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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Theoretical Basis
A. Agency Theory
Agency theory as a basic in understanding corporate governance. Agency theory is a contract between the owner principal and managers as agents
Jensen and Meckling, 1976. The core issue of agency theory that a proper planning contracts between owners and managers to align interests.
According to the agency theory Jensen and Meckling 1976, principal is the shareholder and the managing agent is the management of the firm.
The shareholders hope that the agent will act in the interests of the shareholders, so that they can delegate authority to the agent. But mostly
there is a difference of interests between shareholders and agents, as well as the asymmetry of information, resulting in frequent conflict.
Based on the assumption of selfish is a human nature, resulting a difference between the interests of managers and the interests of the
owner. The owner is motivated to prosper himself with increasing profitability, while the manager is motivated to maximize the fulfillment
of economic, among others, in terms of acquiring the investment and loan.
Thus there are two different interests in the company in which each party seeks to achieve the desired prosperity Nugroho and Syafrudin, 2012.
A lot of managers seek to increase the scale of the firm by expansion than the prosperity of the shareholders. Dissimilarity goals between
shareholders and company’s managers are often called agency problem Arifin and Ratnawati, 2012. The existence of agency problems would
caused costs for companies to overcome the problems, these costs are called agency cost.
There are several ways to reduce the agency cost, one is to increase the shareholding to the management Jensen and Meckling 1976. The greater
ownership by the management will reduce the potential for conflict between management and shareholders. Mohd et al 1998 stated that the
distribution of shares between shareholders from outside institutional investors and dispersion of ownership can reduce agency cost.
Institutional Ownership such as banks, insurance companies or investment companies will increase control that come from external management.
B. Good Corporate Governance Theory
According to Barnhart and Rosenstein 1998 in Siallagan and Machfoedz 2006 agency problem can be solved by good corporate governance
GCG, which are the internal mechanism and external mechanisms.
Kaen 2003 stated corporate governance is basically a matter of “who” should control the course of corporate activities and “why” it must be
controlled on the course of corporate activities. What is meant by who are the shareholders, while the why is because of the relationship between
the shareholders of the various parties interested in the company.
Good corporate governance GCG definitively a system to regulate and control the firm that create value added for all stakeholders Monks,
2003. There are two things that are emphasized in this concept. First, the importance of the right of shareholders to obtain information correctly
and on time. Second, the companys obligation to make an accurate, timely, and transparent disclosure about information of corporate
performance, ownership, and stakeholders.
According Kaihatu 2006 in general, there are five basic principles of good corporate governance:
1. Transparency information disclosure, the transparency in decision making process and openness in expressing material and relevant
information about the company. 2. Accountability, namely clarity of function, structure, systems, and
accountability of corporate divisions, so that the management system of company is effectively implemented.
3. Responsibility is suitability in the management of the company to the principle of healthy corporate and applicable legislation.
4. Independency is a condition in which a company is managed professionally with no conflict of interest or influencepressure from
management that is not in accordance with the regulations and legislation and also the principles of healthy corporate.
5. Fairness is fair and equitable in fulfilling the stakeholder rights which comes under the agreement and applicable laws and regulations.
Corporate governance mechanism can be divided into internal mechanism and external mechanisms. Internal mechanism came from the board of
directors, internal control and internal audit functions. The quality of the internal mechanism is widely associated with better corporate
performance Dharmastuti, 2013. Supervision by the board of commissioners is a mechanism that is essential in aligning the interests of
shareholders and management. External mechanism derived from the capital market, the firm control market, the labor market, the status of the
state, the courts decision, the shareholders and the practice of investor activity.
External mechanisms of corporate governance will be examined through the role of institutional shareholders. Institutions as the owner of the
company has a strategic role in giving effect to the company.
C. Institutional Ownership
According Siallagan and Machfoedz 2006 the companys ownership structure has an influence on the value of the company. In this case the
ownership structure is divided into two; managerial ownership and institutional ownership. The ownership of the company may consist of
