Manajemen | Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji 2005 21
ORIGINS OF A DEBATE: A REPLY TO SEGAL
DAVID PLOWMAN
An earlier issue of this journal included an article by Genevieve Calkin and myself on the origins of compulsory arbitration in Western Australia (Plowman and
Calkin 2004). In this, we examined the explanations often afforded for the introduction of compulsory arbitration in other States and concluded that they did
not explain the Western Australian phenomenon. We concluded that ‘a trilogy of
factors—political opportunism, the need to take account of collective employment
relations, and the capacity of employers to shape the Act in a way that constrained
unions but also minimised the reach of arbitration—go a long way in explaining
the Western Australian phenomenon’.
In our article we made reference to Naomi Segal’s article, one that also seeks to
explain the origins of compulsory arbitration in Western Australian (Segal 2002).
In this, she sees Forrest’s concern with maintaining the colony’s credit rating as
an important motivation for the legislation. Forrest was particularly concerned to
maintain investment in the mining industry. The mining industry was the colony’s
largest employer and a major source of government income at the time. As Segal
notes in her rebuttal, in our paper we took issue with aspects of her article. In turn,
she has taken issue with aspects of our work. She does so with clarity, passion and
in detail.
The details submitted in the rebuttal adds to, but does not materially change,
the arguments put forward by Segal in 2002. The added details have not caused us
to resile from our original position. There are two main areas of contention. One
concerns the introduction of compulsory of arbitration as a means of safeguarding
the State’s credit rating. The other, whether or not Forrest and the Trade Union
Labor Congress (TULC) entered into an arrangement whereby, in return for
compulsory arbitration, the TULC sought to assist Forrest survive a want-ofconfidence motion in Parliament.
Before dealing with these matters we would take issue with Segal’s off-handed
approach to our treatment of the Labor Party. She is critical of our notion that the
party, ‘as currently understood, did not come into being until after the passage of
this legislation’ and claims that ‘the denial of the existence of political labour flies
in the face of much evidence for political labour’s activism in Western Australia
well before arbitration legislation was debated’. She also sees a contradiction in
our contention that the legislation arose to take account of collective employment
relations in the context of unions’ general incapacity to affect industrial outcomes.
We do not resile from the first statement, though perhaps we should have
been clearer by what we meant by ‘as currently understood’. It is evident from
our paper that we have been conscious of the existence of ‘political labour’ prior
to 1900 and have recorded it in great detail. By ‘as currently understood’, we
meant a party capable of contesting a wide number of seats in its own right,
THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 47, NO. 3, SEPTEMBER 2005, 361--363
362
THE JOURNAL
OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
September 2005
and one entailing adherence to party policy and solidarity. We note that
any parliamentary representation enjoyed by political labour to this time did not
lead to these outcomes. Furthermore, we do not see labour’s weak parliamentary
representation or industrial position as denying it the opportunity to influence
outcomes under special circumstances. Those circumstances, however, were rare
and necessitated some major parliamentary split in which labour supporters and
sympathisers could exercise a balance of power. We argue that such a situation
did exist following the referendum leading to Western Australian joining the
Commonwealth. Furthermore, the fact that most unions were weak in 1900 did
not remove the need for the law to take account of collective labour relations.
Weak unionism may have reduced strikes and other forms of militancy, but did
not remove the underlying need for Western Australian to move into line with
Britain and its colonies in recognising that the individual contract of employment,
as embodied in the Master and Servants Act and other legislation, could not take
account of collective action. This was the tenor of the Second Reading Speech.
In relation to the thesis that the origins of compulsory arbitration was to safeguard the State’s credit rating, we can only reiterate arguments we presented in
our paper. As noted, though Segal has provided more detail in support of her case,
this detail does not alter that case. If the support of credit rating was the rationale, it might have been expected that the speeches and debate would reflect this
rationale. We noted in our paper that the Act was not a deterrent to strikes and
thus could not, of itself, guarantee the absence of industrial action. Segal notes
that, in 1900, mine labour ‘was industrially and financially weak’, and further,
that union leaders, ‘all too conscious of the outcome of the Eastern Australian
strikes in the 1890s, desperately wished for industrial peace’. If so, one wonders
why there would be a need for special legislation, and in particular legislation
that broke new grounds. Compulsory arbitration was not needed to deter weak
unions from striking, and was ineffectual in preventing strong unions from doing
so. In short, it is difficult to see how such legislation would assist in maintaining
the colony’s credit rating.
Segal’s treatment of the ‘orthodoxy’ of the Forrest-TULC’ trade-off suggests
that we are part of a band of historians who ‘mostly either quote each other or
faithfully tread in each others’ evidentiary footsteps’. We have concluded that
some trade-off between Forrest and the TULC took place based on two pieces of
evidence. One is the work of Pearce who led the delegation that called on Forrest.
It is true, as Segal notes, that there are contradictory accounts between different
Senators who attended the delegation, and we have pointed out that Pearce himself
is inaccurate on some details. Nevertheless, his account does explain the second
and important piece of evidence, namely that the TULC altered a resolution that
had been passed only hours before the delegation. The fact that factions within
the TULC had divergent views on the matter does not alter the fact that the
TULC did resolve in a particular manner. The motion declared as ‘an enemy of
Labor’s interests’, anyone who voted to bring the Session to an end (as the wantof-confidence motion could have done) or who failed to support the compulsory
arbitration legislation. The closeness of the want-of-confidence motion (three
votes would have tied the issue, four would have caused Forrest to resign) suggests
THE ORIGINS
OF A
DEBATE
363
that Forrest was not as assured of success as Segal would suggest. In our article
we note the importance of labour supporters and sympathisers in this matter.
In some cases these spoke against Forrest but nevertheless voted to keep him in
office. It may also be noted that at that time (that is, many years before the Pearce
origin of the ‘orthodoxy’) Forrest was accused of using the Bill to save himself
from ‘political death’ (see, for example, WAPD, 13/9/1900: 415 ff).
Interpretations on the origins of compulsory arbitration in Western Australia
will remain inconclusive until further important documentary evidence is found.
We know that Forrest wrote to Charles Kingston and that the latter encouraged
Forrest to legislate for compulsory arbitration. Part of Kingston’s letter is quoted
by Crowley but, unfortunately, is not accurately referenced (Crowley 1998: 245).
The unearthing of Forrest’s letter to Kingston would provide valuable insights
into the origin of the first compulsory arbitration Act in Australia.
REFERENCES
Crowley F (2000) Big John Forrest 1847–1918. A Founding Father of the Commonwealth of Ausrtralia.
Perth: University of Western Australia Press.
Plowman DH, Calkin G (2004) The origins of compulsory arbitration in Western Australia. The
Journal of Industrial Relations 46(1): 53–83.
Segal N (2002) Compulsory arbitration and the Western Australian gold-mining industry: A reexamination of the inception of compulsory arbitration in Western Australia. International Review of Social History 47(1): 59–100.
Western Australian Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 13/9/1900.
DAVID PLOWMAN
An earlier issue of this journal included an article by Genevieve Calkin and myself on the origins of compulsory arbitration in Western Australia (Plowman and
Calkin 2004). In this, we examined the explanations often afforded for the introduction of compulsory arbitration in other States and concluded that they did
not explain the Western Australian phenomenon. We concluded that ‘a trilogy of
factors—political opportunism, the need to take account of collective employment
relations, and the capacity of employers to shape the Act in a way that constrained
unions but also minimised the reach of arbitration—go a long way in explaining
the Western Australian phenomenon’.
In our article we made reference to Naomi Segal’s article, one that also seeks to
explain the origins of compulsory arbitration in Western Australian (Segal 2002).
In this, she sees Forrest’s concern with maintaining the colony’s credit rating as
an important motivation for the legislation. Forrest was particularly concerned to
maintain investment in the mining industry. The mining industry was the colony’s
largest employer and a major source of government income at the time. As Segal
notes in her rebuttal, in our paper we took issue with aspects of her article. In turn,
she has taken issue with aspects of our work. She does so with clarity, passion and
in detail.
The details submitted in the rebuttal adds to, but does not materially change,
the arguments put forward by Segal in 2002. The added details have not caused us
to resile from our original position. There are two main areas of contention. One
concerns the introduction of compulsory of arbitration as a means of safeguarding
the State’s credit rating. The other, whether or not Forrest and the Trade Union
Labor Congress (TULC) entered into an arrangement whereby, in return for
compulsory arbitration, the TULC sought to assist Forrest survive a want-ofconfidence motion in Parliament.
Before dealing with these matters we would take issue with Segal’s off-handed
approach to our treatment of the Labor Party. She is critical of our notion that the
party, ‘as currently understood, did not come into being until after the passage of
this legislation’ and claims that ‘the denial of the existence of political labour flies
in the face of much evidence for political labour’s activism in Western Australia
well before arbitration legislation was debated’. She also sees a contradiction in
our contention that the legislation arose to take account of collective employment
relations in the context of unions’ general incapacity to affect industrial outcomes.
We do not resile from the first statement, though perhaps we should have
been clearer by what we meant by ‘as currently understood’. It is evident from
our paper that we have been conscious of the existence of ‘political labour’ prior
to 1900 and have recorded it in great detail. By ‘as currently understood’, we
meant a party capable of contesting a wide number of seats in its own right,
THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 47, NO. 3, SEPTEMBER 2005, 361--363
362
THE JOURNAL
OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
September 2005
and one entailing adherence to party policy and solidarity. We note that
any parliamentary representation enjoyed by political labour to this time did not
lead to these outcomes. Furthermore, we do not see labour’s weak parliamentary
representation or industrial position as denying it the opportunity to influence
outcomes under special circumstances. Those circumstances, however, were rare
and necessitated some major parliamentary split in which labour supporters and
sympathisers could exercise a balance of power. We argue that such a situation
did exist following the referendum leading to Western Australian joining the
Commonwealth. Furthermore, the fact that most unions were weak in 1900 did
not remove the need for the law to take account of collective labour relations.
Weak unionism may have reduced strikes and other forms of militancy, but did
not remove the underlying need for Western Australian to move into line with
Britain and its colonies in recognising that the individual contract of employment,
as embodied in the Master and Servants Act and other legislation, could not take
account of collective action. This was the tenor of the Second Reading Speech.
In relation to the thesis that the origins of compulsory arbitration was to safeguard the State’s credit rating, we can only reiterate arguments we presented in
our paper. As noted, though Segal has provided more detail in support of her case,
this detail does not alter that case. If the support of credit rating was the rationale, it might have been expected that the speeches and debate would reflect this
rationale. We noted in our paper that the Act was not a deterrent to strikes and
thus could not, of itself, guarantee the absence of industrial action. Segal notes
that, in 1900, mine labour ‘was industrially and financially weak’, and further,
that union leaders, ‘all too conscious of the outcome of the Eastern Australian
strikes in the 1890s, desperately wished for industrial peace’. If so, one wonders
why there would be a need for special legislation, and in particular legislation
that broke new grounds. Compulsory arbitration was not needed to deter weak
unions from striking, and was ineffectual in preventing strong unions from doing
so. In short, it is difficult to see how such legislation would assist in maintaining
the colony’s credit rating.
Segal’s treatment of the ‘orthodoxy’ of the Forrest-TULC’ trade-off suggests
that we are part of a band of historians who ‘mostly either quote each other or
faithfully tread in each others’ evidentiary footsteps’. We have concluded that
some trade-off between Forrest and the TULC took place based on two pieces of
evidence. One is the work of Pearce who led the delegation that called on Forrest.
It is true, as Segal notes, that there are contradictory accounts between different
Senators who attended the delegation, and we have pointed out that Pearce himself
is inaccurate on some details. Nevertheless, his account does explain the second
and important piece of evidence, namely that the TULC altered a resolution that
had been passed only hours before the delegation. The fact that factions within
the TULC had divergent views on the matter does not alter the fact that the
TULC did resolve in a particular manner. The motion declared as ‘an enemy of
Labor’s interests’, anyone who voted to bring the Session to an end (as the wantof-confidence motion could have done) or who failed to support the compulsory
arbitration legislation. The closeness of the want-of-confidence motion (three
votes would have tied the issue, four would have caused Forrest to resign) suggests
THE ORIGINS
OF A
DEBATE
363
that Forrest was not as assured of success as Segal would suggest. In our article
we note the importance of labour supporters and sympathisers in this matter.
In some cases these spoke against Forrest but nevertheless voted to keep him in
office. It may also be noted that at that time (that is, many years before the Pearce
origin of the ‘orthodoxy’) Forrest was accused of using the Bill to save himself
from ‘political death’ (see, for example, WAPD, 13/9/1900: 415 ff).
Interpretations on the origins of compulsory arbitration in Western Australia
will remain inconclusive until further important documentary evidence is found.
We know that Forrest wrote to Charles Kingston and that the latter encouraged
Forrest to legislate for compulsory arbitration. Part of Kingston’s letter is quoted
by Crowley but, unfortunately, is not accurately referenced (Crowley 1998: 245).
The unearthing of Forrest’s letter to Kingston would provide valuable insights
into the origin of the first compulsory arbitration Act in Australia.
REFERENCES
Crowley F (2000) Big John Forrest 1847–1918. A Founding Father of the Commonwealth of Ausrtralia.
Perth: University of Western Australia Press.
Plowman DH, Calkin G (2004) The origins of compulsory arbitration in Western Australia. The
Journal of Industrial Relations 46(1): 53–83.
Segal N (2002) Compulsory arbitration and the Western Australian gold-mining industry: A reexamination of the inception of compulsory arbitration in Western Australia. International Review of Social History 47(1): 59–100.
Western Australian Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 13/9/1900.