within a “regional Europe.” At the same time, we have seen a shift from nationalist
identities with a strong ethnic component, to identities that combine reference to the nation with greater attention to multiculturalism and the cohabitation
of diverse cultural groups Johnston 1991b; Melucci 1996. The struggle for self-government of indigenous peoples addresses not only specific rights, but
also the very political rights of nonterritorially bounded communities Brysk 2000; Yashar 1996.
Moreover, not only has globalization weakened the power of politics over economics, it has generated transnational conflicts on the policies of international
institutions, producing different results depending on the organization and field
44 S
OCIAL
C
HANGES AND
S
OCIAL
M
OVEMENTS
of intervention involved. In particular, opposition has arisen to the neoliberalist policies of the so-called international financial institutions such as the IMF or
the WB, which wield strong coercive power through the threat of economic sanctions and conditionalities on international credit. More generally, in addition
to the acquisition of power by these largely nonrepresentative, nontransparent bodies, criticism has centered on their manifest democratic deficit. Similar considerations
may hold for other international organs, for example, in the sphere of the United Nations, or for other types of policy enacted by the European
Union itself, from environmental issues to human rights. In all of these cases, new opportunities have emerged for mobilization and campaigns conducted on
a transnational scale Tarrow 1995; Chatfield et al. 1996; Marks and McAdam 1998. As governance began to involve multiple territorial levels, protestors also
started to develop multilevel strategies Imig and Tarrow 2001a and 2001b; della Porta and Tarrow 2004; della Porta 2004b; della Porta and Caiani 2006; see also
chapter 8 below.
2.2.2 State and classes: the conflicts around the welfare state
The state does not influence the formation of collective actors only through the definition of territorial boundaries to political action. It is well known that
the role of the state in the economy has increased progressively in the course of the twentieth century, peaking in the 1970s, and then, even if unequally in crossnational
comparison, declining with social expenditures at the turn of the century Crouch 1999. However considered, the state has moved from being a
guarantor of the market to managing economic activities through public enterprise; moreover, the welfare state has contained social inequalities for a global
discussion, see Rose 1988. This has led some observers to hold that the principal social cleavage is no longer based on the control of the means of production,
but relates, rather, to the procurement of the means of survival either in the private market or through public intervention Saunders 1987, quoted in Crompton
1993: 103 –4; see also Taylor-Gooby 1986; Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby 1987.
Certainly, criteria for allocation of public resources, often those concerned with the satisfaction of basic needs such as housing or transport, have represented a
significant area for collective action, in particular, for social groups from an urban context Dunleavy 1980; Castells 1983; Lowe 1986: Pickvance 1977, 1985, 1986.
Processes of a political nature, rather than based on market dynamics, affect the existence of certain social groups. As mentioned, the field of unemployment
is heavily influenced by state institutions that affect the number of unemployed as well as their conditions. After the Second World War, the phenomenon has
become more marked, with the development of the welfare state, as well as of
S
OCIAL
C
HANGES AND
S
OCIAL
M
OVEMENTS
45
neocorporatist patterns of interest representation see chapter 8 below. In recent decades, social movements have criticized the model of the interventionist state,
as well as that of the state as mediator between the forces of production. Various factors have converged towards a further widening of the potential for conflict.
First, as the active role of the state in the distribution of resources has become increasingly evident, the opportunities for mobilization to protect ever more heterogeneous
social groups and interests have also grown. Second, while the expansion of social rights has certainly brought greater opportunities for those from
the lowest social classes, it has also entailed considerable fiscal redistribution. This has been considered, in the medium term, as particularly heavy for the middle
classes, as well as insufficient to cover the growing costs of the welfare state, particularly in the context of an ageing population. The result has been a universal
welfare crisis that is at the same time fiscal and political. The explicitly political nature of the criteria for the allocation of social resources has, in fact, stimulated
mobilization among the middle classes, not only in the form of antitax movements, but also from a perspective which is globally critical of the welfare state
Fabbrini 1986; Brissette 1988; Lo 1982, 1990. More recently, however, the global justice movement has mobilized mainly in
defense of the welfare state. In differing ways in various countries, trade-union organizations have joined in protest, accusing neoliberal globalization of subordinating
citizens ’ rights to the free market, thus increasing the inequalities both
between the North and South and within their own countries. The forerunners of the Seattle protests can in fact be found, at least in part, in the world of work.
As mentioned, in various ways, depending on the prevailing patterns of interest representation in various countries, the 1990s saw a transformation of labor
action. While, in general terms, the union federations in European countries accepted privatization, deregulation, and the
“flexibilization” of labor, opposition grew in other sectors both inside and outside unions. In France, Italy, and
Germany, for example, protest extended particularly to public services, expressing
opposition to privatization and its effects on domestic work conditions and the global efficiency of services. Accused of defending old privileges, the publicsector
unions often sought consensus in public opinion by claiming to defend public against private values, service against goods.
Apart from public transport, opposition to neoliberal economic policies extended particularly to education and health. In these areas, in countries with
pluralist patterns of industrial relations with various representative organizations competing with each other, new unions highly critical of the various forms
of privatization arose and expanded – from Coordonner, Ressembler, Construire
CRC, and Solidaire, Unitaire, Démocratique SUD-PTT in France Béroud, Mouriaux, and Vakaloulis 1998: 49; Sommier 2003, to Cobas in Italy della Porta
2005c. In the so-called neocorporative countries, with occupational representation confined to a single union, public-sector unionists took the most radical
46 S
OCIAL
C
HANGES AND
S
OCIAL
M
OVEMENTS
positions for instance, first the OETV and then Ver.di in Germany. It was no coincidence that these unions were the most involved in the protest campaigns
against neoliberal globalization della Porta 2005c, 2005d. To summarize: the growth of the role of the state has multiplied the number
of social actors whose existence and opportunities seem to be linked at least partially to political decision-making mechanisms. At the same time, the processes
of globalization which we have just described, have undermined the capacity of consolidated political actors to effectively mediate between the various interests.
Changes in the criteria for defining actors and for determining the stakes to play for, have promoted the multiplication of collective identities and of mobilized
interests and, therefore, also their segmentation.
2.3 Knowledge, Culture, and Conflicts
