Economics of Education Review 19 2000 351–361 www.elsevier.comlocateeconedurev
The missing link: an econometric analysis on the impact of curriculum standards on student achievement
Nicola A. Alexander
University of Minnesota, 86 Pleasant Street S.E., Minneapolis, MN 55455-0221, USA Received 15 December 1997; accepted 26 October 1998
Abstract
Nationwide, state policy-makers have increasingly adopted curriculum standards as a means of improving education. However, relatively little empirical research has been done to investigate if a link actually exists between curriculum
standards and student performance. Using data collected by the New York State Department of Education, the impact of standards on high school student achievement is examined through estimation of a one-way fixed-effects model of
the education production function. Curriculum standards are operationalized as the award of a “50–64” variance, which is considered a means of increasing the number of students taking demanding courses. The findings suggest that curricu-
lum standards can improve student performance, but they do little to improve equity. While larger portions of pupils pass curriculum-based assessment exams, continued associations between select student characteristics and student
performance remain.
2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: JEL I21 Keywords: Curriculum standards; Student achievement; Educational policy; “At-risk” pupils
1. Introduction
1.1. Overview American public elementary and secondary schools
were branded mediocre after the publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983 National Commission on Excellence in
Education, 1983. The educational conditions high- lighted by this report sparked a series of reform efforts
across the nation, many of which called for additional aid to public schools Odden, 1990. Despite increased
funding, criticism of schools persisted and even intensi- fied. Many practitioners and academics questioned the
notion that expending more money on the educational status quo would necessarily lead to improved outcomes
Hanushek, 1989, 1991.
Tel.: +
1-612-624-1507; fax: +
1-612-624-3377. E-mail address: nalexandtc.umn.edu N.A. Alexander.
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2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 2 7 2 - 7 7 5 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 - 0
Decision-makers in some states targeted selected school inputs e.g. faculty, organization, curriculum as
areas in need of a major overhaul. Policy-makers dis- cussed the use of merit pay Odden Kelley, 1996,
decentralization Weiler, 1990; Odden, 1994 and more rigorous coursework Altonji, 1994. Lately, however,
input-oriented strategies are being replaced by an empha- sis on results Monk, 1994.
The imposition of curriculum standards
1
reflects these dual approaches input and output to improving edu-
1
Curriculum reform encompasses two key issues: 1 increased knowledge provided in particular subject areas; and
2 raised expectations of student mastery of the course material. Standard setting often refers to the imposition of
higher graduation requirements, often in the selection of type and quantity of courses. Because research in curriculum stan-
dards is still relatively new, these definitions may vary slightly from study to study. For a good general overview of these
terms, see the issue on educational standards Anon, 1994.
352 N.A. Alexander Economics of Education Review 19 2000 351–361
cation. That is, in its early conceptualization, curriculum standards were associated with a prescriptive curriculum
NYS Department of Education, 1984 but later evolved into a more flexible, results-oriented strategy NYS
Department of Education, 1991. An assumed benefit of either approach is that promotion of a rigorous curricu-
lum for all pupils will also reduce the gaps in perform- ance between different student groups. That is, if a rigor-
ous curriculum yields high student performance then ensuring that all students participate in more demanding
courses will generate improved achievement for all.
In recent years, proponents of curriculum standards have been at the forefront of educational reform, yet the
literature remains relatively silent on the impact of this approach on educational outcomes. Little is known about
the differential effects of curriculum reform on different cohorts of the student population. For instance, what are
the impacts of curriculum standards on course selection and school attendance of at-risk pupils? Will there be a
trade-off between improved performance on the part of some students e.g. increased college attendance and
lower retention rates on the part of others? Is there a risk that the “educational bar” will be raised too high? With
the widespread adoption of systemic education reform by states, there is a growing need for answers to these
questions.
The primary objective of this research is to examine how curriculum standards affect student achievement.
The underlying logic of the policy of curriculum stan- dards encompasses two assumptions. First, the types of
courses that students take affect their educational achievement. Second, policy-makers know what types of
courses lead to better outcomes and can prescribe or influence the time allotted to these “better” courses. If
the first assumption is true, differential access to the cur- riculum becomes very important, particularly on equity
grounds, and the relevance of curriculum standards becomes clearer.
This study is part of a larger body of research on cur- riculum standards. It continues the inquiry begun in an
earlier paper, which explored changes in student class time spent on particular areas of the curriculum
Alexander, 1996. That descriptive look at the trends in course-taking patterns provides the context in which the
behavioral model linking course-taking patterns, curricu- lum standards, and student achievement is developed.
This study examines the relationships between curricu- lum standards and student achievement using pooled
data on public school districts in New York State for the past 6 years, 198990 through 199495.
1.2. The issues Much of the research on tracking has found that the
quality of the curriculum to which a student is exposed has an impact on the quality of learning that takes place
Oakes, 1985; Vanfossen, Jones Spade, 1987. This influence is often mediated through the impact that cur-
riculum tracks have on the choice of courses selected by students Lee Bryk, 1988. This influence is above and
beyond and even greater than the impact of prior aca- demic performance and interests Vanfossen et al.,
1987. Course-taking patterns in turn influence how much students learn of subjects such as mathematics,
science, or business, and also how much practice they obtain in reading and vocabulary Vanfossen et al.,
1987. Consequently, many authors contend that students in non-academic tracks are not given an environment that
encourages them to increase their performance and their educational and occupational aspirations Oakes, 1985;
Vanfossen et al., 1987. They also note that too often poor, minority students are over-represented in these
low, special, or vocational tracks Page Valli, 1990, p. 2.
This line of argument implies that the more knowledge to which a student is exposed, the more that student will
remember in absolute terms. An example will illustrate this point. Let us assume that an academic curriculum
provides three times the “knowledge” of a low-track cur- riculum. Thus, remembering 50 of the academic course
work produces absolutely more “knowledge” than remembering 100 of the less-challenging material, all
else being equal. This assumption is supported by the work of Alexander and Pallas 1984. These authors find
that the test scores of students who complete the “New Basics”
2
are considerably higher, on average, than of those who do not. However, these findings may overstate
the influence of taking a challenging curriculum. That is, while Alexander and Pallas note that “better” students
are likely to take more challenging courses, they only control for different innate abilities by including a pre-
dictor variable for prior performance. The authors do not adequately address the issue of selection bias.
Bishop 1993, 1994, 1996 argues that policy-makers can greatly influence the quality of schooling for all stu-
dents if they make use of the appropriate signals and incentives. According to the author, increased reliance
on sound high school education by employers and insti- tutions of higher learning will act as a signal to those
involved in the educational process parents, teachers, students. Moreover, external curriculum-based assess-
ments in specific high school subjects will increase the students’ rewards for learning. Bishop contends that this
combination of signals and rewards will persuade the
2
The “New Basics” include four units of English, three units of science, three units of social studies, three units of mathemat-
ics, and a half unit of computer science. College-bound students are advised to add two units of foreign language to the rec-
ommended list of requirements.
353 N.A. Alexander Economics of Education Review 19 2000 351–361
student to choose more demanding courses and to work harder in them Bishop, 1994, p. 2.
Even when one considers curriculum-based assess- ment as the route to improved student performance, the
success of this strategy is linked to its ability to induce students to take substantive, rigorous courses Bishop,
1994. While the educational process is not highly conscribed under this approach, the crux of the policy
remains the assumed link between curriculum quality and student performance. Consequently, this paper cate-
gorizes as examples of curriculum standards those edu- cation strategies that explicitly or implicitly aim to impel
students to take more traditionally challenging courses.
Standards proponents hope that exposing students to challenging material will start a chain reaction of bene-
fits, where both curriculum mastery and post-secondary opportunities are improved. The benefits sought, how-
ever, are not just the tangible ones of increased college attendance or pass rates in selected subjects. It is
assumed that there are also intangible benefits to be gained from increased exposure to higher levels of
knowledge. These intangibles may include the acquire- ment of better conceptual and analytical skills, as well
as improved self-confidence. Well documented in the literature is the focus on problem-solving and leadership
skills commonly provided to students in academic tracks. This contrasts with the more control-oriented approach
that marks the learning experience of pupils in non-aca- demic tracks Oakes, 1985.
1.2.1. The link between curriculum standards and student performance
The effect of curriculum standards on student perform- ance can be explored through the estimation of a simple
education production function. Generic measures of edu- cational outcomes i.e. college attendance, retention
rates, and diploma type are regressed on district, school, and classroom characteristics. Similarly, more specific
measures of student performance, such as pass rates in particular subjects, are also regressed on “inputs” in the
schooling production process. In both the generic and subject-specific models of student outputs, curriculum
standards policy is entered as an input, holding other educational factors constant. Three expectations emerge
regarding the relationship between student outcomes and implementation of curriculum standards as given below.
Hypothesis I. There will be a positive association between the implementation of curriculum standards
policy and generic student outcomes. Hypothesis II. There will be a positive association
between the implementation of curriculum standards policy and subject-specific student outcomes.
Hypothesis III. The magnitude of the association between demographic characteristics and student out-
comes will be lessened after the implementation of curriculum standards policies.
1.2.2. Curriculum standards in NYS New York State provides a good natural experiment
for evaluating the effectiveness of curriculum standards policies as a means of improving student outputs. Policy-
makers in that state have long relied on curriculum stra- tegies as part of the agenda of educational reform. Poli-
cies have ranged from a prescriptive approach detailing the types of courses to be taken to curriculum-based
assessment, where student performance on exams is key. More recently, educators have tried to increase the num-
ber of students taking a demanding curriculum by reduc- ing the procedural burden of double testing borne by
schools and some pupils when “marginal” students fail a Regents exam. That is, school districts could request
a variance from the educational regulations in order to develop a “safety net” for students whose scores fell just
short of passing. This safety net would allow those stu- dents who marginally failed the Regents exam i.e.
scored between 50 and 64 to earn a passing grade in the corresponding subject on the less challenging,
Regents Competency Test RCT. District leaders felt that without this variance, there was a disincentive for
“marginal” pupils to take Regents courses because if they failed the Regents examinations they still needed to
demonstrate competency by taking the RCT.
While the burden of double testing borne by students is important, it is the perception held by schooldistrict
leaders regarding this burden that is germane to this study. Recall the underlying notion of curriculum stan-
dards regarding a link between curriculum quality and student performance: curriculum quality affects student
outcome. Since it is school administrators who often determine the rigor of the curriculum to which a student
is exposed, their choices are key to a voluntary standards strategy. The more burdensome that these policy-makers
find it to double test students, the less likely that “mar- ginal” pupils will be encouraged to take the more
demanding curriculum and associated exams. By remov- ing the procedural cost of double testing, state policy-
makers are essentially removing some of the costs asso- ciated with encouraging all students to take demanding
courses. If the additional benefits of more students taking a rigorous curriculum outweigh the additional cost of
receiving a variance i.e. annual reports, smaller classes, teacher training, then school administrators are likely to
encourage students to take more demanding courses.
Benefits, however, are not the same for all schools and across all subjects. On average, the greater the number
of “marginal” students, the bigger the direct benefits to the school. For those schools where those students who
fail the Regents exam are considered unlikely to get between 50 and 64, the benefit of a variance is negated.
354 N.A. Alexander Economics of Education Review 19 2000 351–361
Table 1 Total number of variances by year and by subject, 1990–1995
Subject Year
Biology English
Earth Science Global Studies
Math I US History
Any 1990
1991 1992
2 3
5 9
9 9
9 1993
8 61
59 71
68 73
76 1994
33 123
110 127
125 134
142 1995
55 194
188 199
203 218
239
Table 2 Distribution of variances among districts
Number of variances, 1990–1995 1
2 3
4 5
6 Number of districts
15 14
14 37
122 37
n =
239
Similarly, for those subjects where those students who fail the Regents exam are considered unlikely to get
between 50 and 64, the benefit of a variance is nulli- fied. Where students are likely to pass the Regents exam
i.e. a score of 65 or higher, there is no variance needed.
These results are reflected in the data presented in Tables 1 and 2. Note that the data in the tables only
reflect variance information for those districts in the 6- year panel. The information in Table 1 illustrates the
number of districts
3
that exchanged the burden of “dou- ble-testing” for the requirements associated with receiv-
ing a 50–64 variance. It may be assumed that there was a concomitant increase in the number of students taking
the more demanding course in the varianced subject. Note that New York City is excluded from the analysis
because of data limitations. In 1992, only nine schools districts had received a “50–
64” variance in at least one subject; by 1995, this number had increased to 239. Most of these districts were issued
variances for US history 218 districts. By contrast, less than one-third of the districts n
= 55 were awarded a
variance for biology. These data suggest that the additional costs of exposing more students to a
demanding curriculum are higher for biology than for US history. By extension, more “marginal” students were
3
Because this study focuses on high schools, the infor- mation provided in school level data is essentially that for dis-
tricts. Exceptions are for NYC, Buffalo, Rochester and Syra- cuse, which have multiple high schools.
more likely to be encouragedmandated to take a demanding US history course than would be for biology.
The data shown in Table 2 present information on the distribution of variances among school districts from
198990 through to 199495. Most school districts tended to be awarded “50–64” variances in five subjects, often-
times omitting biology. Rarely did school districts receive variances in three or fewer subjects. These find-
ings suggest that few additional resources are needed to enjoy the benefits of the fifth variance after work has
been done to bring about variances for four subjects. It is important to note, however, that even in those districts
where a “50–64” variance was awarded, students still had the option to take the RCT exam. Consequently,
information on the association between standards policy and retention rates may not be very telling for contexts
when this option is removed.
1.2.3. Assumptions, concerns, and selection bias One problem with using the issuance of the 50–64
variance as a proxy for curriculum standards policies is the fact that school districts are not randomly assigned
to control no variance and treatment variance groups. By randomly assigning districts, the separate effects of
variances, and by extension, curriculum standards, could be isolated while ruling out the effect of certain influ-
ences that are unknown, or known but unmeasurable. In the case of subject-specific variances, however, there was
no statewide imposition of exogenous standards on all districts. Those districts that have received variances in
355 N.A. Alexander Economics of Education Review 19 2000 351–361
specific subjects over the time frame studied have chosen to apply for exemption. It is therefore possible that the
factors that led these districts to adopt this strategy would have also led to higher student achievement in the
absence of said policy.
Assume, for instance, that school districts with more “effort” have higher student performance even without
this curriculum initiative. Assume also that “effort” is one of the factors that drive districts to apply for a vari-
ance see Fig. 1. Excluding this variable from the model thus leads to an upward bias in the estimation of the
impact of curriculum standards on student achievement. Concerns regarding selectivity bias are especially rel-
evant to this study because of the historical and insti- tutional processes that led to the formal institution of the
new policy on standards in New York State.
In summary, there are several reasons that may have pushed districts to make this appeal for a “50–64” vari-
ance, and each may have an individual impact on student performance. For instance, parents may have forced
higher standards into schools. Many of the early requests came from relatively wealthy suburban districts where a
majority of their students already take the Regents exam. School districts may have had sufficient institutional
“slack”. Being granted a variance obliged school districts to make annual reports to the NYS Department of Edu-
cation and often entailed having smaller classes and improved teacher training.
4
In addition, the receipt of variances by districts may have induced neighboring dis-
tricts to apply for the same. Besides the above district- specific attributes, time and the increased emphasis
nationwide on student performance may have contrib- uted to changes in educational output.
1.2.4. Controlling for district-specific influences and historical trends
One way of isolating the effect of curriculum stan- dards on student achievement is to adopt a one-way fixed
effects model and to include a variable that represents each year of the sample. This strategy controls for dis-
Fig. 1. Tracing the true impact of curriculum standards.
4
This information comes from anecdotal evidence and dis- cussions with Nick Argyros of the NYS Department of Edu-
cation, who handles the awarding of the variances in question.
trict-specific characteristics by creating dummy variables for districts in the analysis. Similarly, inclusion of a
dummy variable for each year allows historical trends to be taken into account. These strategies allow the model
to address concerns that apparent effects of curriculum policy on student achievement may be merely historical
artifacts or caused by particular district attributes. Thus, average student performance in a district A
i
is thought to be a function of district-specific characteristics D
i
, time year
b
i
, a vector of explanatory variables c
i
, and an error term
e
i
: A
i
5a
i
D
i
1b
i
c
i
1e
i
Note that it is assumed that implementation of the variance is immediate. As indicated, school districts had
to have resources in place and to have presented a viable plan of action to the NYS Department of Education in
order to gain approval for their variance request.
5
2. Institutional features of NYS
