When is a process of observation completely described? Outline of the proposal
BioSystems 54 2000 165 – 180
Towards a closed description of observation processes
Dieter Gernert
Department of Economics, Technical Uni6ersity of Munich, Arcisstrasse
21
, D-
80333
Munich, Germany Received 24 May 1999; received in revised form 26 October 1999; accepted 5 November 1999
Abstract
A closed description of observation processes must necessarily include the observer, too. In order to find a basis for such a unified description, an operator algebra is developed which enables a formal description of at least a
significant majority of cognitive processes. It is found that this operator algebra, which is a noncommutative semiring of a type already known in literature, has astonishing similarities with the usual operator algebras in quantum theory.
Combined with a method for the formal treatment of perspective notions, the representation scheme proposed here may open a chance for a unified description of a process itself together with the relevant cognitive processes on the
observer’s side. By the description of parallel-processing systems on the same basis an operational definition of ‘internal time’ becomes possible. © 2000 Elsevier Science Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords
:
Observation; Measurement; Unified description; Operator algebra; Quantum theory; Cognitive process; Perspective notion; Semantics
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1. When is a process of observation completely described?
‘‘Any description of the world that someone advocates as being complete… must ‘close the
circle’: it must include an account of how we come by that description. In particular, any phys-
ical theory that claims such completeness must account for our experience as observers.’’ But-
terfield, 1995 The crucial role of the observer in quantum physics is generally accepted, and there
is an abundant literature just on this topic. Prob- lems immediately arise when an ‘inclusion of the
observer’ is understood in a strict sense, because this will inevitably imply a study and formal
description of processes beyond the usual scope of physics.
‘‘Consciousness exists, but it resists definition.’’ Flanagan, 1995 This quotation gives a cue to
stop for a moment searching for a perfect defin- ition of terms like ‘consciousness’, ‘mind’, ‘men-
tal’, etc. Rather, an attempt will be made here to supply a basis for a unifying description
1
through a ‘change of perspective’, which will not only help
circumventing that
trouble with
definitions, but, hopefully, will also bring about some new
insight.
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The ‘problem of two languages’ and the necessity of a ‘unified description’ are particularly emphasized by Lau-
rikainen 1988. 0303-264700 - see front matter © 2000 Elsevier Science Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
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