The Aggressive-Revolutionary Indonesian Communist Party

40 The participation of Paruk ronggeng troupe in Bakars campaign rally has made Srintil now closely associated with Bakar and his followers. She had become popularly known as Ronggeng of the Proletariat by the end of 1964 p. 254. It is as noted by Brӓuchler 2009 that in the 1960s, a song called Genjer- genjer, “a song created by M. Arif, a member of LEKRA the Institute of People’s Culture, which was accused of being affiliated to the PKI”, became popular because this song was associated with a large party at the time; the PKI p. 189. Echols 1989 also defines Genjer-genjer as “a song associated with Indonesian Communist Party p. 184. Regardless their political ignorance, Srintil and her ronggeng troupe are now considered as Communists. Nevertheless, on other occasion, Srintil starts to realize that there is something wrong with her involvement in every political event held by the PKI. She witnesses the violence perpetrated by the masses who attend every campaign rally in which she performs: One night, after a rally in which she had danced, hundreds of the spectators went berserk. As if possessed, they rampaged through rice paddies, plundering the ripening crops. The situation became violent as the owners arrived to protect their fields. By the time the police had arrived, seven bodies lay on the ground covered in blood. This first brawl was followed by a second a month later, and another the following month. During the third riot, the situation was particularly tense. It took place in the daytime, and involved hundreds of aggressors fighting the owners of fields. A full-scale war of hoes and sickles was avoided only because of the timely arrival of the police p. 254-255. As described by Glasberg and Shannon 2011 that the consciousness of being exploited had made the proletariat “in constant conflict” with the landlords “over the distribution of the fruits of the proletariat’s collective labor” p. 31. In 41 Indonesia, Mehr 2009 portrays the conflicts between the PKI and the land owners was the impact of the land reform laws. As a result, the conflicts triggered by the land reform laws maps two main groups which are politically disputed. They were “various peasant organizations affiliated with the PKI and joined by sympathetic left-wing groups, faced determined opposition from the PNI, Islamic groups and the military” p. 30. Knowing these events, Srintil and Sakarya start to worry because Paruk will be considered to be fully responsible for every riot occurs. However, Bakar tries to explain that: What’s happening is just a form of mass action, a reaction by the poor who have long suffered injustice. They have sweated working the paddy fields owned by a few, but have never benefited from their labor, except to receive just enough to subsist, sometimes less than that. All they are doing now is demanding what’s rightfully theirs p. 255. In fact, Bakar adapts a belief system that his party is a representation of the Ratu Adil that promises “delivery of justice, through promoting ideas like the equal distribution of land, regardless of rank or position” p. 253. Sharma and Sharma 2006 explained that the society transformation demanded land reform laws in which the personal property and the family were abolished. Besides, it also emphasizes the equal distribution of land p. 57. In conclusion, the aggressive PKI has also created tensions within the country. All those conflicts color the Indonesian politics until a turnaround occurs in the beginning of October 1965. 42

B. The Civil War

This part is to provide reasons why the civil war in Jakarta also destroys Paruk. It starts with the explanation about the murders in Jakarta and the involvement indications of the Indonesian Communist Party in it.

1. Murders in Jakarta

In the early October 1965, an anxiety engulfs Paruk as the spread of a rumor about murders of government officials in Jakarta p. 260. It is because the rumor says that the culprits are people like Bakar p. 260. As has been concluded before, Srintil and her ronggeng troupe has closely associated with Bakar and his followers. These murders are distinct from the violence that Srintil has witnessed sometime ago. Although the riots might be a hint for this case, the murders are considered as sudden events which happen without any explicit preceding explanation provided in the novel. Without having basic knowledge regarding the event, the readers must remain confused reading the next plot of the story. Firstly, the analysis begins by anatomizing the murders itself. Conboy 2003 refers to RRI broadcast on 1 st October 1965 as the most authentic source that reported an action saving the president from a coup attempt: Shortly after 0700, however, the fog started to lift. From the Radio Republic Indonesia RRI building on the opposition side of Merdeka Square, the first of several rebel radio broadcasts hit the airwaves. The broadcast was nothing short of explosive. Allegedly the words of Lieutenant Colonel Untung Sjamsuri speaking on behalf of a “30 September Movement,” it stated that their action had been done in opposition to a so-called General’s Council that was planning to seize power during the 5 October parade. It further stated that President Sukarno was safe in their custody p.130. 43 It sounds that nothing terrible happens during the action but Crouch 1978 chronicles that it was a bloody incident when six generals Lieutenant General Yani, Major General Suprapto, Major General Harjono M.T., Major General S. Parman, Brigadier General D.I. Pandjaitan, and Brigadier General Sutojo Siswomihardjo and an adjutant to Defense Minister First Lieutenant P. Tendean were taken from their residence and brought them to an area known as Lubang Buaya at the edge of the Halim air force base on the outskirts of Jakarta. In this process, three Yani, Harjono, and Pandjaitan were killed either by bullets or bayonets. General Nasution, the Defense Minister, successfully managed to escape but unfortunately his adjutant was taken during this operation. First Lieutenant P. Tendean and the other two were taken alive and also killed at Lubang Buaya. Then, their dead bodies were dumped into an unused well p. 99. In conclusion, the government officials mentioned in the rumor refers to the six generals and one lieutenant. Secondly, the analysis attempts to investigate the culprits of the murders. Bakar clarifies the rumor that the murders are committed by members of the military against other military members p. 260-261. However, Bakar’s hiding in Paruk is unquestionable. Bakar used to be known as someone who is fierce and fiery in his speeches now he is nothing more than someone who has lost power p. 260. It might indicate such involvement of Bakar or even his party in the murders. Shiraishi 1997 clarifies that Lieutenant Colonel Untung Sjamsuri is “the Commandant of a Battalion of the Tjakrabirawa, the personal bodyguard of 44 President Sukarno” p. 41. Seeing his position, he automatically has a duty to save the president from any dangerous situation. Through the broadcasting, on 1 st October 1965, he claims that the G30S 30 th September Movement has saved President Sukarno from a coup attempt. Besides Lieutenant Colonel Untung Sjamsuri , Stodulka and Rӧssler 2014 add that the G30S were led by other “prominent Indonesian Army officers, namely “Colonel Abdul Latief and Brigadier General Soepardjo” p. 197. Roosa 2006 gives more detail about the composition of the G30S during the raid. The movement’s personnel included one company from the presidential guard under Untung, two platoons from Jakarta army garrison under Latief, and a battalion of air force troops under Soejono. In addition, there were ten companies-five each-from Battalions 454 and 530. There were also small contingents from a paratroop command south of Jakarta and from the military police p. 45. As concluded by Anderson and McVey that the G30S was “an internal affair” in the army between young and junior revolutionary officers struck against the reactionary top army commanders, the PKI merely playing a subsidiary role by taking advantage of these developments by supporting them as cited in Fic, 2005, p.2. However, this internal affair is then used by the PKI as an advantage to eliminate their chief political rival. The supports are given by supplying civilian forces to the G30S. Roosa 2006 adds that about two thousand members of the PKI or PKI-affiliated organizations also participated in the morning’s operation. They were scattered among the forces that kidnapped the 45 generals and occupied the buildings on Merdeka Square. Some were armed but most were not p. 45. It affirms that the PKI is involved in the murders but Anderson and McVey justified that the PKI was not the mastermind because there was no solid evidence for that claim in the press reports and army’s statement as cited in Roosa, 2006, p. 65. It discovers the meaning of Bakar’s hiding as he also clarifies that the murders are committed by members of the military against other military members. Instead of commemorating the Armed Forces Day, Roosa 2006 mentions that on 5 th October 1965, “the army released a quickly composed 130-page book that chronicled the events of October 1 and accused the PKI of being the mastermind” p. 63. This accusation based on General Yoga Sugomo’s assumption, as disclosed by Wiwoho and Chaeruddin 1990, based on Yogas memoir, explains that knowing the G30S was led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung Sjamsuri, General Yoga Sugomo claimed that the PKI masterminded the G30S. Further, he explained that Untung was his subordinate when quelling the PRRI revolt in West Sumatra. He recognized Untung as a soldier who have a “leftish political view” p. 149. Shortly, his presumption argues that being led by a leftist soldier, the G30S had to be the PKI’s strategy to weaken the army in Indonesian politics. This claim is then used as Suharto’s reason to predicate that the G30S is masterminded by the PKI in eliminating the army; their chief political rival. Anderson and McVey justified this claim that the PKI was not the mastermind because there was no solid evidence for that claim in the press reports and army’s 46 statement. They kept emphasizing that the action was merely “an internal affair’ which was supported by the PKI as cited in Roosa, 2006, p. 65. In conclusion, Bakar’s hiding proves the involvement of the PKI in the murders in Jakarta. This action is full of inconsistency. The inconsistency of this action is the unclear mission to be performed. Notwithstanding saving the president from a coup attempt, as Crouch 1978 mentions that “the raiding soldiers told the generals that they had been summoned to the palace by the president” p. 99. The generals should have been taken to the president to clarify the alleged coup. But, in fact, the generals are killed at their residence while the others also meet the same fate at Lubang Buaya. Moreover, still on the same day, Fic 2005 also shows the G30S’ strange political maneuver broadcasted through RRI: The announcement further said that a Revolutionary Council will be established soon as the supreme state authority, with its subsidiary agencies in the provinces, to replace the old political and social order in the entire country. The announcement was an unmistakable sign that Indonesia was in the middle of a classical coup d’etat p.1. It is really strange that the G30S openly states a coup against the president whom they have saved from a coup attempt. This political maneuver is concluded that through the G30S, the army considers the PKI is attempting to overthrow the president by establishing a Revolutionary Council as the supreme state authority.

2. The Helpless PKI

The announcement of Revolutionary Council by the G30S obviously shows that the state is in a coup. Thus, as submitted by Bellamy 2012, “General Suharto deployed loyal units and crushed the rebellion within twenty-four hours”