International terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs caused some political cooperation within the anti-terrorism
coalition and demonstrated that security may reflect the inclusive and exclusive claims to ocean space and use. The new rules that
promote inclusive interests at the expense of exclusive interests, such as sovereignty over the territorial sea and exclusive flag
authority, came about through Security Council decisions and bilateral and multilateral treaties that were adopted over the past
10 years. The Security Council has recognized the significance of certain maritime security threats to international peace and can
improve maritime security by exercising its Chapter VII powers. On the other hand, while the modern peacetime maritime security
concerns prompted some revision of the rules of the use of force and the law of the naval warfare due to traditional military
interests relating to the passage and the conduct of military activities, including intelligence gathering in another state is
EEZ, they also met rightful resistance. Improvement of maritime security requires a shift from three fundamental tenets of the law
of the sea: state sovereignty over the territorial sea, freedom of navigation in the EEZs and on the high seas, and the exclusive
jurisdiction of the flag state over its vessels. The shift requires protecting existing interests. As a result, evolution of the law of
the sea has serious obstacles in keeping pace with the social- economic development of the world and trade dynamic in South-
East Asia.
2. SOCIO-POLITICAL ASPECTS OF “VOID OF
GOVERNANCE ” REGIME
Social and political factors can undermine the lawful governance of national or international waters. These factors of include a
the social vulnerability of the local coastal population, b rapid economic development of the region with insufficient
infrastructure, c historical distrust among neighbouring countries of the region.
2.1. Social challenges of state control and political obstacles to regional institution building
The local coastal communities of the region are full of various ethnic groups with low educational levels and economic
and social autarchy. These ethnic groups are easily manipulated though the loyalty system in which their personal allegiance is
determined not by citizenship but by clan or tribal interests. These interests push them to collaborate with international
criminal groups rather than national or international security forces. The areas in Southeast Asia where maritime crime is most
prevalent-along the coast of Sumatra bordering the Malacca Strait, and areas along the Sulu and Celebes Seas - are
characterized by poor governance, at both central and local levels, weak institutions, widespread poverty, corruption, and the
existence of underground economies rivalling that of the formal economy. Most people in these areas do not have access to land,
property rights, or resources, and have been excluded from meaningful political participation. At the same time, numerous
NGO’s that are focusing on maritime crime in the region operate independently of each other. These NGOs could make a larger
impact by working together with one another, and with think tanks and private foundations. NGOs can advocate for changes
in the laws to accommodate economically justified activities that are currently characterized as illegal. For example, people using
the barter boats to travel between Sabah and the Southern
12
Marketos, T.N., 2009. Philippines should be viewed not as smugglers but as necessary
goods and passenger service. South Pacific us
ed to be considered as being “the edge of the map” but as the world pivots to the Asia-Pacific, the South
Pacific regions true geopolitical, strategic and economic value is coming to the fore. As U.S. Pacific Command Commander
Admiral Samuel Locklear said in the Cook Islands in 2012: Five trillion dollars of commerce rides on the Asia-Pacific sea lanes
each year. Far from being small island states, the Pacific Island Countries are showing themselves as large ocean states, with vast
fisheries, potential seabed resources, and increasingly important geostrategic positioning - as the range of military bases dotted
throughout the region can attest. At the same time, the region shows obvious shortage of political and economic institutions
necessary to provide safe and legal infrastructure proportionate to the new scale of economic activity in Asia. The region has been
traditionally relying on limited bilateral measures without concerted policy direction between countries, often times at their
neighbour’s expense12. This tradition holds back any multilateral
defence project.
Influenced by
historical development of norms of common security, non-interference or
nonalignment, there is also still lack of consensus on regional identity and direction of the security
cooperation: “open regionalism”, advocated by OPEC: “cooperative” security via
ARF or “the ASEAN way”. At the same time “hub-and spoke” pattern of US alliances and ASEAN style of “spider web”, do not
represent a multilateral solution to maritime security challenges of the region.
2.2. Non-traditional threats
