Development of Herbicide Resistant Crops

1.5. Development of Herbicide Resistant Crops

Biosafety legitimately shares the ultimate responsibility and takes cognizance of both the poten- tial for the plethora of undesirable consequences emanating from new technological advancements as well as the absolute requirement for appropriate measures to significantly minimize these consequences.

Example : Genetic engineering of crops is invariably claimed to have defended a host of the world’s genuine problems specially to meet the ‘hunger’. Therefore, specific emphasis with respect to the present day agricultural research is mainly focused towards the develpment of herbidicide resist-

ant crops.

Consequently, the crux of the problem suggests explicitely that the actual and genuine benefici- aries of the above cited new technology may not be identical as those forced to assume the ensuing risks involved. The promulgation of an internationally binding safety protocol has been initiated and insti- tuted to avoid such glaring imbalances ; besides, to contain adequately the outcome of ecological risks as well as socio-economic impacts of genetically engineered organisms together with their probable risks to human-health.

Valid cardinal and vital reasons for essentially including the genetically modified organisms (GMOs) under the regulation of a biosafety protocol are as enumerated under* :

(1) The potential for transgenic crops to become weeds and unwanted plants, to become chan- nels via which new genes move to wild plants, and to facilitate the creation of new viruses that may cause newer plant diseases.

(2) The potential of genetic engineering to contribute to the erosion of agricultural biodiversity by either of the two ways, namely :

(a) creation of crops that essentially compete with wild plants and other traditional varieties, and (b) transfer of new crop’s genes into the more primitive varieties.

(3) The potential of genetic engineering to upset (imbalance) the prevailing ‘ecosystems’ in manners that may not be properly understood or adequately remediated. (4) The potential for adverse social and economic impacts in developing countries from the products emanated from genetic engineering. Production of such substitutes for export crops has already led to tremendous loss of livelihoods and export earnings in certain countries in the world.

(5) In some countries there is no facility and provision to ensure the safety of genetically modi- fied organisms (GMOs), to monitor and regulate their entry at the border, and to take appro- priate remedial measures in the event of certain untoward mishap(s).

PHARMACEUTICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY

(6) The existence of a transboundary ecological dimension to genetically engineered organ- isms. Even when there is no human intent to export, living organisms may spontaneously mutate, multiply , and migrate.

(7) Genetic engineering is based on the ‘idea’ that characteristic features of organisms are deter- mine uniquely by stable genes, such that the transfer of genes automatically gives rise to the transfer of the ‘desired characteristics’. Importantly, this genetic determinism* fails to take

into consideration the complex interactions amongst the genes that are duly involved in the overall development of all characteristics of an organism ; and, therefore, frequently masks the genuine inability to predict the ensuing consequences of transferring a gene from one type of organism to another.

A good number of International Organizations viz., EC, FAO, UNEP, and UNIDO are not only interested but also genuinely keen to look into biosafety aspects, such as : • Biosafety and its impact on the use of ‘biotechnology’ in the developing countries so as to assess the various needs in order to ensure that the agricultural and environmental applica- tions of biotechnology move forward devoid of any undue risks or excessive costs.

• Real public concerns arising obviously from certain newer biotechnological product(s) causes lots of apprehensions that need to be resolved and confidence gained, in case biotechnology is to make its greatest impact and maximum contribution to the much needed welfare of society.

A few developing countries have evolved and formulated their own stringent ‘national biosafety systems’ thereby incorporating definite well-defined guidelines for :

(a) experimental modus operandi, and (b) small-scale release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).

However, the ‘National Guidelines’ operative in India, are mainly based upon the United States- National Institute of Health (NIH) guidelines.

It is indeed pertinent to mention here that an evidently much greater and extended focus upon the benefits and risks involved in the specific release of an ‘alien organism’, in comparison to the process engaged for its production. It has been duly observed that there are certain critical and absolutely vital biological considerations with regard to the ‘intended releases’ for which adequate strategies require to

be devised exclusively to ensure the stability of its legitimate and safe introduction. Example : The potential for the usual overexposure of the novel Bt* genes for affording ‘insect

resistance’ ultimately leading to the rapid development of resistance.