SILEBR 2011 007.
SIL Electronic Book Reviews 2011-007
How words mean: Lexical concepts, cognitive models,
and meaning construction
By Vyvyan Evans
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. xviii, 377. hardback $130.00, £75.00,
paperback $50.00, £27.00. ISBN 0-19-923466-3 (hardback), 978-0-19-923466-0 (hardback),
0-19-923467-1 (paperback), 978-0-19-923467-7 (paperback).
Reviewed by George Huttar
SIL International
How is it that a single word in a language can be used to mean so many different things, and that
listeners/readers are so often successful in figuring out what speakers/hearers intend to convey
with the words they use, and that on the other hand we sometimes get it wrong? Basic questions
for exegetes, translators, linguists, arbitrators, and ordinary people just trying to understand and
be understood! This book (HWM) aims to answer these questions about the “construction of
meaning” by presenting the Theory of Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models, or LCCM Theory,
a theory that draws on other cognitive approaches to language and communication—mostly from
linguistics (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson 1999, Talmy 2000, Fauconnier and Turner 2002, Langacker
2008), but to a lesser extent also from cognitive science (especially Barsalou 1991 and several
later works by that author). A summary of HWM is available in Crombach 2010 and in Taylor
2010, while I recommend Murphy 2011 for its critique by a psychologist, including relevant
experimental data not referred to by Evans. Rather than offering yet another summary of HWM, I
focus here on some specific components of LCCM Theory as presented in the book, relating
them to other approaches to meaning construction, in particular Relevance Theory.
Perhaps the central principle of LCCM Theory is that “meaning is not a property of words, or
even language, per se. Rather…meaning arises as a function of the way words (and language) are
deployed by language users in socioculturally, temporally, and physically contextualized
communicative events, which is to say utterances, due to a complex battery of linguistic and
non-linguistic processes, in service of the expression of situated communicative intentions” (22).
To say that “meaning is not a property of words” is not to say that “words do not have stable
semantic representations associated with them….they do” (23), representations Evans calls
“lexical concepts,” as in the name of his theory. These lexical concepts play an initial role in the
“complex battery of linguistic and non-linguistic processes” called into play in interpreting an
utterance, the role of providing access to encyclopaedic knowledge, knowledge which is
organized into “cognitive models,” the other half of the theory’s name.
Lexical concepts are linguistic, associated with linguistic forms (“vehicles”) such as words, affixes,
and constructions. Their representation of meaning is “schematic,” limited to “representations
that are specialized for being encoded by language” (42). They provide access to the much richer
“representations associated with the conceptual system, [which] are not directly encoded by
language—although language facilitates access to this level” (43). What happens when we try to
understand what someone is saying is that the words (and other linguistic forms) allow us to
access some of our cognitive models, among which we select one (or more) that matches our
encyclopaedic knowledge of the way things are, including the context of the utterance, what we
already believe about the speaker/writer, and what has already been said.
Some vehicles, such as polysemous words, trigger access to a greater number of cognitive models
than others, but the same non-linguistic processes of selection just mentioned apply. Similarly,
non-literal use of words or other expressions are processed in the same way, not in some way
different from how we process expressions used literally: “the same set of compositional
mechanisms are responsible for literal and figurative understanding. Hence, figurative language
does not involve a distinct module or set of processes. Rather, it is continuous with literal
understanding” (301).
With its notion of lexical concepts, claims Evans, “LCCM Theory gives back to cognitive
linguists the importance of language in meaning-construction processes” (338), correcting what
he sees as some other cognitive linguists’ tendency to “downplay the significance of language
itself in meaning construction” (ibid.). Nevertheless, Evans himself, while seeking to restore a
balance between the linguistic and non-linguistic processes in the construction of meaning, often
emphasizes the latter. For example, in explicating why some previous approaches to word
meaning fall short, he claims “they make no serious attempt to relate their theoretical claims to
the nature of situated meaning,” and goes on to say, “We need a theoretical account of context,
and the role of the language user as an intentional agent who employs language, in part, in
service of the expression of situated communicative intentions” (69), referring to, among others,
Sperber and Wilson 1995.
I mention the reference to Sperber and Wilson to draw attention to what I see as a great deal in
common between S&W’s Relevance Theory and Evans’s approach to meaning construction. The
quote just given stresses speaker intention, a concept important in RT (as well as in the philosophy
of language of John Searle—e.g., Searle 1983—and, in a very different way, in the account of
child language acquisition propounded in Bloom 2002). More generally, both LCCM Theory and
RT rightly insist that linguistic forms alone do not fully determine the meaning of an utterance—
far from it! And more specifically, the above-mentioned position that there is no principled
distinction between interpreting literal and figurative language use also meshes with the explication
within RT of figurative language use as just another example of “loose talk” (see, e.g., Sperber
and Wilson 2008).
With so much in common between LCCM Theory and Relevance Theory, it is perhaps
unfortunate, although not altogether surprising in the context of how academic communities are
constituted these days, that there is not more collaboration and building on each other’s work
between the two approaches. Evans does mention RT occasionally, as we have seen, but
sometimes fails to represent it clearly. For example, he adduces Carston 2002 in support of his
position that “the principled separation of context-independent and context-dependent meaning
(the semantics/pragmatics distinction) is illusory” (8–9), yet Carston (2002:11) clearly
distinguishes semantics and pragmatics as two different kinds of cognitive processes: decoding
and inference.) For a broader sample of the degree that cognitive linguistics takes work in RT
into account, Geeraerts and Cuyckens 2007, for all its nearly 1300 pages, has no entries in its
Index for well-known RT proponents Diane Blakemore, Robyn Carston, Dan Sperber, or Deirdre
Wilson—or, for that matter, another contextualist often cited by RT writers, François Recanati.
Similarly, the Index to Carston 2002 has no entries for René Dirven, Giles Fauconnier, Dirk
Geeraerts, George Lakoff, Ronald Langacker, or Leonard Talmy (though its references include
three works of Fauconnier’s).
These observations about two schools of thought operating with little obvious interaction with
each other’s ideas on their shared interest—communication and understanding—are intended not
so much as criticisms as a programmatic statement: while scholars well established in their
respective subfields understandably have enough to do in developing their own theoretical
directions, perhaps some younger reader will take up the challenge to explore how the
overlapping insights of LCCM Theory and RT can enhance each other. A good specific place to
start would be the understanding of figurative language use.
References
Barsalou, Lawrence. 1991. Deriving categories to achieve goals. In G. H. Bower (ed.), The
psychology of learning and motivation: Advances in research and theory, vol. 27, 1–64. San
Diego: Academic Press.
Bloom, Paul. 2002. How children learn the meanings of words. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Carston, Robyn. 2002. Thoughts and utterances: The pragmatics of explicit communication .
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Crombach, Michael. 2010. Review of V. Evans, How words mean.
http://linguistlist.org/issues/21/21-2636.html.
Fauconnier, Gilles and Mark Turner. 2002. The way we think: Conceptual blending and the
mind’s hidden complexities. New York: Basic Books.
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. 1999. Philosophy in the flesh . New York: Basic Books.
Langacker, Ronald. 2008. Cognitive grammar: A basic introduction . Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Murphy, Gregory L. 2011. Review of V. Evans, How words mean. Language 87.393–396.
Available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/language/v087/87.2.murphy.html (accessed June 30,
2011).
Searle, John. 1983. Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. 1995. Relevance: Communication and cognition . Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing.
Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. 2008. A deflationary account of metaphor. In Raymond W.
Gibbs, Jr. (ed.), The Cambridge handbook of metaphor and thought , 84–108.
Talmy, Leonard. 2000. Toward a cognitive semantics (2 vols.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Taylor, John R. 2010. Review of V. Evans, How words mean. Journal of Linguistics 46.503–508.
How words mean: Lexical concepts, cognitive models,
and meaning construction
By Vyvyan Evans
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. xviii, 377. hardback $130.00, £75.00,
paperback $50.00, £27.00. ISBN 0-19-923466-3 (hardback), 978-0-19-923466-0 (hardback),
0-19-923467-1 (paperback), 978-0-19-923467-7 (paperback).
Reviewed by George Huttar
SIL International
How is it that a single word in a language can be used to mean so many different things, and that
listeners/readers are so often successful in figuring out what speakers/hearers intend to convey
with the words they use, and that on the other hand we sometimes get it wrong? Basic questions
for exegetes, translators, linguists, arbitrators, and ordinary people just trying to understand and
be understood! This book (HWM) aims to answer these questions about the “construction of
meaning” by presenting the Theory of Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models, or LCCM Theory,
a theory that draws on other cognitive approaches to language and communication—mostly from
linguistics (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson 1999, Talmy 2000, Fauconnier and Turner 2002, Langacker
2008), but to a lesser extent also from cognitive science (especially Barsalou 1991 and several
later works by that author). A summary of HWM is available in Crombach 2010 and in Taylor
2010, while I recommend Murphy 2011 for its critique by a psychologist, including relevant
experimental data not referred to by Evans. Rather than offering yet another summary of HWM, I
focus here on some specific components of LCCM Theory as presented in the book, relating
them to other approaches to meaning construction, in particular Relevance Theory.
Perhaps the central principle of LCCM Theory is that “meaning is not a property of words, or
even language, per se. Rather…meaning arises as a function of the way words (and language) are
deployed by language users in socioculturally, temporally, and physically contextualized
communicative events, which is to say utterances, due to a complex battery of linguistic and
non-linguistic processes, in service of the expression of situated communicative intentions” (22).
To say that “meaning is not a property of words” is not to say that “words do not have stable
semantic representations associated with them….they do” (23), representations Evans calls
“lexical concepts,” as in the name of his theory. These lexical concepts play an initial role in the
“complex battery of linguistic and non-linguistic processes” called into play in interpreting an
utterance, the role of providing access to encyclopaedic knowledge, knowledge which is
organized into “cognitive models,” the other half of the theory’s name.
Lexical concepts are linguistic, associated with linguistic forms (“vehicles”) such as words, affixes,
and constructions. Their representation of meaning is “schematic,” limited to “representations
that are specialized for being encoded by language” (42). They provide access to the much richer
“representations associated with the conceptual system, [which] are not directly encoded by
language—although language facilitates access to this level” (43). What happens when we try to
understand what someone is saying is that the words (and other linguistic forms) allow us to
access some of our cognitive models, among which we select one (or more) that matches our
encyclopaedic knowledge of the way things are, including the context of the utterance, what we
already believe about the speaker/writer, and what has already been said.
Some vehicles, such as polysemous words, trigger access to a greater number of cognitive models
than others, but the same non-linguistic processes of selection just mentioned apply. Similarly,
non-literal use of words or other expressions are processed in the same way, not in some way
different from how we process expressions used literally: “the same set of compositional
mechanisms are responsible for literal and figurative understanding. Hence, figurative language
does not involve a distinct module or set of processes. Rather, it is continuous with literal
understanding” (301).
With its notion of lexical concepts, claims Evans, “LCCM Theory gives back to cognitive
linguists the importance of language in meaning-construction processes” (338), correcting what
he sees as some other cognitive linguists’ tendency to “downplay the significance of language
itself in meaning construction” (ibid.). Nevertheless, Evans himself, while seeking to restore a
balance between the linguistic and non-linguistic processes in the construction of meaning, often
emphasizes the latter. For example, in explicating why some previous approaches to word
meaning fall short, he claims “they make no serious attempt to relate their theoretical claims to
the nature of situated meaning,” and goes on to say, “We need a theoretical account of context,
and the role of the language user as an intentional agent who employs language, in part, in
service of the expression of situated communicative intentions” (69), referring to, among others,
Sperber and Wilson 1995.
I mention the reference to Sperber and Wilson to draw attention to what I see as a great deal in
common between S&W’s Relevance Theory and Evans’s approach to meaning construction. The
quote just given stresses speaker intention, a concept important in RT (as well as in the philosophy
of language of John Searle—e.g., Searle 1983—and, in a very different way, in the account of
child language acquisition propounded in Bloom 2002). More generally, both LCCM Theory and
RT rightly insist that linguistic forms alone do not fully determine the meaning of an utterance—
far from it! And more specifically, the above-mentioned position that there is no principled
distinction between interpreting literal and figurative language use also meshes with the explication
within RT of figurative language use as just another example of “loose talk” (see, e.g., Sperber
and Wilson 2008).
With so much in common between LCCM Theory and Relevance Theory, it is perhaps
unfortunate, although not altogether surprising in the context of how academic communities are
constituted these days, that there is not more collaboration and building on each other’s work
between the two approaches. Evans does mention RT occasionally, as we have seen, but
sometimes fails to represent it clearly. For example, he adduces Carston 2002 in support of his
position that “the principled separation of context-independent and context-dependent meaning
(the semantics/pragmatics distinction) is illusory” (8–9), yet Carston (2002:11) clearly
distinguishes semantics and pragmatics as two different kinds of cognitive processes: decoding
and inference.) For a broader sample of the degree that cognitive linguistics takes work in RT
into account, Geeraerts and Cuyckens 2007, for all its nearly 1300 pages, has no entries in its
Index for well-known RT proponents Diane Blakemore, Robyn Carston, Dan Sperber, or Deirdre
Wilson—or, for that matter, another contextualist often cited by RT writers, François Recanati.
Similarly, the Index to Carston 2002 has no entries for René Dirven, Giles Fauconnier, Dirk
Geeraerts, George Lakoff, Ronald Langacker, or Leonard Talmy (though its references include
three works of Fauconnier’s).
These observations about two schools of thought operating with little obvious interaction with
each other’s ideas on their shared interest—communication and understanding—are intended not
so much as criticisms as a programmatic statement: while scholars well established in their
respective subfields understandably have enough to do in developing their own theoretical
directions, perhaps some younger reader will take up the challenge to explore how the
overlapping insights of LCCM Theory and RT can enhance each other. A good specific place to
start would be the understanding of figurative language use.
References
Barsalou, Lawrence. 1991. Deriving categories to achieve goals. In G. H. Bower (ed.), The
psychology of learning and motivation: Advances in research and theory, vol. 27, 1–64. San
Diego: Academic Press.
Bloom, Paul. 2002. How children learn the meanings of words. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Carston, Robyn. 2002. Thoughts and utterances: The pragmatics of explicit communication .
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Crombach, Michael. 2010. Review of V. Evans, How words mean.
http://linguistlist.org/issues/21/21-2636.html.
Fauconnier, Gilles and Mark Turner. 2002. The way we think: Conceptual blending and the
mind’s hidden complexities. New York: Basic Books.
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. 1999. Philosophy in the flesh . New York: Basic Books.
Langacker, Ronald. 2008. Cognitive grammar: A basic introduction . Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Murphy, Gregory L. 2011. Review of V. Evans, How words mean. Language 87.393–396.
Available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/language/v087/87.2.murphy.html (accessed June 30,
2011).
Searle, John. 1983. Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. 1995. Relevance: Communication and cognition . Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing.
Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. 2008. A deflationary account of metaphor. In Raymond W.
Gibbs, Jr. (ed.), The Cambridge handbook of metaphor and thought , 84–108.
Talmy, Leonard. 2000. Toward a cognitive semantics (2 vols.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Taylor, John R. 2010. Review of V. Evans, How words mean. Journal of Linguistics 46.503–508.