Manajemen | Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji 2002 10
THE ECLIPSE OF DABSCHECK’S GENERAL
THEORY: A REPLY
GRANT MICHELSON AND MARK WESTCOTT*
C
onstructive discussion and debate about matters of theory in any field or
discipline is a healthy sign. We therefore welcome the response by Braham
Dabscheck to our paper (Michelson & Westcott 2001) which critiqued his
general theory of (Australian) industrial relations or ‘orbits’ theory (see Dabscheck
1994, 1995). Our point of departure in writing the paper was to ask why, in spite
of more recent interest in matters of a theoretical nature, had Dabscheck’s
theory received so little public interest among, and commentary from, the academic community. We concluded that the apparent intellectual indifference
stemmed from the theory’s inability to provide new insights and understanding.
A detailed analysis revealed that there were a number of shortcomings with the
theory. These included the way in which the theory was constructed, problems
with its underlying assumptions including the exaggeration of agency, the
purpose of, and privilege ascribed to, ‘authority’, the equivocal distinction
between ‘orbits’ and ‘interactors’, and the wholly descriptive nature of its empirical predictions.
We were also interested in trying to account for why the theory had appeared
when it had, believing that ‘history does matter’. Here we spent a not inconsiderable part of the paper (see Michelson & Westcott 2001: 309–317) tracing
Dabscheck’s intellectual journey in the area of theory over the last 20 or so years.
The historical expedition was fruitful because it revealed significant stages of conceptual development which pointed to the general theory. Moreover, it highlighted the close relationship between changes in national industrial relations in
Australia and how Dabscheck had sought to explain these changes. To claim, as
he does, that the general theory ‘occurred by happenstance’, is unconvincing.
In fact, this claim contradicts an earlier point where he notes ‘it is difficult to
know how I, or anyone else for that matter, could not be influenced by Australian
empirics’. By regularly modifying his theoretical explanations in light of the successive industrial relations changes observed, a pattern emerges which suggests
that Dabscheck considers ‘good’ theory to be ahistorical. Perhaps this is one of
the ‘crimes’ he confesses to having committed? One widely understood measure
of ‘good’ theory is its ability to endure over time, irrespective of changes to the
key phenomena of interest.
Before progressing we need to make one final point. Dabscheck is perturbed
that we have not used more of his work in our analysis of his intellectual journey. Specifically, he notes his Industrial Relations in Australia text co-authored with
* Grant Michelson and Mark Westcott are Lecturers in Work and Organisational Studies, School
of Business, University of Sydney, NSW 2006.
THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 44, NO. 1, MARCH 2002, 144–148
D A B S C H E C K ’ S G E N E R A L T H E O RY: A R E P LY
145
John Niland (1981), and research monograph, Arbitrator at Work (1983) are
absent. From our reading, it is the latter omission which causes the most consternation so we will focus on this only. Our decision to omit Arbitrator at Work
was a conscious one. As noted above, we sought to identify Dabscheck’s key conceptual pieces. We did in fact discuss an earlier article which actually provided
the basis of chapter 1 of Arbitrator at Work (see Dabscheck 1981). It was more
important for our purposes to examine when this particular line of thought first
appeared, not when it was subsequently tested in the person of Sir William
Raymond Kelly.
It was not our intention in Heading into Orbit? to offer an alternative; this brief
was clearly beyond the purview of our immediate task of exposing the weaknesses
of the general theory of (Australian) industrial relations. Dabscheck asserts that
we have misrepresented him and ‘failed to understand various aspects of [his]
work’. We respectfully disagree with Dabscheck on these issues and stand by our
original analysis of his general theory.
Together with Dabscheck, we also share a concern with theoretical rigour of
industrial relations analyses. What, then, is the general basis of our disagreement?
Perhaps our major concern with Dabscheck’s general theory is the manner in
which it conflates theory as a means of explaining social phenomena, and theory
as a mechanism for defining a discipline. We clearly see the importance of the
former but are less concerned about the latter. Indeed we would argue that to
achieve the latter is to compromise the former. Clearly Dabscheck disagrees with
this view. As we have shown, Somers (1969) warns of the dangers of developing
a general theory (or a general conceptual framework). As Dabscheck points out,
Somers contends that developing a general conceptual framework helps ensure
‘the survival of industrial relations as a separate discipline and its growth as a
respectable field . . .’ Dabscheck conflates theories of industrial relations and
theories in industrial relations. A concern with the lack of theoretical rigour
explaining social phenomena (that is, the lack of theories in industrial relations)
is not the same as a concern about the lack of a general framework or theory that
defines the discipline.
We argue that Dabscheck’s concern seems to be––as with Somers––the development of a general theory to ensure the survival and growth of industrial relations as a ‘legitimate’ field of study. Dabscheck apparently does not see this as
incompatible with an all-encompassing general explanation for industrial relations phenomena. Let us be unequivocal about the basis of our concern on this
issue. A general theory that seeks to artificially quarantine an area of social
terrain in order to define a discipline (whether this is Dabscheck’s general
theory or Dunlop’s general theory) is not necessarily useful in helping us explain
social phenomena. As we have suggested, we are not alone in voicing such a view.
Dabscheck clearly attempts to do this with his theory. He wants to cast a broad
net over those individuals and institutions involved in the practice of industrial
relations. However, he wants only to explain the industrial relations activities of
these actors/parties. What, then, are their industrial relations activities? He claims
that ‘[t]he question of whether or not an interactor is involved in industrial relations, or what aspects of their “life” involve industrial relations, is a matter for
146
THE JOURNAL
OF
I N D U S T R I A L R E L AT I O N S
March 2002
empirical investigation. The “activities at work” incorporated in the General
Theory are those that pertain to authority struggles’. Putting aside the a priori
nature of identifying empirically those activities that pertain to authority
struggles, this statement suggests to us that Dabscheck believes that there are
industrial relations activities that can somehow be cordoned off from other social
activities and consequently studied in isolation. While the concept of ‘interactors’
is broad, the scope of their (empirically defined) industrial relations activities provides a boundary to the discipline.
For us, industrial relations activities cannot be adequately explained within these
constraints. We take just two of Dabscheck’s proposed interactors to illustrate
the point. In order to understand unions’ activities with respect to women’s groups
it is necessary to understand gender roles more generally. As many writers have
previously noted, ‘gender’ is a socially constructed variable. While the industrial
relations activities of unions and women can be observed in order to understand
these activities, there must be some reference to the domestic sphere, which
arguably lies outside Dabscheck’s analysis (for a discussion of the impact of domestic work and family responsibilities on womens’ activism in unions, see Pocock
1995). While this is but one example, it does illustrate the problem of ‘fencing
off’ a particular set of social relations. This leads us on to the related issue that
the general theory simply does not further our understanding of industrial relations phenomena.
The industrial relations activities of interactors is characterised by the
‘struggle for authority’. Putting to one side direct questions of cohesion and conflict (although it appears that Dabscheck has missed our original point on both
issues), Dabscheck presents an open system whereby all interactors are motivated
by the same struggle for authority. We continue to ask: why do interactors
struggle for authority? The answer to this seems to be––in order to achieve their
interests. We then logically pose the question: but what are their interests? These,
like the ‘various equilibria which result from (authority) struggles’, seem to be
empirically identified. This is where the explanatory value of the theory falls down.
Dabscheck presents an a priori statement for the motivation of his interactors
but does not tie this to any systematic or structurally based group of interests
that are empirically identifiable. The struggle for authority remains a constant
in the context of changing interactors with changing interests operating in
different orbits creating and destroying equilibria. For us this does not help us
answer the ‘why’ questions.
What then is the way forward? In our opinion it requires scholars (and we are
not excused from this) to identify, if not develop, constructs that can better account
for industrial relations without being concerned about rigid disciplinary parameters. This is the key challenge. This may require us to ‘go back’ to some
of the classic texts which initially provided us with important conceptual and
empirical insights. We remain unconvinced, though, that such conceptually
ambiguous terms as ‘orbits’ and ‘interactors’ are helpful in this task. The notions
of ‘authority’ and ‘agency’ as employed by Dabscheck are also problematic (see
Michelson & Westcott 2001). As he notes: ‘To know the part it is necessary to
know the whole; to know the whole it is necessary to know the parts’ (Dabscheck
D A B S C H E C K ’ S G E N E R A L T H E O RY: A R E P LY
147
1995: 17). But what is ‘the whole’ when it comes to industrial relations? Indeed,
the general theory seems to say nothing that is exclusive to, or about, industrial
relations as an area of intellectual study (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 324). For
instance, one could presumably posit that human resource management––or its
earlier variants––also comprise n interactors which interact in orbits of interaction.
This theoretical obfuscation is unfortunate. We need to use constructs which are
not historically or contextually bounded (if this is possible, see the following sentence) to more clearly define and articulate the terrain of industrial relations. We
are cognisant that there may be significant differences in the various scholarships
both within and between English-speaking and non-English-speaking countries.
However, this does not negate the central task.
While ‘industrial relations’ implies the existence of a relationship (typically
believed to be the worker-employer relationship), what are the fundamental constructs that make up industrial relations? We acknowledge that there will be differences of opinion here, particularly as academic industrial relations rests heavily
on its interdisciplinarity. Therefore, to advance the debate we draw briefly on
the research of Giles (2000) and Fells (2001) to highlight what may be one more
worthwhile theoretical path ‘through the mush which is industrial relations’. Of
course, our overarching interest remains that of seeking out better explanations
for the phenomena we observe.
Instead of focusing exclusively on the institutions of industrial relations or maintaining an obsession with formal labour-management relations (the decline of
which, including trade unions and collective bargaining processes, has meant the
demise of academic industrial relations according to some), we suggest one alternative based around the notion of ‘work’. While arguably operating within different paradigms, both Giles and Fells nonetheless point to the possibilities of
drawing on ‘work’ and ‘work relations’ to provide a distinctive industrial relations focus. They believe that such a focus may encourage scholars to engage in
more thorough investigations of their major analytical categories. Specifically,
this might allow more reflection on such themes as work goals including efficiency, productivity and fairness, the regulation of work, mobilisation, power and
the control of work. It may also help overcome the high level of national specificity or ethnocentrism that much industrial relations research currently exhibits
(see Giles 2000: 62–6; Fells 2001).1
This reply has reiterated the general arguments contained in our earlier paper.
Dabscheck’s additional comments in this issue of the JIR have done little to allay
our fundamental concerns with his general theory. While he does, correctly in
our view, highlight the need for industrial relations scholars to engage in theory
building, he has developed a framework we consider is established on very shaky
foundations. We stand by our original prediction that Dabscheck’s general
theory of (Australian) industrial relations or ‘orbits’ theory will continue to attract
minimal attention from industrial relations scholars, principally because it fails
to contribute to a better understanding and explanation of the field. In spite of
this, we remain relatively optimistic that progress in industrial relations theory
can still be made by those interested in such matters.
148
THE JOURNAL
OF
I N D U S T R I A L R E L AT I O N S
March 2002
NOTE
1. In this context too, it will be necessary to examine unpaid as well as paid work (see Forrest
1998).
REFERENCES
Dabscheck B (1981) Theories of regulation and Australian industrial relations. Journal of Industrial
Relations 23(4), 430–446.
Dabscheck B (1994) A general theory of (Australian) industrial relations. Journal of Industrial Relations
36(1), 3–17.
Dabscheck B (1995) The Struggle for Australian Industrial Relations. Melbourne: Oxford University
Press.
Fells R (2001) Industrial relations as an enduring contradiction. Paper presented to the Future
Directions of Industrial Relations as a Field of Inquiry symposium, University of Sydney,
14 September.
Forrest A (1998) The industrial relations significance of unpaid work. Labour/Le Travail 42, 199–225.
Giles A (2000) Industrial relations at the millennium: Beyond employment? Labour/Le Travail 46,
37–67.
Michelson G, Westcott M (2001) Heading into orbit? Braham Dabscheck and industrial relations
theory. Journal of Industrial Relations 43(3), 308–329.
Pocock B (1995) Gender and activism in Australian unions. Journal of Industrial Relations 37(3),
377–400.
Somers GG, ed. (1969) Essays in Industrial Relations Theory. Ames: Iowa State University Press.
THEORY: A REPLY
GRANT MICHELSON AND MARK WESTCOTT*
C
onstructive discussion and debate about matters of theory in any field or
discipline is a healthy sign. We therefore welcome the response by Braham
Dabscheck to our paper (Michelson & Westcott 2001) which critiqued his
general theory of (Australian) industrial relations or ‘orbits’ theory (see Dabscheck
1994, 1995). Our point of departure in writing the paper was to ask why, in spite
of more recent interest in matters of a theoretical nature, had Dabscheck’s
theory received so little public interest among, and commentary from, the academic community. We concluded that the apparent intellectual indifference
stemmed from the theory’s inability to provide new insights and understanding.
A detailed analysis revealed that there were a number of shortcomings with the
theory. These included the way in which the theory was constructed, problems
with its underlying assumptions including the exaggeration of agency, the
purpose of, and privilege ascribed to, ‘authority’, the equivocal distinction
between ‘orbits’ and ‘interactors’, and the wholly descriptive nature of its empirical predictions.
We were also interested in trying to account for why the theory had appeared
when it had, believing that ‘history does matter’. Here we spent a not inconsiderable part of the paper (see Michelson & Westcott 2001: 309–317) tracing
Dabscheck’s intellectual journey in the area of theory over the last 20 or so years.
The historical expedition was fruitful because it revealed significant stages of conceptual development which pointed to the general theory. Moreover, it highlighted the close relationship between changes in national industrial relations in
Australia and how Dabscheck had sought to explain these changes. To claim, as
he does, that the general theory ‘occurred by happenstance’, is unconvincing.
In fact, this claim contradicts an earlier point where he notes ‘it is difficult to
know how I, or anyone else for that matter, could not be influenced by Australian
empirics’. By regularly modifying his theoretical explanations in light of the successive industrial relations changes observed, a pattern emerges which suggests
that Dabscheck considers ‘good’ theory to be ahistorical. Perhaps this is one of
the ‘crimes’ he confesses to having committed? One widely understood measure
of ‘good’ theory is its ability to endure over time, irrespective of changes to the
key phenomena of interest.
Before progressing we need to make one final point. Dabscheck is perturbed
that we have not used more of his work in our analysis of his intellectual journey. Specifically, he notes his Industrial Relations in Australia text co-authored with
* Grant Michelson and Mark Westcott are Lecturers in Work and Organisational Studies, School
of Business, University of Sydney, NSW 2006.
THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 44, NO. 1, MARCH 2002, 144–148
D A B S C H E C K ’ S G E N E R A L T H E O RY: A R E P LY
145
John Niland (1981), and research monograph, Arbitrator at Work (1983) are
absent. From our reading, it is the latter omission which causes the most consternation so we will focus on this only. Our decision to omit Arbitrator at Work
was a conscious one. As noted above, we sought to identify Dabscheck’s key conceptual pieces. We did in fact discuss an earlier article which actually provided
the basis of chapter 1 of Arbitrator at Work (see Dabscheck 1981). It was more
important for our purposes to examine when this particular line of thought first
appeared, not when it was subsequently tested in the person of Sir William
Raymond Kelly.
It was not our intention in Heading into Orbit? to offer an alternative; this brief
was clearly beyond the purview of our immediate task of exposing the weaknesses
of the general theory of (Australian) industrial relations. Dabscheck asserts that
we have misrepresented him and ‘failed to understand various aspects of [his]
work’. We respectfully disagree with Dabscheck on these issues and stand by our
original analysis of his general theory.
Together with Dabscheck, we also share a concern with theoretical rigour of
industrial relations analyses. What, then, is the general basis of our disagreement?
Perhaps our major concern with Dabscheck’s general theory is the manner in
which it conflates theory as a means of explaining social phenomena, and theory
as a mechanism for defining a discipline. We clearly see the importance of the
former but are less concerned about the latter. Indeed we would argue that to
achieve the latter is to compromise the former. Clearly Dabscheck disagrees with
this view. As we have shown, Somers (1969) warns of the dangers of developing
a general theory (or a general conceptual framework). As Dabscheck points out,
Somers contends that developing a general conceptual framework helps ensure
‘the survival of industrial relations as a separate discipline and its growth as a
respectable field . . .’ Dabscheck conflates theories of industrial relations and
theories in industrial relations. A concern with the lack of theoretical rigour
explaining social phenomena (that is, the lack of theories in industrial relations)
is not the same as a concern about the lack of a general framework or theory that
defines the discipline.
We argue that Dabscheck’s concern seems to be––as with Somers––the development of a general theory to ensure the survival and growth of industrial relations as a ‘legitimate’ field of study. Dabscheck apparently does not see this as
incompatible with an all-encompassing general explanation for industrial relations phenomena. Let us be unequivocal about the basis of our concern on this
issue. A general theory that seeks to artificially quarantine an area of social
terrain in order to define a discipline (whether this is Dabscheck’s general
theory or Dunlop’s general theory) is not necessarily useful in helping us explain
social phenomena. As we have suggested, we are not alone in voicing such a view.
Dabscheck clearly attempts to do this with his theory. He wants to cast a broad
net over those individuals and institutions involved in the practice of industrial
relations. However, he wants only to explain the industrial relations activities of
these actors/parties. What, then, are their industrial relations activities? He claims
that ‘[t]he question of whether or not an interactor is involved in industrial relations, or what aspects of their “life” involve industrial relations, is a matter for
146
THE JOURNAL
OF
I N D U S T R I A L R E L AT I O N S
March 2002
empirical investigation. The “activities at work” incorporated in the General
Theory are those that pertain to authority struggles’. Putting aside the a priori
nature of identifying empirically those activities that pertain to authority
struggles, this statement suggests to us that Dabscheck believes that there are
industrial relations activities that can somehow be cordoned off from other social
activities and consequently studied in isolation. While the concept of ‘interactors’
is broad, the scope of their (empirically defined) industrial relations activities provides a boundary to the discipline.
For us, industrial relations activities cannot be adequately explained within these
constraints. We take just two of Dabscheck’s proposed interactors to illustrate
the point. In order to understand unions’ activities with respect to women’s groups
it is necessary to understand gender roles more generally. As many writers have
previously noted, ‘gender’ is a socially constructed variable. While the industrial
relations activities of unions and women can be observed in order to understand
these activities, there must be some reference to the domestic sphere, which
arguably lies outside Dabscheck’s analysis (for a discussion of the impact of domestic work and family responsibilities on womens’ activism in unions, see Pocock
1995). While this is but one example, it does illustrate the problem of ‘fencing
off’ a particular set of social relations. This leads us on to the related issue that
the general theory simply does not further our understanding of industrial relations phenomena.
The industrial relations activities of interactors is characterised by the
‘struggle for authority’. Putting to one side direct questions of cohesion and conflict (although it appears that Dabscheck has missed our original point on both
issues), Dabscheck presents an open system whereby all interactors are motivated
by the same struggle for authority. We continue to ask: why do interactors
struggle for authority? The answer to this seems to be––in order to achieve their
interests. We then logically pose the question: but what are their interests? These,
like the ‘various equilibria which result from (authority) struggles’, seem to be
empirically identified. This is where the explanatory value of the theory falls down.
Dabscheck presents an a priori statement for the motivation of his interactors
but does not tie this to any systematic or structurally based group of interests
that are empirically identifiable. The struggle for authority remains a constant
in the context of changing interactors with changing interests operating in
different orbits creating and destroying equilibria. For us this does not help us
answer the ‘why’ questions.
What then is the way forward? In our opinion it requires scholars (and we are
not excused from this) to identify, if not develop, constructs that can better account
for industrial relations without being concerned about rigid disciplinary parameters. This is the key challenge. This may require us to ‘go back’ to some
of the classic texts which initially provided us with important conceptual and
empirical insights. We remain unconvinced, though, that such conceptually
ambiguous terms as ‘orbits’ and ‘interactors’ are helpful in this task. The notions
of ‘authority’ and ‘agency’ as employed by Dabscheck are also problematic (see
Michelson & Westcott 2001). As he notes: ‘To know the part it is necessary to
know the whole; to know the whole it is necessary to know the parts’ (Dabscheck
D A B S C H E C K ’ S G E N E R A L T H E O RY: A R E P LY
147
1995: 17). But what is ‘the whole’ when it comes to industrial relations? Indeed,
the general theory seems to say nothing that is exclusive to, or about, industrial
relations as an area of intellectual study (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 324). For
instance, one could presumably posit that human resource management––or its
earlier variants––also comprise n interactors which interact in orbits of interaction.
This theoretical obfuscation is unfortunate. We need to use constructs which are
not historically or contextually bounded (if this is possible, see the following sentence) to more clearly define and articulate the terrain of industrial relations. We
are cognisant that there may be significant differences in the various scholarships
both within and between English-speaking and non-English-speaking countries.
However, this does not negate the central task.
While ‘industrial relations’ implies the existence of a relationship (typically
believed to be the worker-employer relationship), what are the fundamental constructs that make up industrial relations? We acknowledge that there will be differences of opinion here, particularly as academic industrial relations rests heavily
on its interdisciplinarity. Therefore, to advance the debate we draw briefly on
the research of Giles (2000) and Fells (2001) to highlight what may be one more
worthwhile theoretical path ‘through the mush which is industrial relations’. Of
course, our overarching interest remains that of seeking out better explanations
for the phenomena we observe.
Instead of focusing exclusively on the institutions of industrial relations or maintaining an obsession with formal labour-management relations (the decline of
which, including trade unions and collective bargaining processes, has meant the
demise of academic industrial relations according to some), we suggest one alternative based around the notion of ‘work’. While arguably operating within different paradigms, both Giles and Fells nonetheless point to the possibilities of
drawing on ‘work’ and ‘work relations’ to provide a distinctive industrial relations focus. They believe that such a focus may encourage scholars to engage in
more thorough investigations of their major analytical categories. Specifically,
this might allow more reflection on such themes as work goals including efficiency, productivity and fairness, the regulation of work, mobilisation, power and
the control of work. It may also help overcome the high level of national specificity or ethnocentrism that much industrial relations research currently exhibits
(see Giles 2000: 62–6; Fells 2001).1
This reply has reiterated the general arguments contained in our earlier paper.
Dabscheck’s additional comments in this issue of the JIR have done little to allay
our fundamental concerns with his general theory. While he does, correctly in
our view, highlight the need for industrial relations scholars to engage in theory
building, he has developed a framework we consider is established on very shaky
foundations. We stand by our original prediction that Dabscheck’s general
theory of (Australian) industrial relations or ‘orbits’ theory will continue to attract
minimal attention from industrial relations scholars, principally because it fails
to contribute to a better understanding and explanation of the field. In spite of
this, we remain relatively optimistic that progress in industrial relations theory
can still be made by those interested in such matters.
148
THE JOURNAL
OF
I N D U S T R I A L R E L AT I O N S
March 2002
NOTE
1. In this context too, it will be necessary to examine unpaid as well as paid work (see Forrest
1998).
REFERENCES
Dabscheck B (1981) Theories of regulation and Australian industrial relations. Journal of Industrial
Relations 23(4), 430–446.
Dabscheck B (1994) A general theory of (Australian) industrial relations. Journal of Industrial Relations
36(1), 3–17.
Dabscheck B (1995) The Struggle for Australian Industrial Relations. Melbourne: Oxford University
Press.
Fells R (2001) Industrial relations as an enduring contradiction. Paper presented to the Future
Directions of Industrial Relations as a Field of Inquiry symposium, University of Sydney,
14 September.
Forrest A (1998) The industrial relations significance of unpaid work. Labour/Le Travail 42, 199–225.
Giles A (2000) Industrial relations at the millennium: Beyond employment? Labour/Le Travail 46,
37–67.
Michelson G, Westcott M (2001) Heading into orbit? Braham Dabscheck and industrial relations
theory. Journal of Industrial Relations 43(3), 308–329.
Pocock B (1995) Gender and activism in Australian unions. Journal of Industrial Relations 37(3),
377–400.
Somers GG, ed. (1969) Essays in Industrial Relations Theory. Ames: Iowa State University Press.