40 Copyright © 2009 Open Geospatial Consortium, Inc.
Effect Adversary’s client will record GetCapabilities requestresponse to SPS.
Result Adversary’s client receives SPS capabilities.
Scope No application specific knowledge required to exercise this attack.
Example Likelihood
High Impact on Asset
None Impact on User
None Potential
Important for exercising other attacks, requiring sensorID as input. Reason
Future Espionage, Sabotage, DoS Requirement
Allow execution of GetCapabilities for authenticated users only and protect response with confidentiality to prevent unveiling of the metadata.
Table 9: Record GetCapabilites requestresponse
9.5.3 Identify the Threats for DescribeTasking operation
Asset: Sensor metadata
Cause Man-In-The-Middle
Effect User client will receive fraudulent metadata for a sensor assignment.
Result User client might not be able to task the sensor due to the fraudulent information.
Scope Attacker has to have application specific knowledge to tamper the response
―properly‖. Example
Likelihood Low
Impact on Asset None
Impact on User There is a potential affect on the future use of the asset effective to the actual user in
cases where the user client makes the actual tasking of a sensor dependent on the response from the DescribeTasking operations.
Potential NA
Reason Sabotage
Copyright © 2009 Open Geospatial Consortium, Inc. 41
Requirement Integrity
Table 10: Modify DescribeTasking response
Cause Adversary’s client can execute SPS
Effect Adversary’s client will receive sensor metadata about a sensor that is relevant for
submitting an assignment request Submit operation. Result
Adversary obtains sensor metadata. Scope
Adversary has to have application specific knowledge and a valid sensor ID. But this is not problematic; it just requires to issue a GetCapabilities request first.
Example Likelihood
Low Impact on Asset
None Impact on User
None Potential
The adversary gains all parameters of a sensor for tasking. Reason
Espionage Requirement
None
Table 11: Create DescribeTasking request
Cause E
avesdropping and adversary’s client can execute SPS Effect
Adversary’s client will send recorded DescribeSensor request to SPS. Result
Adversary’s client will receive sensor metadata. Scope
No application specific knowledge required. Example
Likelihood High
Impact on Asset None
Impact on User None
Potential The adversary gains all parameters of a sensor for tasking.
Reason Espionage
42 Copyright © 2009 Open Geospatial Consortium, Inc.
But the Shannon entropy of the information gained is probably zero unless the SPS is serving new sensors since the last attack.
Requirement None
Table 12: Replay DescribeTasking request
Cause Eavesdropping
Effect NA
Result Adversary obtains sensorID and tasking parameter.
Scope No application specific knowledge is required to exercise the attack.
Example Likelihood
High Impact on Asset
None Impact on User
None Potential
The adversary gains all parameters of a sensor for tasking, including the sensor ID. Reason
Fetch information required to exercise other attacks. Requirement
Confidentiality of the sensorID and the tasking parameters as they are valuable for the attacker.
Table 13: Record DescribeTasking requestresponse
9.5.4 Submit operation
