RELIGION AND LOCAL POLITICS
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[north coastal] santri, Arek, and Madurese) has very broad personal and regional variants. 67 The distinction finally depends on individual interpretation, two cases that tend to merge into one another. The function of kiai in daily life is mostly played out in a religious aspect through t } ari > qah (Sufi brotherhood) practices/rituals. Meanwhile, their political functions tend to be more personal and benefit-oriented. .
The fact that geo-cultural and geo-political considerations contribute to the tendency of political preference can be seen from parliamentary elections from 1955 up to 2004. In fact, culture and ideology, which play an important role in determining the political participation of the East Java community, cannot be neglected. The cultural and ideological factors (particularly the so called Islam supporters and Nationalists) can be easily observed from the results of these parliamentary elections over the years. In the 1955 parliamentary election in which 39 parties competed, NU and Masyumi both highly dependent on the Muslim communities of East Java, were the major political powers. In contrast, in the faction of non-religious parties, the action of PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party) and PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) also had a great influence. The result of the 1955 parliamentary election positioned these four parties as winners of a significant share of the votes. In this election, the largest shares of votes were gathered by the NU3,370,000 votes.or 34.1% of the 9 million total electorate. With that large proportion, NU gained 20 legislative seats or 31.7% of the total 63 seats. On the other hand, the PNI and PKI competed fiercely with one another for second position. The PKI was able to gain 23.3% of votes and obtained 14 seats.
Meanwhile, PNI got 22.8% or 14 seats and Masyumi received 11.2%. 68
Of those four big parties, it seems that the power of Islamic and non-Islamic parties were in close competition in East Java. If compiled, the votes collected by the NU and Masyumi party dominated 45.3%, meanwhile PNI and PKI reached 46.1%. Yet, if viewed from the distribution of votes based on geographical position, Islamic-based parties dominated the eastern part of East Java. They dominated ‘Tapal Kuda’ (horse shoe) regions such as Bondowoso, Situbondo, Banyuwangi, Jember, Probolinggo, Pasuruan, Sidoarjo, Gresik, Lamongan, Surabaya and Madura. In this region, Surabaya was
67 Geertz, Santri, Abangan, Priyayi, p. 173.
68 Kompas, 8 July 1971.
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the sole area that was not dominated by NU. In contrast, the western parts of East Java such as Bojonegoro, Tuban, Madiun, Ngawi, and Magetan up to the southern part of East Java were dominated of PNI
and PKI. 69
Table 3: The Result of the 1955 East Java Parliamentary Election Parties
Outcomes Winning concentration (%)
(Party Basis)
NU
34.1 % Situbondo, Probolinggo, Pasuruan, Sidoarjo, Surabaya, Gresik, Pasuruan and Madura
PKI 23.3 % Blitar, Nganjuk, Bojonegoro, Tuban, Ngawi PNI 22.8 % Blitar, Nganjuk, Bojonegoro, Tuban, Ngawi,
Madiun, Magetan
Masyumi 11.2 % Source: Kompas, 8 June 1997 and 10 February 2004; Research
and Development Division of East Java Kompas; www.situsjatim.com ; Moch Nurhasim, “Pengaruh dan Kekuatan Kiai dalam Rekrutmen Politik,” in Syamsudin Haris (ed.), Pemilu Langsung di Tengah Oligarki Partai; Proses Nominasi dan Seleksi Calon Legislatif Pemilu 2004 (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2005), p. 31; Asfar, Pemilu dan Prilaku Memilih; Iskandar Ritonga et al., “Kiprah Perempuan di Arus Politik Indonesia” (Unpublished research report, Surabaya, 2005).
This competition recurred in subsequent parliamentary elections. In 1971, Golkar gained 54.9%, while the Islamic parties, which later on merged into the PPP, obtained 39.4%. At the time, the NU heartlands, such as Pasuruan, Banyuwangi, Bondowoso, Situbondo, Jember and Madura island and other regencies in the eastern areas, were not dominated by Golkar. Yet, the western areas adjoining Central Java, such as Ponorogo, Pacitan, Ngawi, Madiun and Bojonegoro, previously the stronghold of PKI and PNI, were entirely dominated
by Golkar. 70
69 Ibid.
70 Kompas, 6 February 2004.
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The next parliamentary election furthered the success story of Golkar. In 1977, Golkar raised its share of the vote to 59.2%, whereas the PPP declined to just 35.9%. Golkar won in Situbondo, Bondowoso, Jember, Sampang, and Sumenep, the regencies that had traditionally supported the Islamic parties. The power of the PPP was even poorer in the 1982 and 1987 elections; with NU’s policy in 1984 of “going back to the 1926 khittah” which automatically meaning they withdrew from political life; thus the PPP’s votes hit an all time low with just21.4% in 1987. The PPP was beaten in almost all regencies, except Mojokerto, in which it remained undefeatable. In contrast, the Golkar reached 70.7%, its highest ever proportion of the popular vote
in East Java. 71
Table 4: The Results of East Java Parliamentary Election (1971-1982) Parliament
Parties Outcomes Winning Remark election
concentration (Parties basis)
1971 Golkar
Ponorogo, Pacitan, Previously Ngawi, Madiun,
Islamic Probolinggo, Parties
Pasuruan, Sidoarjo, Surabaya, Gresik,
Pasuruan, Banyuwangi and Madura
Golkar 59.2 % Pasuruan, NU basis,
Situbondo,
but won Bondowoso, Jember, by Golkar
Sampang, Sumenep
1977 PPP 35.9 % Madura, Tapal Kuda Gained
71 Ibid.
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Parliament Parties Outcomes Winning Remark election
concentration (Parties basis)
and north coastal votes, but
defeated PDI
Still dominant in western areas and won in nearly all cities and regencies.
PPP 25.60 % Madura and Tapal
Kuda areas
PDI 4.8% Source: Kompas, 8 June 1997 and 10 February 2004; Research
and Development Division of East Java Kompas; www.situsjatim.com ; Nurhasim, “Pengaruh dan Kekuatan Kiai,” in Haris (ed.), Pemilu Langsung di Tengah Oligarki , p. 31; Asfar, Pemilu dan Prilaku Memilih; Ritonga et al., “Kiprah Perempuan.”
In 1992, the PPP increased its share of the vote to 25.2%, while Golkar though decreasing slightly, were still victorious with 58.8% of the total votes. Some municipalities and regencies that previously supported Golkar, were won back by the PPP. Such was the case particularly in municipalities and regencies in the eastern part of East Java. In 1997, the last election in the New Order era, the PPP continued its rise. In cities and regencies such as Bangkalan, Pamekasan, Jombang, Bondowoso and Surabaya City as well, where competition with Golkar was unavoidable. Pasuruan was the only area that was still dominated by Golkar. In general, the Golkar’s votes
reached 62.9%, while PPP obtained 33.9%. 72
Table 5: The Result of East Java Parliamentary Election (1987-1997) Parliament
Parties Outcomes Winning concentration
election
(Parties basis)
1987 Golkar
Dominated nearly all regencies and cities
72 Ibid.
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Parliament Parties Outcomes Winning concentration election
(Parties basis)
PPP
Madura and parts of Tapal Kuda areas
Fewer votes in Madura and Tapal Kuda areas
PPP
Significant votes in Pasuruan and the eastern parts of East Java
Dominant in western areas, Struggling in Tapal Kuda areas.
PPP
Though defeated, gaining significant votes in Surabaya, Bangkalan, Pamekasan, Jombang, and Bondowoso.
PDI
Source: Kompas, 8 June 1997 and 10 February 2004; Research and Development Division of East Java Kompas; www.situsjatim.com ; Nurhasim, “Pengaruh dan Kekuatan Kiai,” in Haris (ed.), Pemilu Langsung di Tengah Oligarki , p. 31; Asfar, Pemilu dan Prilaku Memilih; Ritonga et al., “Kiprah Perempuan.”
The 32 years of New Order political hegemony could not erase the political loyalty of East Java communities toward the identity and ideology of political parties. The result of the 1999 parliament election strengthened this assumption. Of 48 political parties competing in this province, the rivalry between parties that depended on the basis of Muslim mass and nationalist seemed more competitive. In general, East Java was the major base of the PKB in 1999.. The PKB gained 35.48%, whereas the PDIP got 33.81%. This relative share of the vote reminds us of the 1955 parliamentary election, in which political parties such as NU, PKI and PNI competed to obtain the influence/power in this area. In East Java, in 1955 NU had obtained 34.14%, the PKI 23.29%, and the PNI 22.80%. Meanwhile, Masyumi
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gained just 11.24%. 73 A predictably poor result was experienced by Golkar party. Where before,it had dominated six parliamentary elections during the New Order regime, Golkar now got only 12.7% in 1999.
The rivalry between the PKB and PDIP occurred up to regency and city level. Although, the PKB was dominant at provincial level, the PDIP dominated at regency and city levels. Around 23 regencies/cities in the western part of East Java were held by this party. The PKB merely dominated 13 regencies/cities and was concentrated in Tapal Kuda and Madura areas, excluding Pamekasan which was won by the PPP. This pattern was not very different from that of the 1955 parliament election. The cities/regencies in the western part of East Java was under domination of non-religious parties such as the PKI and PNI, while in the eastern areas, particularly Tapal Kuda and north coastal area the Islamic parties triumphed. The difference was that, while the regencies/cities of Malang, Jombang, and Sidoarjo in 1955 parliament election were dominated by NU, in the 1999 parliament election, PKB’s share was less than the PDIP’s. In contrast, Trenggalek, which in the past was of the base of the PNI, was won by the PKB rather than the PDIP.
The success story of PKB continued in 2004 with 31.3% of the votes while in contrast, the PDIP picked up only24.3% of the votes. Apparently, traditional voters of PDIP voted for Golkar, which increased its votes to 15.3%, and other nationalist parties like the Democrats. Geographically, the votes of PKB, PDIP or Golkar originated from their traditional regions.
Table 6: The Result of East Java Parliamentary Election in the Post New Order Era (1999-2004)
Parliament Parties Outcomes Winning Remark election
concentration (Parties basis)
1999 PKB
13 regencies/cities: Madura, Tapal Kuda areas and Trenggalek
PDIP
23 regencies/cities, particularly in
73 Nurhasim, “Pengaruh dan Kekuatan Kiai,” in Haris (ed.), Pemilu Langsung di Tengah
Oligarki , p. 31.
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Parliament Parties Outcomes Winning Remark election
concentration (Parties basis)
western and southern regencies.
Golkar 12.7% PPP 5.2%
2004 PKB 31.3% Votes slightly PDIP’s
decreased
rival party in Surabaya
PDIP 24.3% Votes significantly Vote
decreased
migration to PD
Golkar 15.3% Source: Kompas, 8 June 1997 and 10 February 2004; Research
and Development Division of East Java Kompas; www.situsjatim.com ; Nurhasim, “Pengaruh dan Kekuatan Kiai,” in Haris (ed.), Pemilu Langsung di Tengah Oligarki , p. 31; Asfar, Pemilu dan Prilaku Memilih; Ritonga et al., “Kiprah Perempuan.”
Looked at from a geo-political point of view, the general tendency of the voters’ attitude in the parliamentary elections from 1955 to 2004 did not schange ignificantly. From 1955 onward the Mataraman area was dominated by the PKI and PNI, and in the 1971 parliamentary election was dominated by Golkar. Meanwhile, in post-New Order parliamentary elections, Golkar’s position was rivaled by the PDIP. In this area, the votes of the PKB and/or NU-based political parties had never been significant. In contrast, however, they dominated on the island of Madura and Pendalungan. The performance of NU in the 1955 election was fairly strong, and such was the case in the 1999 and 2004 parliamentary elections, in which the PKB won in these areas.
In Arek and north coastal areas, nationalist and religious parties went neck and neck with no dominant political party. For instance, in the 1955 parliamentary election, in Surabaya and its surroundings, the
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NU and nationalist parties’ votes ran very close. This trend wasrepeated in the 1999 and 2004 parliamentary elections, which the PDIP won in 1999 and the PKB won in 2004.
This pattern shows that geo-cultural and geo-political factors obviously had an impact on the community’s political preferences. Later, this helps us to understand the participation of the NU elites in those five areas.
Table 7: Typology and Political Preference of the NU Elites in East Java
Political Tendency Areas
relationship Politics
Old New Post relationship Order
Order New Order
Mataraman
PNI and Golkar PDIP (Madiun,
PKI and and Magetan,
Central Java authority of
prefer
PDI Golkar Nganjuk,
(Keraton)
syncretic
substance to
obedient to
Kingdom
king/state leader, tend to apply politics personally
NU and PPP PKB,
Masyumi and Golkar (The northern Java (Arek
North coast
Eastern
Islamic area
pragmatics
Golkar and area Gresik,
Substance
PAN Lamongan
language)
and symbol
walk
and Tuban)
simultan- eously Kiai- santri /comm- unity relationship is more rational.
NU PPP, Majority
some PKB (Madura
island
Madura/-
Islam area
charisma,
are island)
Golkar (gentle),
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Political Tendency Areas
relationship Politics
Old New Post relationship Order
Order New Order
(rough)
Fanaticism to Kiai
Pendalungan Madurese/
NU PPP Majority (Jember,
The
Traditional,
some PKB Banyuwangi
Madura-
migrants of
charisma but
are Bondowoso,
Golkar Situbondo,
(mixed)
island in 19 th rigidly
beginning of religious
Pasuruan,
20 th century
tradition
Probolingo)
symbol, Fanaticism to Kiai
Arek
PNI, Golkar, PKB (Surabaya,
Javanese/- Most are
Rational
PKI, PPP and Sidoarjo,
use Arek
migrants
pragmatics
NU and and PDIP Malang,
Javanese
from various (due to the
Masyumi PDI are arch Jombang)
language,
areas in East influence of
some use
rivals in Madurese
Egalitarian, tolerant and rational cosmo- politan)
We should draw some distinctions between the political participation pattern during and after the New Order era. In the New Order era, the community’s political participation tended to be ‘mobilized’ participation, and did not act completely from an awareness of their political choice. Their participation in political campaigns and in polling stations tended to be mainly due to pressures from the New Order regime. They were forced to obey the regime since they were afraid to be labeled as “Anti Development”, “Right Extremists (Muslim Fundamentalists)” or “Left Extremists (Communists)”. This stigma was quite effective in mobilizing the society to give political legitimacy to New Order regime. In contrast, in the “Reformation” era, political participation was more autonomous because the authoritarian New Order regime, which had used all
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means to conduct cooptation and penetration into all lines of life, had been terminated and transformed into a more substantive democracy.
In such a free political atmosphere, the motivation behind the political actions of the NU elites washighly varied. Among the crucial points has been the consideration behind their engagement to a certain
political party. This case can be examined using Schultz’s theory 75 of “because motive” (motive that becomes the basis of political involvement) and “in order to motive”. Based on this theory, the reason for the NU elites’ political involvement is strictly religious. According to them, their involvement in politics is a religious obligation of each Muslim as stipulated in the Qur’a> n. Due to this instruction, joining politics is considered as part of devotion to God. God will grant reward in the Hereafter to those performing this instruction (the ‘in order to’ motive). In addition, Berger added a pragmatic motive, according to which a person conducts an action
based on self-interest. 76 In this context, the interest of kiais with their political involvement enables them to access power through their patronage over santris, alumni or links.
The political motivation of kiai is not permanent, because it can change due to pressure and continuous political conflict. In this context, the NU elites’ involvement in politics is “symbolic” since they have struggled and improved the party, but there would be a possibility of withdrawal from politics (mufa > raqah ) as shown by the resignation of some NU elites from the PKB and foundation of another party called PKNU. In this context, Blumer states that every human being has the wisdom to modify and changee. This happens because of their ability to interact with themselves, which enables them to examine a number of opportunities, assess their relative advantages and disadvantages and
later on select one of the various opportunities. 77
75 Ian Craib, Teori-Teori Sosial Modern: Dari Parson Hingga Habermas (Jakarta: Rajawali
Press, 1992), p. 126.
76 Peter L. Berger, RJ. Neuhaus, “To empower people; the Role of Mediating Structure in Public Policy,” in DC. Korten and R. Klauss (eds), People Centered Development
(Connecticut: Kumarian, 1984), pp. 253-4.
77 Blumer, Symbolic Interaction, p. 78.
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The Politics of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama > `ah;
Symbolics and Pragmatics
Besides the hybridization and amalgamation of culture that form the character of the political participation of the NU elites in East Java, fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) also constitutes a distinctive feature of the NU elites’ politics. As NU is a religious social organization, thus, it is only natural that religious values should function not only as basic rules within their religious rituals, but also should also be implanted into their wider life.
Religious values of Aswaja give the NU elites a flexible space to be further involved in a space that is social-politically not their discipline. The values developed by NU are flexible, universal and inclusive. Although there is an assumption that Aswaja political values are considered as legitimizing action for the NU social-political journey, the values indeed are substantially anchored in the Qur’a> n and Sunnah, the normative sources of Aswaja values.
Meanwhile, the most important aspect in Aswaja religious view is the fiqh. Fiqh discourse is more dominant than `aqi > dah (Islamic theology), akhla q > (Islamic ethic) and tas } awwuf (Sufism). Fiqh is widely used by the NU elites as a basic argument and response to social- political issues that appear both within and outside NU. For instance, the principle of “conserving good values of the past and adopting
better new values” (al-muh } a faz > } ah `ala > al-qadi m al-s > } a > lih } wa al-akhdh bi al- jadi > d al-as } lah } ) is always used by the NU elites in several important decisions, though legally it contradicts organization rules. By this norm, any conflicts between religion and politics can be overcome through reconciliation and therefore conflicts are avoided. One example of this is the involvement of Kiais listed as NU structural officials as well as being active in a political party. This double identity is basically forbidden in NU. Such conflicts of interest can be overcome through religious explanation and argumentation. The NU kiai involved in founding the PKB can remain active in NU as well as the PKB because of this logical reasoning. There was also the case of NU kiais who became officers, founders or active participants of PKB, then resigned and founded another party, the PKNU. All of these conflicting interests religiously can be accepted using this logical reasoning. This religious basis is also frequently used by the NU elites when they are considered of having broken the principle of “going back to the 1926 khittah”, which strictly limits NU activities in social
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and religious programs. The consideration of NU benefit and service for national interest is often used as a reason by those who are both partyofficeholders and part of the NU structure.
Another jurisprudential maxim that is frequently used says that “if there are two conflicting hazards, then the least hazardous is performed” (idha > ta`a > raz } at mafsadata ni ru’iya a’z > } amuha > d } arara bi irtika > b akhaffihima ). This maxim is basically used in risk management. The > political choices of the NU elites in anticipating social-politics consequences are made according to the measurement of the effects that could possibly result from those actions. Ali Haidar’s claims, there
is “nothing absolute” in the political tradition of the NU elites. 78 By this maxim, the move of the NU elites from the PKB to the PKNU or PPP is based on a consideration that the PKB is considered to have deviated from the principle of Aswaja and to have given no protection to Islam by appointing officers and legislative members of the PKB with non-Muslim. The religious motivation of PKNU figures in founding the party was to save the political aspirations of the group’ or Jama’ah NU. According to some NU elites who resigned from the PKB, on the grounds that non-Muslims and non-NU figures had been admitted to the PKB, it means that the PKB was in a hazardous condition and there should be a political mechanism to represent the political aspirations of NU community.
Another maxim that is frequently used is “avoiding hazards is more important than generating benefits” (dar` al-mafa > sid muqaddam `ala jalb al-mas a } > lih ). This maxim is used by the NU elites when they find } themselves in a dilemma. Thus, they will take a decision that is able to reduce risks to a minimum rather than keeping pursuing benefits. In this context, the involvement of the NU elites in a variety of political parties, their resignation from the PKB, and the founding of the PKNU is a part of minimizing the hazard after the failure of the PKB to implement the mandate of NU.
Suggestions for avoiding hazards is frequently related to the two broader principles of mas } lah } ah and amr bi al-ma’ru > f wa nahy `an al-munkar . Mas lah } ah } (lit. “welfare” or “benefit”) which are concepts in Islamic legal theory proposing that the ultimate goal of Islamic law is community interest or prosperity. As the contrary of mas } lah } ah is mafsadah , preventing mafsadat is mas lah } } ah . Interpretation and
78 Haidar, Nahdlatul Ulama dan Islam di Indonesia, p. 322.
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implementation of mas } lah } ah by the NU elites is based on the decision making by measuring the advantages and disadvantages of the action to be taken. The way that gives most benefits or avoids most hazards is the most appropriate one.
Meanwhile, amr bi al-ma`ru > f wa nahy `an al-munkar suggests encouraging good deeds and preventing cruelties. This concept is not a fiqh concept but a command taken from the Qur’a> n, that is, what is explicitly stated in the Qur’a> n (3:104). Executing amr bi al-ma`ru > f wa nahy `an al-munkar is an obligation for every Muslim. According to Achmad Siddiq, besides personal obligation to give advice to government, he argues that NU can truly execute amr bi al-ma`ru > f wa nahy `an al-munkar through political participation within available
political institutions. 79 Based on his observation of NU’s political experiences, Fealy proposes three principles, namely wisdom, flexibility and moderatism in politics that emanate from Aswaja teaching. 80 The term wisdom is used within the definition of taking conducive action to gain benefits or to avoid the loss. Flexibility means NU always tries to adjust/adapt to the situation and never proposes an absolute or unconditional attitude. Furthermore, moderation may be defined as a wish to avoid an extreme position and greater care in acting and stating an opinion. In NU political discourse, these ideas are clearly held. Moderate manners, particularly the tendency to select common/general ways, known as the “middle way approach”, is an Islamic value as well as a Javanese philosophy.
In the political history of the NU, since the Old Order up to the Reformation era, there have been numerous political decisions by the NU elites considered ambiguous and ambivalent. Accordingly, negative perceptions frequently emerged due to the lack of knowledge about NU’s religious basis. Masyumi, for instance, considered the actions of
NU inconsistent, weak, and opportunistic. 81 On the other side, the political moves of NU were unpredictable. In one issue, NU was forceful to the ruling government but in another issue they were moderate. For example, NU kept a distance from the government
79 Achmad Shiddiq, Khittah Nahdliyyah (Surabaya: LTNU dan Khalista, 2007), p. 66.
80 Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama, p. 69.
81 Ibid., p. 77.
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during the New Order era, especially after the period of “going back to the 1926 khittah”. This attitude is called, by Nakamura, “radical
traditionalism”. 82 In detail, Nakamura asserts that the political attitude of NU actually is “accommodative”, but critical and autonomous. 83 Before Nakamura, Geertz 84 addresses the attitude of kiai as cultural brokers, namely activities that relate to the broader socio- political role of kiai in the community as spiritual guide, holder and controller of information, and determiner of a variety of local policies, including political issues.
What has the pattern of the NU elites’ participation been like since the New Order age? Really, there have been two models of participation: “symbolic-pragmatic” and “symbolic- non-pragmatic”. Symbolically, the political participation of the NU elites is described with a participation model that only lies on symbol and cover. It does not touch upon the real participation, which is based on religious faith. `Ulama > ’ , kiai, and pesantren are used as symbols in carrying out political participation, particularly in founding a political party, and becoming an officer or member of a party. `Ulama > ’ and kiai are symbols that are extremely close to spiritual and religious realms, so the involvement of kiai in politics is interpreted as the involvement of religion, or even the involvement of God in politics. From the political perspective, the NU elites can be regarded as symbols of God and religion in politics.
Symbolic participation tends to be artificial, by placing “instant interest” rather than a truly political struggle as the basis of politics, . It also tends to be “tenuous”, strongly sensitive to interest and even conflict. This tendency can be observed, for instance in the movement of the NU elites from one party to another because of differences in opinion or their aspirations not being accommodated. Likewise, they easily form new parties on behalf of `ulama ’, kiai, pesantren > and even regard themselves as the only party that fights for Aswaja.
On the other hand, pragmatic participation is based on well- calculated politics, measuring benefit and loss and their socio-
82 Mitsuo Nakamura, “Tradisioanalisme Radikal, Catatan Muktamar Semarang 1979,”
in Fealy and Barton (eds), Tradisionalisme Radikal, pp. 72-75.
83 Similar assertion is also stated by Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama’, p. 66; Muhtadi,
Komunikasi Politik Nahdlatul Ulama , p. 145; and Feillard, NU vis a vis Negara, p. 76.
84 Clifford Geertz, “The Javanese kijaji: the Changing Role of a Cultural Broker,”
Comparative Studies in Society and History: an international quarterly , 2, 2 (1960): pp. 228-59.
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economic impacts. Pragmatic participation tends not to employ normative reasoning as a political platform. Instead, it relies largely on the fulfillment of instrumental matters and material gain. This model of participation is often followed by the NU elites in Madura, Pendalungan and some parts of the Arek area. In contrast, non- pragmatic participation frequently occurs in the NU elites of Mataraman area and a part of pesisir (coastal) area. However, not all of the NU elites in Madura, Pendalungan and Arek are pragmatic, because some of them firmly embrace the traditional doctrines of `ulama > ’ and NU, so that they maintain the Islamic values of religious personalities. Likewise, not all NU elites in Mataraman and pesisir (coastal) areas are non-pragmatic, because a variety of maneuvers are is also found that are frequently considered contradictory to the values of `ulama > ’ and NU.
Since the Reformation era, the opportunity of founding political parties has been well-utilized by Indonesians. As a result, any forms of political attitudes have been more tenuous and not dominated by a single political power. In this context, the NU elites have been more predisposed to get involved in politics because of their autonomous status. The transformation of political participation to “symbolic – pragmatic” can be interpreted from the openness of the NU elites toward a political dynamic which is not “black and white” any more, but rather has a variety of colors.
Conclusion
Looking at geo-political and geo-cultural reality, the tendencies of political participation of the NU elites in East Java were prevalently heterogeneous. The NU kiais are in a position which is close to politics. It is normal for NU followers to consider the double roles of NU kiais; they are religious leaders dealing with spiritual aspects as well as community leaders involving themselves in social and potentially political aspects of life. However, this consideration occurs only locally, and cannot be implemented in the context of NU kiais nationally. The locality of political role is related to their social interaction with the culture in each area. Locality makes a contribution to understanding and perceiving politics; for instance, the Mataraman NU elites that tend to maintain a relationship with formal religious issues and there is a tendency to separate religion from politics. In contrast, Madura, Pendalungan, Pesisiran (north coast), and Arek areas tend to combine religion and politics.
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In the island of Madura and the Pendalungan area, the closeness of religion and politics is obvious in the utilization of religious symbols in politics. For example, kiais who attend formal meetings always wear robes and turbans as arguably religious symbols. Likewise, kiais who are members of local parliament always wear religious attributes in formal ceremonies. Those cases rarely occur in Mataraman or Pesisir (coastal) areas, in which they have commenced to differ between religion and state formal agenda, except the wearing of the peci (hat) which has become a part of the national dress.
In addition to the expansion above, there is another general characteristic that differentiates the NU elites of East Java from other Islamic elites (especially modernist Muslims). That aspect concerns the employment of principles of Islamic jurisprudence and legal theory in politics. There are different characteristics between these two Islamic groups because of a difference in social background. The modernist group, in general is highly driven by efforts to change the social reality of Muslims with regard to their religious practices. This religious experience finally is also applied to the change of political attitude. In contrast, the traditionalist group tries to coordinate, maintain and develop the faith, the religious culture that generally already exists. This attitude, in turn, has an impact on their view of social and political life.
The argument that is commonly used is “al-muh } a > faz } ah `ala > al-qadi > m al- s } a lih > } wa al-akhdh bi al-jadi > d al-as } lah } ” . Accordingly, the first group tries to develop an ideal situation, while the second reflects social reality. The fiqh-oriented approach used by the NU elites in responding to political issues culminates in the implementation of fiqh principles. It then creates the accommodative and pragmatic tendency of the NU elites. Evolution of political behavior can be observed by looking at the intellectual tradition and decision making process developed by NU. Due to the fiqh-oriented political responses, political style of the NU elites is more flexible and accommodative which is proven to provide solutions to any political dilemma. []
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The Politics of East Java NU Elites
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