Analytical procedures

Analytical procedures

These aids to analysis, then, should be seen in relation to systematic procedures for performing qualitative analysis. Two analytical procedures—analytic induction and grounded theory—are of special interest here because of their historical origins and substantive contributions within social science. (See also the account in Chapter

1 of discourse analysis as a possible “statistics” or systematics of qualitative analysis.) Other procedures, such as ethnographic (Spradley, 1979; 1980) and phenomenological analysis (Hycner, 1985), represent refinements specifying the steps to follow in concrete analysis, but they are essentially varieties of the other, established procedures, and are not considered further in this context.

Analytic induction. Perhaps the earliest explication of a procedure for qualitative analysis was analytic induction, which involves “an exhaustive examination of cases in order to prove universal, causal generalizations” (Manning, 1982:280). The procedure has been most elaborately worked out in a twelve-step sequence by Denzin (1970a; 1978). Basically, the procedure calls for, first, constructing a general description of the phenomenon under study. Next, the characteristics which the researcher initially assumes are the most important are elaborated and specified. Then, a specific case is examined to establish whether the assumed characteristics apply. If the case does not fit the

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characteristics, then either the description is modified so as to manifestly exclude the case, or the originally hypothesized characteristics are changed so that the case may become part of the phenomenon under study. This procedure is repeated until there are no more cases left to categorize, or until no cases arise which do not fit within the parameters of the phenomenon.

As a practical form of analysis, analytic induction is time- consuming and has found limited application outside exploratory sociological studies (see Lindesmith, 1947). It is, moreover, doubtful whether it lives up to the claim of being able to predict events, establish causality, or produce universal statements (Manning, 1982:294). The technique does, however, offer a procedure for thoroughly examining cases that might be related to a concept in development. One example of work in communication research that relies on analytic induction can be found in the Lang and Lang (1953) investigation of the differences between the television coverage of the MacArthur Day Parade in Chicago and the perceptions of the event among the spectators along the parade route (see Chapter 11 of this volume).

Grounded theory. The procedure of analytic induction provided part of the inspiration for other researchers who were concerned with theory development while, at the same time, wanting analyses to remain “close to the data.” Glaser and Strauss (1967), two of these researchers, proposed that new theoretical formulations were needed which would

be based or “grounded” in empirical data. They recommended relying on “sensitizing concepts” to guide such theory development, a phrase originally coined by Blumer:

Hundreds of our concepts—like culture, institution, social structure, mores, and personality—are not definitive concepts but are sensitizing in nature. They lack precise bench marks which allow clear-cut identification of a specific instance, and of its content. Instead they rest on a general sense of what is relevant.

(Blumer, quoted in Rock, 1979:9)

One of the difficulties with this proposal stems from the principle of staying close to the data. The question is how close to the data one can be and still undertake theoretical work, which of necessity requires

a certain level of abstraction and hence distance from empirical data. Addressing this question, Glaser and Strauss (1967:3) speak in terms

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of “criteria of fit” and “criteria of relevance.” Relevance, for them, not only has an analytical dimension, as in traditional deductive use of theory, but also a substantive dimension. Theories thus should “fit” the specific field under observation; the theoretical concepts are in this way “sensitized” to the subject of research.

While the analytical procedure proposed by Glaser and Strauss received widespread attention, it was also strongly criticized for being

a polemic rather than a constructive intervention into scientific debate. As it turned out, researchers who set out to practice the precepts of grounded theory frequently went aground in uncharted analytical terrain. Glaser (1978), Strauss (1987), and Strauss and Corbin (1990) have made attempts to solve such difficulties in subsequent volumes, and other researchers, such as Turner (1981), have contributed to a further codification of analysis within grounded theory.

One of the most comprehensive efforts so far in this area is Wester’s (1984; 1987) procedural approach to grounded theory. This approach is comparable, in certain respects, to analytic induction, consisting of four phases which each in turn contain some fifteen procedural steps. The initial, or exploratory, phase is intended to extract preliminary concepts from the collected material. In the second or defining phase, the researcher tries to construct variables based on the concepts. In the third or reduction phase, the aim is to formulate the core of a theory. In the fourth and final phase, termed integration, the concepts are related to one another and the relations tested on the data. The cycle of reflection, observation, and analysis is repeated throughout the research process in each of the four phases until the theoretical formulations have exhausted the available data (Peters and Wester, 1990).

As was the case for analytic induction, communication research seldom makes explicit use of grounded theory. Lull (1988a:16) does refer, albeit briefly, to the “compelling argument of Glaser and Strauss,” and he further explains his own preference for the grounded theory approach thus:

the theoretical essence of our work emerges quite spontaneously within each research project. I believe that we should not simply conduct research that is programmatically influenced by any fixed theoretical perspective if we are to really “let the data speak to us.”

(Lull, 1988a:17)

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Data of and by themselves, however, cannot generate theory. It is only through intervention by a researcher, operating within a theoretical perspective, that data can be examined and used to develop theory. For this reason, many researchers employ “sensitizing concepts” or ideal types in the preliminary phases of their empirical investigations. Such concepts may help to orient the researcher theoretically, while at the same time allowing the kind of flexibility which Lull was referring to. Most of the chapters in this book provide examples of the specific relevance of qualitative methodologies for theory development (see especially Chapter 11).