1.53 Expanding the Mozambican social

38 Towards a Mozambican Social Protection Floor The suggested programme structure would imply a shift from the current approach, delinking the allocation from alternative support mechanisms to the assessment of residual labour capacity. In Scenarios C.1 and C.2 the transfer structure is set using the same payment schedule as the PSSB. It includes a basic monthly transfer for the first member identified i.e. child, elderly, chronically ill or disabled, and an increase for any additional dependent member i.e. other children, elderly, chronically ill or disabled. This maintains the logic of the current government approach that considers the whole household rather than the individual to be the recipient of social protection interventions. In both scenarios Child Benefit and Social Pension cannot be combined, and by default households are granted access to Social Pension if they are eligible for both schemes. For example, a household with both an elderly person and children would be counted as a beneficiary of the Social Pension and would not be covered by the Child Grant. In practice the two interventions would be integrated, turning the proposal into a Family Grant, targeted to poor households with children or elderly members. Scenarios C.1 and C.2 also maintain a small version of the PASP project, conceived as an additional safety net to be operated in geographical areas that are more heavily affected by weather and economic shocks with negative consequences on food security. In this case it is envisaged that the PASP could be cumulated with Child Benefit or Social Pension. Scenario C.3 introduces a further variant to the model, organizing the benefits through transfers targeting individuals rather than households. This option would imply a move towards an individual rights-based traditional social protection approach, like for instance that used in South Africa or Cape Verde. Scenario C.1 Scenario C.1 is based on the hypothesis that both the Child Benefit and Social Pension will be poverty targeted, reaching households that fall in the poorest two quintiles 40 per cent of the population. The PASP will have the same targeting approach as in Scenario A but the simulation assumes a maximum take-up rate of 35 per cent of the eligible in 2016. From 2017 onwards, when the Child Benefit and Social Pension would start to be implemented, the PASP take-up rate would fall smoothly fall 20 per cent see figure 4.4 and table 4.5. At this stage the same logic as in the Operational Plan is adopted to define the transfer amounts: 13 of the poverty line as base transfer for Child Benefit and Social Pension with additional 0.25 per cent for every dependant up to a maximum of four dependants; and the value of the poverty line without adjustment for dependents for the PASP.