Enforceability of rights Directory UMM :Data Elmu:jurnal:I:International Review of Law and Economics:Vol21.Issue1.2001:

Y 1917–1945: over which intellectual property rights were either constant or declining. Y 1945–1970: over which intellectual property rights were steadily improving, or re- mained constant. Y 1970 –1996: over which intellectual property rights were steadily decreasing. We realize that these indexes cannot be considered as anything but fairly remote proxies for intellectual property rights. Indeed, a more immediate interpretation might be that the indexes would be more appropriately understood as indicators of the level of technology transferral. However, even if the latter argument is well founded, the probability of tech- nology transferral should be correlated with the degree of protection that owners of tech- nology blue-prints perceive to attach to their discoveries. Technology transfer, in short, is more probable under conditions of well-protected property rights, than otherwise.

7. Enforceability of rights

Given that the formal codification of rights and freedoms is of little significance under conditions where those rights cannot be enforced, we add a number of indicators of the quality of the judicial system in South Africa. These indicators are of relevance both to the political freedoms and the property rights indexes. Given that the magistrates’ courts in South Africa are the first line of recourse for judicially mediated legal disputes, we suggest that the efficiency of magistrates courts are the most important indicators of judicial efficiency. The first two measures are based on the number of magistrates’ bench hours spent per criminal or civil case during the course of a Fig. 4. Intellectual Property Rights Proxy 119 J.W. Fedderke et al. International Review of Law and Economics 21 2001 103–134 calendar year. While a high score on the index may be taken to indicate that the courts deliberate with great care on the decisions that are reached, it also implies that the costs of litigation are likely to be high, thus raising the barriers to proper enforcement of property rights. It is in the latter sense that we employ the index. Fig. 6 illustrates the two measures of what we term the “efficiency” of the magistrate court system in South Africa. We present two alternative indicators of judicial activity. The first is the number of magistrates court criminal and civil cases per unit of population, and the second the number of magistrates court criminal and civil cases per unit of GDP. These are presented in Figs. 7 and 8 respectively. The three sets of indicators show similar patterns. All show a marked rise in the number of criminal and civil cases per bench hour, per population unit and real GDP unit over the 1945– 60 time frame. All remain in a narrow, constant band over the remaining time period, to 1996. If the indicators are plausible proxies for institutional efficiency, therefore, there is a suggestion of declining efficiency in the post war era, while the post-1960 period has seen little alteration in the efficiency of rights enforcement mechanisms.

8. An index of political instability