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2015 International Conference on Automation, Cognitive Science, Optics, Micro Electro-Mechanical System, and
Information Technology (ICACOMIT), Bandung, Indonesia, October 29–30, 2015

Security Mechanism for IPv6 Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration
Supriyanto Praptodiyono

Iznan H. Hasbullah

Mohammed M. Kadhum

Electrical Engineering Department
Universitas Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa
Cilegon, Banten, Indonesia
supriyanto@ft-untirta.ac.id

National Advanced IPv6 Centre
Universiti Sains Malaysia
Penang 11800 Malaysia
iznan@nav6.usm.my

National Advanced IPv6 Centre
Universiti Sains Malaysia
Penang 11800 Malaysia
kadhum@nav6.usm.my

Raja Kumar Murugesan

Chong Yung Wey

Azlan Osman

School of Computing
Taylor’s University
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
rajakumar.murugesan@taylors.edu.my

National Advanced IPv6 Centre
Universiti Sains Malaysia
Penang 11800 Malaysia
chong@nav6.usm.my

School of Computer Sciences
Universiti Sains Malaysia
Penang 11800 Malaysia
azlan@cs.usm.my

Abstract—Internet Protocol version six (IPv6) was designed
and developed to solve the problem of exhaustion of current
Internet address. IPv6 also introduces a number of benefits
including address auto-configuration mechanism which allows
host to self-generate its own IPv6 address without the presence of
a DHCPv6 server. It is one mechanism, among others, provided
by Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP). However, the protocol
does not have a built-in security mechanism and its messages
were exchanged without security verification thus leaving the
mechanism vulnerable to exploitation by malicious nodes. A
malicious node could disrupt or tamper with the IPv6 address
auto-generation process that will leave the victim without an IP
address needed for communication or having a wrongly formed
address. . The NDP standard suggests either IPSec or SeND to

secure the mechanism. Unfortunately, both security mechanisms
have been extensively studied and were reported to have serious
drawbacks that limit their implementation and adoption. This
research proposes Trust-ND to secure IPv6 address autoconfiguration mechanism based on a distributed trust
mechanism. Experiment result shows that this mechanism is
more lightweight and uses less bandwidth while still able to fulfill
the required security feature.
Keywords—IPv6; address
security; neighbor discovery

auto-configuration;

Trust-ND;

I. INTRODUCTION
Internet grows extremely fast in the last decade. It has been
connecting people on around the world. In the future, the
Internet not only connects computers but also other electronic
equipments and then called Internet of Thing concept [1]. The
growth of Internet obviously requires large space of IP

address. Since the current Internet Protocol, IPv4 has depleted
its IP address space; IETF developed a new version of IP, and
then named IPv6. The development of IPv6 not only solves
the IP address problem but also introduces some benefits.
One of the improvements on the IPv6 is stateless address
auto-configuration (SLAAC) mechanism [2]. Using this
mechanism, an IPv6 host is able to generate IPv6 address
automatically without any help from DHCP server. This
address generation mechanism is provided by the Neighbor

978-1-4673-7408-8/15/$31.00©2015 IEEE

Discovery Protocol (NDP) [3]. NDP uses five ICMPv6
messages to perform the address auto-configuration. However,
since there is no security verification for NDP messages
exchange, SLAAC is prone to various attack vectors.
Attackers can exploit one or more NDP messages used by
SLAAC mechanism to disturb the address generation process
or making the generated address wrongly by sending wrong
prefix information. Either way, the host cannot communicate

with other nodes or it communicates using a wrong address.
Hence, the SLAAC mechanism needs to be secured. The
importance of securing SLAAC has attracted a number of
researchers to propose security mechanism for SLAAC such
as [4-7].
Original standard on NDP, RFC 4861 recommends to use
IPSec [4] or Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND) [5] on
securing SLAAC. IPSec is a complete security mechanism for
network layer. However, since SLAAC is an operation
performed by a new IPv6 host that has yet to have any IPv6
address, the implementation of IPSec faces bootstrapping
issue as analyzed by [8]. SeND mechanism was recommended
to solve security issue on NDP including SLAAC, but its
implementation is not trivial. This is because SeND
mechanism adds four options on NDP messages which include
CGA option and RSA signature option. The two options
require high resources on their computation and consume high
bandwidth as studied in [7].
In order to address the heavy computation on SeND
mechanism, a Simple Secure Addressing Scheme for IPv6

Auto-configuration (SSAS) was proposed by [6]. SSAS
introduces a different signature scheme compared to SeND
that resulted in the faster message generation and verification.
However, the signing process still requires significant amount
of time that reaches 367.59 milliseconds if using RSA
algorithm and 223.08 milliseconds if using ECC algorithm. It
increases when security level is higher. SSAS mechanism adds
SSAS signature option on NDP messages. As the issue on
SeND is CGA and RSA signature processing and bandwidth
consumption, the adding of SSAS signature option would

result are larger NDP messages and thus, the NDP packet size
will also increase. As a result, SSAS mechanism will consume
higher bandwidth.
This paper introduces Trust-ND for securing SLAAC
using a lightweight and distributed trust mechanism. The rest
of this paper presents an overview of SLAAC in Section 2
followed by related works in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the
implementation of Trust-ND on securing SLAAC. Section 5
provides the results and discussion and followed by a

conclusion of this paper on Section 6.
II. OVERVIEW OF SLAAC ON IPV6
IPv6 address consists of two parts: network prefix and
interface identifier. IPv6 supports both manual address
configuration and address auto-configuration. The protocol
involves two types of address auto-configuration mechanisms:
stateful and stateless mechanism. The first mechanism uses
DHCPv6 server as in the current IPv4 central address
distribution. The second mechanism – the focus of this
research – does not use DHCPv6 server but uses default router
information to generate IPv6 address. An IPv6 host obtains
network information including network prefix from router
using router advertisement (RA) message and generate the
interface identifier by itself. The mechanism is illustrated in
Fig. 1.
Default Router

IPv6 Hosts

DAD is performed by sending neighbor solicitation message

(NS) to all neighbors in the link with the tentative address as
the target. If there is no respond from the neighbors, the
address is considered o be unique. Otherwise, there is address
duplication. In this case, the host should generate other
tentative address.
Since RA message information is important for stateless
address auto-configuration mechanism on IPv6, neglecting its
security exposes the mechanism to attack. Attacker could
exploit the message to do malicious activities. Malicious
nodes may modify one or more fields on the RA message.
Table 1 lists potential impacts on modifying RA message.
TABLE I. IMPACTS ON MODIFYING RA MESSAGE

No.

Fields
Modified

1.

Prefix
Information

2.

Router
Link Layer
Address

3.

Lifetime

4.

Flags

5.

MTU

RA Message
Fig. 1. Stateless Address Auto-Configuration.

In the figure, there is no DHCP server connected. Default
router is an access router that supports IPv6 and placed in the
same link with the IPv6 hosts. The default router sends RA
message containing prefix information, router lifetime and
other information. The RA message is sent periodically every
five minutes to all hosts connected to the router. After
receiving the RA message, IPv6 host uses the information to
configure IPv6 address by concatenating IPv6 prefix inside the
message and an its own generation interface identifer. In case
of no RA message received, the host can request the message
by sending router solicitation (RS) to multicast group of router
in the link.
Generation of interface identifier at the host machine could
use one or more mechanisms. Firstly, EUI-64 mechanism by
using the uniqueness of MAC address of each interface. This
mechanism is mainly used by Unix OS. Secondly, random

generation or privacy extension mechanism which is used in
Windows OS. Whichever mechanism to generate interface
identifier is used, both will require information inside the RA
message.
However, the generated IPv6 address by the host is
considered as tentative address, until it has been determined
not being used by other host within the network. The detection
mechanism is called duplicate address detection (DAD). The

Potential Impacts

9 Host configures wrong IPv6
address
9 Host communicates with wrong
source address
9 Host is suspected as attacker
9 Host connects to wrong default
router
9 Host connects to false next hop
node
9 The access router death
9 Host generates false IPv6 address
9 Host cannot configure properly
9 Host does false fragmentation
9 Host receives Packet Too Big Error
message
9 Inefficient transmission when the
MTU smaller

Some experiments were done by Marc Houser [9] on
exploiting RA message as listed in Table 2. The exploitation
caused a number of operating system to crash and freeze.
Considering the impact of RA message exploitation, a security
mechanism on preventing RA exploitation is needed. Related
works on securing NDP message especially RA message is
discussed in Section 3.
TABLE 2. EXPERIMENTS ON EXPLOITING RA MESSAGE

No.

Experiments

1.

RA flood

2.

Wireless Attack

3.
4.

More Prefix
Information
Option
DoS Attack by
RA Packets

Operating
System
Windows,
Android,
MacBook Air,
iPad1

Impacts

Freezing

iPad 3

Consume 10 –
20% CPU,
Crashes

Mac

Crash

All Windows

Freezes Totally

III. RELATED WORKS ON SECURING SLAAC
As introduced in aforementioned Section 1, there are three
recommended security mechanisms on securing SLAAC. This
section provides detail evaluation and discussion on the
mechanisms to understand the reason for their limited
implementation. IPSec is a network security mechanism that is
used not only in IPv6 but also in IPv4. It provides integrity,
confidentiality and non-repudiation as important security
goals. However, when implemented on SLAAC, IPSec has a
number of issues such as its performance and the
bootstrapping phase. Decreasing performance of IPSec is due
to the heavy reliance on encryption algorithm [10]. The issue
of bootstrapping phase arises because when the host is
undergoing SLAAC process, its network interface is not yet
assigned an IP address which is required by IPSec to establish
security association [8]. Furthermore, the IPSec cannot be
implemented in the stage, or otherwise the use of manual
keying that is impractical on a large network.
Ferguson & Schneier [11] and Stockebrand [12] criticized
the cryptographic mechanism of IPSec. The security protocol
is overly complex but fulfills only a limited range of security
goals at a very high price. In addition, it only operates in
network layer that does not cover transport layer and
application layer, thus requires the use of other security such
as SSL (Secure Socket Layer), TLS or SSH (Secure Shell).
Specification of IPv6 security architecture requires MD5 for
the computation. However, MD5 has been shown to have
problems especially on the current high-speed data transfer
[13]. The problems with using MD5 in IPv6 include the
higher latency cost compared to the value used and the
processor was occupied entirely by the computation of MD5
algorithm. In addition, MD5 was found to be vulnerable to
collision attack in 2004 [14]. As a result, the usage of MD5 is
not recommended.
Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND) is introduced to
address the issue on IPSec especially on the bootstrapping
phase. It introduces four NDP options: CGA option, Nonce
option, Timestamp option and RSA signature option as well as
two ICMPv6 messages: Certificate Path Solicitation (CPS)
and Certificate Path Advertisement (CPA) as specified in [5].
This mechanism is believed to prevent malicious attacks on
IPv6 neighbor discovery. However, it has been reported to
have a number of drawbacks as investigated by [7, 15, 16].
Firstly, SeND introduces high computation to generate the
options especially the CGA option and RSA signature. When
used with higher security level, the computation time also
increased. Secondly, the four options introduced by SeND
expanded the size of NDP messages by 368 bytes for each
message. This resulted in increased network bandwidth
consumption.
The usage of RSA signature on SeND was analyzed by
[15]. Based on the analysis, RSA signature mechanism adds
significant processing time on SeND as shown in Table 3.
When SeND does not include RSA signature, it requires only
0.44 milliseconds. When RSA algorithm is used on SeND
operation the processing time increases up to 75.97

milliseconds. This showed that RSA is the source of 99% of
processing time increase on SeND.
TABLE 3. PROCESSING TIME OF SEND

Protocol

ICMPv4

NDP

SeND w/o
RSA

SeND

Processing
Time (ms)

0.29

0.34

0.44

75.97

The operation of SeND begins with the generation of CGA
address for IPv6 nodes that implements SeND. The IPv6
address is generated using cryptographic algorithm as
specified in RFC 3972. Sending node generates SeND
messages which are actually NDP messages with an additional
four NDP options provided by SeND mechanism. CGA option
delivers a public key from the IPv6 address where the key
originates. This key allows receiver to verify the digital
signature using its corresponding private key. The RSA
signature option proves that the public key in the CGA option
corresponds to the receiver’s private key. Cost for the
generation of CGA address is O(259+16*sec) as analyzed by [17].
The CGA generation time depended on Sec value: the higher
the Sec values, the longer the generation time. RSA signature
involves key generation, encryption or signing process and
decryption or verification process as specified in RFC 3447.
Time complexity of RSA signature is O(n2) as analyzed by
[18] where n is the key size.
The complexity of CGA as well as RSA signature causes
the implementation of SeND in IPv6 environment to be
limited. Even though major networking device vendors such
as Cisco and Juniper have been supporting SeND in their
routers to various degrees, major operating system vendors
have been reluctant to provide a decent level of support [7].
Existing implementations of SeND such as Easy-SeND [19]
and WinSeND [20] are basically proofs of concept rather than
production-ready implementation. In addition, Easy-SeND
author has yet to implement router authorization messages.
This has encouraged researchers to analyze the use of SeND in
order to study its performance and drawbacks that has been a
limiting factor for its adoption as the default security
mechanism to secure SLAAC.
SSAS is an improvement of SeND mechanism on securing
SLAAC [6]. As shown earlier, one of the major contributors to
SeND complexity is the CGA option. Taking this fact into
consideration, SSAS introduces alternative addressing schema
using ECC algorithm instead of RSA as used by SeND
mechanism. In general, SSAS mechanism is similar with
SeND mechanism but required fewer steps. An NDP message
requires generating an SSAS IPv6 address and followed by
signing an SSAS Signature to protect the message from
spoofing attack. Thus, NDP message is appended with SSAS
Signature option and Timestamp option. Since this method
still relies on signature and key exchange mechanism, the
complexity issue still remains. It still takes time to generate
the key and the signature as well as verifying the signature.
However, the use of ECC is believed to reduce the complexity
and resulted in decreased generation time compared to using

RSA. The author claimed ECC took only 223.1 milliseconds
instead of 367.6 milliseconds required by RSA to perform
signature related processes. The decrease of processing time of
SSAS is due to the significant reduction in key size of ECC
which is only 192 bits instead of 1280 bits used by RSA.

Message Authentication Data as the main content of Trust
Option.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRUST-ND ON SLAAC
The introduction of SLAAC in IPv6 is evidence that the
protocol supports the decentralization mode of operation.
SLAAC provides each individual host in IPv6 network with a
capability to generate its own IPv6 address without depending
on a server. Nevertheless, the support for centralized
management of IPv6 address allocation is still available via
DHCPv6, if needed.
In line with the decentralized nature of SLAAC, Trust-ND
make use of distributed trust management concept to secure
SLAAC. Trust-ND nodes perfoming SLAAC operation is
allowed to generate and verify Trust-ND messages as well as
to maintain and update its own trust table. Each Trust-ND
node could either be a sender or a receiver of Trust-ND
messages. Each node independently calculates trust value of
its neighboring nodes on the same link. Trust-ND nodes do not
distribute trust value, thus do not require a central authority or
a server for such purpose. The trust value calculation is based
on Beta Reputation System [21].
Trust-ND improves security on the NDP by introducing a
new ICMPv6 option called Trust Option [22]. The Trust
Option includes three main fields: Message Generation Time,
Nonce and Message Authentication Data. The Message
Authentication Data is a result of SHA-1 operation as the
message integrity check. It is attached to all five NDP
messages to fulfill the security goals. The NDP messages are
then named as Trust-RS, Trust-RA, Trust-NS, Trust-NA and
Trust-Redirect respectively. Trust-ND messages are used by
IPv6 nodes that implements Trust-ND on IPv6 NDP operation.
Sending node generates the Trust-ND messages and receiving
node verifies the messages. Upon receiving the Trust-ND
messages, receiver conducts trust computation. Results of the
computation are trust status of the sender that could take one
of three values: trusted, distrusted or uncertainty. The result of
the calculation will be stored by the receiver in its trust
neighbor cache table.
Fig. 2 shows the operation of Trust-ND in IPv6 local
network. The default router sends Trust-RA which is an RA
message carrying Trust Option to all nodes multicast group in
the link. In the case of a host not able to receive Trust-RA
message, it can solicit a request by sending Trust-RS message
to the router. Receivers, either host or a router, should verify
Trust-ND messages. The first verification is a validation
process on the received NDP message which is exactly similar
to existing NDP mechanism. A message is considered as valid
if it has correct checksum, hop limit value of 255 and the
message length is in multiple of 4 bytes. The next validation
process is verification of the availability of Trust Option. Any
NDP message without Trust Option is automatically
considered to be unsecured; otherwise the process will
proceed to the next verification stage. The third verification is
checking the value of message generation time, Nonce and

Fig. 2. Trust-ND Operation.

After the verification, receiver performs trust calculation
for the message sender. The trust calculation is based on the
verification result and knowledge based on previous
information. The trust calculation yields one of three trust
status: trusted, distrusted or uncertainty. Trusted status is
issued if a good verification is obtained and good previous
experience for the sender stored. Distrusted is given if one or
both of the two components of trust calculation result in bad
value. Uncertainty status is assigned if the message is a first
message received from the particular sender and there is no
prior record available in the trust table. The status of a sender
is then stored in node’s trust table for future trust calculation.
V. RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The main issue of SeND mechanism is complexity. This is
the main consideration on designing Trust-ND. Trust-ND
integrates both traditional hard security and soft security
approaches to reduce the complexity. The integration is in the
form of message verification and trust calculation as discussed
in aforementioned section. This section provides result on
implementation of Trust-ND and discussion to benchmark the
performance of Trust-ND on securing SLAAC.
Implementation of Trust-ND is done in an isolated IPv6
network to avoid interruption to existing network. Apart from
Trust-ND, implementation of the standard NDP and SeND
mechanisms were also performed for comparison. Three
parameters are used to measure Trust-ND performance on
securing NDP especially SLAAC on IPv6. First, complexity
both in generation and verification since the complexity is the
main issue on SeND. Second, bandwidth consumption is
measured as a consequence of extending NDP message size by
adding new options. Third, integrity checking performance is
included also as the main function on securing NDP from
exploitation. The analysis is then discussed in the next
paragraphs.
Complexity of an algorithm is usually analyzed using BigO notation. The main source of the complexity of SeND is
within the process of generating the RSA digital signature
option and CGA option. The CGA address is generated only
once, which is when an IPv6 host is connected to SeND
environment. When the Sec value is used in a SeND machine,
the generation of CGA address will be constant. But it needs a
higher time when higher Sec value is used. Signing process of
RSA signature is done for each SeND message transmitted
and the verification is done for each SeND message received.
Big-O notation for RSA signature is quadratic; meaning that

the time required performing the process increases in
quadratic form, which is in a non-linear fashion. In Big-O
analysis, a linear time algorithm is always faster than a
quadratic-time algorithm.
As mentioned earlier, Trust-ND uses SHA-1 to provide
message integrity check. Big-O notation for SHA-1 is O(n),
where n is the message size [23]. Thus, the complexity of
Trust-ND depends on the message size. Larger NDP message
needs more time than smaller message size. Since the Big-O
notation of SHA-1 is in linear category, the complexity of
Trust-ND is linear accordingly. Based on Big-O categories, an
algorithm with a linear complexity is faster than the one with
quadratic complexity. Hence, SeND mechanism that uses RSA
signature is slower than Trust-ND that uses SHA-1 algorithm.
In addition, based on the benchmark provided in [24], the
generation of RSA 1024 signature is 1.48 milliseconds per
operation and 0.07 milliseconds for verification. Further, the
use of RSA signature option in SeND resulted in a very high
processing time. If SeND is operated without RSA, it only
requires 0.44 milliseconds; whereas with RSA, the processing
time increases significantly to 75.97 milliseconds (see Table
3). This implies that the use of RSA took 172 times longer
than without RSA option. In other word, RSA signature has
added 17,166% for the SeND processing time. However,
without RSA, SeND is useless because it is used to protect the
integrity of NDP messages and to authenticate the sender of
the messages.
SASS uses elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) as the
signature algorithm to change RSA algorithm. In term of
complexity, the ECC algorithm has sub-quadratic complexity
as elaborated in [25]. With a shorter key, the usage of ECC
implementation on SASS signature scheme makes it faster
than RSA used in SeND. However, since the ECC Big-O
notation is sub-quadratic, it still contains a quadratic
component and the worst case time complexity is also O(n2) as
with RSA.
There are two parameters used to calculate the bandwidth
consumption: packet length and transmission time. Packet
length is the total bytes of the entire NDP message with the
use of all general defined ICMPv6 options; while the total
time of transmission is assumed to be constant for any NDP
messages since the experiment is conducted in the same local
network with the same medium. Each of the NDP messages
has different length based on the options contained within the
NDP message. Measurement of the bandwidth consumption
can be done by calculating the total size of all NDP messages
used in SLAAC process as shown in Table 4.
TABLE 4. COMPARISON OF BANDWIDTH CONSUMPTION

NDP Process
SLAAC

Trust-ND
SeND
Bandwidth
Saved
(Kbps)
Kbps
%
Kbps
%
3.072 36.6 35.328 421.3
32.256

Comparison on Table 4 is only for SeND with the reason
the size of SeND is fixed and it has been standardized in RFC

3971. The option size is 368 bytes that has to be attached in
each NDP messages. In contrast, Trust-ND just adds 32 bytes
option. As a result, the implementation of Trust-ND could
reduce bandwidth consumption by up to 32.256 Kbps for
every SLAAC process. The saved bandwidth can be utilized
by other processes in the local network. In addition, the
smaller messages size also reduces potential network delay in
the network due to congestion.
The last measurement is on the performance of integrity
checking of Trust-ND. One of the drawbacks on the existing
NDP is unavailability of satisfying integrity check. It uses
checksum as other ICMPv6 messages. However, in the sense
of security, checksum has some disadvantages as summarized
in [26]. First, it has low assurance against malicious attack.
Further, the checksum cannot protect the data from malicious
activities. Second, it is very simple to create a new data with
matching checksum. If only checksum is used, the possibility
to fool the receiver by creating the same checksum value is
higher.
Trust-ND uses SHA-1 algorithm to generate a hash code.
The hash code is carried in the Message Authentication Data
field to ensure the integrity of Trust-ND messages.
Experiments were done to study the ability of Trust-ND to
prevent spoofing attacks by executing some hacking tools
such as parasite6 and replay attack. Fig. 3 is a captured Trust
Neighbor Cache of a victim when attacked. The last entry in
the list is the sender IP address for the spoofed Trust-ND
message.

Fig. 3. Trust Neighbor Cache of Victim.

The value of trust in the last entry is 0.0 which means the
alteration on Trust-ND message has been detected by the
victim’s machine. Trust-ND is able to protect the host from
spoofing attacks. Spoofing attacks could be done by spoofing
the sender’s identity or altering the message content. Since the
attacking activity is done by an attacker acting as a middle
man, the receiver should be able to detect the spoofed packet.
This is because the Message Authentication Data generated by
the original sender will be different from the one generated by
the man in the middle. The message is suspected as distrusted
when it fails the verification process. Otherwise, it will be
considered as trusted.
In term of integrity checking, SeND mechanism relies on
RSA signature option. RSA signature is used to ensure the
integrity of the message and also to authenticate the sender of
the message. However, as discussed earlier, RSA is a highly
complex algorithm and this remains as the main issue of
SeND mechanism. Hence, Trust-ND mechanism was designed
to use lightweight algorithm in its operation to avoid the pitfall
of SeND. The experiment result showed that Trust-ND could
achieve the integrity requirement on NDP with low

complexity. In addition, with less complexity, message
processing time is reduced and this means SLAAC operation
would be concluded faster without compromising security.

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VI. CONCLUSION
Neighbor discovery protocol in IPv6 provides a
mechanism for host to self-generate its own IPv6 address
without the presence of a DHCPv6 server. This mechanism is
known as Stateless Address Auto-Configuration or SLAAC.
Unfortunately, since NDP was not designed with built-in
security mechanism, SLAAC is vulnerable to various attacks.
Standard on SLAAC suggested Secure Neighbor Discovery or
SeND to secure the mechanism. However, SeND is overly
complex of a security mechanism for this particular purpose.
This is the reason for lack of adoption and implementation of
SeND on most common operating system. This research
proposes Trust-ND as a new lightweight alternative security
mechanism on SLAAC. We introduced Trust Option which
includes a Message Authentication Data to provide integrity
check. Analysis was performed on Trust-ND performance
which measures complexity, bandwidth consumption and
integrity check. Results of the experiments showed Trust-ND
is lighter than SeND. It also consumes less bandwidth than
SeND since the number of options and sizes were reduced. On
the integrity analysis, Trust-ND is able to detect alteration on
the message content. However, since the experiments were
performed on a limited-sized network, further research can be
carried out to measure its scalability performance by
implementations on larger network.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This research was supported by the Research University
Grant No: 1001/PNAV/811298 funded by Universiti Sains
Malaysia, in collaboration with Directorate General of Higher
Education, Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher
Education, the Republic of Indonesia; and Taylor’s University,
Malaysia.
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