Manajemen | Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji 2003 1 (24)
REGIONAL LABOUR COUNCILS, LOCAL
EMPLOYMENT GENERATION AND
LABOUR–COMMUNITY COALITIONS
YASMIN RITTAU*
R
egional labour councils have been involved in building labour–community coalitions.
The case study of the South Coast Labour Council demonstrates that a regional
labour council can engage in a broader make-up of lobbying partners than is generally
recognised in the literature, which includes labour–community coalitions that are not
geographically, politically or socially close. The South Coast Labour Council did not
focus on employer opposition, as is usually the case with building labour–community
coalitions, but rather, it focused on lobbying farmers to increase pressure on government
officials for the siting of a grain terminal in Port Kembla, near Wollongong in the
Illawarra region of NSW. It pursued broader aims of labour–community coalitions to
include local employment generation.
INTRODUCTION
The South Coast Labour Council (SCLC) is a regional peak union council of
locally based trade unions in the Illawarra and South Coast regions of New South
Wales. It had 45 affiliates during the lobbying and construction of the Grain
Terminal (GT) project between 1983 and 1989, which were grouped under
‘metals’, ‘building trades’, ‘marine transport’, ‘public sector’ and ‘transport’.
The SCLC was resourced through affiliation fees of member unions. It formed
and utilised a labour–community coalition with farmers in the West and
South-west of New South Wales to pursue local employment generation in
the Illawarra region.
LABOUR–COMMUNITY
COALITIONS AND REGIONAL LABOUR COUNCILS
The concept of labour and community offers a wide area of research. Community
is an important base for labour organisation, labour history, labour reproduction
and working-class culture (see Labour and Community: Historical Essays 2001;
Labour History May 2000; Australian Society for the Study of Labour History
1999).
The literature suggests that labour–community coalitions are specific formations, with a noteworthy distinction between labour–community coalitions
* Post-doctoral research fellow, Centre for Innovation and Structural Change, National University
of Ireland, Galway, Ireland. Email: [email protected] I am grateful to Greg Patmore,
Discipline of Work and Organisational Studies, University of Sydney, for his support in my
undertaking of the research for this paper as part of my PhD thesis. Also, I wish to thank the
two anonymous referees for their valuable comments on the earlier draft of the paper.
THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 45, NO. 3, SEPTEMBER 2003, 395–400
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and trade union involvement in community issues. A labour–community coalition is distinguished by the circumstances where ‘. . . it is part of an explicit union
strategy of seeking reciprocal community assistance in the pursuit of industrial
objectives’ (Thornthwaite 1997, p. 248). Unions sometimes find it advantageous
to align themselves with communities to achieve union goals by utilising
community as a resource (or ally) in collective bargaining and as a source of
union power (Thornthwaite 1997, pp. 244–6). Yet, reciprocity is important for
community. Labour–community coalitions can be used to increased pressure
on both employers and on government officials, with regional labour councils
possibly playing a significant role.
Studies of unions explain that the roles of regional labour councils, and the
national and State peak union bodies, are mobilisation, exchange and the social
regulation of labour and commodity markets. Each of these roles evoke both
political and industrial dimensions (Briggs 1999, pp. 28–9; Ellem and Shields
2001, pp. 65–6). Further, affiliates provide regional labour councils with ‘power
for’ utilising their collective strength to pursue common interests through
coordinating action, negotiating on their behalf, and providing support with
strikes. Correspondingly, regional labour councils use ‘power over’ affiliates. The
concepts of ‘power for’ and ‘power over’ are inter-related. Affiliates concede a
degree of their autonomy, and, thereby, provide the peak council with ‘power
over’ them, to provide ‘power for’ a united front (Brigden 2000, pp. 62–4).
Unions in the US and Australia have used labour–community coalitions in
industrial campaigns over issues such as retrenchments and plant closures, with
US examples also including threats of plant closures, relocations and employers
gaining concessions from unions, labour and the state. The literature has
covered labour–community coalition activity in a local area as in the United States
hospital patient care example and, in one town, as in the examples of threatened
retrenchment and retrenchment in Hammond, Indiana, United States and in
Lithgow, Australia. Similarly, the literature has covered protests against possible
retrenchment and retrenchment in multiple localities in rural Queensland,
Australia (Craypo and Nissen 1993, pp. 8–17; Nissen 1993, pp. 210–6; Patmore
1997, pp. 219, 224–41; Thornthwaite 1997, pp. 244, 249–61). The range of
responses to labour–community coalitions has included slowing or halting the
planned retrenchments, workplace closures and declining services.
In the present case study, the SCLC mobilised the power of affiliates into collective action to engage (or exchange) effectively with governments to regulate the
labour market in terms of generating local employment. The political dimension
of mobilisation and exchange included mobilising its affiliates to organise farmers to assist it in lobbying governments. The affiliates gave up their autonomy
in this case to the extent that they allowed the SCLC ‘power over’ them so as to
coordinate lobbying actions from which all could benefit. The SCLC regulated
the labour market by generating local employment.
PORT KEMBLA
HARBOUR TASK FORCE
In 1981, the SCLC sought the establishment of the Port Kembla Harbour Task
Force (PKHTF): a labour–community coalition to facilitate the diversification
of the port of Port Kembla and the growth of its maritime activities.
REGIONAL LABOUR COUNCILS
397
Its members consisted of representatives from Wollongong City Council
(chairperson), University of Wollongong, SCLC, Waterside Workers’ Federation
(WWF), Painters and Dockers union, stevedoring and transport industries,
citizen members and professional staff of the Wollongong City Council attached
to the executive committee. The major initiative of the PKHTF was to attract
the construction of the GT to the Illawarra (Blakey 1984, p. 12; Markey 1988,
pp. 21, 48; PKHTF 1985, p. 1).
The PKHTF lobbied many government and opposition members, and government authorities to pressure the state government’s Grain Handling Authority
of New South Wales (GHA) to choose Port Kembla as the site on which to
build a new grain terminal. As part of the PKHTF, the SCLC participated in
lobbying government officials, but also believed that, for the most part, its energy
was best directed towards lobbying wheat growers and, thereby, developing
an active support network with the agricultural community. The support of
farmers was critical as they were to pay a significant part of the cost of construction
that was to be levied through the New South Wales Livestock and Grain
Producers’ Association (LGPA; now known as New South Wales Farmers’
Association). It was considered that the farmers’ public preference for siting the
GT at Port Kembla, rather than at alternative locations, would carry significant
weight in the final decision, particularly for the state government that was keen
on appealing to the rural sector (Blakey 1984, p. 3; Ginnane 1986, p. 3; Markey
1988, pp. 42, 48; SCLC 1986, p. 5).
LOBBYING
PROCESS
Beginning in 1981, the New South Wales Government examined various options
for increasing the capacity of existing grain handling sites and determining
possible sites for the construction of a new terminal in New South Wales. Grain
terminals were used to assemble cargoes of grain, primarily wheat, for shipment
and to provide ship loading facilities. The commissioned Coopers and Lybrand
Study of 1982 recommended eight options, but favoured an expansion of the
Botany Bay site because it provided the lowest cost. The suggestion by the
PKHTF of Port Kembla as a possible site was dismissed. However, lobbying by
the PKHTF assisted in the decision of making it one of nine options.
Subsequently, with further lobbying by the PKHTF, in February 1983, Coopers
and Lybrand recommended Port Kembla as the ‘preferred option’, for achieving
maximum cost-effectiveness. Yet, this recommendation depended on the agreement of the federal and state governments, and grain growers with the provision
of funds. So, the PKHTF, which included the SCLC, continued with its intensive
political campaign. It set out its case and met twice with the New South Wales
Premier. It met several times with the Federal Government Ministers of
Agriculture, Trade and Employment, National Farmers’ Federation Board, GHA,
State Rail Authority, Maritime Services Board, LGPA Board and the Barley
Marketing Board (Blakey 1984, p. 3; Blakey 1985, p. 3; Carmichael et. al. 1981,
pp. 75–80; Gilpin 1985, p. 6).
The SCLC and PKHTF worked with the LGPA as the ‘union of farmers’,
which, though not representing all grain growers, was influential. Farmers
described their main concern for the GT project, and the major problems of the
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September 2003
industry as industrial relations at existing facilities. The SCLC and unions were
aware that there would be resistance by farmers to the terminal being located at
Port Kembla. In response, they raised with the farmers the misconceptions of
the media and employers about the militancy of the area and, in particular, the
maritime unions. In working with the PKHTF, the SCLC and unions offered a
united union position to grain growers concerned with the GT project. They
established that industrial relations, on the union side, at the Port Kembla GT
would be managed by combined unions operating as one union and stoppages
would only occur as a very last resort (Nixon n.d., p.2; Markey 1988, pp. 51, 64;
PKHTF 1983a, p. 1, 1983b, p. 9).
In February 1983, the SCLC met with the LGPA and GHA in Port Kembla.
A year later, the SCLC and PKHTF travelled to the wheat growing districts in
Western and South Western New South Wales to promote Port Kembla as the
site of a new grain terminal. In the tour, the SCLC argued that Port Kembla
offered a better option than the two current terminals that were then in operation at Balmain and Newcastle. It compared the operating times at Balmain,
which were 8-hours-a-day with Port Kembla, which were 24-hours-a-day. The
increased operating hours at Port Kembla were part of an agreement in 1982
between port management together with the SCLC and the WWF (Nixon 1986,
pp. 2, 20; Nixon n.d., p. 2; Markey 1988, p. 37; PKHTF 1983a, p. 7).
Shortly after this intense lobbying by the SCLC and PKHTF, the state government announced in February 1984 that a new grain terminal would be built in
Port Kembla. The relationship between the SCLC and the farmers continued
and even grew, demonstrating that there was genuine goodwill between the
two groups. In March 1984, a delegation from Port Kembla, including SCLC
and port unionists, visited for three days as house guests of Eugowra LGPA
members; visits were also organised to other areas in the central west of
New South Wales, including Parkes, Forbes, Bathurst and Orange (Noble 1988,
p. 37; PKHTF 1985, p. 6; PKHTF 1986, p. 1). Return visits to Port Kembla
ensued. This time, LGPA members were houseguests of the SCLC and port
unionists. The first of these visits, involving 18 guests, was for three-and-a-half
days in October 1984. By 1986, the exchange of visits involved a larger number
of representatives from both the farming community and the port unionists. These
visits helped create strong organisational links as well as personal contacts between
individuals and families (Nixon n.d., p. 2; Morton 1988, p. 31; PKHTF 1985,
p. 6; PKHTF 1986, pp. 1–2).
CONCLUSION
While a final count on the number of jobs was never taken, it was estimated that
the grain terminal generated 900 direct jobs during the peak of construction and
declined to 240 at the trough. Also, the construction was estimated to generate
a further 1800 jobs in the local area during the peak and 480 during the trough.
The operational phase of the grain terminal was expected to generate between
30 and 38 direct jobs in one estimate and 72 direct jobs in another, with further
regional flow-on effects (Department of Environment and Planning 1985, p. 20;
Markey 1988, pp. 46–8; Pascuzzo 1985, p. 148–50).
REGIONAL LABOUR COUNCILS
399
The SCLC initiated and developed a labour–community coalition to lobby
government for a grain terminal in the Illawarra. The relationship between the
SCLC and the LGPA can be labelled a labour–community coalition as the literature suggests that a reciprocal relationship is needed for such a characterisation.
Indeed, the arrangement between the SCLC and LGPA did involve reciprocity.
The SCLC gained an influential partner to assist in its lobbying for the siting of
the grain terminal in Port Kembla to help generate local employment. This was
in return for the LGPA gaining a partner that was receptive to its needs to
have the grain terminal built and operational. Its negotiations with the SCLC
provided it with a good working relationship with the unions, a single union
position and the promise of minimal industrial disruption, which was fulfilled
(Blakey 1985, p. 2).
The SCLC case illustrates that regional labour council participation in a
labour–community coalition can take lobbying a step further than is usually
recognised in the literature. The SCLC-farmer labour–community coalition
covered a larger diversity of groups than has been suggested by the literature. It
went beyond homogeneous or close-knit groups and spaces, whether they were
geographically, politically or socially close as they are in local areas or single towns,
which tend to be the focus of the literature. Instead, the SCLC-farmer
labour–community coalition consisted of a relationship between diverse groups.
This labour–community coalition was not focused on opposition to an
employer in a situation of plant closure or retrenchment, as the literature
usually suggests is needed for this formation. Instead, it was ultimately aimed at
pressuring government officials to position the grain terminal in Port Kembla,
for local employment generation purposes from the SCLC’s viewpoint and for
industrial relations from the farmers’ viewpoint.
Rather than being reactive to threats, as in most such coalitions, this particular labour–community coalition took the initiative to pursue a mutually
beneficial goal.
REFERENCES
Australian Society for the Study of Labour History (1999) Labour and Community. Proceedings
of the Sixth National Conference of the ASSLH, hosted by the Illawarra Branch ASSLH
2–4 October 1999, Wollongong. Edited by Robert Hood and Ray Markey, published by
the Department of Economics, University of Wollongong, Australia.
Blakey K (1984) Paper presented to the Rotary International meeting at Wollongong University,
14 May 1984, Wollongong, Australia.
Blakey K (1985) Seminar paper organised by the New South Wales Department of Transport
Advisory Committee (TRANSAC), 3 May 1985, New South Wales, Australia.
Brigden C (2000) Beyond peak body authority: Power relations in the Trades Hall Council (THC).
Labour and Industry 11 (2), 59–74.
Briggs C (1999) The Rise and Fall of the ACTU: Maturation, Hegemony and Decline. Unpublished
PhD thesis, University of Sydney: Department of Industrial Relations.
Carmichael A, Ducker J, Renshaw H (1981) Final Report of the Grain Handling Enquiry. Presented
to the Honourable JR Hallam, MLC, Minister for Agriculture.
Craypo C, Nissen B (1993) Introduction. In: Craypo C, Nissen B, eds, Grand Designs: The Impact
of Corporate Strategies on Workers, Unions and Communities, New York: ILR Press.
Department of Environment and Planning (1985) Proposed Port Kembla Grain Handling
Terminal: Environmental Impact Assessment. Sydney: Department of Environment and
Planning.
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Ellem B, Shields J (2001) Placing peak union purpose and power: The origins, dominance and
decline of the Barrier Industrial Council. The Economic and Labour Relations Review 12 (1), 61–84.
Gilpin A (1985) Proposed Port Kembla Grain Handling Terminal. Report to the Honourable Bob
Carr, Minister for Planning and Environment, an inquiry pursuant to Section 119 of the 1979
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, Sydney.
Ginnane P (1986) Terminal project’s timing is perfect. Illawarra Mercury 12 July.
Labour History (2000) May edition, Wollongong, NSW: Australian Society for the Study of Labour
History.
Labour and Community: Historical Essays, (2001) Markey R (ed), Wollongong: University of
Wollongong Press.
Markey R (1988) Industrial Democracy at Port Kembla: An Assessment of the Port Kembla Harbour Task
Force as a Regional Model of Industrial Democracy, Report commissioned by the Federal
Department of Industrial Relations, Canberra: AGPS.
Morton P (1988) Speech presented by Chairperson of Port Kembla Harbour Taskforce In: Markey
R, Hood R, eds, Proceedings of the Seminar on Industrial Democracy and Employee Participation at
Port Kembla, Wollongong: University of Wollongong, pp. 1–56.
Nissen B (1993) Successful labor–community coalition building. In: Craypo C, Nissen B (eds),
Grand Designs: The Impact of Corporate Strategies on Workers, Unions and Communities, New York:
ILR Press.
Nixon M (1986) Speech presented to the combined meeting of farmers and grain handling personnel regarding the establishment of a grain handling terminal at Port Kembla, June 1986,
Wollongong, NSW, Australia.
Nixon M (n.d.) Correspondence from Mr Merv Nixon, Secretary, South Coast Labour Council
to Mr John McMillan, Registrar, Commissioners of Inquiry.
Noble B (1988) Speech presented by a farmer representative on the Port Kembla Harbour Task
Force from Eugowra NSW. In: Markey R, Hood R (eds) Proceedings of the Seminar on Industrial
Democracy and Employee Participation at Port Kembla, University of Wollongong, pp. 1–56
Pascuzzo P (1985) Port Investment Multipliers: The Impact Potential of a Grain Handling Facility in
the Port of Port Kembla, Unpublished honours degree thesis, Department of Economics,
University of Wollongong.
Patmore G (1997) Labour-community coalitions and state enterprise: Lithgow small arms factory
1918–1932. Journal of Industrial Relations 39 (2), 218–44.
Port Kembla Harbour Task Force (PKHTF) (1983a) Minutes of meeting, 24 November.
Port Kembla Harbour Task Force (PKHTF) (1983b) Recommendations for the Development of a Grain
Handling Facility at Port Kembla Harbour: The Preferred Option. A submission to the Grain Handling
Authority of New South Wales.
Port Kembla Harbour Task Force (PKHTF) (1985) Proposed Grain Handling Terminal, Port Kembla.
A Primary Submission by the PKHTF, 11 June, pp. 1–17.
Port Kembla Harbour Task Force (PKHTF) and Port Kembla Maritime Unions (1986)
Consultation not Confrontation: A Forum between Port Kembla Unions and the Farmers, Wollongong.
South Coast Labour Council (SCLC) (1986) Annual Report. Wollongong: SCLC.
Thornthwaite L (1997) Union strategy and labour–community alliance. Journal of Industrial Relations
39 (2): 244–63.
EMPLOYMENT GENERATION AND
LABOUR–COMMUNITY COALITIONS
YASMIN RITTAU*
R
egional labour councils have been involved in building labour–community coalitions.
The case study of the South Coast Labour Council demonstrates that a regional
labour council can engage in a broader make-up of lobbying partners than is generally
recognised in the literature, which includes labour–community coalitions that are not
geographically, politically or socially close. The South Coast Labour Council did not
focus on employer opposition, as is usually the case with building labour–community
coalitions, but rather, it focused on lobbying farmers to increase pressure on government
officials for the siting of a grain terminal in Port Kembla, near Wollongong in the
Illawarra region of NSW. It pursued broader aims of labour–community coalitions to
include local employment generation.
INTRODUCTION
The South Coast Labour Council (SCLC) is a regional peak union council of
locally based trade unions in the Illawarra and South Coast regions of New South
Wales. It had 45 affiliates during the lobbying and construction of the Grain
Terminal (GT) project between 1983 and 1989, which were grouped under
‘metals’, ‘building trades’, ‘marine transport’, ‘public sector’ and ‘transport’.
The SCLC was resourced through affiliation fees of member unions. It formed
and utilised a labour–community coalition with farmers in the West and
South-west of New South Wales to pursue local employment generation in
the Illawarra region.
LABOUR–COMMUNITY
COALITIONS AND REGIONAL LABOUR COUNCILS
The concept of labour and community offers a wide area of research. Community
is an important base for labour organisation, labour history, labour reproduction
and working-class culture (see Labour and Community: Historical Essays 2001;
Labour History May 2000; Australian Society for the Study of Labour History
1999).
The literature suggests that labour–community coalitions are specific formations, with a noteworthy distinction between labour–community coalitions
* Post-doctoral research fellow, Centre for Innovation and Structural Change, National University
of Ireland, Galway, Ireland. Email: [email protected] I am grateful to Greg Patmore,
Discipline of Work and Organisational Studies, University of Sydney, for his support in my
undertaking of the research for this paper as part of my PhD thesis. Also, I wish to thank the
two anonymous referees for their valuable comments on the earlier draft of the paper.
THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 45, NO. 3, SEPTEMBER 2003, 395–400
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and trade union involvement in community issues. A labour–community coalition is distinguished by the circumstances where ‘. . . it is part of an explicit union
strategy of seeking reciprocal community assistance in the pursuit of industrial
objectives’ (Thornthwaite 1997, p. 248). Unions sometimes find it advantageous
to align themselves with communities to achieve union goals by utilising
community as a resource (or ally) in collective bargaining and as a source of
union power (Thornthwaite 1997, pp. 244–6). Yet, reciprocity is important for
community. Labour–community coalitions can be used to increased pressure
on both employers and on government officials, with regional labour councils
possibly playing a significant role.
Studies of unions explain that the roles of regional labour councils, and the
national and State peak union bodies, are mobilisation, exchange and the social
regulation of labour and commodity markets. Each of these roles evoke both
political and industrial dimensions (Briggs 1999, pp. 28–9; Ellem and Shields
2001, pp. 65–6). Further, affiliates provide regional labour councils with ‘power
for’ utilising their collective strength to pursue common interests through
coordinating action, negotiating on their behalf, and providing support with
strikes. Correspondingly, regional labour councils use ‘power over’ affiliates. The
concepts of ‘power for’ and ‘power over’ are inter-related. Affiliates concede a
degree of their autonomy, and, thereby, provide the peak council with ‘power
over’ them, to provide ‘power for’ a united front (Brigden 2000, pp. 62–4).
Unions in the US and Australia have used labour–community coalitions in
industrial campaigns over issues such as retrenchments and plant closures, with
US examples also including threats of plant closures, relocations and employers
gaining concessions from unions, labour and the state. The literature has
covered labour–community coalition activity in a local area as in the United States
hospital patient care example and, in one town, as in the examples of threatened
retrenchment and retrenchment in Hammond, Indiana, United States and in
Lithgow, Australia. Similarly, the literature has covered protests against possible
retrenchment and retrenchment in multiple localities in rural Queensland,
Australia (Craypo and Nissen 1993, pp. 8–17; Nissen 1993, pp. 210–6; Patmore
1997, pp. 219, 224–41; Thornthwaite 1997, pp. 244, 249–61). The range of
responses to labour–community coalitions has included slowing or halting the
planned retrenchments, workplace closures and declining services.
In the present case study, the SCLC mobilised the power of affiliates into collective action to engage (or exchange) effectively with governments to regulate the
labour market in terms of generating local employment. The political dimension
of mobilisation and exchange included mobilising its affiliates to organise farmers to assist it in lobbying governments. The affiliates gave up their autonomy
in this case to the extent that they allowed the SCLC ‘power over’ them so as to
coordinate lobbying actions from which all could benefit. The SCLC regulated
the labour market by generating local employment.
PORT KEMBLA
HARBOUR TASK FORCE
In 1981, the SCLC sought the establishment of the Port Kembla Harbour Task
Force (PKHTF): a labour–community coalition to facilitate the diversification
of the port of Port Kembla and the growth of its maritime activities.
REGIONAL LABOUR COUNCILS
397
Its members consisted of representatives from Wollongong City Council
(chairperson), University of Wollongong, SCLC, Waterside Workers’ Federation
(WWF), Painters and Dockers union, stevedoring and transport industries,
citizen members and professional staff of the Wollongong City Council attached
to the executive committee. The major initiative of the PKHTF was to attract
the construction of the GT to the Illawarra (Blakey 1984, p. 12; Markey 1988,
pp. 21, 48; PKHTF 1985, p. 1).
The PKHTF lobbied many government and opposition members, and government authorities to pressure the state government’s Grain Handling Authority
of New South Wales (GHA) to choose Port Kembla as the site on which to
build a new grain terminal. As part of the PKHTF, the SCLC participated in
lobbying government officials, but also believed that, for the most part, its energy
was best directed towards lobbying wheat growers and, thereby, developing
an active support network with the agricultural community. The support of
farmers was critical as they were to pay a significant part of the cost of construction
that was to be levied through the New South Wales Livestock and Grain
Producers’ Association (LGPA; now known as New South Wales Farmers’
Association). It was considered that the farmers’ public preference for siting the
GT at Port Kembla, rather than at alternative locations, would carry significant
weight in the final decision, particularly for the state government that was keen
on appealing to the rural sector (Blakey 1984, p. 3; Ginnane 1986, p. 3; Markey
1988, pp. 42, 48; SCLC 1986, p. 5).
LOBBYING
PROCESS
Beginning in 1981, the New South Wales Government examined various options
for increasing the capacity of existing grain handling sites and determining
possible sites for the construction of a new terminal in New South Wales. Grain
terminals were used to assemble cargoes of grain, primarily wheat, for shipment
and to provide ship loading facilities. The commissioned Coopers and Lybrand
Study of 1982 recommended eight options, but favoured an expansion of the
Botany Bay site because it provided the lowest cost. The suggestion by the
PKHTF of Port Kembla as a possible site was dismissed. However, lobbying by
the PKHTF assisted in the decision of making it one of nine options.
Subsequently, with further lobbying by the PKHTF, in February 1983, Coopers
and Lybrand recommended Port Kembla as the ‘preferred option’, for achieving
maximum cost-effectiveness. Yet, this recommendation depended on the agreement of the federal and state governments, and grain growers with the provision
of funds. So, the PKHTF, which included the SCLC, continued with its intensive
political campaign. It set out its case and met twice with the New South Wales
Premier. It met several times with the Federal Government Ministers of
Agriculture, Trade and Employment, National Farmers’ Federation Board, GHA,
State Rail Authority, Maritime Services Board, LGPA Board and the Barley
Marketing Board (Blakey 1984, p. 3; Blakey 1985, p. 3; Carmichael et. al. 1981,
pp. 75–80; Gilpin 1985, p. 6).
The SCLC and PKHTF worked with the LGPA as the ‘union of farmers’,
which, though not representing all grain growers, was influential. Farmers
described their main concern for the GT project, and the major problems of the
398
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OF
I N D U S T R I A L R E L AT I O N S
September 2003
industry as industrial relations at existing facilities. The SCLC and unions were
aware that there would be resistance by farmers to the terminal being located at
Port Kembla. In response, they raised with the farmers the misconceptions of
the media and employers about the militancy of the area and, in particular, the
maritime unions. In working with the PKHTF, the SCLC and unions offered a
united union position to grain growers concerned with the GT project. They
established that industrial relations, on the union side, at the Port Kembla GT
would be managed by combined unions operating as one union and stoppages
would only occur as a very last resort (Nixon n.d., p.2; Markey 1988, pp. 51, 64;
PKHTF 1983a, p. 1, 1983b, p. 9).
In February 1983, the SCLC met with the LGPA and GHA in Port Kembla.
A year later, the SCLC and PKHTF travelled to the wheat growing districts in
Western and South Western New South Wales to promote Port Kembla as the
site of a new grain terminal. In the tour, the SCLC argued that Port Kembla
offered a better option than the two current terminals that were then in operation at Balmain and Newcastle. It compared the operating times at Balmain,
which were 8-hours-a-day with Port Kembla, which were 24-hours-a-day. The
increased operating hours at Port Kembla were part of an agreement in 1982
between port management together with the SCLC and the WWF (Nixon 1986,
pp. 2, 20; Nixon n.d., p. 2; Markey 1988, p. 37; PKHTF 1983a, p. 7).
Shortly after this intense lobbying by the SCLC and PKHTF, the state government announced in February 1984 that a new grain terminal would be built in
Port Kembla. The relationship between the SCLC and the farmers continued
and even grew, demonstrating that there was genuine goodwill between the
two groups. In March 1984, a delegation from Port Kembla, including SCLC
and port unionists, visited for three days as house guests of Eugowra LGPA
members; visits were also organised to other areas in the central west of
New South Wales, including Parkes, Forbes, Bathurst and Orange (Noble 1988,
p. 37; PKHTF 1985, p. 6; PKHTF 1986, p. 1). Return visits to Port Kembla
ensued. This time, LGPA members were houseguests of the SCLC and port
unionists. The first of these visits, involving 18 guests, was for three-and-a-half
days in October 1984. By 1986, the exchange of visits involved a larger number
of representatives from both the farming community and the port unionists. These
visits helped create strong organisational links as well as personal contacts between
individuals and families (Nixon n.d., p. 2; Morton 1988, p. 31; PKHTF 1985,
p. 6; PKHTF 1986, pp. 1–2).
CONCLUSION
While a final count on the number of jobs was never taken, it was estimated that
the grain terminal generated 900 direct jobs during the peak of construction and
declined to 240 at the trough. Also, the construction was estimated to generate
a further 1800 jobs in the local area during the peak and 480 during the trough.
The operational phase of the grain terminal was expected to generate between
30 and 38 direct jobs in one estimate and 72 direct jobs in another, with further
regional flow-on effects (Department of Environment and Planning 1985, p. 20;
Markey 1988, pp. 46–8; Pascuzzo 1985, p. 148–50).
REGIONAL LABOUR COUNCILS
399
The SCLC initiated and developed a labour–community coalition to lobby
government for a grain terminal in the Illawarra. The relationship between the
SCLC and the LGPA can be labelled a labour–community coalition as the literature suggests that a reciprocal relationship is needed for such a characterisation.
Indeed, the arrangement between the SCLC and LGPA did involve reciprocity.
The SCLC gained an influential partner to assist in its lobbying for the siting of
the grain terminal in Port Kembla to help generate local employment. This was
in return for the LGPA gaining a partner that was receptive to its needs to
have the grain terminal built and operational. Its negotiations with the SCLC
provided it with a good working relationship with the unions, a single union
position and the promise of minimal industrial disruption, which was fulfilled
(Blakey 1985, p. 2).
The SCLC case illustrates that regional labour council participation in a
labour–community coalition can take lobbying a step further than is usually
recognised in the literature. The SCLC-farmer labour–community coalition
covered a larger diversity of groups than has been suggested by the literature. It
went beyond homogeneous or close-knit groups and spaces, whether they were
geographically, politically or socially close as they are in local areas or single towns,
which tend to be the focus of the literature. Instead, the SCLC-farmer
labour–community coalition consisted of a relationship between diverse groups.
This labour–community coalition was not focused on opposition to an
employer in a situation of plant closure or retrenchment, as the literature
usually suggests is needed for this formation. Instead, it was ultimately aimed at
pressuring government officials to position the grain terminal in Port Kembla,
for local employment generation purposes from the SCLC’s viewpoint and for
industrial relations from the farmers’ viewpoint.
Rather than being reactive to threats, as in most such coalitions, this particular labour–community coalition took the initiative to pursue a mutually
beneficial goal.
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