The Development of Ethics Vol 1 pdf
The Development of Ethics
This page intentionally left blank The Development of Ethics A Historical and Critical Study
Volume I: From Socrates to the Reformation T E R E N C E I R W I N
1
1 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide in
Oxford New York
Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto
With offices in
Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore
South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam
Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press
in the UK and in certain other countries
Published in the United States
by Oxford University Press Inc., New York
Terence Irwin 2007
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
Database right Oxford University Press (maker)
First published 2007
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press,
or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate
reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction
outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department,
Oxford University Press, at the address above
You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover
and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Data available
Typeset by Laserwords Private Limited, Chennai, India
Printed in Great Britain
on acid-free paper by
Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk
ISBN 978–0–19–824267–3
1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
In Memoriam
Henry Ernest Irwin
1915–2006
This page intentionally left blank
P R E F A C E
This book was originally intended to be a companion to The Development of Logic, by William and Martha Kneale, published by Oxford in 1962. I undertook it at the suggestion of Angela Blackburn, who was at that time editor for Philosophy at the Press, and with the encouragement of Sir Anthony Kenny, who was at that time the Delegate to the Press for Philosophy. I was doubtful whether I could match the learning, acuity, clarity, and brevity of Kneale and Kneale, and my doubts have certainly been vindicated. To say nothing of the first three features of Kneale and Kneale, I have not been able to achieve their brevity. On the contrary, the work has expanded to three volumes, and in this respect resembles a Victorian novel.
The three-volume novel has not been universally admired. In The Importance of Being
Earnest
, Miss Prism offers a rather unsuccessful defence:
MISS PRISM. Do not speak slightingly of the three-volume novel, Cecily. I wrote one myself in earlier
days.CECILY. Did you really, Miss Prism? How wonderfully clever you are! I hope it did not end happily?
I don’t like novels that end happily. They depress me so much. MISS PRISM. The good ended happily, and the bad unhappily. That is what Fiction means. CECILY. I suppose so. But it seems very unfair.According to the incisive literary critic Lady Bracknell, Miss Prism’s work was ‘a three- volume novel of more than usually revolting sentimentality’. Though Henry James is less direct than Lady Bracknell, he none the less denounces some Victorian novels as ‘large, loose, baggy monsters, with their queer elements of the accidental and the arbitrary’ (Preface to The Tragic Muse).
I have not sought to draw precisely the moral described by Miss Prism, but I have a reasonably optimistic attitude to the history of ethics, and I don’t know whether I have avoided revolting sentimentality. Some readers, if they get through the whole book, may well take Henry James’s view. But perhaps some reasons can be given to explain why it is looser and baggier than Kneale and Kneale, and may not be free of queer elements of the accidental and the arbitrary.
Kneale and Kneale decided, quite reasonably, to devote most space to logic after 1879, and to treat the previous history relatively briefly. Any similar decision about the history of ethics would be misguided, Even if we supposed that, say, moral philosophy made a great advance in 1874 with Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics, we could hardly understand or evaluate Sidgwick’s achievement without a comparison with his predecessors. More important, good reasons can be given for doubting whether Sidgwick in the 19th century, or Kant or Hume in the 18th, or Hobbes in the 17th, made the sort of advance that would justify us in relegating their predecessors to a relatively minor role.
Preface Many people teaching the history of moral philosophy, or teaching moral philosophy from a historical point of view, would probably want to include some ‘pre-modern’ moralist, usually Aristotle, in their presentation of the area. Alasdair MacIntyre said he wanted to include the Greeks in his Short History of Ethics for the sake of undergraduates confined to the ‘treadmill’ of Hume, Kant, Mill, and Moore (Preface). Fewer people, however, have taken it to be equally important to discuss moral philosophy between Aristotle and Hobbes. I have tried to do something to encourage the closer study of moral philosophy between the 4th century and the 17th century , This choice has greatly increased the size of the book.
One might well argue, however, that my treatment of this important period is still too short. While I have given some space to Aquinas and to Suarez, the treatment of Augustine, Scotus, and Ockham is quite brief, and many important people (including Neoplatonists, Church Fathers, Abelard, and less well-known mediaeval writers) are omitted. The decision to omit them reflects my aim (explained further in the Introduction) of concentrating on the development of an Aristotelian outlook, but it may have been mistaken. At any rate, I hope this part of the book will encourage some more people to pursue the study of mediaeval moral philosophy far enough to discover how little of it I have covered.
A further reason for the length of this book is my aim of expounding different views fully enough to show what can be said for and against them. This is not meant to be a neutral exposition that refrains from evaluation; I also try to defend, object, or revise, where it seems appropriate. Success in these tasks would demand would need a clear understanding of all the major questions in moral philosophy, not to mention the relevant questions in other areas of philosophy. Readers who understand the questions better than I do will no doubt discover many errors in interpretation and judgment. But perhaps they will be encouraged to improve the account that I offer.
Some parts of this book (e.g., the chapters on Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill) cover very familiar ground and express views on questions that many others have discussed in detail. Other parts (e.g., the chapters on Suarez, Cudworth, Balguy, Price) discuss moralists who have received far less attention from moral philosophers writing in English. I have tried, as far as possible, to ignore the familiarity or unfamiliarity of a particular author. I have not refrained from going over familiar issues; nor have I discussed someone at greater length simply because he has attracted more attention from other critics. Readers may well find, therefore, that the discussion of Kant (e.g.) is rather thin, in so far as it overlooks some of the questions, elaborations, and complications that have resulted from later philosophical criticism. This uneven character (as it may seem) of different parts of the book reflects my attempt to allocate space to different people according to their importance in the argument, not according to the degree of attention they have attracted.
Though the three volumes are being published separately, they have been conceived as a single study. The division simply results from the excessive length of the book. The volumes begin at reasonably natural places (the second with Suarez, the third with Kant), but I would not want the reader to attach any particular philosophical significance to these divisions.
One inconvenience for the reader results from the separate publication of the volumes. I have not inserted cross-references to later volumes, in case the sections are re-numbered in the final stages of revision. Instead I have inserted references to the works of later Preface philosophers. When readers have the later volumes in their hands, they should be able to find some relevant discussion by looking at the chapters that discuss these later works.
The notes and bibliography are intended to give the necessary information reasonably briefly. It seemed to me difficult and unnecessary to try to separate ‘original sources’ from ‘secondary sources’ (where ought Sidgwick’s Outlines, for instance, to be placed?), and so I have gathered them all in a single alphabetical list. Readers who consult the list of abbreviations should be able to cope with the notes and bibliography.
I have been working intermittently on this book since 1990 or so, but it expresses an interest, beginning in the early 1970s, in the history of ethics. I mainly owe this interest to the teaching and advice of Gregory Vlastos, and to some conversations with John Rawls. Hence many of the papers I have published have provided matter, more or less proximate, for the following chapters. I have also learned from many people during this time I have been working on this book. Some of them are the helpful and well-informed people who, on hearing about the project, asked me questions of the form: ‘And what are you going to say about X?’. In some cases I had to say ‘Who?’, and in some cases ‘Nothing’. The present length of the book is partly the result of such questions. To many reasonable questions of the same form I would still have to say what Dr Johnson said about an entry in his dictionary: ‘Ignorance, madam, pure ignorance.’ But in some cases I discovered that X was worth reading and discussing, and moreover that Y, discussed by X, also deserved attention, and so on.
I have received comments from a number of helpful and acute anonymous referees. For Volume 1 in particular, I am pleased to be able to thank Gareth Matthews and Richard Kraut by name. Among those whose work I have learned most from I would include Richard Kraut, John Cooper, Julia Annas, and Alasdair MacIntyre.
In trying to construct some reasonably clear lines of argument, I have been helped considerably by the patient, intelligent, and thoughtful students, both undergraduate and graduate, at Cornell who have heard and discussed some of the main ideas in this book in many courses on the history of ethics. The tenacity of those who have lasted through a whole academic year, and not just one term, has been especially encouraging. Though the book contains too much to squeeze into a 28-week academic year, these students have probably been the readers I have had in mind most often.
Since I have taught in the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell for quite a few years, I have absorbed—no doubt incompletely—many aspects of the philosophical outlook of my colleagues. If I have any slight grasp of any relevant questions in metaphysics and epistemology, I owe much of it to Richard Boyd and Sydney Shoemaker. My temerarious efforts in the study of mediaeval philosophy were encouraged by the models of scholarship and philosophical imagination provided by Norman Kretzmann and Scott MacDonald. If I have any slight grasp of moral philosophy, I owe much of it to Nicholas Sturgeon. Though he will certainly find that many things I say are false, confused, or superficial, anything that approaches truth or clarity probably results from his influence. I owe so much, in so many ways, to Gail Fine that I will not even try to describe it in detail.
The writing of this book might have taken even longer had I not been able to work on it during several periods of leave, which I owe to Cornell University, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Guggenheim Foundation. In 2004 I was fortunate to spend a ix
Preface month at the Rockefeller Foundation Study Centre in Bellagio. I spent some of the leave in Oxford, where I found more things to write about by exploring some of the resources of the Bodleian Library, and where I especially learned from discussion with David Charles.
The finishing of a long book written over many years involves a number of indispensable but tedious tasks. Fortunately, I have been helped in these tasks by the careful attention of Yurii Cohen. It would be too much to hope that he has succeeded completely in removing the effects of my errors and oversights, but he has worked hard and diligently in the interests of readers who would like citations and cross-references to be accurate and relevant.
I mentioned that Oxford University Press suggested this book to me. For this reason and for many others, it is a duty and a pleasure to thank the Delegates and officers of this admirable institution that has done so much to advance classical and philosophical learning. In particular, Peter Momtchiloff has been a source of wise advice and patient encouragement over a number of years, to me as to many other philosophers.
The design on the title page is based on Plato, Republic 328a. I owe it to William Whewell, who used it in several of his books on ethics, including those on the history of ethics (which I will come to in the later volumes). Since Whewell was not only a considerable moral philosopher, and a leader in the revival of the English universities in the 19th century, but also one of the first people in modern England to take up the systematic study of the history of ethics, including Plato, from a philosophical point of view. He could justly claim to have passed on the torch that had reached him from Plato. Faculty of Philosophy University of Oxford June 2007
S U M M A R Y C O N T E N T S
Contents18. Aquinas: Freedom 475
12. Stoicism: Action, Passion, and Reason 285
13. Stoicism: Virtue and Happiness 312
14. Christian Theology and Moral Philosophy 360
15. Augustine 397
16. Aquinas: Will 434
17. Aquinas: Action 456
19. Aquinas: The Ultimate End 492
10. The Sceptics 233
20. Aquinas: Moral Virtue 516
21. Aquinas: Natural Law 545
22. Aquinas: Practical Reason and Prudence 571
23. Aquinas: The Canon of the Virtues 588
24. Aquinas: Sin and Grace 628
25. Scotus: Will, Freedom, and Reason 653
11. Epicurus 257
9. Aristotle: Virtue and Morality 198
xiii
3. The Cyrenaics
Abbreviations
xxv
1. Introduction
1
2. Socrates
13
45
8. Aristotle: Virtue 153
4. The Cynics
57
5. Plato
69
6. Aristotle: Happiness 114
7. Aristotle: Nature 134
26. Scotus: Virtue and Practical Reason 679
Summary Contents
27. Ockham 701
28. Machiavelli 725
29. The Reformation and Scholastic Moral Philosophy 744
Bibliography
775
Index
793
C O N T E N T S
Abbreviations xxv1. Introduction
1
1. Scope
1
2. The Socratic Tradition
2
3. Aristotelian Naturalism
4
4. Critics of Aristotelian Naturalism
5
5. Beginning and End
6
6. Progress, Optimism, and Pessimism
6
7. What this Book is Not
10
8. Level and Organization
11
2. Socrates
13
9. The Founder of Moral Philosophy?
13
10. Method
15
11. What is a Socratic Definition?
16
12. Basic Moral Principles
19
13. Knowledge of the Good: Eudaemonism
22
14. Why Virtue is Necessary for Happiness
23
15. Why is Virtue Sufficient for Happiness?
25
16. Wisdom and its Product
27
17. The Supremacy of Virtue
28
18. Does Happiness give a Reason for being Virtuous?
29
19. What sort of Virtue is Supreme in Happiness?
30
20. Integrity and Socratic Virtue
32
21. The Nature of Happiness: Socratic Hedonism
33
22. Hedonism and Socratic Virtue
35
23. Objections to Hedonism: The Gorgias
37
24. Hedonism without Prudence?
38
25. An Adaptive Conception of Happiness
40
26. Is Virtue Identical to Happiness?
41
27. Reason and Desire
42
3. The Cyrenaics
45
28. The ‘One-Sided’ Socratics
45
29. Aristippus and the Protagoras
47 Contents
30. Hedonism without Eudaemonism
84
91
53. Inadequate Conceptions of Happiness
89
52. Is Justice Sufficient for Happiness?
87
51. How is Justice a Non-instrumental Good?
50. Why is Justice to be Chosen for Itself ?
94
81
49. The Tripartite Soul, Virtue, and Vice
79
48. Why Parts of the Soul?
76
47. Why a Tripartite Soul?
54. Cyrenaic Hedonism v. Eudaemonism
55. Why Intelligence is Not the Good
46. Non-rational Desires
61. The Philosopher as Ruler: A Conflict between Justice and Happiness? 105
66. Aristotle’s Main Contributions 115
65. Interpreting Aristotle 114
6. Aristotle: Happiness 114
64. Eudaemonism and Concern for Others 111
63. Love, Self-Concern, and Concern for Others 109
62. The Philosopher as Ruler: No Sacrifice of Happiness? 107
60. How Psychic Justice Fulfils the Human Function 103
96
59. What is Psychic Justice? 101
58. Are Plato’s Questions Reasonable? 100
98
57. Why Justice is Insufficient for Happiness
97
56. Responses to the Philebus
75
73
48
55
58
36. Socratic Alternatives to Hedonism: Virtue or Self-Sufficiency?
57
35. Socrates and the Cynics
57
4. The Cynics
34. A Conflict between Hedonism and Eudaemonism?
60
53
33. Doubts about the Continuing Self
51
32. Epistemological and Metaphysical Objections to Eudaemonism
49
31. For and against Eudaemonism
37. Happiness and Adaptation
38. Do the Cynics Improve on Socrates?
45. Appropriate Definitions
69
72
44. Why Explanation Requires Non-sensible Forms
71
43. Definitions and Disputes
70
42. The Scope of Plato’s Ethical Thought
41. Plato’s Reflexions on Socrates
62
69
5. Plato
67
40. An Objection to Cynicism
65
39. Socrates and the Cynics: Is Virtue Identical to Happiness?
67. Method 119 Contents
68. The Role of the Final Good 122
92. Anti-rationalism and the Weakness of Practical Reason: Incontinence 165
86. Virtue and Harmony 157
87. Rationalist v. Anti-rationalist Accounts of Virtue 158
88. Anti-rationalism: Virtue and Pleasure 160
89. Anti-rationalism: Limits of Practical Reason 161
90. Anti-rationalism: Moral Virtue and Responsibility 162
91. Anti-rationalism: The Voluntary 164
93. Anti-rationalism: Vice 166
84. Virtue, Continence, Incontinence, and Vice 154
94. Virtue, Election, and Reason 167
95. Pleasure and Reason 168
96. Virtue, Election, and Deliberation 171
97. Wish and Will 173
98. Prudence and Deliberation 175
99. Virtue, Reason, and Responsibility 177 100. Voluntary Action in Rational Agents 179 101. Rational Agency and Character 181 102. Moral Responsibility and Morality 183 103. Questions about Incontinence and Responsibility 183 104. Incontinence, Ignorance, and Deliberation 185 105. Vice, Reason, and Appetite
85. The Doctrine of the Mean 155
83. The Function Argument and the Virtues 153
69. The Final Good and Happiness 123
75. Function, Essence, End, and Explanation 136
70. The Final Good and the ‘Three Lives’ 126
71. A Comprehensive Conception of Happiness 128
72. Happiness and Goodness 129
73. Implications of Eudaemonism 132
7. Aristotle: Nature 134
74. The Function Argument 134
76. Function and Practical Reason 139
8. Aristotle: Virtue 153
77. Aristotelian Naturalism? 140
78. A Non-naturalist Account of the Function Argument 142
79. Nature, Happiness, and External Goods 143
80. Naturalism and ‘Second Nature’ 145
81. The Extent of Naturalism in the Ethics 147
82. Happiness, Function, and the Theoretical Life 149
187 106. Self-Love, Reason, and the Fine 189 xv Contents 107. How is the Fine Connected with Reason? 190 108. Vice and Pleasure
192 109. The Vicious Person’s Regret
192 110. The Instability of the Vicious Person 194 111. Vice, Reason, and Nature
196
9. Aristotle: Virtue and Morality
112. Why Virtues? 198
238 134. Aristotle and Conflicting Appearances 239 135. Aristotle on Nature and Convention 241 136. Arguments against Objective Goodness 243 137. Natural Goodness
144. Hedonism 259
143. Epicurus’ Aims 257
11. Epicurus 257
254
248 140. What kind of Life can we live without Beliefs? 251 141. Scepticism, Belief, and Deliberation: Sextus, Hobbes, and Hume 253 142. Do we Need Beliefs?
245 139. Actions without Beliefs?
244 138. Sceptical Tranquillity
130. Scepticism in the History of Greek Ethics 233 131. The Sceptic as an Investigator 234 132. Socrates as a Source of Scepticism 236 133. Protagoras and Plato
113. The Content of the Virtues 200
10. The Sceptics 233
198
224 127. Different Aspects of Friendship in the Political Community 226 128. Friendship and Morality
220 126. The Extension of Friendship
218 125. Why Other Selves?
206 117. Justice, the Common Good, and Concern for the Fine 208 118. The Fine and the Virtues of Character: Bravery 210 119. The Fine and the Virtues: Temperance 210 120. The Fine and the Virtues: Generosity and Magnificence 212 121. The Fine and the Virtues: Magnanimity 213 122. How can Friendship Justify Morality? 215 123. Friendship and Concern for Others 216 124. The Friend as Another Self
114. Are the Virtues of Character Moral Virtues? 202 115. Is Aristotle an Unsystematic Theorist? 204 116. Virtue and the Fine
227 129. Aristotelian and other Conceptions of Morality 230 Contents 145. Epicurean Eudaemonism v. Cyrenaic Hedonism 260 146. Why Freedom Matters
262 147. Why we should Reject Compatibilism 263 148. Why we should Reject Determinism 264 149. Epicurus’ Indeterminism
297 168. How can we Correct our Assents? 300 169. Questions about Responsibility 300 170. Assent as Principal Cause
325 184. Crafts, Ends, and Objectives
323 183. Preferred Indifferents
321 182. Indifferents
176. Practical Reason and Preconceptions 312 177. Practical Reason, Consistency, and Agreement 313 178. The Use and the Value of Practical Reason 314 179. The Non-instrumental Value of Practical Reason 316 180. The Non-instrumental Value of Virtue 318 181. Virtue as the Only Good
13. Stoicism: Virtue and Happiness 312
309
305 173. Assent as the Basis for Responsibility 307 174. Passions, Assent, and Responsibility 308 175. Action and Practical Reason
303 172. Incompatibilist Objections
302 171. Fate v. Necessity
292 166. Nature, Conciliation, and Appearances 295 167. Passions as Assents
265 150. Indeterminism and Epicurus’ Ethical Theory 266 151. Types of Pleasure
291 165. Preconceptions
289 164. Stoic Strategies
287 163. Reactions to Stoic Ethics
161. The Stoics and their Predecessors 285 162. Eudaemonism
12. Stoicism: Action, Passion, and Reason 285
283
276 158. Justice and its Consequences: Epicurus v. Plato 278 159. The Value of Friendship: Epicurus and Aristotle 280 160. Difficulties in Epicureanism
273 156. Hedonism and Good Pleasures 274 157. A Defence of Virtue?
266 152. Fear of Death as the Source of Excessive Desires 267 153. Does Epicurus Show that Death is Not an Evil? 268 154. Kinetic Pleasure v. Freedom from Pain 270 155. Is Epicurus a Hedonist?
327 xvii Contents 185. The Connexion of the Virtues 328 186. Concern for Preferred Indifferents 331 187. The Selective Value of Virtue and the Preferred Indifferents 332 188. Why Virtue is Praiseworthy
333 189. Why should Virtue be Identified with Happiness? 336 190. Two Roles of Aristotelian Happiness 338 191. Freedom from Passion
379 210. Moral Implications
406 222. Platonists and Peripatetics on Passions 407 223. The Primacy of the Will
216. The Rejection of Greek Ethics? 397 217. The Importance of the Will: Rejection of Psychological Dualism 398 218. The Will and Other Mental States 400 219. Will and Passion: Stoics v. Peripatetics 403 220. Augustine’s Objections to the Stoics on Passions 404 221. Will and Passions
15. Augustine 397
393
392 215. The Virtues
389 214. Eudaemonism
386 213. Free Will
381 211. The Christian Conception of Morality 383 212. Moral Psychology
373 208. The Moral Law and the Consciousness of Sin 375 209. Justification
342 192. Appearances without Passions 345 193. Is the Sage really Free of Passion? 346 194. The Extent of Friendship
371 207. Perfectionism
370 206. Natural Law
204. The Difference between the Moral and the Ceremonial Law 365 205. Law and Gospel
203. Questions for Moral Theory 363
202. Christian Influences 360
14. Christian Theology and Moral Philosophy 360
354 199. The Community of Human Beings 356 200. Limitations of Stoic Friendship 357 201. Estimate of the Stoic Position 359
352 198. The Community of Sages
347 195. Expanding Circles of Friendship 350 196. The Characteristics of Friendship 351 197. Stoic Political Theory
409 224. The Will and the Good: Eudaemonism and Intellectualism 411 Contents 225. Freewill and Determination
412 226. Pagan Morality and Natural Law 414 227. The Character of Happiness
452 248. The Influence of the Ultimate End 453
18. Aquinas: Freedom 475
473
468 258. The Influence of Will on Intellect 470 259. Will, Reason, and Desire
253. The Influence of the Passions on the Will 461 254. The Influence of the Will on the Passions 462 255. Action without Deliberation? 465 256. The Inter-dependence of Will and Practical Reason 466 257. How is the Will Rational?
252. Consent and Election 459
251. Deliberation 458
250. Aiming at Ends 456
249. Will and Action 456
17. Aquinas: Action 456
447 245. The Passions and Sensory Desire 449 246. Criticism of the Stoics on the Passions 451 247. Will and the Ultimate Good
416 228. Pagan Virtue
441 241. Rational Agency, Voluntary Action, and Freedom 442 242. Will and Properly Human Actions 443 243. Rational v. Non-rational Agents 444 244. The Passivity of the Passions
438 239. The Structure of Aquinas’ Ethical Theory 439 240. Augustine and Aristotle
237. The Form of Aquinas’ Argument 437 238. Aquinas and Naturalism
236. Interpretations of Aristotle 435
235. Aims 434
16. Aquinas: Will 434
429 234. Self-Love, Arrogance, and the Earthly City 431
425 232. Are Pagan Virtues Genuine Virtues? 427 233. Pagan Arrogance
420 230. Pagan Virtues and Misdirected Will 422 231. The Aim of Pagan Virtue
418 229. The Direction of the Will
260. Voluntary Action and the Will 475 261. How Action on Passions is Voluntary 476 262. The Will as the Source of Virtue and Vice 478 xix
Contents 263. The Connexion between Voluntariness and Freewill 481 264. Objections to an Aristotelian Account of Freewill 482 265. Will as the Source of Freewill 483 266. Freewill as Absence of Necessitation 485 267. Freewill as Rational Agency
284. Virtue and Freewill 516
539 299. Sin and Virtue
538 298. Sin and Vice
532 295. Passion and Sin: The Problem of Incontinence 533 296. How Incontinence is Based on Consent 535 297. Deliberate Fault
530 294. The Sources of Sin
529 293. Virtue v. Continence
526 291. Moral and Intellectual Virtues 527 292. Vice and Sin
519 287. The Passions as Subjects of Virtues 520 288. Means, Ends, and the Virtues 521 289. The Positive Contribution of the Passions 522 290. Will, Passion, and Virtue
285. Will and the Formation of Character 517 286. Reason, Passion, and Virtue
20. Aquinas: Moral Virtue 516
486 268. Freedom and External Reasons 487 269. The Place of Will and Intellect in Freedom 488 270. Freedom, Necessity, and Determination 489
510 283. The Pursuit of the Two Grades of Happiness 513
508 282. The Complete Good
504 280. How is Happiness Self-Sufficient? 505 281. Two Grades of Happiness
501 277. Is the Pursuit of Perfection Necessary? 502 278. The Place of Happiness in Aquinas’ Argument 503 279. Criteria for Happiness
498 276. Reasons and Perfection
497 275. Intellectual Love
494 274. Aiming at Perfection
271. Why Must the Will Pursue the Ultimate Good? 492 272. The Final Good and the Natural Law 493 273. Subordinate Ends
19. Aquinas: The Ultimate End 492
541 300. The General Tendency of Aquinas’ View of Virtue 543 Contents
21. Aquinas: Natural Law 545
301. Questions Raised by Natural Law 545 302. Questions about Law
546 303. Law and Obligation
548 304. Law, Reason, and Ends
549 305. Law and Publication
551 306. Eternal Law and Natural Law 552 307. The Natural Law and the Will of God 553 308. What is Natural about Natural Law? 556 309. The Relevance of Natural Law 558 310. The First Principle of Natural Law 560 311. Natural Inclinations and the Highest Precepts of Natural Law 561 312. Rational Agency and Social Nature 563 313. Derived Principles of Natural Law 565 314. Dispensations and Exceptions 567 315. Misunderstandings of Natural Law 569
22. Aquinas: Practical Reason and Prudence 571
316. Virtue, Will, and Practical Reason 571 317. Universal Conscience and the Ultimate End 573 318. How Universal Conscience Grasps Natural Law 576 319. Why Universal Conscience is Indestructible 577 320. How Prudence Discovers Ends 580 321. How Prudence Forms the Virtuous Motive 584 322. Objections to Aquinas’ View
586 323. Natural Law, Universal Conscience, and Prudence 586
23. Aquinas: The Canon of the Virtues 588
324. The Unity of Prudence 588
325. The Reciprocity of the Virtues 589 326. Objections to the Reciprocity of the Virtues 590 327. From the Ultimate End to the Cardinal Virtues 591 328. The Nature of a Cardinal Virtue 592 329. ‘Principal’ Displays of the Cardinal Virtues 593 330. The Range of a Cardinal Virtue 595 331. Subordinate Virtues
597 332. Moral Goodness in Latin Sources 599 333. The Honestum in Aquinas’ Commentary 603 334. The Honestum in the Summa 606 335. Justice
608 336. Friendship
609 337. Friendship as a Basis for Justice 614 xxi Contents 338. The Aims of Justice
615 339. Eudaemonism and Justice
649
374. Universal Conscience 682
373. Intellect, Will, and Virtue 680
372. Passion, Will, and Virtue 679
26. Scotus: Virtue and Practical Reason 679
674 370. Rational Capacity and Contingency 676 371. Voluntarism and Indeterminism 677
668 367. Eudaemonism, Intellectualism, and Voluntarism 670 368. A Dualism of Practical Reason 672 369. Will as Rational Capacity
666 366. Sin and Freedom
660 362. The Conflict between Eudaemonism and Freedom 661 363. Moral Objections to Eudaemonism: The Two Affections of the Will 663 364. Freedom Identified with the Affection for Justice 665 365. Sin and Self-Love
360. Psychological Objections to Eudaemonism 659 361. Defences of Eudaemonism
359. The Character of the Will 658
358. Early Critics of Aquinas 654
357. Alternatives to Aquinas 653
25. Scotus: Will, Freedom, and Reason 653
648 356. Defence of Pagan Virtue
619 340. Commands and Counsels
644 354. How the Infused Virtues Perfect the Acquired Virtues 647 355. Sin and Infused Virtues
642 353. Infused Virtue
639 352. Grace, Freewill, and Merit
637 350. Natural and Supernatural Good 638 351. The Need for Grace
635 349. The Effects of Original Sin
634 348. Original Sin
633 347. How God Causes Sin
345. Sin and Causal Responsibility 631 346. God and Human Freewill
344. The External Causes of Sin 630
343. Questions for Aquinas 628
24. Aquinas: Sin and Grace 628
624 342. Success of the Argument for the Virtues 626
621 341. Self-Love, Sin, and Virtue
375. Practical Reason and Prudence 684 Contents 376. The Unity of Prudence: Aquinas against Scotus 685 377. Eudaemonism and the Unity of Prudence 686 378. Knowledge of Natural Law
687 379. Divine Commands and Natural Law 689 380. Natural Law and the Will of God 690 381. God’s Justice
28. Machiavelli 725
411. Objections to Scholasticism 744
29. The Reformation and Scholastic Moral Philosophy 744
738 410. The Strength of Machiavelli’s Objections to Morality 740
735 408. Adaptation to Circumstances 736 409. Exceptions to Morality?
731 406. Instrumental Practical Reason 732 407. Morality and Circumstances
727 404. Machiavellian Virtue v. Moral Virtue 729 405. Civic Virtue and its End
726 403. Civic v. Christian Virtue
401. Questions about Moral Philosophy 725 402. Civic Virtues
719 399. God and Morality: Versions of Voluntarism 721 400. Voluntarism, Morality, and Reasons 724
691 382. Consonance with Natural Law 693 383. Biel on Consonance and Dispensations 695 384. The Extent of God’s Freedom 697 385. God’s Promises and God’s Generosity 699
711 395. Non-positive v. Positive Morality 713 396. Divine Freedom and Divine Justice 716 397. Questions about God’s Justice 718 398. Conflicts within Morality
709 394. Separability of the Virtues
708 393. Correct Reason and Will
705 391. Developments of Voluntarism 707 392. Virtue and Passion
388. Does Eudaemonism Exclude Freedom? 703 389. Moderate v. Extreme Voluntarism 704 390. Difficulties for Voluntarism
387. How to Reject Happiness 702
386. Approaches to Ockham 701
27. Ockham 701
412. Natural Law 746 xxiii
Contents 413. Dispensations from Natural Law? 749 414. Hooker on Natural Law
751 415. The Effects of Sin
752 416. Objections to Self-Love
755 417. Pagan Virtue
757 418. Sin and Freewill
762 419. Justification, Grace, and Faith 767 420. Grace and Virtue
769 421. Natural Law and Ethics
771 422. Implications
773
Bibliography 775
Index 793
A B B R E V I A T I O N S
This list includes only the most frequently used abbreviations, and those that might puzzle a reader. I have tried to cite primary texts from the sources that will be fairly readily available. Greek and Latin texts appearing in the OCT, BT, Loeb, PG, and PL series are listed with a reference to the relevant series, but without further details.
I have mentioned only a few of the available translations and editions. Acronyms are normally used for the titles of books, journals, and collections. Short titles are used for articles and essays.
Page references include ‘p.’ only in cases where it might avoid ambiguity. A letter after a number (e.g., ‘Reid, EAP 755 H’) usually indicates the relevant edition. Annotated translations and editions are usually listed under the editor’s name.
Ac. =
Cicero, Academica
ACPQ = American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly AP = Ancient Philosophy
Aquinas, in EN (etc.) = Aquinas’ commentaries on Aristotle and on Biblical books Arr. = Epicurus, ed. Arrighetti Articles, see English Articles AV = Bible (1611)
BCP = Book of Common Prayer BF = Aquinas, Blackfriars edn.
BT = Bibliotheca Teubneriana. Greek and Latin texts. Leipzig: Teubner (later Stuttgart: Teubner and Stuttgart: K. G. Saur
CAG = Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca CD = Augustine, De Civitate Dei
Cic. = Cicero
CSEL = Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum
CUAP = Catholic University of America Press (Washington, DC) CUP = Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, London, New York) D or Denz. = Denziger, Enchiridion Symbolorum DK = Diels-Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker DL = Diogenes Laertius EK = Poseidonius, Fragments, ed. Edelstein and Kidd
EN =
Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea (Nicomachean Ethics)
F. = Cicero, De Finibus
Fat
. = Alexander, De Fato, or Cicero, De Fato
FS = Franciscan Studies G =
Kant, Groundwork
Abbreviations HUP = Harvard University Press (Cambridge, Mass.)
JHP = Journal of the History of Philosophy JP = Journal of Philosophy KpV = Kant, Critique of Practical Reason L = Aquinas, Leonine edn.
Loeb = Loeb Classical Library (Greek and Latin texts with facing English translations, of varying quality). Cambridge, Mass: HUP, and London: Heinemann LS = Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers LXX, see Bible, Septuaginta M = Aquinas, Marietti edns.
M =
Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos
Mal
. = Aquinas, De Malo
NP =
Plutarch, Non posse suaviter vivere secundum Epicurum NRSV, see Bible. New Revised Standard Version OCT = Oxford Classical Texts (Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis). Greek and Latin texts (OUP)
Off
. = Cicero, De Officiis OO = Opera Omnia, various authors OO = Scotus, Opera Omnia, ed. Wadding OP = Scotus, Opera Philosophica
OSAP = Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
OT = Ockham, Opera Theologica OUP = Oxford University Press (including Clarendon Press and books published in Oxford,
London, and New York) P = Aquinas, Parma edn.
P =
Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoneae Hypotyposes
PAS = Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society PBACAP = Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy PG = Patrologiae Graecae Cursus Completus
, ed. Migne. Greek texts of early Christian writers
PHP =
Galen, De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis
Phr
. = Phronesis
PL = Patrologiae Latinae Cursus Completus
, ed. Migne. Latin texts of early Christian writers Plu. = Plutarch
PR = Philosophical Review
PUP = Princeton University Press (Princeton)
QM = Scotus, Quaestiones . . . in Metaphysica RTAM = Recherches de th´eologie ancienne et medi´evale Sent = Sententiae
or Scriptum super Sententiis (various authors)
SG =
Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles
SPAS = Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes SR =
Plutarch, De Stoicorum Repugnantiis SR = Socraticorum Reliquiae, ed. Giannantoni ST = Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Stob. = Stobaeus Abbreviations
SVF = Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta
, ed. von Arnim Sx = Sextus Empiricus
TD =
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations
TDNT = Theological Dictionary of the New Testament
, ed. Kittel U = Usener, Epicurea UCP = University of California Press (Berkeley and Los Angeles) V = Scotus, Opera Omnia, Vatican edn.
Ver =
Aquinas, De Veritate
VM =
Plutarch, De Virtute Morali Vulg., see Bible W = Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, ed. Wolter xxvii