Facts about the Day of Implementation

7. The ﬁrst news that arrived was that General Nasution had been caught but had then escaped. The leadership team appeared rather confused and did not give any further orders.

8. The next news was that General Nasution had joined General Suharto and General Umar [Wirahadikusumah] at Kostrad. Even after receiving this news, the operations leadership did not reach any conclusion at all.

9. The news also came in that the troops of the Central Java battalion and the East Java battalion didn’t receive any food,

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then the news that followed was that the East Java battalion asked for food from Kostrad. The troops guarding the radio station RRI abandoned it without having received any instruction to do so.

10. According to the plan, Jakarta was divided into three sectors: South, Central, and North. But when these sectors were contacted, none of them was at its station.

11. The atmosphere of the city was quiet and the opponent was in

a state of panic for twelve hours.

12. 7:00 p.m. on the second night [October 1], General Nasution- Harto and Umar formed a command. They showed signs of launching an offensive the next day.

13. On hearing this news, Vice Marshal Omar Dani suggested to Comrade Untung that the forces of AURI [air force] and “the September 30th Movement” be merged to confront the offensive from Nato (Nasution-Harto) and company. 7 But this did not receive a clear, concrete response. It turned out that the leadership team of the September 30th Movement no longer had a ﬁghting spirit. 8

14. Then there emerged a third problem. Yes, this was with the appearance of Bung Karno at the Halim Airﬁeld. Bung Karno then took the following actions:

a. Stopped the movements of both sides (with the explanation that if a civil war broke out, the neocolonial powers would beneﬁt).

b. Summoned the cabinet and armed services’ ministers. 9 Nasution-Harto and Umar refused to comply with this

call. General Pranoto was forbidden by Nasution to fulﬁll Bung Karno’s summons. 10

c. Decided upon a caretaker for the leadership of the army. The Second Day [October 2]

15. The comrades of the “September 30th Movement” leadership gathered at L.B. [Lubang Buaya]. RPKAD [Special Forces] began to attack and enter. The situation became “wanordelik” [D, wanordelijk] (katjau [I]) [chaotic]. The youth troops were not yet accustomed to facing real combat. At that crucial moment I proposed that I take control of the command of the

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troops, and later, if the situation could be overcome, I would return it. There was no concrete response.

16. Then there was a meeting at which it was decided to stop the resistance and disperse the various units; they were to return to their homes and await further developments. The battalions from Central Java and East Java were to be urged to return to their home bases.

17. That day as well, an order was issued by Bung Karno for all the various troops to stay put and await negotiations. But the Nato side [Nasution-Harto] ignored this order and used the opportunity to continue attacking our troops and even the PKI.

Such are the facts that I myself witnessed and from these facts each person can draw his own lessons and come to different conclusions. Be that as it may, the conclusions that I have come to are as follows:

1. The exhaustion of the comrades of the leadership team that led the military side of the action had a great inﬂuence on the enthusiasm for the operation; this exhaustion inﬂuenced the command activities at the crucial moments when quick and clear decisions were needed from them.

2. When the information was received from the regions, it turned

out that the regions were not ready. This was proven later when there were still many couriers who had not arrived at their appointed destinations by the time the event occurred (the courier sent to Palembang had only just reached Tanjung Karang). Bandung was [not] fully ready but in order to avoid facing harsh questioning simply responded, “It’s all taken care of.”

3. It turned out that the plan for the operation wasn’t clear. It was too superﬁcial. The centerpiece of the whole plan was the simple kidnapping of the seven generals. What would happen after that, if successful, wasn’t clear. And what would be the plan if there was a counteroffensive, for instance, from Bandung? This question was dismissed by saying, “Enough, don’t think about backing off!” According to the requirements of military operations, we are always thinking about retreat when we are victorious and moving forward, and we are thinking about advancing and attacking when we’re defeated

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and retreating. What I mean by this is that thinking about retreating in the course of attacking is not shameful but is standard procedure for every attack or campaign. Retreat does not mean defeat—it is a certain maneuver in an attack that can

be reversed so that one can reattack and gain victory. This state of affairs caused some military comrades to withdraw from the action, but these doubters could have been persuaded if there was a clear and convincing plan for their path to victory.

4. If we review the units we could rely upon, we ﬁnd it was only one company from Cakrabirawa. It was estimated that one battalion from Central Java and one from East Java could be used as extras. Add on to this ﬁve thousand armed youths. When opinions were solicited, someone asked, are these forces really enough to balance the other forces, the answer was delivered in an intimidating tone: If you want to make a revolution, few will want to join in, but if the revolution is successful, just wait and see, many people will want to join in. There was another explanation that was not of a technical character, for instance, “We’re still young, what’s the point of

a revolution if we’re already old?” To return again to the matter of our troop strength, it would have been enough to have army troops that were fairly trustworthy. From a technical, military point of view, the basic idea of an attack, where the highest commander is himself commanding the operation, the troop strength has to be focused upon a decisive target. In my opinion the strategy of the leadership team was a strategy to “light the fuse of the firecracker” in the capital city and then hope that the firecrackers would go off by themselves, that is, a people’s revolt, and resistance in the regions would emerge after hearing the signal. Here were particular mistakes: first, they did not focus the main troop strength on the key target; second, they did not go ahead with a concrete calculation of the troops they had.

5. The comrades of the staff and I made the following errors: overestimated the ability of the comrades of the leadership of the operation. Even though the actual facts did not add up, we still believed that the leadership must have a superior set of calculations and that it would be made known to us at the appropriate moment. The mystery would be revealed later. After all, the slogan of the leadership was always: “Enough, we just have to begin and everything else will just fall into place.”

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We ourselves believed that because it was proven in the operations led by a fellow Communist Party, such as Comrade Mao Zedong, who began with just one regiment and then destroyed the power of Chiang Kai-sek whose troops numbered in the hundreds of thousands. After this bitter event, however, we all have to be more critical and work with concrete calculations. What I saw at Lubang Buaya was that the phase of self-preparation wasn’t yet complete. On the last night various important matters had not yet been settled, most notably, the troops (from AURI) that were supposed to have arrived had not yet arrived. The assignments and the instructions were still being prepared. The boxes of bullets had not yet been opened and distributed. In this condition it was apparent that there wasn’t any division of labor, everything was dependent on Pak Djojo [Major Soejono]. 11 If Pak Djojo had not yet arrived, the work didn’t proceed. And once Pak Djojo arrived, the time was already too short.

When we received the news that Nasution had escaped and ﬂed, the leadership group lost its good judgment and didn’t do anything. For twelve hours, for the entire day, the enemy was in

a state of panic. The troops in the city were under a big question mark and not a few of them were confused (when I was at the palace, I saw for myself the state of the city).

Here we must note a fundamental mistake that can occur in a certain operation (campaign): that is, “Not to take full advantage of one’s success.” (Standard procedure in implementing the principles of combat and one that has to be followed by every combat commander.) This principle actually is based on the teachings of Marx, who said, “After a revolt occurs, the offensive cannot be allowed to halt even for a moment. This means that the masses who join in the revolt and decisively defeat the enemy cannot give any opportunity whatsoever to the ruling class to reassert its political power. They have to use that moment to the fullest to ﬁnish off the power of the regime in the country.” 12

I am of the opinion that one reason behind all these mistakes is the fact that the leadership was divided into three rows [sjaf ]: a) the Head Group [Kelompok Ketua], b) the Sjam and friends group [Kelompok Sjam cs], c) the Untung and friends group [Kelompok Untung cs]. The operation should

234 t Appendix 1 have been under one person. Since this was a military

movement, it was best if the combat command was given to Comrade Untung while Comrade Sjam acted as a political commissioner. Or vice versa, Comrade Sjam being the one holding the supreme command. With a command system divided into rows, it turned out there were many discussions that ate up a lot of time at the very moments when quick decisions needed to be taken, and since the situation kept changing by the minute, one thing after another, the problems at every stage had to be handled one by one as quickly as possible.

[There is no sixth point.]

7. For every battle engagement one has to have a “Picture of the

Battle” [E] well in advance. What happens after the event breaks out, what is the condition of one’s own troops, what

is the situation in Jakarta, what is the situation in Bandung (remember, the center of Siliwangi 13 ), what is the situation in

Central and East Java, what is the situation in the other areas throughout the homeland (as could be followed by radio)? With such a picture we can see the tactical position of Jakarta and its relationship with the wider strategy. And vice versa— seeing the interconnected strategy, seeing what is advantageous or disadvantageous, we can quickly change tactics in the middle of the battleﬁeld.

We should not have given any time to the enemy when it was in a state of panic. We had to advance and complete our victory. The enemy was in such a state—in an altogether wrong position while we were in an altogether correct position. One battalion that panics can be overwhelmed by just one team of soldiers. But the advantage we held was not exploited. Indeed, we did the exact opposite: 1) the Sector commanders (South/Central/North), while we were in a winning position, disappeared, remarkably enough. They had been assigned to take care of administrative matters for the troops in their individual sectors. But all these sectors that had been drawn up beforehand existed only on paper. From this we can learn the lesson, there was no communication between the different troop units (faktor verbinding-komunikasi [cross-communication

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factor]), and each became trapped in an unfamiliar location and became as good as blind to the situation and scared. 2) We did not take advantage of the RRI [Radio Republik Indonesia] station that we held. It was used over the course of the day only to read out a few announcements. A radio station is

a means of communication. It should have been used to its maximum potential by the Agitation-Propaganda Front. If that had been done, its effectiveness would have been equal to dozens of divisions. (In this regard, the opponent has succeeded in the war over the radio and press.) 3) In the ﬁrst hours Nato and company reorganized their command. Their position at that time was very weak. At that moment the leadership of the operation should have ambushed the enemy without thinking at all about the risk to our troops.

8. All the hindrances in the movement of our troops were caused by, among other things, the lack of food. They didn’t eat in the morning, the afternoon, or the night. This fact was only discovered at night when there was some thought about mobilizing troops for an attack inside the city. At that time the Central Java battalion was at Halim. The East Java battalion had already been drawn into Kostrad in order to eat. Actually, there were two paths that could have been opened up: the battalion commander could have been given authority to obtain food in the places where he was. Contacting the residents or taking the initiative to open up food warehouses—half could have been consumed and the rest given to the people who helped cook it. With such a method there would have been sympathy and a sense of responsibility on both sides. The second path: the sector commanders should have managed this matter.

9. After hearing the news that General Harto [Suharto] was preparing a counterattack and Vice Marshal Dani’s offer of integration [of air force and September 30th Movement troops] for fending it off, the offer should have been accepted at that time. By accepting it, all the troops of AURI throughout the country would have joined in. But since there was no faith that victory had to be achieved by blood, this offer of such great importance did not receive a positive response. Omar Dani had already made preparations to the point of ordering rockets to

be installed on the planes.

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10. Other factors that caused the operation to get stuck derived from the fact that there was no division of labor. If we simply followed the normal staff procedure that is mandatory for every military unit, all the zigzagging could have been avoided. The work should have been carried out according to the following method: ﬁrst, it should have been decided who the commander would be who would directly lead the action (campaign), whether Comrade Sjam or Comrade Untung. Then his assistants or staff should have been appointed. One person should have been appointed to be responsible for intelligence work (research/information). Second, one person should have been assigned and given responsibility for monitoring the status of the enemy troops and our own troops. What are the movements of the enemy troops, where are they located, and then what would be the advice to the commander concerning our own troops? A third comrade should have been appointed to be responsible for all those things connected with personnel: those wounded or killed, those troops absent, or whose morale has fallen. Also the personnel of the opponent—the main issue is: the matter of holding them prisoner, taking care of their needs, guarding them, etc. Then, as for the fourth comrade,

he should have been assigned to think of all those things related to logistics, the disbursement of weapons and ammunition, clothes, food, vehicles, etc. Since victory and defeat in this day and age also depends on the role of People’s supplies, there should have been a ﬁfth person given the assignment to take care of this matter. In short, the commander should have been assisted by staff-1, staff-2, staff-3, staff-4, staff-5. Then, if he found himself too busy, he could have appointed a deputy. Furthermore, in the manner of the staff ’s work, the principles of party work—the principle of democratic centralism—also holds here. The staff offers its viewpoints and the commander listens, evaluates them in his mind, and then comes to a decision. Based on this decision, the staff gives directives for its implementation to the lower-level staff. With this method

a commander avoids subjectivism. But he also avoids an environment of liberalism. What happened at that time was a debate or discussion that was langiradis [D, sic: langdradig] (tak berudjungpangkal [I]) [without end], to the point that we were confused on witnessing it: who is really the commander:

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Comrade Sjam, Comrade Untung, Comrade Latief, or Pak Djojo [Major Soejono]? About this matter there has to be a detailed examination because the defeat in the capital largely resulted from the fact there was no normal division of command and labor.

11. There is one issue that is trivial but which still deserves attention. For instance, the style of discussion, especially that of Comrade Latief, did not prioritize fundamental problems and then attempt to solve those ﬁrst. Some matters could have been postponed for later discussion. When the mouth of the cannon was pointed at us, what was urgent for us to discuss was how we could silence the cannon, not issues that could be discussed later.

12. With the appearance of Bung Karno at Halim, a different problem emerged. At that time we had to be quick in political judo, quick in deciding upon the basic point of our strategy. Do we proceed alone or do we proceed with Bung Karno? If we felt that we were capable, we could have quickly decided upon a line of going it alone. If, according to our judgment, we could not win a revolution on our own, then we had to quickly bring Bung Karno on board so that we could destroy the enemy forces together. In my opinion, at that time, the situation changed, as will be explained below:

1) Bung Karno:

a) summoned the cabinet— the service ministers

b) issued an order for both sides not to engage in combat

c) temporarily took control of the army leadership and appointed a caretaker for the army’s internal work.

2) Omar Dani: Did not wish us to confront Bung Karno, and his recommendation was that we continue the revolution together with Bung Karno.

3) Ibrahim Adjie: Issued a statement that Siliwangi would move on Jakarta if anything happened to Bung Karno.

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4) M. Sabur: Ordered RPKAD to be ready at any time if Bung Karno was in danger.

5) Nato and company: Refused the summons of Bung Karno to appear at Halim.

6) September 30th Movement: Comrade Sjam insisted the

revolution would have to proceed without Bung Karno.

The East Java battalion was in an exhausted state and had not yet resolved the problem of food.

The leadership was in a nervous state.

7) The “Regions”: Nusatenggara had given a response. Bandung was quiet. East Java was also quiet. Central Java was quiet. The public in Jakarta was quiet At that time, in the regions over the whole Indonesian archipelago, the sound of return ﬁre could not be heard.

Facts about the Day of Implementation