Manajemen | Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji joeb.83.4.239-245
Journal of Education for Business
ISSN: 0883-2323 (Print) 1940-3356 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/vjeb20
Persistent Themes in Colleges of Business
Cecil E. Bohanon
To cite this article: Cecil E. Bohanon (2008) Persistent Themes in Colleges of Business, Journal
of Education for Business, 83:4, 239-245, DOI: 10.3200/JOEB.83.4.239-245
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PersistentThemesinCollegesofBusiness
CECILE.BOHANON
BALLSTATEUNIVERSITY
MUNCIE,INDIANA
ABSTRACT.Inthisarticle,theauthor
examinesanumberofissuesincollegesof
commerceintheirformativeperiodfrom
1900to1930.Hediscusses4areas:contentofbusinesscurriculum,professional
natureofbusinessandbusinessschools,
socialresponsibilityofcorporatemanagers,
andintegrationofthebusinesscurriculum.
Manyofthetopicsarestillimportanttoday
andcanarguablybeconsideredpersistent
themesincollegesofbusiness.
Keywords:businesscurriculum,business
education,curriculumintegration,economics,socialresponsibilityofbusiness
Copyright©2008HeldrefPublications
I
n this article, I examine a number
ofissuesincollegiatebusinesseducation that emerged during the early
years of business schools, roughly
from 1900 to 1930.After providing a
cursoryhistoryoftheformationofcollegesofbusiness,Iexaminefourissues
oftheera:curriculumcontent,claimof
theprofessionalnatureofbusinessand
business schools, social responsibility
of corporate managers, and the desire
for integration of the business curriculum.The issues were not resolved
during the period and have persisted
as continual topics in collegiate businesseducationtothisday.Inthefinal
section, I offer tentative insights as to
whateducatorscanconcludefromthis
historicalexploration.
ACursoryHistoryofCollegesof
Commerce
Colleges of commerce and business
beganformingatU.S.universitiesinthe
late 19th century.TheWharton School
at University of Pennsylvania began
in 1883. Other university-based business schools were established before
1900 at the University of Chicago, the
UniversityofCalifornia,theUniversity
of Ohio, and Columbia University. By
1900, schools of commerce existed at
Dartmouth College, the University of
Vermont,NewYorkUniversity,theUniversityofMichigan,andtheUniversity
ofWisconsinandwereplannedforthe
UniversityofIllinoisandtheUniversity
ofIowa(James,1901).
Much of the impetus for establishingtheschoolscamefromthebusiness
community. As an early Wharton professorpointedout,membersofthePhiladelphia business community “did not
seewhytheirsonscouldnotbelearning
somethingbearingontheirfuturebusinesswhileacquiringaliberaleducation”
(James,1901,p.154).InWisconsin,it
was argued that many of the best high
schoolstudentsinthestateweregoing
directly into business and not going to
thestateuniversity.Othergoodstudents
wereenrollingasspecialstudentsatthe
university, taking courses only relevant
tobusinessandneverbotheringtocompleteaformaldegree.By1900thiswas
seen as so untenable by the university
administration that a commerce college was established at the University
of Wisconsin (Scott, 1913). Laughlin
(1902) argued that universities should
develop commerce colleges to attract
ablestudents.
It was also noted that, increasingly,
universitygraduateswereenteringbusiness.OftheHarvardclassof1896,35%
developedabusinesscareer,whereas2
decadeslater,thepercentagehadrisento
55%(Mears,1923).Universitiesestablishedcollegesofcommerceinresponse
toanincreaseddemandforcommercial
educationatthecollegiatelevel.
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239
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Establishing a business curriculum
was met with hostility and resistance
atmanyuniversities.Thestudyofbusiness was seen as too vocational and
outside the spirit of liberal education.
Deansofcollegesofcommerceseemed
to continually argue that their institutions were not trade schools (McCrea,
1926). At the University of Wisconsin
in1900,manyfacultymembersconsideredaccountingcourses“unworthyofa
place in the curriculum” (Scott, 1913,
p.131).By1913,therehadbeensome
“breaking down this faculty prejudice”
(Scott, p. 131) so that accounting and
business administration courses were
taught. However, none of these courses counted for general credit for the
undergraduatebachelor’sdegree(Scott,
1913).Aslateas1928,aparticipantat
aroundtablediscussionatajointmeeting of the American Economics AssociationandtheAmericanAssociationof
Collegiate Schools of Business stated,
“Whichoneofushasnotheardtheslurringremarksthattrulyculturalcourses
are not found in the college of commerce” (Bogart, 1928, p. 74). Distancingitselffromthelabelofcommercial,
the economics curriculum at Amherst
stated in 1917 that it “considers itself
under no obligation to meet vocational
orprofessionaldemands,eitherdirectly
orindirectly”(Hamilton,1917,p.2).
CurricularResponsestoHostility
TowardBusinessCourses
Desiring a place in the university,
the administrators of early colleges of
commerce had a number of curricular
responses to the unwelcoming attitude
ofthoseinmoretraditionalquartersof
theuniversity.
LiberalArtsCoursesOutside
theCollege
Earlyproponentsofthebusinesscurriculumalwaysaffirmedbusinesseducationasapartofageneraluniversityeducation.Fromthebeginning,thequestion
of how much of the business student’s
coursework should be traditional and
how much practical was a lively issue.
At the 1903AnnArbor Conference on
Higher Commercial Education, one
businessman’s speech was “devoted to
the praise of the old classical college
240
JournalofEducationforBusiness
course” (Loos, 1903, p. 462), whereas
another“inveighedagainstuselesseducation and pleaded for the practical”
(Loos,p.463).Theconferenceseemed
toconcludethattheidealbusinesscurriculumwouldbeonewithwhich60%
constitutedtheoldclassicalcurriculum,
withtheremaining40%devotedtonew
businessstudies(Loos).
The specific arrangement of the
nonbusiness courses varied. The Tuck
School required 3 years of general
undergraduate work in the liberal arts
before a 4th and 5th year of business
study(Person,1913).Incontrast,Whartonofferedcommercialstudiesgrouped
with liberal education for a 4-year
period. General courses in economics,
politics, and sociology were all given
in the Wharton school, and “as much
as (they) are of the liberal type . . .
Wharton students get a strong infusion
ofthetraditionallyculturaltypeofeducation”(McCrea,1913,p.113).Atthe
UniversityofChicago,thefirst2years
of the business curriculum emphasized
general education and social sciences.
Thiscurriculumwassharedwithpublic
administrationandsocialworkstudents
(Marshall,1913).
LiberalElementsinBusiness
Curriculum
Another approach was to infuse the
commercial courses with liberal and
scientificelements,makingthemmore
thanmeredescriptionsofbusinessphenomena.Oneprominentdeansuggestedthat“descriptive(business)courses
that do not promise to be analytical
should be replaced” and that all subjects in the curriculum must “embody
scientificprinciples”(Hotchkiss,1920,
p.90).Anotherstatedthat“everybusiness course shall have its analytical
and philosophical phase” (McCrea,
1926, p. 220). The dean of the Tuck
school heralded the use of a textbook
in finance that went beyond “descriptions of different securities and methods” but rather “continually asks and
explains why in corporate finance”
(Person, 1913, p. 123; emphasis in
original). Business studies were to be
disciplined studies based on general
and scientific principles that could be
outlinedandtransmitted.
PreponderanceofSocialScience
andEconomicsCourses
Economics was often seen as the
coreofthecommercialcurriculumthat
ensureditsacademicstanding.Anearly
commentatordescribedeconomicsasa
“fundamentalelement”ofacommercial
curriculum and argued that “the man
who grapples in earnest with the problemsofeconomicswillsecure,ifnothing else, a mental discipline” (James,
1901,pp.157–158).AtDartmouth,economicswasthe“foundationuponwhich
the work of the Tuck school is based”
(Person,1913,p.117).Economicswas
seen by some educators as the component that made a school of commerce
morethanatradeschool(Bogart,1928;
Dowrie, 1928; McCrea, 1926). In the
words of one commentator, “Without
thepresenceofeconomicsinsomevital
form...theschoolofbusinessislikely
todegenerateintoadetaileddescription
ofbusinessorganizationandprocedure
withnoorganizingprinciple”(McCrea,
1926,p.222).
Many have affirmed this analogy:
Economics is to business what physics
or mathematics is to engineering, or
what biology is to medicine (James,
1901; Kiekhofer, 1928; Mears, 1923).
However, others have disagreed with
such a characterization (Bonbright,
1926; Howard, 1917; Marshall, 1917).
Some researchers have argued that the
social implications of business were
bettercoveredinotherdisciplines,such
as political science or philosophy, than
in economics (Phillips, 1926), whereas others have asserted that business
administration would likely develop
intoitsownscienceseparatefromeconomics(Jones,1913).
ProfessionalNatureofthe
BusinessSchool
From the very beginning, business
schools claimed to be, or at least were
aspiringtobe,professionalschoolssimilar to those that had been established
inengineering,medicine,law,andtheology at universities in the previous
decades. One dean described colleges
of commerce as “strictly educational
institutionswithprofessionalemphasis”
(McCrea, 1920, p. 108). Others have
affirmedtheprofessionalaspirationsof
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the early schools of commerce (James,
1901;Loos,1903;McCrea,1926).This
aspirationwasattheheartofthenewly
foundedcollegesofcommercein1900.
Although not dismissing personal gain
as a motive for the business student,
the early business school administrators distanced their school from its
pursuit, insisting that public service be
upheld as the ideal of business education. The dean of the University of
Chicago argued that schools of commerce“missedtheirpurposeif...[the]
moneymakingsideispermittedtohave
arulinghand”(Marshall,1913,p.101).
Marshall (1913) argued that especially
in a school of commerce, the “professional attitude” (p. 101) is constantly
tempted by “merely a moneymaking
attitude”(p.101)andthat“eternalvigilance”(p.101)wasnecessarytoensure
thatmoneymakingdidnotdominatein
schoolsofcommerce.Atthemeetingof
theAssociationofCollegiateSchoolsof
Business in 1919, the leading speaker
argued that public responsibility was
the first aim that “the curriculum of
a collegiate school of business should
reflect”andthat“soundbusinessrather
thanindividualrewardsisthefirstconcernofacollegiateschoolofbusiness”
(Hotchkiss, 1920, pp. 89–90). In 1926
another commentator emphasized that
money making must not be allowed to
overshadowcultural,social,andethical
considerations(Phillips,1926).
However, the claim that colleges of
commerce were professional schools
wasnotuniformlyaccepted,evenwithin the colleges themselves. A member
ofthecollegeofcommerceattheUniversity of Iowa noted that given the
popularusageofthetermprofessional,
itwas“difficulttounderstandhowany
school of business can be professional
in character” (Phillips, 1926, p. 231).
Wooster (1919) of the University of
Missouri decried that the college of
commerce “has had to undertake professional training for nonprofessional
pursuits” (p. 48). He argued that business was not a profession because it
had little in terms of a code of ethics
or commitment to public service that
werethehallmarksofotherprofessions.
Wooster, however, thought that business could establish such a code that
could eventually raise it to a profes
sional status and saw colleges of commerce essential in that quest. Wooster
said,“Itisnotimpossible,however,that
businessmaybecomeaprofession”(p.
48). These sentiments were echoed in
anessaytitledTheEmergingProfession
ofBusiness(Donham,1927a).
Recent authors in Harvard Business
Review argued that “business schools
are on the wrong track” (Bennis &
O’Toole, 2005, p. 1) because they fail
toimpartusefulskillsforactualworkin
business.Theauthorsattributethisstate
ofaffairstobusinessschoolsadoptinga
modelofacademicexcellencethattreats
business disciplines as traditional academicfields.Underthismodel,faculty
members focus on scientific research
at the expense of practical application.
Theauthorssuggestedthat“businessis
a profession akin to medicine and the
law”(Bennis&O’Toole,p.2)andthat
business schools ought to reflect this
by being more willing to “deliberately
engagewiththeoutsideworld”(Bennis
&O’Toolep.2).
Then,asnow,thisquestionarises:Are
business schools professional schools?
Theanswerliesinwhatismeantbyprofessional.Boththenandnow,anumberof
criteriatypicallyemerge.Wooster(1919)
argued that professions were modeled
after medieval craft guilds that required
extensive periods of specific training.
Moreover,theprofessionalhasdefinitive
ethicalobligationstothepublic,hisfellowcraftsmen,andhisclients,andthese
obligationsareoftencountertohispecuniary interests. For example, Wooster
argued,aphysicianisoftencalledonto
provideservicewhenanepidemicarises
“forthepublicgood...givenfreelyand
withoutcomplaint”(p.49).
More recently Khurana, Nohira, and
Penrice (2004) argued that professions
have(a)commonbodiesofknowledge,
(b) certification procedures affirming
the acquisition of the body of know-
ledge, (c) a commitment to the public good, and (d) an enforceable code
of ethics. Those authors went further
andsuggestedthatbusinessandsociety
would do well to establish clear professional status for business managers,
although they were vague about how
such a system of managerial professional certification and public control
wouldoperate.
Althoughthetwodefinitionsofpro-
fessionalare85yearsapart,littleseparatesthemintermsofcontent.Moreover,
justasWooster(1919)thoughtthatbusinesswasalongwayfrombeingaprofession,Khuranaetal.(2004)lamented
that “In comparing management with
the more traditional professions of law
and medicine along these criteria, one
inevitablyfindsitwanting”(p.3).
TheCorporateSocial
ResponsibilityDebate
Questionsabouttheethicalandsocial
obligationsofbusinessandbusinesspeoplearepervasiveincontemporarybusiness education. Although many issues
are involved, a central question is this:
To whom do corporate officers have a
fiduciary obligation? Discussion about
how the various groups that interact
withacorporationaretoberegardedby
corporatemanagershasbeenvigorous.
EconomistssuchasFriedman(1970)
argued that corporate executives are
agents of the shareholders, duty bound
toadvancetheirinterestsovertheexecutive’s own personal interest. This is
typically accomplished by maximizing
thefirm’sprofitsinawaythatissubject
to the rules of business as outlined by
legal restraints and by the admonition
offorgoingtheuseofforceandfraudin
businessdealings.Theuseofcorporate
resourcestopromoteothersocialagendasisamisappropriationofshareholder
wealth and an unethical indulgence on
thepartofthecorporatemanager.
This view is often identified as the
shareholder theory of management
responsibility. This is often inaccurately
identifiedasaminimalethic,asifputting
others’interestoverone’sownandadheringtoacodeoftransparencyaremorally
simple tasks. Its critics often ignore that
under the shareholder theory, corporate
managersdohaveresponsibilitiestocustomers,employees,andsuppliersintheir
decisionmaking.Managersarerestrained
by law and contract and—more important—by competitive pressures. Failure
topayattentionconsistentlytotheinterests of these other parties leads to legal
consequencesorerosionofmarketshare
that directly harms the long-run interest
of shareholders. Smith’s (1987) “invisible hand” works to promote a balanced
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241
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harmony of interests between shareholders and other corporate constituencies
throughthepriceandprofitmechanisms.
Incontrast,professorsofmanagement
such as Carroll (1991) and Donaldson
andPreston(1995)haveofferedanalternative stakeholder theory of corporate
responsibility.Underthisapproach,corporate officers have an explicit obligationnotonlytoshareholdersbutalsoto
all of those affected by corporate decision making. The corporate executive
becomes,ineffect,theagentofallwho
areaffectedbythecorporation(thestakeholders) is duty bound to advance their
interests over his own personal interest,
and is duty bound to balance the interests among the different groups. In this
view, contractual, legal, and competitive restraints are not enough to ensure
that adequate attention is paid to the
interests of nonshareholders affected by
corporate decision makers. The invisiblehandisseenasgenerallynonoperativeandineffective.Underthisapproach,
themandateforprofitmaximizationfor
shareholderinterestisclearlyattenuated.
Corporateofficerswillandshouldoften
sacrificeshareholders’financialinterests
forotherconstituenciessuchasemployees, customers, suppliers, and the general public. Making the correct tradeoff
between the shareholders’ interests and
other interests is the essence of responsiblemanagement.
Although the terminology varied,
the issue was discussed among early
business educators, and the conflicts
between perspectives were parallel to
those of contemporary positions. One
early leader argued that administrators
of colleges of commerce should try to
influence business policy to ends that
clearlywentbeyondinstructingstudents
to maximize profits for shareholders
in a Friedman-like way. Jones (1913)
of the University of Michigan argued
that the ultimate purpose of collegelevel business education was “to put
industrial policies on a scientific basis
and to control them by [the] ideals of
socialwelfare”(p.187).Heelaborated
a view consistent with current theories
that emphasizes taking a stakeholder
viewpointinbusinessmanagement:
Therehasbeguntoemergeaspecialclass
ofadministratorswhoarenotcapitalists,
butstandmidwaybetweenthemultitude
242
JournalofEducationforBusiness
of stock- and bondholders on one side,
and the wage earning classes and public
asconsumersontheother....Thisspecial class is more and more responsible
for the inauguration and execution of
industrialandcommercialpolicies.Itisa
great opportunity of the college to assist
this rising profession to a consciousness
of itself, to help it realize its trusteeship
and to stimulate it to conceive itself as
anintellectualaristocracyintheworldof
affairs.(pp.187–188)
Jonesconcludedthatthetaskforcolleges
of commerce was to raise the tone of
industry by setting forth new ideals of
efficiency,ofdistributivejustice,andof
democracy“...[to]stimulatetheambition on the part of industrial leaders
to realize these newer and more social
ideals (as opposed to the desire for
materialacquisition)”(p.195).
Wooster (1919) argued that the hallmarkofaprofessionwasawillingness
to place public service above gain and
argued that “the principle thing necessary to make a profession of business
is the substitution of service for selling as the proper end of business” (p.
52).Althoughrecognizingthatcompetitive pressures require the businessman
to not “slight the customer too much”
(Wooster, p. 52) he argued that part of
the purpose of business education was
“totametheleopardbeforewesethim
loose”(Wooster,p.59).
The dean of the Harvard Business
School argued that because business
leaders control the “mechanisms of
material wealth of modern society”
(Donham,1927b,p.415),theobjective
of business education was “the multiplication of men who will handle their
currentbusinessproblemsinasocially
constructive way” (Donham, 1927b, p.
407). The corporate executive was “to
consider not only the permanency and
goodstandingofhisinstitutionbutthe
sound stability and development of his
community” (Donham, 1927a, p. 401),
and he observed that “the big national
corporations inevitably tend to higher
ethical standards, to more a feeling of
trusteeship, for the community and for
the employee, as well as the shareholder”(Donham,1927b,pp.415–416).
Donham(1927b),however,alsoargued
the Friedman point that “neither has
thecorporateexecutivetherighttouse
other people’s property in ways which
theymightormightnotapprove,simply
because he feels quite apart from his
business the results would be socially
desirable”(p.415).
There was, however, another discussion that was more in line with the
shareholderview.Oneprofessorargued
that the objective of business practice
was“notsocialservicebutprivateprofit” (Howard, 1917, p. 106).Viewing a
businessorganizationasasetofsocial
relations, he distinguished between the
proprietors of a business organization
and its creditor, employees, purveyors,
and others that in contemporary jargon would be identified as stakeholders, and argued that “Successful business administration is measured by the
. . . maximum of ultimate profit for
the proprietors” (Howard, p. 106). He
argued that the “science of business is
thescienceofprofit-making”(Howard,
p.109)andthatthiswasthedomainof
business education. He recognized that
deviations from profit maximization,
either as social policy or as individual
choice,werepossiblebutthattheywere
notthedomainofbusinessstudybutof
political economy, sociology, religion,
andethics(Howard).
Another professor at a panel discussion distinguished between the view
thatthebusinesscurriculum“shouldbe
designed . . . to teach students how to
makethemostmoneyintheirbusiness
careers” (Bonbright, 1926, p. 234) in
comparison with one that would teach
howtorunindustryfrom“thepointof
view of the public interest” (p. 234).
Hecalledthefirstthe“acquisitivetest”
(234) and the second the “social test”
(234).Arguing that the social test was
“a very vague and ill-defined concept”
(Bonbright, p. 234), he proceeded to
defend the acquisitive curriculum in
light of the “mean and slurring comments” (p. 235) that other panel members had made about it. He argued in
the economic tradition of Smith and
Mandeville that self-interest and the
publicgoodcoincide.Themostimportant exception was making money in
theshortrunattheexpenseofthelong
run, but this was a problem that was
easilyremediedinbusinessinstruction.
Indeed, most business faculties were
aware of the trade-off. “The businessmanwhotriestohigglehiswageearn-
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ersdowntothelastfarthingorwhosays
meanthingstohisstenographermaybe
richernextyear,butintenyearshewill
beapauper”(Bonbright,p.236).
Bonbright (1926) lampooned the
social concept of business education
that“taughtbusinessmentomakedecisions not merely on their reactions on
hispocketbook”(p.241).Howcoulda
business graduate decide, for example,
whether to become a stockbroker or to
sellfruitonthebasisofasocialtest?
Ononehand,heneedstoknowallabout
the theory of stock speculation and its
social utility and disutility. On the other
hand,heshouldhaveaccurateinformation
aboutthenutritivevalueofbananas,and
he should also be in a position to weigh
critically the possible incidental results
ofhisbusiness,suchasthosethatmight
normallybeexpectedtofollowfromthe
promiscuousthrowingofbananapeelson
thesidewalk.(Bonbright,p.241)
EarlyEffortsatCurriculum
Integration
In the past 20 years or so, colleges of business have made a persistent
effort to promote curriculum integration. Although the definition of curriculum integration may vary, the idea
isthatbusinessschoolsshouldinculcate
their students in a “broad understandingofhowthefunctionsworktogether
in a business enterprise” (Stover, Morris,Pharr,Reyes,&Byers,1997,p.1).
Business education, it is argued, has
been relegated to departmental silos
wherestudentsreceiveexcellenttraining
in selective functional business disciplines—suchasaccounting,marketing,
or production—but fail to see the big
pictureofhowfunctionalbusinessareas
fittogether.Collegiatebusinessschools
have implemented various models to
promotecurriculumintegration,ranging
from extensive curriculum redesign to
the introduction of common themes in
the curriculum (Cannon, Klein, Koste,
&Magal,2004).
It is often argued that curriculum
integrationisaby-productofchanging
business conditions. Because of the
increasingly dynamic nature of commercial enterprises, businesses have
moved from function-based organizational structures. The university businesscurriculum,however,isstillmired
in a functional mentality. The modern
curriculum must be more integrated
to meet current demands of business
(Cannonetal.,2004;Hartenian,Schellenger,&Fredrickson,2001;Stoveret
al.,1997).Thissuggeststhatdemands
for curriculum integration are primarily driven by contemporary business
conditions. However, a reading of
the literature describing the formative years of university-based schools
of commerce indicates that the early
business schools were aware of the
integration issue. Then, as now, different methods were used to promote
integration. However, the demand for
broad integrative thinking by businessgraduatesisnotparticularlyaby-
product of contemporary business
trends (although such trends may
accentuatethedemand)but,rather,an
inherent component of any sound collegiatebusinesseducationcurriculum.
At the first meeting of the Associated Collegiate Schools of Business in
1919,WillardE.Hotchkiss,whoserved
as dean at a number of early schools
of commerce, outlined the elements he
thoughtappropriateforthecurriculum.
In Hotchkiss’ view, the freshman and
sophomoreyearsofthebusinessstudent
should be composed of a prebusiness
course of study. This should include a
large component of liberal education
and what we would today call foundational courses in business, such as
economics, accounting, and statistics
(Hotchkiss,1920).
This should be followed by a more
specialized curricula—because a numberofalternativecoursesofstudycould
be pursued—in the junior and senior
years. Each of those curricula should
begin with a discipline-specific survey
course.Althoughthecoursewastobein
the specific discipline, the point of the
coursewasnottobedisciplinespecific.
Rather, he argued that the important
componentofeachofthesurveycourseslayindevelopingthehabitsofmind
conducivetoabroadviewofbusiness:
Theideaofthesurveythenisnottogive
thestudentaninsightintoallthesubjects
he may have occasion to use, but rather
togivehimsamplescomingfromawideenough range of subjects whose content
ispertinenttohisproblemsothathewill
develop the habit of following collateral
aswellasdirectlinesofinquiry.Thefact
that a student has been unable to take a
courseintransportationwouldnotnecessarilyimplythathewouldomittransportation phases in analyzing a problem in
marketing.(Hotchkiss,p.100)
Incurrentjargon,Hotchkisscalledfor
thesurveycoursetoprovidecurriculum
integrationanddevelopcritical-thinking
skills. A second case of early integrationawarenessandeffortswasoutlined
byWallaceB.Donham(1922),deanof
the Harvard School of Commerce. He
extolledthepedagogicalvirtuesofcase
studies in graduate business education
(amethodstillassociatedwithHarvard
Business School). He noted, however,
that after the first year of foundational
andfunctionalcourses
the typical first-year man at the end of
theyearseemedtohavestudiedindividualcourseswithlittleconceptionoftheir
interrelation. Accounting was . . . simplyaccounting,andfinanceonlyfinance.
There was no clear understanding of the
usefulness of factory management training for the accountant. He wished in far
toomanycasestomakehimselfanarrow
specialist.(Donham,1922,p.63)
Donham(1922)indicatedthattheproblemwasresolvedwithabusinesspolicy
course that was given in the 2nd year
of the curriculum but asserted that an
integratedviewoughttobepresentedin
the1styear,andheofferedamethodto
accomplishthatend:
Yetthereisagreatneedthatmenshould
from the beginning of their work build
toward a coordinated structure of training rather than toward isolated units
whose interrelationship is beyond their
vision. In the effort to bring about this
coordinationwegivethefirst-yearclass
immediately after their arrival a very
complicatedbusinesscasewhichshould
foritssolutiondependuponthesubject
matterofalargepartofthecoursesgiven
intheschool.Ofcoursesuchaproblem
is beyond the capacity of every man in
the class. It nevertheless is presented
for their consideration and after careful
studybythemdiscussedbytheinstructor. This discussion serves as an object
lesson in the preliminary analysis of a
complicated business problem, and at
thesametimebringsouttherelationof
the problem to the different courses. In
thiswaythestudentatoncerealizeshow
theindividualcoursesintheschoolwork
togetherasapreparationofasolutionof
a single executive problem while at the
same time he acquires a more adequate
conceptionofthegeneralandinterlocking nature of business problems. (Donham,1922,pp.63–64)
March/April2008
243
Although described in dated language, the problems that Donham
(1922)andHotchkiss(1920)considered
andthesolutionstheyofferedarefamiliartothoseinthecontemporarydiscussionofcurriculumintegration.Perhaps
thedesireforcurriculumintegrationof
businesscoursesisnotonlyaresultof
the changing business world. Perhaps
anintegratedcurriculumisthemanifestationofthepersistentvalueofabroad,
liberal, and interconnected course of
studyincollegiatebusinesseducation.
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Conclusion
Many of the issues that colleges of
businessfacetodayarethesameasthose
facedintheearlypartofthe20thcentury.Thesameissueswilllikelybewith
business schools in the 22nd century.
From the earlier educators of business,
two conclusions and one admonition
readily arise: First, collegiate business
educationispartofageneraluniversity
education. Business students at universitiesandcollegeshavealwaysandwill
always be “learning something bearing
ontheirfuturebusinesswhileacquiring
a liberal education” (James, 1901, p.
154).Thisimpliesnotonlythatmuchof
theircourseworkwillinevitablybeoutside the business college, but also that
business courses must be disciplined,
analyticallyrigorous,andbeyondmere
descriptions of business phenomena.
These were the aspirations of the first
generation of business educators. This
wasreinforced50yearslaterwhenthe
Carnegie report on collegiate business
educationentreated,“Bothundergraduateandgraduatecourseworksneedsto
be kept in a broad context and limited
to problems of solid analytical content” (Pierson, 1959, p. xi). Although
the exact blend between the practical
andtheliberalwillalwaysevolve,both
will be necessary components of businessstudies.
Second, for almost 100 years, businessschoolshaveunsuccessfullysought
professional status. It seems business
educators have always been anxious
over the absence of clear professional
status of business occupations.Yet the
realityisthatmostundergraduatebusinessdegreesneverdidandcurrentlydo
notleadtooccupationsthatareprofes244
JournalofEducationforBusiness
sional in the strict sense of the term.
Perhaps it is time to ask: So what?
Businessschoolsshouldthinkofthemselves as academic hybrids. Parts of
thebusinessschoolcurriculum,notably
economicsandfinancecourses,areacademicinnature.Othercomponentssuch
as accounting and certain specialized
courseworkinmanagement(e.g.,human
resources) are professional or quasiprofessional in nature. Others such as
communications and technical courses
are somewhere between the two and
aptly considered vocational. So what?
Businessschoolshavebeenaroundfora
century.Dotheyneedtomakeextraordinary claims of professional status to
justifytheirpresenceinauniversitysetting? Such self-confident clarity might
do much to improve interdepartmental
andintercollegialrelationships.
Last, an admonition arises. Contemporary business colleges are subject to
demandsforchangefrombothinternal
andexternalconstituenciesandaccreditationsagenciesonanynumberofissues.
Althoughsuchpressureisundoubtedly
necessaryandusuallyhealthy,itwould
be useful if the proponents of reform
adopted the scholarly habit of reviewing the history of the issue in business
education. This would serve the twofoldpurposeofhelpingtheadvocatesof
change to better understand and refine
theirpositionandsimultaneouslygiving
theirclaimincreasedlegitimacy.
Ifanadvisoryboardmemberofacollege of business wants to make a case
thatstudentsaredeficientintheirwriting
skillsandthatthefacultyandadministrationofthecollegeshoulddosomething
about it, the board member’s case and
credibility would be enhanced if he or
shedocumentedtheproblemsofstudent
writingincollegesofbusinessovertime.
Of course, this would require a broader
knowledge of the history of business
collegesamongalltheconstituenciesof
business colleges. This article contributessomewhattothatend.
NOTES
Dr. Cecil E. Bohanon’s research interests are
applied microeconomics, public choice analysis,
andbusinesscurriculum.
Correspondence concerning this article should be
addressed to Dr. Cecil E. Bohanon, Department of
Economics,BallStateUniversity,Muncie,IN47306.
E-mail:cbohanon@bsu.edu
REFERENCES
Bennis,W. G., & O’Toole, J. (2005). How business schools lost their way. Harvard Business
Review,83,1–9.
Bogart, E. L. (1928). The relationship between
departments of economics and collegiate
schools of business. American Economic
Review,18,74–77.
Bonbright, J. C. (1926). The place of economics in the curriculum of a school of business:
Discussion. Journal of Political Economy, 34,
233–242.
Cannon, D. M., Klein, H. A., Koste, L. L., &
Magal, S. R. (2004). Curriculum integration
usingenterpriseresourceplanning:Anintegrative case approach. Journa
ISSN: 0883-2323 (Print) 1940-3356 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/vjeb20
Persistent Themes in Colleges of Business
Cecil E. Bohanon
To cite this article: Cecil E. Bohanon (2008) Persistent Themes in Colleges of Business, Journal
of Education for Business, 83:4, 239-245, DOI: 10.3200/JOEB.83.4.239-245
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.3200/JOEB.83.4.239-245
Published online: 07 Aug 2010.
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VIEWPOINT
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PersistentThemesinCollegesofBusiness
CECILE.BOHANON
BALLSTATEUNIVERSITY
MUNCIE,INDIANA
ABSTRACT.Inthisarticle,theauthor
examinesanumberofissuesincollegesof
commerceintheirformativeperiodfrom
1900to1930.Hediscusses4areas:contentofbusinesscurriculum,professional
natureofbusinessandbusinessschools,
socialresponsibilityofcorporatemanagers,
andintegrationofthebusinesscurriculum.
Manyofthetopicsarestillimportanttoday
andcanarguablybeconsideredpersistent
themesincollegesofbusiness.
Keywords:businesscurriculum,business
education,curriculumintegration,economics,socialresponsibilityofbusiness
Copyright©2008HeldrefPublications
I
n this article, I examine a number
ofissuesincollegiatebusinesseducation that emerged during the early
years of business schools, roughly
from 1900 to 1930.After providing a
cursoryhistoryoftheformationofcollegesofbusiness,Iexaminefourissues
oftheera:curriculumcontent,claimof
theprofessionalnatureofbusinessand
business schools, social responsibility
of corporate managers, and the desire
for integration of the business curriculum.The issues were not resolved
during the period and have persisted
as continual topics in collegiate businesseducationtothisday.Inthefinal
section, I offer tentative insights as to
whateducatorscanconcludefromthis
historicalexploration.
ACursoryHistoryofCollegesof
Commerce
Colleges of commerce and business
beganformingatU.S.universitiesinthe
late 19th century.TheWharton School
at University of Pennsylvania began
in 1883. Other university-based business schools were established before
1900 at the University of Chicago, the
UniversityofCalifornia,theUniversity
of Ohio, and Columbia University. By
1900, schools of commerce existed at
Dartmouth College, the University of
Vermont,NewYorkUniversity,theUniversityofMichigan,andtheUniversity
ofWisconsinandwereplannedforthe
UniversityofIllinoisandtheUniversity
ofIowa(James,1901).
Much of the impetus for establishingtheschoolscamefromthebusiness
community. As an early Wharton professorpointedout,membersofthePhiladelphia business community “did not
seewhytheirsonscouldnotbelearning
somethingbearingontheirfuturebusinesswhileacquiringaliberaleducation”
(James,1901,p.154).InWisconsin,it
was argued that many of the best high
schoolstudentsinthestateweregoing
directly into business and not going to
thestateuniversity.Othergoodstudents
wereenrollingasspecialstudentsatthe
university, taking courses only relevant
tobusinessandneverbotheringtocompleteaformaldegree.By1900thiswas
seen as so untenable by the university
administration that a commerce college was established at the University
of Wisconsin (Scott, 1913). Laughlin
(1902) argued that universities should
develop commerce colleges to attract
ablestudents.
It was also noted that, increasingly,
universitygraduateswereenteringbusiness.OftheHarvardclassof1896,35%
developedabusinesscareer,whereas2
decadeslater,thepercentagehadrisento
55%(Mears,1923).Universitiesestablishedcollegesofcommerceinresponse
toanincreaseddemandforcommercial
educationatthecollegiatelevel.
March/April2008
239
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Establishing a business curriculum
was met with hostility and resistance
atmanyuniversities.Thestudyofbusiness was seen as too vocational and
outside the spirit of liberal education.
Deansofcollegesofcommerceseemed
to continually argue that their institutions were not trade schools (McCrea,
1926). At the University of Wisconsin
in1900,manyfacultymembersconsideredaccountingcourses“unworthyofa
place in the curriculum” (Scott, 1913,
p.131).By1913,therehadbeensome
“breaking down this faculty prejudice”
(Scott, p. 131) so that accounting and
business administration courses were
taught. However, none of these courses counted for general credit for the
undergraduatebachelor’sdegree(Scott,
1913).Aslateas1928,aparticipantat
aroundtablediscussionatajointmeeting of the American Economics AssociationandtheAmericanAssociationof
Collegiate Schools of Business stated,
“Whichoneofushasnotheardtheslurringremarksthattrulyculturalcourses
are not found in the college of commerce” (Bogart, 1928, p. 74). Distancingitselffromthelabelofcommercial,
the economics curriculum at Amherst
stated in 1917 that it “considers itself
under no obligation to meet vocational
orprofessionaldemands,eitherdirectly
orindirectly”(Hamilton,1917,p.2).
CurricularResponsestoHostility
TowardBusinessCourses
Desiring a place in the university,
the administrators of early colleges of
commerce had a number of curricular
responses to the unwelcoming attitude
ofthoseinmoretraditionalquartersof
theuniversity.
LiberalArtsCoursesOutside
theCollege
Earlyproponentsofthebusinesscurriculumalwaysaffirmedbusinesseducationasapartofageneraluniversityeducation.Fromthebeginning,thequestion
of how much of the business student’s
coursework should be traditional and
how much practical was a lively issue.
At the 1903AnnArbor Conference on
Higher Commercial Education, one
businessman’s speech was “devoted to
the praise of the old classical college
240
JournalofEducationforBusiness
course” (Loos, 1903, p. 462), whereas
another“inveighedagainstuselesseducation and pleaded for the practical”
(Loos,p.463).Theconferenceseemed
toconcludethattheidealbusinesscurriculumwouldbeonewithwhich60%
constitutedtheoldclassicalcurriculum,
withtheremaining40%devotedtonew
businessstudies(Loos).
The specific arrangement of the
nonbusiness courses varied. The Tuck
School required 3 years of general
undergraduate work in the liberal arts
before a 4th and 5th year of business
study(Person,1913).Incontrast,Whartonofferedcommercialstudiesgrouped
with liberal education for a 4-year
period. General courses in economics,
politics, and sociology were all given
in the Wharton school, and “as much
as (they) are of the liberal type . . .
Wharton students get a strong infusion
ofthetraditionallyculturaltypeofeducation”(McCrea,1913,p.113).Atthe
UniversityofChicago,thefirst2years
of the business curriculum emphasized
general education and social sciences.
Thiscurriculumwassharedwithpublic
administrationandsocialworkstudents
(Marshall,1913).
LiberalElementsinBusiness
Curriculum
Another approach was to infuse the
commercial courses with liberal and
scientificelements,makingthemmore
thanmeredescriptionsofbusinessphenomena.Oneprominentdeansuggestedthat“descriptive(business)courses
that do not promise to be analytical
should be replaced” and that all subjects in the curriculum must “embody
scientificprinciples”(Hotchkiss,1920,
p.90).Anotherstatedthat“everybusiness course shall have its analytical
and philosophical phase” (McCrea,
1926, p. 220). The dean of the Tuck
school heralded the use of a textbook
in finance that went beyond “descriptions of different securities and methods” but rather “continually asks and
explains why in corporate finance”
(Person, 1913, p. 123; emphasis in
original). Business studies were to be
disciplined studies based on general
and scientific principles that could be
outlinedandtransmitted.
PreponderanceofSocialScience
andEconomicsCourses
Economics was often seen as the
coreofthecommercialcurriculumthat
ensureditsacademicstanding.Anearly
commentatordescribedeconomicsasa
“fundamentalelement”ofacommercial
curriculum and argued that “the man
who grapples in earnest with the problemsofeconomicswillsecure,ifnothing else, a mental discipline” (James,
1901,pp.157–158).AtDartmouth,economicswasthe“foundationuponwhich
the work of the Tuck school is based”
(Person,1913,p.117).Economicswas
seen by some educators as the component that made a school of commerce
morethanatradeschool(Bogart,1928;
Dowrie, 1928; McCrea, 1926). In the
words of one commentator, “Without
thepresenceofeconomicsinsomevital
form...theschoolofbusinessislikely
todegenerateintoadetaileddescription
ofbusinessorganizationandprocedure
withnoorganizingprinciple”(McCrea,
1926,p.222).
Many have affirmed this analogy:
Economics is to business what physics
or mathematics is to engineering, or
what biology is to medicine (James,
1901; Kiekhofer, 1928; Mears, 1923).
However, others have disagreed with
such a characterization (Bonbright,
1926; Howard, 1917; Marshall, 1917).
Some researchers have argued that the
social implications of business were
bettercoveredinotherdisciplines,such
as political science or philosophy, than
in economics (Phillips, 1926), whereas others have asserted that business
administration would likely develop
intoitsownscienceseparatefromeconomics(Jones,1913).
ProfessionalNatureofthe
BusinessSchool
From the very beginning, business
schools claimed to be, or at least were
aspiringtobe,professionalschoolssimilar to those that had been established
inengineering,medicine,law,andtheology at universities in the previous
decades. One dean described colleges
of commerce as “strictly educational
institutionswithprofessionalemphasis”
(McCrea, 1920, p. 108). Others have
affirmedtheprofessionalaspirationsof
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the early schools of commerce (James,
1901;Loos,1903;McCrea,1926).This
aspirationwasattheheartofthenewly
foundedcollegesofcommercein1900.
Although not dismissing personal gain
as a motive for the business student,
the early business school administrators distanced their school from its
pursuit, insisting that public service be
upheld as the ideal of business education. The dean of the University of
Chicago argued that schools of commerce“missedtheirpurposeif...[the]
moneymakingsideispermittedtohave
arulinghand”(Marshall,1913,p.101).
Marshall (1913) argued that especially
in a school of commerce, the “professional attitude” (p. 101) is constantly
tempted by “merely a moneymaking
attitude”(p.101)andthat“eternalvigilance”(p.101)wasnecessarytoensure
thatmoneymakingdidnotdominatein
schoolsofcommerce.Atthemeetingof
theAssociationofCollegiateSchoolsof
Business in 1919, the leading speaker
argued that public responsibility was
the first aim that “the curriculum of
a collegiate school of business should
reflect”andthat“soundbusinessrather
thanindividualrewardsisthefirstconcernofacollegiateschoolofbusiness”
(Hotchkiss, 1920, pp. 89–90). In 1926
another commentator emphasized that
money making must not be allowed to
overshadowcultural,social,andethical
considerations(Phillips,1926).
However, the claim that colleges of
commerce were professional schools
wasnotuniformlyaccepted,evenwithin the colleges themselves. A member
ofthecollegeofcommerceattheUniversity of Iowa noted that given the
popularusageofthetermprofessional,
itwas“difficulttounderstandhowany
school of business can be professional
in character” (Phillips, 1926, p. 231).
Wooster (1919) of the University of
Missouri decried that the college of
commerce “has had to undertake professional training for nonprofessional
pursuits” (p. 48). He argued that business was not a profession because it
had little in terms of a code of ethics
or commitment to public service that
werethehallmarksofotherprofessions.
Wooster, however, thought that business could establish such a code that
could eventually raise it to a profes
sional status and saw colleges of commerce essential in that quest. Wooster
said,“Itisnotimpossible,however,that
businessmaybecomeaprofession”(p.
48). These sentiments were echoed in
anessaytitledTheEmergingProfession
ofBusiness(Donham,1927a).
Recent authors in Harvard Business
Review argued that “business schools
are on the wrong track” (Bennis &
O’Toole, 2005, p. 1) because they fail
toimpartusefulskillsforactualworkin
business.Theauthorsattributethisstate
ofaffairstobusinessschoolsadoptinga
modelofacademicexcellencethattreats
business disciplines as traditional academicfields.Underthismodel,faculty
members focus on scientific research
at the expense of practical application.
Theauthorssuggestedthat“businessis
a profession akin to medicine and the
law”(Bennis&O’Toole,p.2)andthat
business schools ought to reflect this
by being more willing to “deliberately
engagewiththeoutsideworld”(Bennis
&O’Toolep.2).
Then,asnow,thisquestionarises:Are
business schools professional schools?
Theanswerliesinwhatismeantbyprofessional.Boththenandnow,anumberof
criteriatypicallyemerge.Wooster(1919)
argued that professions were modeled
after medieval craft guilds that required
extensive periods of specific training.
Moreover,theprofessionalhasdefinitive
ethicalobligationstothepublic,hisfellowcraftsmen,andhisclients,andthese
obligationsareoftencountertohispecuniary interests. For example, Wooster
argued,aphysicianisoftencalledonto
provideservicewhenanepidemicarises
“forthepublicgood...givenfreelyand
withoutcomplaint”(p.49).
More recently Khurana, Nohira, and
Penrice (2004) argued that professions
have(a)commonbodiesofknowledge,
(b) certification procedures affirming
the acquisition of the body of know-
ledge, (c) a commitment to the public good, and (d) an enforceable code
of ethics. Those authors went further
andsuggestedthatbusinessandsociety
would do well to establish clear professional status for business managers,
although they were vague about how
such a system of managerial professional certification and public control
wouldoperate.
Althoughthetwodefinitionsofpro-
fessionalare85yearsapart,littleseparatesthemintermsofcontent.Moreover,
justasWooster(1919)thoughtthatbusinesswasalongwayfrombeingaprofession,Khuranaetal.(2004)lamented
that “In comparing management with
the more traditional professions of law
and medicine along these criteria, one
inevitablyfindsitwanting”(p.3).
TheCorporateSocial
ResponsibilityDebate
Questionsabouttheethicalandsocial
obligationsofbusinessandbusinesspeoplearepervasiveincontemporarybusiness education. Although many issues
are involved, a central question is this:
To whom do corporate officers have a
fiduciary obligation? Discussion about
how the various groups that interact
withacorporationaretoberegardedby
corporatemanagershasbeenvigorous.
EconomistssuchasFriedman(1970)
argued that corporate executives are
agents of the shareholders, duty bound
toadvancetheirinterestsovertheexecutive’s own personal interest. This is
typically accomplished by maximizing
thefirm’sprofitsinawaythatissubject
to the rules of business as outlined by
legal restraints and by the admonition
offorgoingtheuseofforceandfraudin
businessdealings.Theuseofcorporate
resourcestopromoteothersocialagendasisamisappropriationofshareholder
wealth and an unethical indulgence on
thepartofthecorporatemanager.
This view is often identified as the
shareholder theory of management
responsibility. This is often inaccurately
identifiedasaminimalethic,asifputting
others’interestoverone’sownandadheringtoacodeoftransparencyaremorally
simple tasks. Its critics often ignore that
under the shareholder theory, corporate
managersdohaveresponsibilitiestocustomers,employees,andsuppliersintheir
decisionmaking.Managersarerestrained
by law and contract and—more important—by competitive pressures. Failure
topayattentionconsistentlytotheinterests of these other parties leads to legal
consequencesorerosionofmarketshare
that directly harms the long-run interest
of shareholders. Smith’s (1987) “invisible hand” works to promote a balanced
March/April2008
241
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harmony of interests between shareholders and other corporate constituencies
throughthepriceandprofitmechanisms.
Incontrast,professorsofmanagement
such as Carroll (1991) and Donaldson
andPreston(1995)haveofferedanalternative stakeholder theory of corporate
responsibility.Underthisapproach,corporate officers have an explicit obligationnotonlytoshareholdersbutalsoto
all of those affected by corporate decision making. The corporate executive
becomes,ineffect,theagentofallwho
areaffectedbythecorporation(thestakeholders) is duty bound to advance their
interests over his own personal interest,
and is duty bound to balance the interests among the different groups. In this
view, contractual, legal, and competitive restraints are not enough to ensure
that adequate attention is paid to the
interests of nonshareholders affected by
corporate decision makers. The invisiblehandisseenasgenerallynonoperativeandineffective.Underthisapproach,
themandateforprofitmaximizationfor
shareholderinterestisclearlyattenuated.
Corporateofficerswillandshouldoften
sacrificeshareholders’financialinterests
forotherconstituenciessuchasemployees, customers, suppliers, and the general public. Making the correct tradeoff
between the shareholders’ interests and
other interests is the essence of responsiblemanagement.
Although the terminology varied,
the issue was discussed among early
business educators, and the conflicts
between perspectives were parallel to
those of contemporary positions. One
early leader argued that administrators
of colleges of commerce should try to
influence business policy to ends that
clearlywentbeyondinstructingstudents
to maximize profits for shareholders
in a Friedman-like way. Jones (1913)
of the University of Michigan argued
that the ultimate purpose of collegelevel business education was “to put
industrial policies on a scientific basis
and to control them by [the] ideals of
socialwelfare”(p.187).Heelaborated
a view consistent with current theories
that emphasizes taking a stakeholder
viewpointinbusinessmanagement:
Therehasbeguntoemergeaspecialclass
ofadministratorswhoarenotcapitalists,
butstandmidwaybetweenthemultitude
242
JournalofEducationforBusiness
of stock- and bondholders on one side,
and the wage earning classes and public
asconsumersontheother....Thisspecial class is more and more responsible
for the inauguration and execution of
industrialandcommercialpolicies.Itisa
great opportunity of the college to assist
this rising profession to a consciousness
of itself, to help it realize its trusteeship
and to stimulate it to conceive itself as
anintellectualaristocracyintheworldof
affairs.(pp.187–188)
Jonesconcludedthatthetaskforcolleges
of commerce was to raise the tone of
industry by setting forth new ideals of
efficiency,ofdistributivejustice,andof
democracy“...[to]stimulatetheambition on the part of industrial leaders
to realize these newer and more social
ideals (as opposed to the desire for
materialacquisition)”(p.195).
Wooster (1919) argued that the hallmarkofaprofessionwasawillingness
to place public service above gain and
argued that “the principle thing necessary to make a profession of business
is the substitution of service for selling as the proper end of business” (p.
52).Althoughrecognizingthatcompetitive pressures require the businessman
to not “slight the customer too much”
(Wooster, p. 52) he argued that part of
the purpose of business education was
“totametheleopardbeforewesethim
loose”(Wooster,p.59).
The dean of the Harvard Business
School argued that because business
leaders control the “mechanisms of
material wealth of modern society”
(Donham,1927b,p.415),theobjective
of business education was “the multiplication of men who will handle their
currentbusinessproblemsinasocially
constructive way” (Donham, 1927b, p.
407). The corporate executive was “to
consider not only the permanency and
goodstandingofhisinstitutionbutthe
sound stability and development of his
community” (Donham, 1927a, p. 401),
and he observed that “the big national
corporations inevitably tend to higher
ethical standards, to more a feeling of
trusteeship, for the community and for
the employee, as well as the shareholder”(Donham,1927b,pp.415–416).
Donham(1927b),however,alsoargued
the Friedman point that “neither has
thecorporateexecutivetherighttouse
other people’s property in ways which
theymightormightnotapprove,simply
because he feels quite apart from his
business the results would be socially
desirable”(p.415).
There was, however, another discussion that was more in line with the
shareholderview.Oneprofessorargued
that the objective of business practice
was“notsocialservicebutprivateprofit” (Howard, 1917, p. 106).Viewing a
businessorganizationasasetofsocial
relations, he distinguished between the
proprietors of a business organization
and its creditor, employees, purveyors,
and others that in contemporary jargon would be identified as stakeholders, and argued that “Successful business administration is measured by the
. . . maximum of ultimate profit for
the proprietors” (Howard, p. 106). He
argued that the “science of business is
thescienceofprofit-making”(Howard,
p.109)andthatthiswasthedomainof
business education. He recognized that
deviations from profit maximization,
either as social policy or as individual
choice,werepossiblebutthattheywere
notthedomainofbusinessstudybutof
political economy, sociology, religion,
andethics(Howard).
Another professor at a panel discussion distinguished between the view
thatthebusinesscurriculum“shouldbe
designed . . . to teach students how to
makethemostmoneyintheirbusiness
careers” (Bonbright, 1926, p. 234) in
comparison with one that would teach
howtorunindustryfrom“thepointof
view of the public interest” (p. 234).
Hecalledthefirstthe“acquisitivetest”
(234) and the second the “social test”
(234).Arguing that the social test was
“a very vague and ill-defined concept”
(Bonbright, p. 234), he proceeded to
defend the acquisitive curriculum in
light of the “mean and slurring comments” (p. 235) that other panel members had made about it. He argued in
the economic tradition of Smith and
Mandeville that self-interest and the
publicgoodcoincide.Themostimportant exception was making money in
theshortrunattheexpenseofthelong
run, but this was a problem that was
easilyremediedinbusinessinstruction.
Indeed, most business faculties were
aware of the trade-off. “The businessmanwhotriestohigglehiswageearn-
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ersdowntothelastfarthingorwhosays
meanthingstohisstenographermaybe
richernextyear,butintenyearshewill
beapauper”(Bonbright,p.236).
Bonbright (1926) lampooned the
social concept of business education
that“taughtbusinessmentomakedecisions not merely on their reactions on
hispocketbook”(p.241).Howcoulda
business graduate decide, for example,
whether to become a stockbroker or to
sellfruitonthebasisofasocialtest?
Ononehand,heneedstoknowallabout
the theory of stock speculation and its
social utility and disutility. On the other
hand,heshouldhaveaccurateinformation
aboutthenutritivevalueofbananas,and
he should also be in a position to weigh
critically the possible incidental results
ofhisbusiness,suchasthosethatmight
normallybeexpectedtofollowfromthe
promiscuousthrowingofbananapeelson
thesidewalk.(Bonbright,p.241)
EarlyEffortsatCurriculum
Integration
In the past 20 years or so, colleges of business have made a persistent
effort to promote curriculum integration. Although the definition of curriculum integration may vary, the idea
isthatbusinessschoolsshouldinculcate
their students in a “broad understandingofhowthefunctionsworktogether
in a business enterprise” (Stover, Morris,Pharr,Reyes,&Byers,1997,p.1).
Business education, it is argued, has
been relegated to departmental silos
wherestudentsreceiveexcellenttraining
in selective functional business disciplines—suchasaccounting,marketing,
or production—but fail to see the big
pictureofhowfunctionalbusinessareas
fittogether.Collegiatebusinessschools
have implemented various models to
promotecurriculumintegration,ranging
from extensive curriculum redesign to
the introduction of common themes in
the curriculum (Cannon, Klein, Koste,
&Magal,2004).
It is often argued that curriculum
integrationisaby-productofchanging
business conditions. Because of the
increasingly dynamic nature of commercial enterprises, businesses have
moved from function-based organizational structures. The university businesscurriculum,however,isstillmired
in a functional mentality. The modern
curriculum must be more integrated
to meet current demands of business
(Cannonetal.,2004;Hartenian,Schellenger,&Fredrickson,2001;Stoveret
al.,1997).Thissuggeststhatdemands
for curriculum integration are primarily driven by contemporary business
conditions. However, a reading of
the literature describing the formative years of university-based schools
of commerce indicates that the early
business schools were aware of the
integration issue. Then, as now, different methods were used to promote
integration. However, the demand for
broad integrative thinking by businessgraduatesisnotparticularlyaby-
product of contemporary business
trends (although such trends may
accentuatethedemand)but,rather,an
inherent component of any sound collegiatebusinesseducationcurriculum.
At the first meeting of the Associated Collegiate Schools of Business in
1919,WillardE.Hotchkiss,whoserved
as dean at a number of early schools
of commerce, outlined the elements he
thoughtappropriateforthecurriculum.
In Hotchkiss’ view, the freshman and
sophomoreyearsofthebusinessstudent
should be composed of a prebusiness
course of study. This should include a
large component of liberal education
and what we would today call foundational courses in business, such as
economics, accounting, and statistics
(Hotchkiss,1920).
This should be followed by a more
specialized curricula—because a numberofalternativecoursesofstudycould
be pursued—in the junior and senior
years. Each of those curricula should
begin with a discipline-specific survey
course.Althoughthecoursewastobein
the specific discipline, the point of the
coursewasnottobedisciplinespecific.
Rather, he argued that the important
componentofeachofthesurveycourseslayindevelopingthehabitsofmind
conducivetoabroadviewofbusiness:
Theideaofthesurveythenisnottogive
thestudentaninsightintoallthesubjects
he may have occasion to use, but rather
togivehimsamplescomingfromawideenough range of subjects whose content
ispertinenttohisproblemsothathewill
develop the habit of following collateral
aswellasdirectlinesofinquiry.Thefact
that a student has been unable to take a
courseintransportationwouldnotnecessarilyimplythathewouldomittransportation phases in analyzing a problem in
marketing.(Hotchkiss,p.100)
Incurrentjargon,Hotchkisscalledfor
thesurveycoursetoprovidecurriculum
integrationanddevelopcritical-thinking
skills. A second case of early integrationawarenessandeffortswasoutlined
byWallaceB.Donham(1922),deanof
the Harvard School of Commerce. He
extolledthepedagogicalvirtuesofcase
studies in graduate business education
(amethodstillassociatedwithHarvard
Business School). He noted, however,
that after the first year of foundational
andfunctionalcourses
the typical first-year man at the end of
theyearseemedtohavestudiedindividualcourseswithlittleconceptionoftheir
interrelation. Accounting was . . . simplyaccounting,andfinanceonlyfinance.
There was no clear understanding of the
usefulness of factory management training for the accountant. He wished in far
toomanycasestomakehimselfanarrow
specialist.(Donham,1922,p.63)
Donham(1922)indicatedthattheproblemwasresolvedwithabusinesspolicy
course that was given in the 2nd year
of the curriculum but asserted that an
integratedviewoughttobepresentedin
the1styear,andheofferedamethodto
accomplishthatend:
Yetthereisagreatneedthatmenshould
from the beginning of their work build
toward a coordinated structure of training rather than toward isolated units
whose interrelationship is beyond their
vision. In the effort to bring about this
coordinationwegivethefirst-yearclass
immediately after their arrival a very
complicatedbusinesscasewhichshould
foritssolutiondependuponthesubject
matterofalargepartofthecoursesgiven
intheschool.Ofcoursesuchaproblem
is beyond the capacity of every man in
the class. It nevertheless is presented
for their consideration and after careful
studybythemdiscussedbytheinstructor. This discussion serves as an object
lesson in the preliminary analysis of a
complicated business problem, and at
thesametimebringsouttherelationof
the problem to the different courses. In
thiswaythestudentatoncerealizeshow
theindividualcoursesintheschoolwork
togetherasapreparationofasolutionof
a single executive problem while at the
same time he acquires a more adequate
conceptionofthegeneralandinterlocking nature of business problems. (Donham,1922,pp.63–64)
March/April2008
243
Although described in dated language, the problems that Donham
(1922)andHotchkiss(1920)considered
andthesolutionstheyofferedarefamiliartothoseinthecontemporarydiscussionofcurriculumintegration.Perhaps
thedesireforcurriculumintegrationof
businesscoursesisnotonlyaresultof
the changing business world. Perhaps
anintegratedcurriculumisthemanifestationofthepersistentvalueofabroad,
liberal, and interconnected course of
studyincollegiatebusinesseducation.
Downloaded by [Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji] at 23:10 11 January 2016
Conclusion
Many of the issues that colleges of
businessfacetodayarethesameasthose
facedintheearlypartofthe20thcentury.Thesameissueswilllikelybewith
business schools in the 22nd century.
From the earlier educators of business,
two conclusions and one admonition
readily arise: First, collegiate business
educationispartofageneraluniversity
education. Business students at universitiesandcollegeshavealwaysandwill
always be “learning something bearing
ontheirfuturebusinesswhileacquiring
a liberal education” (James, 1901, p.
154).Thisimpliesnotonlythatmuchof
theircourseworkwillinevitablybeoutside the business college, but also that
business courses must be disciplined,
analyticallyrigorous,andbeyondmere
descriptions of business phenomena.
These were the aspirations of the first
generation of business educators. This
wasreinforced50yearslaterwhenthe
Carnegie report on collegiate business
educationentreated,“Bothundergraduateandgraduatecourseworksneedsto
be kept in a broad context and limited
to problems of solid analytical content” (Pierson, 1959, p. xi). Although
the exact blend between the practical
andtheliberalwillalwaysevolve,both
will be necessary components of businessstudies.
Second, for almost 100 years, businessschoolshaveunsuccessfullysought
professional status. It seems business
educators have always been anxious
over the absence of clear professional
status of business occupations.Yet the
realityisthatmostundergraduatebusinessdegreesneverdidandcurrentlydo
notleadtooccupationsthatareprofes244
JournalofEducationforBusiness
sional in the strict sense of the term.
Perhaps it is time to ask: So what?
Businessschoolsshouldthinkofthemselves as academic hybrids. Parts of
thebusinessschoolcurriculum,notably
economicsandfinancecourses,areacademicinnature.Othercomponentssuch
as accounting and certain specialized
courseworkinmanagement(e.g.,human
resources) are professional or quasiprofessional in nature. Others such as
communications and technical courses
are somewhere between the two and
aptly considered vocational. So what?
Businessschoolshavebeenaroundfora
century.Dotheyneedtomakeextraordinary claims of professional status to
justifytheirpresenceinauniversitysetting? Such self-confident clarity might
do much to improve interdepartmental
andintercollegialrelationships.
Last, an admonition arises. Contemporary business colleges are subject to
demandsforchangefrombothinternal
andexternalconstituenciesandaccreditationsagenciesonanynumberofissues.
Althoughsuchpressureisundoubtedly
necessaryandusuallyhealthy,itwould
be useful if the proponents of reform
adopted the scholarly habit of reviewing the history of the issue in business
education. This would serve the twofoldpurposeofhelpingtheadvocatesof
change to better understand and refine
theirpositionandsimultaneouslygiving
theirclaimincreasedlegitimacy.
Ifanadvisoryboardmemberofacollege of business wants to make a case
thatstudentsaredeficientintheirwriting
skillsandthatthefacultyandadministrationofthecollegeshoulddosomething
about it, the board member’s case and
credibility would be enhanced if he or
shedocumentedtheproblemsofstudent
writingincollegesofbusinessovertime.
Of course, this would require a broader
knowledge of the history of business
collegesamongalltheconstituenciesof
business colleges. This article contributessomewhattothatend.
NOTES
Dr. Cecil E. Bohanon’s research interests are
applied microeconomics, public choice analysis,
andbusinesscurriculum.
Correspondence concerning this article should be
addressed to Dr. Cecil E. Bohanon, Department of
Economics,BallStateUniversity,Muncie,IN47306.
E-mail:cbohanon@bsu.edu
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Bonbright, J. C. (1926). The place of economics in the curriculum of a school of business:
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