Experimental design Directory UMM :Data Elmu:jurnal:J-a:Journal of Economic Behavior And Organization:Vol43.Issue4.Dec2000:

E.-S. Park J. of Economic Behavior Org. 43 2000 405–421 409 Fig. 1. The value orientation circle. 7.50 points for self and 13.00 points for the other. The 24 decision problems are listed in Appendix A. Social psychologists use the observed motivational vector, the sum of the individual’s 24 chosen vectors, to classify individual’s value orientations. Subjects with an observed motivational vector lying between degree −112.5 and −67.5 are classified aggressive, subjects with vectors between −67.5 and −22.5 are classified competitive, subjects with − 22.5 and 22.5 are classified as individualistic, subjects with vectors between 22.5 and 67.5 are classified as cooperative, and subjects with vectors between 67.5 and 112.5 are classified as altruistic see Fig. 1.

3. Experimental design

One hundred subjects were used in each framing condition, for a total of 200 hundreds subjects. All subjects were volunteers from the undergraduate students enrolled in the Col- lege of Business and Economics of West Virginia University. All students participated were inexperienced subjects. The data are collected in five separate sessions. For each session, 40 subjects were recruited and divided randomly into two rooms of 20 each. In a particular room the 20 subjects were assigned randomly to numbered desks. In each room a value orientation experiment Experiment I was first conducted and a different condi- tion of Andreoni’s experiment Experiment II was followed. Each experiment was led by 410 E.-S. Park J. of Economic Behavior Org. 43 2000 405–421 two experimenters. Each session lasted about one-and-a-half hours. Average earnings per subject were 11.27. In Experiment I, the Decomposed Game experiment was conducted to assess individual value orientations. Subjects were given instructions and a numbered envelope. A copy of instruction for Experiment I can be found in Appendix B. Subjects were told that their task is to choose between Option A and Option B: each Option lists the points heshe will receive or pay himherself and the points that the other will receive or pay. At no point did the subjects know what the other subjects were choosing. For each of the 24 decision problems an experimenter provided each subject with a decision form. The 24 decision problems were presented in a random order from the list in Appendix A. Subjects made their decisions by circling an option in a statement like “Choose between Option A=14.5, 3.9 and Option B=13, −7.5”. Subjects were told that each point is worth 0.10 in payoff for example, 14.5 points would earn 1.45. In each round of decision problem they were instructed to put their decision form in the numbered envelope provided after they have chosen their options. Subjects were told that after all of the 24 decision problems, the second experimenter will collect, shuffle the envelopes, and randomly pair one subject’s form with that of another subject in this experiment. They were told that the second experimenter calculates total earnings for each subject and they will be paid after the completion of Experiment II. In Experiment II, Andreoni’s framing experiment was replicated. Instructions that are nearly identical to the one used in Andreoni’s experiment Andreoni, 1995, pp. 14–19 were used. The subjects were given instructions and a packet of 10 ‘Investment Decision Form’, which subjects use to record their decisions to allocate 60 tokens between Individual Exchange Account and Group Exchange Account. The subjects played the game for 10 rounds, and are randomly and anonymously assigned to new groups each round. In each round of the experiment, one experimenter collects an investment decision form from each subject. The experimenter, using a computer, randomly assigns subjects to groups of five, calculates payoffs, and prepares an ‘earnings report’ for each subject. The earnings report tells subjects their investment decision, the group’s investment decision in the public good, and their monetary payoffs. After the second experiment has ended subjects were paid privately their earnings, in cash, from the two experiments. 4

4. Experimental results