen as a substantive appointment, usually
following external advertisement, and carrying a not insubstantial salary premium. They
have been seen as line managers, allocating
duties within the overall workload agreement. However, even within the new universities the role of the head of department
has been very different from that of line
manager in industry. The collegiate emphasis may not be as great as in the old
universities, but it is not absent, and the
professional status of academic staff has
restricted the head of department's role.
One of the key variables influencing the
approach taken by the head of department
may be the basis of their appointment.
Certainly the informants consulted for this
research routinely argued that heads of
department appointed as the result of a
managerial decision were more likely to
adopt a managerial approach (and to be given
more explicit powers and responsibilities)
than if they were appointed as the result of an
election. Further, in a number of instances
the relationship between the dean and the
head of department, and the decision as to
who should be given the main managerial
responsibility, seemed to be strongly influenced by the method of appointment.
In the new universities appointments as
head of department are commonly permanent (though not always ± in some cases the
option remains to return to a full-time
teaching and research career). However, in
the new universities looked at in this
research the criteria for appointment as head
of department emphasised a mixture of
academic and managerial qualities and,
while the separation of titles from positions
(professorships from headship of departments) enabled managerial qualities to be
highlighted more than they might have been,
some still looked for a mix and stipulated
academic criteria as a minimum.
Bone and Bowner (1998) found that about
half of all universities they surveyed offered
a training course for new heads of departments. However, in most cases such courses
were voluntary. In all of the universities
looked at in this research some training was
offered to heads of department. The extent
and type of training, though, varied greatly.
In some the training amounted to no more
than a basic introduction to university
policies and procedures. In others, training
was offered regularly, throughout a term of
office. In still others it was in-house though
some used outside trainers and some joined
together as a consortium of institutions.
However, the amount of training offered in
all cases was limited and few senior managers claimed that it was designed to do
much more than alert and sensitise. It would
be difficult to argue that it was training them
to be managers as such or designed to rectify
a gap in management skills recognised on
appointment and some heads of department
anyway would have resisted such a notion.
Discussion
Staff, particularly academic staff in universities, traditionally have been given considerable autonomy. They have been viewed as
professionals who can be relied on to deliver
the performance needed because of their
personal interest in and commitment to their
subject. The autonomous model has been
most clearly seen in the old universities, but
it has not been without influence in the new
universities as well. The autonomy given to
academic staff has been mirrored by the
collegiate system. Again, this has been at its
strongest in the old but by no means absent
in the new universities. Heads of department
have had a limited role to play. This has
varied from, at one extreme in many old
universities, acting as little more than a
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Michael P. Jackson
The role of the head of
department in managing
performance in UK
universities
The International Journal of
Educational Management
13/3 [1999] 142±149
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chair for a group of colleagues, to the other
extreme in some new universities where
heads of department have had significant
administrative responsibilities, including
organising the allocation of teaching duties.
However, in few cases, traditionally, were
heads of department called on, in any significant way, to manage performance.
The traditional picture, and role of the
head of department, started to change around
a decade ago. It has been argued earlier that
this was in part a response to universities
paying much more attention to management,
following the Jarratt report (see Sizer, 1988),
but more importantly a response to pressures
felt by universities as the result of national
attempts to measure their performance, in
teaching and research (see Kogan et al., 1994).
The role of the head of department has
changed, though not as the result of a serious
consideration and debate about that role. In
few universities looked at, the research
reported here, have they systematically considered the role of head of department as
such; rather the role of the head of department has changed as a result of the pressures
placed on the university itself. In one of the
universities looked at management consultants were engaged to review the structure
and operation of the institution. In a key
passage in their report they described the
devolution of responsibilities to the head of
department as ``haphazard'' rather than
planned. Such a comment undoubtedly could
be applied well beyond the example from
which it has been taken.
In this article attention has centred on the
way that the national assessments of teaching and research have fed through to the role
of the head of department. In other areas as
well, though, the same has been happening.
As budgets have been devolved, so heads of
department have been called on to exercise
more financial expertise and responsibility
(Sizer, 1987). As legislation has been introduced on equal opportunities and health and
safety, so heads of department have been
called on to pay more attention to such
matters (Hall, 1996).
If the changes to the role of the head of the
department had occurred because of a systematic consideration of that role rather than
because of the indirect consequences of other
pressures, then one might have expected
changes to the role to be reflected in the
selection and training of holders of the post
and in the range of levers made available to
them. In fact, because of the way the changes
have occurred, little seems to have happened
in this regard. It would be misleading to
claim that nothing has happened. In the old
universities when members of a department
are nominating or electing one of their
members to act as head of department and in
the new universities when a new appointment as head of department is being made,
then more attention may be paid to their
management/administrative skills. However, this may be only one among a range of
considerations. Similarly, in all of the universities looked at for the research reported
in this article there was an attempt to offer at
least some training to heads of department,
but the training is limited and sometimes
offers little more than a guide to institutional
policy.
The way in which the role of the head of
department has changed has also meant that
little thought has been given to the levers
they need to be able to use to do their job,
particularly as far as performance management is concerned. In many examples reviewed in this article they only had limited
ability to measure ongoing performance ±
such is the continuing hold of the professional model. Further, even if they encounter
markedly poor or good performance they
have to rely on others to implement any
recommendations they might make. Persuasion and encouragement are likely to be the
mainstay of the head of department's
armoury.
The result of such developments is to
further increase ambiguity and tension already present in the role. The head of
department frequently is seen as a manager
of performance but he/she rarely has the
skills, training or levers to carry out this
function. Some of course do so, but this is
more the result of chance (the personality of
the individual concerned) than a deliberate
strategy on the part of the university. The
ambiguity and tension are exacerbated in the
old universities where the position of head of
department is normally temporary and a
career route is likely to be one seen as best
pursued through research (which will be
hindered rather than helped by taking the
role of head of department).
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