Sources of power and infrastructural conditions in medieval governmental accounting

Accounting, Organizations and Society

journalhomepage:www.elsevier.com/locate/aos

Sources of power and infrastructural conditions in medieval governmental accounting

Michael John Jones * School of Economics, Finance and Management, University of Bristol, 8 Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1TN, United Kingdom

article info

abstract

The role which accounting plays in power and governance is a key issue in accounting his- tory. This study looks at a crucial development in accounting history, the emergence in the 12th century of Exchequer accounting. Exchequer accounting played a significant part in the rise of the European administrative state. This paper uses Mann’s Model of the sources of power to study the nature and role that accounting played in medieval governance. The ideological, economic, military and political sources of power are shown to be underpinned by key infrastructures such as accounting. The interrelationships between accounting, other medieval infrastructures (such as the feudal system, administrative and territorial organisation, logistics, coinage, and literacy and numerical technologies) and the sources of power are explored.

Ó 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction & Feroz, 2001; Edwards, Coombs, & Greener, 2002; Neu, 1999; Neu, 2000; Robson, 1994 ) have investigated key as-

The role which accounting plays in power and gover- pects of the way in which accounting supports governmen- nance has increasingly become a key issue of concern in

tal power. The current study adds to this literature. accounting history ( Hoskin & Macve, 2000 ). For example,

This paper looks at a crucial period in accounting his- the study of power, knowledge and government was iden-

tory: the emergence of Exchequer accounting in the tified by Napier (2006) as a key theme of the new account-

twelfth century, which formed the basis of charge and dis- ing history which had concerned many authors (such as

charge accounting, the dominant form of accounting in the Burchell, Chubb, & Hopwood, 1985; Hoskin & Macve,

UK government until 1830 ( Edwards et al., 2002 ). It looks 1986; Loft, 1986; Miller & O’Leary, 1987 ). As such this con-

at the interrelationship between government and account- firms the need more actively to probe the ‘‘underlying pro-

ing at a time of great historical importance; the emergence cesses and forces at work” in accounting ( Hopwood, 1987 ,

of the administrative state in the Early Middle Ages. At this p. 207). These enquiries will, in turn, place greater empha-

time, emergent nations, such as England, France and sis on the social, economic and political forces implicated

Scotland, were in constant struggle with their neighbours in the structuring of accounting institutions ( Miller, 1986 ).

with fluid territorial boundaries. Political power was The nature and role of accounting techniques and prac-

dependent on military power which, in turn, was depen- tices in the establishment, emergence and extension of gov-

dent on finance. As a consequence, there was a pressing ernmental power has traditionally received relatively little

necessity for states to raise money for wars and for their attention. However, since Miller’s (1986, 1990) early

domestic needs. These states were complex. They com- seminal studies investigating the interactions between

prised multiple interacting power sources underpinned accounting and the state, several studies (such as Carpenter

by supportive infrastructures such as accounting. Account- ing helped to solve key organisational problems of control,

* Tel.: +44 117 928 9000; fax: +44 117 928 8577. logistics and communication. Financial administration was E-mail address: Michaeljohn.jones@bristol.ac.uk

becoming the sine qua non of these embryonic states. 0361-3682/$ - see front matter Ó 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.aos.2009.01.005

82 M.J. Jones / Accounting, Organizations and Society 35 (2010) 81–94

The central thesis in this paper is that accounting tech- tures of medieval England. Third, it shows the interrela- nologies played a significant part in the emergence, devel-

tionships between accounting, other non-accounting opment and extension of state power in England in the

infrastructures and the sources of power in medieval Eng- twelfth century. For the first time in Western Europe,

land. Fourth, it provides further evidence on the use of accounting enabled the state to govern effectively over ter-

accounting as a device for enforcing power in the context ritorial distance through the mechanism of an annual audit

of medieval English state and demonstrates accounting’s at the Royal Exchequer. The Exchequer was supported by a

power to monitor an individual’s performance, through complex administrative and technological infrastructure. It

an exploration of the nature and function of an accountable enabled the king to collect the money from his own land-

subject, the sheriff.

holdings in the shires. More importantly, in the longer term, This paper uses a theoretical model novel to the it also provided an efficient method to raise and collect

accounting discipline to show how accounting is impli- taxes. This source of finance underpinned the growth of

cated in the territorial centralisation and emergence of the modern state by enabling it to develop its military

the twelfth century English state. This is Mann’s model of power. In fact, the unprecedented administrative efficiency

the four sources of power (ideological, economic, military of the state was premised upon a well-developed account-

and political). Mann believed that these four sources of ing system. The accounting system itself was operationa-

power underpinned the development of the state. Society lised through the use of other related infrastructures. This

needed to be seen not as a unified whole, but as four sep- central relationship between government and accounting

arate networks of social interactions ( Brenner, 2006 , p. is embedded within a broader nexus of interlocking struc-

189). These four sources of power were, in turn, under- tures and technologies. These involved personal relation-

pinned by key infrastructures such as accounting, feudal- ships,

ism, administrative and territorial organisation, literary economic, administrative, political structures and account-

institutional and

organisational

structures,

and numerical technology, communication and transporta- ing technologies. The English state at this time has been

tion, and coinage. Mann’s model shows how these infra- seen as having the most sophisticated governmental struc-

structures were melded by the government into a tures in Europe since the Romans ( Hollister, 2001 ).

complex set of techniques that enabled it successfully to This new state was innovative both in its accounting

solve the spatial problems of governance. The state’s terri- technology and in its administrative structures. Conse-

torial centralisation allowed it to develop infrastructures to quently, new methods of control were successfully intro-

reinforce its power ( Hobson, 2006 ). These infrastructures duced

not only facilitated and enabled the creation of the Royal produces the first records of the newly constituted Exche-

and institutionalised.

‘‘Henry’s

government

Exchequer system, but allowed it to develop and flourish. quer, the Pipe Roll of 1130, by far the earliest surviving

In this paper, the relationships between accounting, the kingdom wide financial survey in the history of human-

sources of power and the other infrastructures are kind” ( Hollister, 2001 , p. 368). As a result a fundamental

examined.

problem of twelfth century financial administration was Mann’s model has been the subject of much contro- solved: how to account for and efficiently collect at the

versy. On the one hand, Mann’s model has been widely ac- centre money due and raised by the localities. In effect, this

claimed: ‘‘Michael Mann’s two-volume Magnum Opus, The solved a crucial problem with extensive patrimonial

sources of social power, is, in my opinion, one of the most power: ‘‘The problem of maintaining adequate surveillance

impressive works of scholarship produced in the last fifty and control over expansive territory” ( Clegg, 1989 , p. 170).

years” ( Hobson, 2006 , p. 150). While Gorski (2006, p. Giddens (1984) terms this ‘‘time-space distantiation”. This

101) terms it ‘‘the single most ambitious work of historical problem was effectively solved by physically bringing the

sociology to appear during the last thirty years”. However, localities as personified by local administrators to the cen-

on the other hand, there are critics such as Robert Brenner tre as represented by the Exchequer. So government at a

and Gianfranco Poggi. 1 Brenner, a Marxist, unsurprisingly distance was achieved by removing the physicality of dis-

dislikes Mann’s fourfold taxonomy. He asserts the suprem- tance. The creation of the publicly accountable subject;

acy of economic primacy and the importance of feudal lord- the sheriff, the king’s ‘‘accountant” in the shire, was the

ship ( Brenner, 2006 ). Brenner, in effect, sees political power effective solution.

as a by-product of economic power. Mann (2006, p. 369) , in The state controlled the sheriffs through the use of an

reply, believes that Brenner is too reductionist: reducing accounting system which enforced a strict accountability.

‘‘Europe to the villages and manors of feudalism”. Poggi In effect, the government, perhaps for the first time in

(2006) , by contrast, is unhappy with Mann’s separation of Western Europe, set up a surveillance system which had

political and military power although he accepts his ideolog- the effect of establishing a new mode of accountability

ical, economic and political sources of power. For Poggi, mil- and control. In is own era, it was the equivalent of the

itary power is always subordinate to political power. Both surveillance regimes of later centuries ( Miller and O’Leary,

Mann (2006) and Schroeder (2006, p. 12) , however, robustly 1987 ; Carmona, Ezzamel, & Gutierrez, 2002 ).

defend military power as a separate source, for example, in This paper has four specific contributions. First, it adds to our general understanding of the relationship between

accounting, power and governance by a detailed explora- 1 Interested readers are referred to An Anatomy of Power. The Social tion of the English Royal Exchequer accounting in the Mid- Theory of Michael Mann ( Hall & Schroeder, 2006 ). This volume contains dle Ages. Second, it explores the interactions between essays by leading sociologists who debate Mann’s theory from different

theoretical perspectives. In the concluding chapter, Mann provides a accounting and the economic, political and social struc-

detailed defence of his theory.

83 the domination of the South by the North in the American

M.J. Jones / Accounting, Organizations and Society 35 (2010) 81–94

quer in the Early Middle Ages, Hoskin and Macve (1986) civil war.

analyse the basics of the Exchequer system as a power- In the next section, the prior literature relating to medi-

knowledge control system. However, there is little explicit eval accounting is evaluated. The remainder of the article is

recognition of the other three Mannian sources neither of then structured as follows. A brief focused description of

power (economic, ideological and military) nor of key the Exchequer system as a medieval administrative system

infrastructures such as feudalism or coinage. The focus is provided next to set the scene for the later discussion. In

of this particular article, accounting’s relationship to the the section ‘‘Sources of power”, Mann’s model of the four

sources of power in the twelfth century and its interac- sources of power and their underpinning infrastructures

tion with other infrastructures, is thus new. is explained. In the section ‘‘Multiple interaction networks in the twelfth century”, the four main sources of power are

The Exchequer as a medieval administrative mechanism then explained in the context of twelfth century England.

In the section ‘‘Infrastructures”, the general infrastructures The Exchequer-based accounting system was essen- (feudalism, administrative and territorial, logistical and

tially a twelfth century institutional innovation which al- monetary) and the specific infrastructure which under-

lowed the centre, the state, to control the periphery, the pinned accounting and the twelfth century state are dis-

shires. It substantively increased the power of the state. cussed. Then in the section ‘‘Linkages of the accounting

The sheriffs, the king’s officials in the shires, accounted to infrastructure to non-accounting infrastructures and the

royal officials for revenues from inter alia the royal manors sources of power”, interrelations between the accounting

and shires, from taxes such as Danegeld and from the infrastructure and the non-accounting infrastructures and

administration of royal judicial administration. 2 The Exche- the sources of power are investigated. Finally, the conclu-

quer was assembled circa 1110 using current technologies sion summarises the paper.

by Roger of Salisbury, the king’s Justiciar, probably to raise

a marriage aid for Henry I’s daughter ( Hollister, 2001, p. 216; Jones, 2009 ). Its origins are traceable to Anglo-Saxon Historiographical reflections

England and to the post 1066 Anglo-Norman state ( Jones, 2009 ).

Very few accounting researchers investigate accounting The Exchequer was an accountability device. At its heart history in the Early Middle Ages in England. Most of those

was a relationship of personal control and accountability. that do cover this topic in a broad way in Meta histories

The king attempted to restrain the power of the sheriffs, (see, for example, Brown, 1905; Chatfield, 1973 and Ed-

raise taxation efficiently and tightly organise the rather wards, 1989 ) or as part of general articles which have a

scattered geographical resources of the Crown. The sheriffs broad historical sweep (e.g., Hoskin & Macve, 1986; Jack,

received summonses, reported personally and rendered 1966; Yamey, 1983 ). Only a few articles deal specifically

their accounts to the Exchequer twice yearly. There were, with the twelfth or thirteenth centuries (e.g., Baxter,

in reality, two Exchequers: an upper Exchequer (court of 1989; Noke, 1981 ). Noke (1981) focuses on bailiffship in

audit) and a lower Exchequer (essentially a treasury). thirteenth century England, while Baxter (1989) reviews

In the upper Exchequer, the sheriff’s sums payable were the tally and the checkerboard in the Early Middle Ages.

calculated in front of the Barons of the Exchequer by a roy- These articles traditionally adopt a rather narrow historical

al official (the calculator) on the Exchequer board (a che- focus with little contextualisation of accounting within an

quered table), resembling an Abacus, with scribes interdisciplinary framework. Consequently, only a handful

keeping written records on Pipe Rolls. Importantly, the of authors (such as: Bryer, 1994; Bryer, 2000a; Bryer,

sheriffs’ account was rendered on oath and there were 2000b and Hoskin & Macve, 1986 ) focus on the wider

penalties in place for non-attendance. interactions between accounting and society.

The audit was conducted using a set defined protocol in Bryer (1994) adopts a Marxian perspective. His basic

what has come to be known as charge and discharge for- focus was on manorial accounting from the late thir-

mat. The sheriff was formally ‘charged’ with prior years’ teenth century onwards and he sought to account for

debts, the king’s revenues, principally the farm. The sheriff the social relations of feudalism. Bryer saw the history

was then allowed authorised expenses, allowances and of manorial accounting as the ‘‘implementation and

cash payments as his formal ‘discharge’. This ‘charge and development of a system for helping to manage and

discharge’ system proved a very successful accounting sys- intensify feudal exploitation” (1994, p. 226). Bryer’s two

tem spreading from the English Exchequer to the English later articles (2000a, 2000b) deal with the transition from

Church, to manors, to universities, to boroughs and guilds feudalism to capitalism and use Weber’s and Marx’s the-

( Jones, 2008b , provides more detail). 3 ories; however, they primarily begin in the sixteenth cen- tury. Bryer’s work, therefore, is wider in scope than the

present paper which investigates administrative mecha- nisms in the Early Middle Ages. In addition, Bryer’s focus

2 The word sheriff derives from the Anglo-Saxon, ‘‘shire reeve”. This was is on manorial accounting and the feudal surplus rather

the official in charge of the shire. The farm of one night was an annual than more particularly, as in this paper, on the Exchequer.

payment to the king from royal manors. 3

Hoskin and Macve’s (1986) seminal article adopts a wide Earlier systems of accounting have used accountability-based systems historical sweep using a Foucauldian framework. In a (e.g., in Mesopotamia, Greece and Rome). However, they do not have the sophisticated format, structure or terminology that characterises charge brief overview of financial administration at the Exche-

and discharge accounting ( Jones, 2009 ).

84 M.J. Jones / Accounting, Organizations and Society 35 (2010) 81–94

The Exchequer itself is an example of a calculative tech- Mann (1986) identified four power sources which nique that was an ensemble of practices and rationales

underpinned the development of states: ideological, mili-

tary, economic and political. These power sources overlap, comprised a complex set of interrelated features. This sim-

( Miller & Napier, 1993 ). 4 The accounting infrastructure

intersect and are historically contingent. In the Middle ple accountability relationship operated with the prevailing

Ages, Mann argues that initially ‘‘no single group could social, economic, political and administrative framework of

monopolise power” ( Mann, 1986 , p. 397). However, from feudalism. It was predicated upon an effective coinage, effi-

15 onwards there was a steady growth of political power cient communication and transportation system and on a

through territorial centralisation ( Mann, 1986 , p. 439). The literary and numerical technology which included Pipe Rolls,

most distinctive and controversial part of Mann’s model is writs, tallies and the Abacus. 5 his conceptualisation of militarism as a separate source of social power ( Schroeder, 2006 ). Broadly this paper follows

Sources of power Mann’s analysis with one refinement. Military power is considered too narrow. Clegg’s (1989, p. 219) broader

Mann offers a distinct view of looking at human socie- reconstitution of force as techniques of discipline is pre- ties. Societies, according to Mann (1986, p. 1) , are dynamic

ferred. ‘‘The point of force or military violence is to secure and are ‘‘constituted of multiple overlapping and intersect-

outcomes which cannot be achieved through circuits of so- ing sociospatial networks of power”. They do not exist as

cial integration”. I use enforcement to describe this source systems, nor should societies be conceived as unproblem-

of power. 7 All states need some sort of enforcement power atic, unitary totalities. 6 Societies are necessary to help hu-

whether it be military, police, or fiscal. man beings to attain their goals. Human beings come

Ideological power represents ‘‘the social organisation of together to organise and control people, materials and terri-

ultimate knowledge and meaning . . .. necessary to social tories. Central problems are thus organisation, control, logis-

life” ( Mann, 1986 , p. 22). It is a broad-ranging meaning sys- tics and communication. Accounting can play a key part in

tem which ‘surpasses experience’ ( Mann, 2006 , p. 345). this process, for example, by the control and organisation

Ideological power is dependent on accepted patterns of of people and resources.

human behaviour, for example, norms or rituals that may ‘‘Power is the ability to pursue and attain goals through

or may not be based on reality. Ideological power may be mastery of one’s environment” ( Mann, 1986 , p. 6). Using

transcendent or immanent. Transcendent power, the most Mann’s theoretical framework power can be distributive

powerful and of universal appeal, reaches outwards cross- or collective, extensive or intensive, and authoritative or

ing existing social boundaries (e.g., world religions are the diffused. Distributive power is restrictive power (e.g., A

most important transcendent ideologies ( Mann, 2006 , p. controls B by establishing accounting control and monitor-

342). Immanent ideological power (i.e., concepts like nation ing techniques). By contrast, collective power is where

and class) is more inward-looking; it intensifies the cohe- individuals can enhance their joint power over third

sion of an already-established group. Ideological power parties. Extensive power refers to the ability loosely to

tends to be diffuse rather than authoritative, flowing infor- organise large numbers of people over wide territorial

mally and interstitially through networks of communica- regions. By contrast, intensive power is the ability to orga-

tion, relatively unimpeded by authoritative power centres nise tightly e.g., over widespread geographical regions.

like states, armies or class boundaries ( Mann, 2006 , p. 386). Accounting is useful for either ‘‘extensive” or ‘‘intensive”

Enforcement power is a ‘‘hard” technology that under- power, in particular, facilitating control at a distance.

pins most states. It can be formal (military) or informal Authoritative power consists, in essence, of commands

(non-military). Military power can be defensive or aggres- and orders. It is very controlling and conscious (e.g., sub-

sive. In essence, military power is concentrated, coercive, jects may be commanded by their king by writs). Diffused

blunt power. Military power has a direct (i.e., within power, such as social norms, is a subtler, more normalised

immediate military striking distance) and an indirect power. Individuals follow social norms either because they

element (i.e., outside striking distance) ( Mann, 1986 ). As are natural, moral or out of self interest. The Exchequer

military power needs to be financed, an efficient govern- was in essence an example of distributive, intensive power.

mental accounting system facilitating the collection of revenues and taxes is an effective precursor. Taxation is necessary to enable states to make international war

4 Most of our knowledge of the operational aspects of the Exchequer ( Mann, 1986 , p. 423). Enforcement techniques vary from system is derived from Fitz Nigel’s book, Dialogus de Scaccario (Dialogue of

state to state. In medieval times, in particular, enforcement the Exchequer). Jones (2008c) argues this was the first Western book on

power includes brute military power, but also includes accounting. 5

other coercive techniques such as punishment, patronage, Pipe rolls were records kept and maintained on vellum (calf skin);

taxation and the judiciary. Accounting has very often been rolled up for storage they resembled pipes. Writs were informal, sealed written letters generally addressed to the sheriff and used inter alia ‘‘to

seen as a disciplinary mechanism (e.g., Hoskin & Macve, send comments, grant favours, or confer privileges on named individuals”

( Campbell, 1986 , p. 237). Tallies are essentially short sticks on which notches are cut to represent monetary amounts and were commonly used by both governments and private individuals throughout medieval Europe

7 I did not use the term ‘disciplinary power’ as it risks attributing to ( Jenkinson, 1923–1924 6 ).

Medieval times a Foucauldian term more usually and appropriately used in Mann’s view of society is thus, as he himself confesses, at odds with

later capitalist historical periods. As Armstrong (1994, p. 31) puts it: ‘‘In most sociological orthodoxies such as Marxism, structuralism, evolution-

Foucault’s various accounts, disciplinary regimes were concerned with ism, diffusionism, and action theory ( Mann, 1986 , p. 2).

moulding the actual details of individual conduct . . .”

85 ‘‘Economic power derives from the satisfaction of sub-

M.J. Jones / Accounting, Organizations and Society 35 (2010) 81–94

munication, accounting methods, fiscal/auditing struc- sistence needs through social organisation” ( Mann, 1986 ,

tures, and so forth generally denied to earlier states” p. 24). It involves control over the production, distribution,

( Mann, 1986 , p. 527). Effectively, these universal infra- exchange and consumption of material resources. Eco-

structures are social inventions. ‘‘Once invented, the major nomic power has been the subject of considerable histori-

infrastructural techniques seem almost never to have dis- cal discussion; often in a class context by Marxist

appeared from human practice” ( Mann, 1986 , p. 524). In- historians. Bryer (1994) , for example, argues that Marx’s

stead, they have continually evolved. For example, concept of the mode of production provides a useful con-

accounting has developed over time with occasionally a ceptual framework for understanding the emergence and

quantum leap (e.g., from charge and discharge accounting development of feudal and capitalist accounting. Economic

to double-entry bookkeeping). All these infrastructures in- power is the most deeply entrenched in everyday life. Over

crease collective and distributive power. Indeed, Mann sees the long term, economic networks exercise the most mas-

human society as being characterised by a steady, cumula- sive, cumulative impact on collective power.

tive, but uneven increase in social power ( Mann, 1986 , p. Political powers are those of ‘‘centralised, institutiona-

524). Indeed, Mann sees human society as being character- lised, territorial regulation” ( Mann, 1986 , p. 11). Political

ised by a steady, cumulative, but uneven increase in social power differs from the other three power sources as it is

power ( Mann, 1986 , p. 524). Some are narrow and techni- centralised and territorial, heightening boundaries rather

cal, others wide ( Mann, 1986 , p. 525). Some are rooted in than transcending them ( Mann, 1986 ). ‘‘Regulation exer-

one power source (such as knights and castles in military cised from the centre through territories, rather than either

power), others can be located in multiple power sources legitimacy (ideology) or violence (military), is the key

(such as literacy). Importantly, and crucially, these infra- function of the state” ( Mann, 2006 , p. 353). Accounting is

structures are interlinked and mutually dependent. one obvious regulatory mechanism for controlling state

Accounting thus facilitates state power, but also depends functions and activities. ‘‘Expenditures give us an indicator,

on it. Accounting enables the concentration and efficient though not a perfect one, of the functions of the state,

exploitation of the state’s resources. However, the state whereas revenue indicates its relationship to the various

provided other infrastructures, such as territorial organisa- power groupings who compose its ‘‘civil society” ( Mann,

tion and money, which enables accounting systems to 1986 , p. 417). Money not only has a functional, immediate

develop.

use, but also, often incrementally, increases a state’s power and scope.

Multiple interaction networks in the twelfth century These four sources of power are underpinned by univer-

sal infrastructures (see Fig. 1 ). ‘‘Power is most fruitfully

Ideological power

seen as means, as organisation, as infrastructure, as logis- tics” ( Mann, 1986 , p. 518). Accounting represents one such

The main source of ideological power in Europe in the universal infrastructure; others include literacy, coinage,

Middle Ages was the Church. The Church was transcen- administrative and territorial organisation. These infra-

dent, crossing territorial and social boundaries. Catholic structures, or diffused power techniques, underpin the

Christendom extended throughout most of Europe. The sources of power, enabling its more effective realisation.

Pope headed two parallel hierarchical institutions with ‘‘For territoriality and boundedness also have infrastructur-

extensive agricultural holdings: bishoprics and monaster- al preconditions. What was achieved by the early modern

ies. The Church’s own power network embraced every as- European state depended on the volume of written com-

pect of medieval life whether at court or on the manor. The Church provided a universal and unifying ideology, a Euro-

pean Christian identity. This was helped by the fact that Centralised, institutionalised, territorial

Political Source of Power

Ideological Source of Power

the Church shared a common language, Latin. The ethical regulation

teaching of the Church helped to create the fundamentals Embedded Infrastructures :

Social organisation of ultimate knowledge

and meaning.

of a peaceful society. The Church also reinforced state e.g. Accounting

Embedded Infrastructures:

e.g. Administrative and territorial structure power. Individual bishops and abbots helped to administer

e.g. Technological

state judicial and administrative functions. ‘‘[A]t the polit- ical level, the bishops and abbots assisted the ruler to con-

Transcedent Infrastructure

trol his domains, providing the sacral authority and literate

e.g. Feudalism

clerics for his chancellors, backing his judicial authority with legitimacy and efficiency” ( Mann, 1986 , p. 383). They

gave the state a moral authority. In addition, the Church exchange and consumption of material

Control over production, distribution,

played a major part in interstate politics and diplomacy. resources

The enforcement of state power

In the defence of Christendom the Church orchestrated the crusades into the Holy Land. There was also the latent,

Embedded Infrastructures:

but powerful threat of excommunication. e.g. Monetary

Embedded Infrastructures:

e.g. Knights and Castles e.g. Patronage and punishment

Enforcement power

Economic Source of Power

Enforcement Source of Power

Norman power was premised upon formal military Fig. 1. Four sources of power with illustrative embedded infrastructures.

might. There was no standing army just a feudal levy.

86 M.J. Jones / Accounting, Organizations and Society 35 (2010) 81–94

The military power of the king, and thus the state, largely During the eleventh and twelfth centuries there were depended on his relations with his vassals who were re-

pressures on this agricultural economy. First, trade in- quired to supply a requisite number of knights. Essentially,

creased with a greater demand for luxury rather than

he could only galvanize an army with their support and in commodity goods. Second, merchants became more times of crisis. In effect, the king depended on the local

important with the growth of guilds and towns. And magnates to maintain stability and enforce the royal laws.

third, the English economy gradually moved towards a Under strong kings, such as Henry I and Henry II, this

money-based economy and away from the payments- worked well. However, under weak kings such as Stephen

in-kind prevalent since Anglo-Saxon times. Landlords the realm descended into civil war. The Norman network

preferred the greater flexibility which money provided of castles stretched from Caerleon in South Wales to York

over labour services. Coinage provided an essential in the North. This was essential not only for a profitable

infrastructure for the efficient administration of the rural and town economy, to safeguard the citizens of the

kingdom.

realm but also to secure the communication and transpor- tation infrastructure.

Political power

Non-military enforcement techniques were available to the medieval government. Punishment and fear of punish-

Political power in the Middle Ages was concentrated ment were particularly important, with possibility of exile,

and hierarchical. Indeed, Mann comments: ‘‘Concentra- sequestration of lands or fines. The granting and with-

tion of resources proved to be the key in geopolitics” drawal of royal patronage as rewards for loyal followers

( Mann, 1986 , p. 440). Effectively, the king and his vassals and retainers were also significant techniques. Ecclesiasti-

controlled most of the power. However, compared to to- cal benefices and other fiefs were all subject to rights of

day there was relatively little social power to control. appointment at a change of occupancy or vacancy. Another

The king was at the top of the social pyramid; the peas- enforcement mechanism available to the state was taxa-

ants were at the bottom. The king ruled by the ‘‘grace tion, whereby the state could extract funds from the pop-

of God”. Under the contemporary notion of the state, ulation to fulfil its central functions. In addition, the

the king was the real owner of all the land and property judicial system was a method of coercion whereby the no-

(of the realm) which was possessed and enjoyed by his bles could exercise feudal control.

subjects as a gift and fief from himself” ( Knowles, 1941 , pp. 565–566). Land was held in return for homage and

Economic power military service. Government was maintained through a feudal hierarchical infrastructure, bolstered by the ideo-

The medieval economy was primarily agricultural. The logical power of the Church. For instance, at their corona- manor, the major economic unit, was the centre of a hier-

tions, English kings were anointed with oil ( Bates, 2001 , archical, feudal power structure in which the peasant had

Chapter 2, p. 73). In the Middle Ages the consecration of his own land, but also worked for the Lord. The village

the ruler meant that the ruler was not only outwardly community coexisted with the manors with a complex

changed, but also inwardly purified through the Grace interdependency. The basis of the medieval economy has

of the Holy Ghost. The king gained a new status and rela- been greatly contested by social and economic historians.

tion with God through the Church. In granting the king In particular, the role of the peasantry, population growth

consecration God had accepted him as his office bearer. and class conflict has been much debated (see, for example,

This, in effect, signalled a melding of the religious and

secular roles of the king. The king was ruling by divine clear consensus about the drivers of the economy. However,

the Brenner Debate, Ashton & Philpin, 1985 ). 8 There is no

right. It made the king dependent on the religious what is fairly clear is that there was no single village type,

services rendered to him, but also created a distinct posi- that land laws were diverse and social gradients complex

tion for him that reinforced his power ( Schramm, 1937 , ( Herhily, 1975 ). The traditional view that the lords coerced

pp. 6–8).

their peasants has recently been challenged by Campbell The nature of royal power, however, was changing in (2000, p. 3) . He states that ‘‘The proportion of seigniorial

the twelfth century throughout Europe, in general, but in products actually accounted for by labour services may con-

England in particular. Anglo-Saxon England had always sequently have been as little as 8%. It was as employers

been advanced in terms of governance and financial rather than coercers of labour that lords were, therefore,

administration. The Normans thus inherited an effective most significant. In fact, lords increasingly substituted hired

administrative and territorial infrastructure and an effi- labour since it was better motivated and incurred lower

cient communication and transportation system. However, supervision costs”. However, this does not mean that these

Norman power was much more concentrated than that in workers were necessarily wage labourers in the modern

Anglo-Saxon England ( Hollister, 2001 ). ‘‘By 1150 the Eng- sense, devoid of other means of subsistence or paid in cash. 9 lish state was probably the most centralised in Europe” ( Mann, 1986 , p. 393). The growth of financial administra- tion and judicial power under Henry I and Henry II was

8 In this debate, sparked by a Markist economist, Robert Brenner, leading unparalleled in Western Europe. Of especial importance economists debate the role of agrarian class structure and economic

was the role of accounting systems. ‘‘To begin with, new development. Interestingly, Hilton (1985, p. 3) states that ‘‘it would seem

that the gap between the opponents has much more to do with their accounting systems appeared virtually simultaneously in theoretical starting points than with the evidence adduced”.

state, Church, and manor. The records of Henry II them- 9 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point.

selves indicate greater logistical capacity by the state”

M.J. Jones / Accounting, Organizations and Society 35 (2010) 81–94

tems . . .. of social property relations”. Under feudalism, relatively limited, the king could raise taxes via the Exche-

( Mann, 1986 , pp. 440–441). 10 Although royal power was

there was ‘‘both sustained economic growth and the begin- quer-based accounting system for military and administra-

ning of a growth in the powers of the state, which gave a tive purposes.

more precise judicial bite to the normative pacification of Christendom” ( Mann, 1986 , p. 393).

The universal infrastructures of power The Exchequer accounting system represented a formal, feudal accounting relationship between sheriff and king. It Five infrastructures underpinned, and made possible,

was used by the king to derive surplus feudal income from the accounting system. These can be conceptualised as four

the shires. In such a hierarchically-based society, an general infrastructures (feudalism; administrative and

accountability-based accounting system such as charge territorial organisation; efficient communication and

and discharge accounting was perfectly natural. Social transportation system; and money) and one specific infra-

inferiors, sheriffs, reported to their social superiors, the structure (technological).

king and the Barons of the Exchequer. The structure of These infrastructures did not determine the exact nat-

the charge and discharge process and royal authority itself ure of the Exchequer system. There was no teleological

were both premised upon the concept of personal inevitability about the Exchequer accounting system.

accountability.

However, without the other five infrastructures it would not have existed in the form that it did.

Political source of power Administrative and territorial infrastructure. The efficient

Infrastructures governance of the state and exercise of political power was premised upon an effective administrative and territo-

General infrastructures rial organisation. ‘‘The first means of political power is territorial centralisation; states are called forth and inten-

Ideological, enforcement, political and economic sources of sified when dominant source groups, pursuing their goals, power

require social regulation over a confined bounded Feudal infrastructure. Feudalism was characterised by

territory” ( Mann, 1986 , p. 521). This also made possible a Mann as comprising multiple interaction networks: ideo-

workable and sophisticated accounting infrastructure. logical, military, political and economic power ( Mann,

The efficient administration of the kingdom at both the 1986 , p. 379). It provided the broad framework in which

national and at the local level was dependent upon govern- state power could be operationalised. In Mannian terms,

able and accountable units: shires, hundreds and man- ors. it provides infrastructural strength, the cement which en- 11 The shires and manors, in particular, formed the abled English society to be governed effectively. Church

administrative backbone upon which the accountability of and State were feudally organised. The Church’s preaching

feudal England depended. They were also the mechanism supported the established feudal order.

by which the king ensured effective control over his far- Political and military power was entwined. The ruling

flung territories. The hundreds, the basic assessable admin- class held their land from the king and rendered military

istrative unit of the Danegeld (an important twelfth century service ( Keeton, 1966 ). The feudal society consisted of a so-

tax), allowed the royal fiscal powers to be exercised at the cial hierarchy bound by a multiplicity of rights and obliga-

lowest micro-political levels.

tions (for example, reliefs, wardships, and control over An efficient bureaucracy underpinned the exercise of marriages) ( Bates, 2001 , Chapter 2) which reinforced royal

state power and the Royal Exchequer. This was provided power within an enforcement framework. As a result of

in the localities by the sheriff in the shire and the reeve this there was a chain of accountability relationships be-

on the manor. The Justices in Eyre further linked the centre tween king and barons, barons and knights, knights and

to the localities supervising the sheriffs. Royal authority peasants. This was an intensive relationship between

and control was thus exercised by a network of royal men at different levels of society. This personal loyalty,

appointees. Power became more controlling and intensive. reinforced by an oath of loyalty ( Knowles, 1941 ), was one

At the centre of government was the royal household of the cardinal principles of society.

staffed by a professional bureaucracy of generally clerics. In Marxist terms, feudalism involved the lords extract-

A permanent state elite was set up to provide ‘‘logistical ing a surplus from the labour of the peasants. In other

capacities for exercising autonomous power” ( Mann, words, landlords were empowered at the expense of the

1986 , p. 521). Without it the accounting system would peasants. Mann saw the greater organisational powers of

have been much less efficient. In the shires, too, literacy the lords as the way in which this surplus was appropri-

gradually increased. Sheriffs either had to be literate them- ated. However, Brenner (2006, p. 208) argues persuasively

selves, or depend upon educated individuals, to under- that ‘‘economic appropriation depends on the emergence

stand the written summons in Latin. When combined and maintenance, ultimately by force, of different sys-

these elements formed an effective network of persona- lised control. This supported and underpinned the political

source of power.

Mann is not quite correct in his chronology. Jones (2008b) shows the diffusion of charge and discharge accounting in the Middle Ages. Devised at the English Exchequer (ca. 1110), it appears in the Church for the first time

11 The manor first emerged as a grouping of hundreds (small units of land) in the late twelfth century. Its first documented use on the manors is in

in early Anglo-Saxon England. The manor is broadly an area of land owned 1208/1209 over a century later than its first use by government.

by a lord of the manor, with perhaps some tenanted land rented.

88 M.J. Jones / Accounting, Organizations and Society 35 (2010) 81–94

Economic and political sources of power of sheriff, improve the control of the king’s revenue and Logistical infrastructure. An efficient communication and

tighten the methods of accounting for payments. By these transportation network also underpinned an efficient, cen-

methods, the authoritative and intensive nature of royal tralised governmental accounting system and the exercise

power was enhanced.

of political power. It was imperative for the system to work that the king’s writs were communicated swiftly and effi-

Specific infrastructure

ciently. Without the king’s instructions, intensive and authoritative political control from the centre would have

Ideological source of power

been much more difficult. Technological infrastructure. At the national and local level, There was an increasing need for royal officials, in par-

literary and numerical skills became increasingly more ticular, Justices in Eyre and sheriffs, to travel safely and

important. They became new ideological norms that grad- swiftly. In addition, the sheriffs physically transferred

ually diffused through society. They provided the techno- money from the shires to the Exchequer. The concept of

logical infrastructure which underpinned the new the peace of the king’s highway was part of the state’s

centralised state and facilitated the exercise of political overall enforcement apparatus. London was at the centre

power. A key aspect of the Exchequer accounting system, of the road network which was a legacy from Roman times.

for example, was the creation of written, numerical re- ‘‘Nevertheless, with all its defects, the road system of

cords. Indeed, Clanchy (1998) sees bureaucracy in England medieval England provided alternative routes between

beginning with the Exchequer Pipe Rolls of the early many pairs of distant towns, united port and inland mar-

twelfth century: ‘‘There is no sure evidence then, that the ket, permitted regular if not always easy communication

regular writing down of accounts, in England certainly, between the villages of a shire and the county town which

and probably in France and the Empire, much preceded was its head, and brought every part of the country within

the year 10 (1998, p. 146). Their production necessitated

a fortnight’s ride of London. In the last resort, it proved not the existence of a complex and sophisticated literary and inadequate to the requirements of an age of notable eco-

numerical technology.

nomic activity, and it made possible a centralisation of na- Clanchy (1998, p. 114) comments broadly on the rise of tional government to which there was no parallel in

practical literacy in England from 1100–1307: ‘‘[T]he com- Western Europe” ( Stenton, 1936 , p. 21).

bination of skills required to produce these diverse arte- facts of written record, ranging in medieval Europe from

Economic source of power the expertise of the tanner and the tally-cutter to that of Monetary infrastructure. The Exchequer system was also

the book illuminator and the master in the schools, consti- dependent upon a national, stable and managed coinage

tutes a technology”. For Exchequer accounting, major tech- which also enhanced economic power. On the Exchequer

nological elements comprised: skilled scribes learned in table monetary amounts owing and paid were represented

Latin and writing; the existence of accounting rolls and tal- by counters. Underpinning this were payments into and

lies; and the abacus. Together this technology constituted out of the lower Exchequer in coinage. This implied a

an ‘‘advance of government through the written word” nationwide system of coinage with monetary exchange,

( Green, 1986 , p. 214).

rather than payment-in-kind, being prevalent – at least The efficient running of the Exchequer system was in payments to, and from, the government. Only current

dependent upon scribes (most often clerics) who could re- and lawful coins were permissible ( Blackburn, 1990/

cord the Pipe Rolls and also prepare the king’s writs. Clan- 1991 ). The ‘‘farm” was increasingly commuted into mone-

chy (1998) points out that in 1130 perhaps 300 writs were tary payments. This monetarisation enabled a more precise

produced, and the royal output, in total, might be up to and bureaucratic approach to be adopted to the levying

4,500 letters. This documentary output was new in Eng- and recording of monetary obligations ( Britnell, 2001 ,

land and unique in Europe.

Chapter 3). The collection of successive gelds was premised

A perhaps unintended consequence in the growth of the upon an adequate supply of money.

letters and writs was that they were directed to individu- In England, this move from an agrarian to a monetary

als. As such the lines of personal accountability from mon- economy was in advance of other countries in Western

arch to royal officials (local or national) were strengthened. Europe, such as Flanders, France and Normandy ( Lyon &

As Clanchy (1998, p. 66) points out: ‘‘Royal governments Verhulst, 1967 ). The provision of a stable, abundant money

learned that it was possible to deal with individuals in- supply stimulated economic production and trade. Eco-

stead of communities as the Anglo-Saxons had done”. nomic growth meant that England was richer, which, in

These writs enhanced the political source of power of the turn, boosted the amount of tax collectable.

king over his subjects ( Hagger, 2004 ). Writs were delivered Political, centralised control over the money supply was

by messenger to all parts of the kingdom dealing with a at the heart of English success. Henry I took ruthless mea-

wide range of financial and judicial information sures against malpractice by moneyers and forgers, includ-

Royal messengers could convey oral messages to the ing blinding and castration ( Kealey, 1972 ). As well as this

shires. However, these lacked the authority, complexity physical disciplining and direct control over the moneyers

and reliability of written messages. Written instructions themselves, the ways of testing and controlling monetary

enabled for the first time in England efficient, effective payments into the Exchequer became more advanced.

and rapid control of royal officials in the shires from the Sound political control led to innovations in monetary pol-