Manajemen | Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji 2002 21
CHANGES, DANGERS, CHOICE AND VOICE:
UNDERSTANDING WHAT HIGH
COMMITMENT MANAGEMENT MEANS
FOR EMPLOYEES AND UNIONS
MARIAN BAIRD*
U
sing a case study approach, this article explores the implications for employees and
unions of the introduction of a high commitment management (HCM) model to
two Australian workplaces; one a brownfield site, the other a greenfield site. The article
assesses the impact of HCM on employees using a combination of qualitative and
quantitative methods. Its central argument is structured around four themes. The first
relates to the extent and type of the changes introduced. The article briefly overviews the
features of the new HCM system at the greenfield site and contrasts them with the
traditional industrial relations (IR) extant at the brownfield site. The second theme
examines the dangers of the new system for employees and unions at both sites. The third
theme analyses the choices available to employees at each workplace and argues that
only limited choice is available. The fourth theme considers the opportunities for, and
impediments to, employee voice being heard in both the old and new systems. The
article concludes with an evaluation of the costs and benefits of the new system for all
employees and argues that in order to fully appreciate the implications of HCM, an
integration of traditional IR concerns with human resource management (HRM)
analysis is essential.
This article is concerned with exploring and understanding the implications for
employees and unions of dismantling the traditional Industrial Relations (IR)
model and introducing a High Commitment Management (HCM) model. The
analysis is based on research conducted at two Australian manufacturing
workplaces owned by the same multinational company. One site is a traditional
brownfield site, the other is a new greenfield site. Neither the company nor the
market in which it operates is identified because the article is not concerned with
the organisation per se, but with considering the implications for employees of
the transition to HCM at the brownfield site and the implementation of HCM
at the greenfield site.
The two sites provided a unique opportunity to compare ‘old IR’ with ‘new
HCM’. The research covers a period of transformation at the brownfield site
* Lecturer, Work and Organisational Studies, School of Business, The University of Sydney,
NSW 2006. Email: m.baird@econ.usyd.edu.au The author wishes to thank the reviewers for their
very helpful and instructive comments.
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that resulted in the dismantling of an industrial relationship built on multiunionism and collective bargaining, pluralism and adversarialism, and the introduction of an HCM model. By contrast, the greenfield site was entirely new,
and from the outset adopted an integrated bundle of employment policies and
practices that have come to be recognised as high commitment management.
Employment numbers at the greenfield site grew to approximately 115 and at
the brownfield site stabilised at around 150. Strategic recruitment and selection
strategies that emphasised personal initiative and adaptability, willingness to be
trained, and suitability for team work ensured that the majority of greenfield
employees were male, in their thirties and generally inexperienced in factory work.
By contrast, the employees at the brownfield site were older, experienced factory
workers and long term union members. In studying the two sites the comparison
is not like with like, but rather old with new, or, traditional IR with new human
resource management (HRM). If we are to see the difference for employees
between old IR and new HRM anywhere, we will see it in these two workplaces
which represented a typical brownfield site and an ‘ideal-type’ greenfield site
(Baird 2001).
This article is divided into three parts. Part one explains the methodology
adopted for the research. Part two provides both objective and subjective evaluations of the impact of HCM on employees. As the intention of the article is to
both analyse the objective data and explore in a more speculative way the impact
on employees of high commitment management, the article does not provide a
traditional chronological account or description of change at the two sites. Instead,
in the second part of the article, four themes are addressed under the titles of
changes, dangers, choice and voice. In the theme of changes, the article provides a
brief overview of the changes represented by the new HCM model, the significance of these changes and their resonance with contemporary HRM theory. The
second theme highlights the potential dangers of the high commitment model
for employees and unions. The third theme analyses the choices available to
employees under the new high commitment model at both the brownfield and
greenfield sites. In the fourth theme the opportunity for employees to express
their voice in the old and new systems is explored. In conclusion, the costs and
benefits for employees of the HCM system are briefly outlined and it is argued
that the HCM/IR dichotomy oversimplifies the complexity of employee
experience.
METHODOLOGY
The research and analysis presented in this article arises from a six-year case study
of organisational change. Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al. (1995: 13) have lamented
the fact that there are few detailed accounts of significant change programs at
the organisational level, yet, as they say, ‘it is only by tracing the twists and turns
in the change process that we can fully appreciate why the pathways to change
are so complex’. An appropriate way to trace such pathways and importantly,
where they lead, is through the case study. Case study methodology provides the
tools for in-depth study of ‘contemporary’, ‘real-life’ phenomena and allows for
the use of multiple sources of evidence (Yin 1984: 23).
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Both qualitative and quantitative methods were used in this case study. The
qualitative methods were extensive and included over one hundred structured
and semi-structured interviews with a wide range of managers, employees and
union officials at the two workplaces as well as senior managers at the company’s
headquarters in Australia and New York. The qualitative tools also included a
number of site visits and fieldwork, observation of workers and their work,
participation in work activities, training sessions and meetings. Additionally, to
provide contextual and historical information, company documents and archives
were closely examined.
The central feature of the company’s organisational change program was the
introduction of a high commitment work system. Accordingly, the quantitative
aspect of the research tested the organisational commitment levels of both managers and employees at each of the workplaces. However, it is the employees’
level of commitment with which this article is primarily concerned. Organisational
commitment levels were measured using the Mowday, Steers and Porter (1979)
Organisational Commitment Questionnaire (OCQ).1 The OCQ measures
commitment in relation to the Mowday et al. (1979: 226) definition: ‘[T]he
relative strength of an individual’s identification with and involvement in a
particular organisation’, which is characterised by three related factors, ‘a strong
belief in and acceptance of the organisation’s goals, a willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organisation, and a strong desire to maintain
membership of the organisation’.
Similarly, Walton incorporates these three dimensions in his conceptualisation
of organisational commitment (Walton 1980; 1982).
The nine item OCQ was used to measure organisational commitment levels
at both sites. To establish changes over time in organisational commitment at
the greenfield site, two data measurement points, with a fourteen month interval,
were used. To determine the significance of different organisational commitment
levels between the workplaces, occupational groups and time periods, independent t-tests of the mean organisational commitment levels were conducted. Over
the course of the three surveys, a total of 354 questionnaires were distributed
to employees and 240 were returned, representing a response rate of 68%.
Independence from the company and anonymity of responses was guaranteed
to all respondents.
The response format used a 7-point Likert scale with the anchors ranging
from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). The final commitment score is
an average of the responses to all the items. The highest possible score is therefore 7, interpreted as a very high level of organisational commitment; the lowest is 1, or very low commitment. As the responses to the questionnaires were
anonymous they could not be paired over the two time periods. Independent
t-tests were thus the most appropriate method to determine the statistical significance of the results.
The OCQ scores for production employees at the greenfield site were 5.6
(Time 1) and 5.1 (Time 2). At the brownfield site, which had a different job
classification system, production employees scored 5.1 and store employees’
commitment levels measured 3.3.2 In addition to measuring the aggregate
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levels of organisational commitment, employee responses to the individual items
were explored along each of the dimensions of organisational commitment
referred to in the definition; that is, loyalty to, effort for and continuance with
the organisation. On the basis of these answers, generic employee responses were
developed. These are called ‘organisational commitment profiles’ and provide a
more qualitative form of response from the employees.
In summary, the research for this particular case was longitudinal and comprehensive, providing rich and detailed information of a process of IR transformation and the implications for employees of the introduction of high commitment
management, albeit in one particular company. This raises one final issue with
regard to the case study methodology: to what extent can we generalise from
these results? One response must be that in a purely statistical sense generalisations cannot be made. What can be substantiated by the use of the empirical
material are the patterns and outcomes of change. If similar changes are reported
in other research, then wider conclusions can be drawn. The fact that to date
there has been little research on the employee’s experience of HRM and HCM
(Guest 1999), therefore making it difficult to generalise more widely than this
case study, raises important questions of researchers, rather than the generalisability of case study methodology. Finally, the case study necessitates the interpretation of observations and results, requiring the voice of the researcher to be heard.
It is recognised here that these conclusions are therefore, by virtue of the research
process and the subject matter, open for debate and further analysis.
EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF HIGH COMMITMENT MANAGEMENT ON
EMPLOYEES
Changes
This section commences with a review of the general characteristics of HCM
and its links with HRM. It goes on to focus on the HCM that was applied at the
case study greenfield site. The greenfield and brownfield sites are then compared
in terms of their HCM and IR characteristics, a process which serves to
highlight the significance of the HCM changes.
It is generally accepted that HRM is a distinctive approach to managing the
employment relationship and that it is supposed to impact positively on organisational performance, either directly or as a moderating influence (Snell & Dean
1996). The strategic HRM approach typically combines and integrates a set of
policies and practices ‘for the full and positive utilisation of human resources’
(Guest 1987: 506). These clusters or bundles of strategic HRM policies and
practices are usually designed to elicit high levels of organisational commitment
from employees. Consequently, HRM has become closely linked with characteristics associated with high performance work systems (HPWS) and HCM; so
much so that HRM is now often considered synonymous with HCM (Storey 1995;
Wood 1999). The emphasis in mainstream research has been on how policies
and practices associated with HCM or HPWS enhance employee performance,
reduce labour turnover and improve organisational performance and profitability
(Ichniowski 1990; Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1991; Arthur 1994; Huselid 1995;
MacDuffie 1995; Huselid & Becker 1996). In some cases, employee satisfaction
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has been included as the intervening variable (see for example, Berg 1999), but
much of this research has failed to demonstrate any interest in truly understanding
employee opinions and union reactions to the implementation of these new
systems.
The emphasis on organisational performance and commitment, rather than
commitment to unions for example, suggested that the orientation of HRM was
opposed to that of traditional IR, where one of the fundamental interests was
unionism. In apparent support of this distinction between IR and HRM, Guest
noted that within the HRM model ‘collective industrial relations have, at best,
only a minor role’ (Guest 1987: 503). Later, Guest and Hoque (1994: 2) also
argued that we should be ‘developing frameworks and dimensions which allow
us to study aspects of employment relations and HRM without distinctive
reference to the union issue’. Boxall and Dowling (1990) on the other hand, concluded that HRM and IR were complementary and that HRM was not ‘uniformly
anti-union’. Furthermore, they argued that HRM could contribute to IR theory
and research in understanding ‘management as an actor, enterprise-level
Table 1 Human resource management (HRM) policies and practices associated with
the high commitment management (HCM) model
HCM policies and practices*
Harmonised conditions between management and non-management employees
Single status for all employees
Trainability as a major selection criterion
Use of selection tests
Use of realistic job interviews
Formal system for communicating company values and systems to new staff
Deliberate development of learning organisation
Explicit requirement for annual minimum training time for all staff
Flexible job descriptions
Job design to use all skills and abilities
Team work for majority of staff
Production staff responsible for quality
Majority of workers involved in quality circles or similar
Regular use of attitude surveys
Formal, regular appraisal of all staff
Regular information sessions from management to shop floor
Provision of information about market position, company performance
Merit element in pay of all staff
Staff involvement in setting performance targets
Internal promotion as the norm
HRM policy deliberately integrated with business
HRM policies deliberately integrated with each other
* Features based on Guest and Hoque (1994).
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phenomena and direct management-employee relations’ (Boxall & Dowling
1990: 210). Ironically, given that all three aspects have received greater
attention from IR researchers, it is now time to incorporate the traditional
IR dimensions of collectivism, unionism and employee representation into
the study of HRM, especially where the emphasis is on HCM. Certainly,
this article seeks to do so, because it is argued that by excluding the ‘union
issue’ and other IR factors, one obtains only a partial understanding of the
implications for employees of organisational change and the introduction
of HCM.
Various authors have summarised the practices and policies associated with the
distinctive HRM model (see for example, Guest & Hoque 1994; Wood &
Albanese 1995). These practices and policies are listed in Table 1.
Given the discussion about the compatibility (or not) of IR and HRM, it is
notable that a number of traditional IR characteristics are absent from Table 1.
To overcome this omission, Table 2 provides a list of characteristics most
frequently associated with the traditional IR model. The case study reported in
this article explores the changes in both IR and HRM that result from the introduction of an HCM system. This is a more comprehensive approach to understanding the impact on employees than focusing on the introduction of HCM
practices alone, which tends to be the approach adopted in the majority of
studies.
During the 1980s the organisation under investigation sought to improve
market position, performance and profitability. The key to this, as management
saw it, was to change the way in which work was conducted and the way
workers were managed. To achieve this objective, they introduced an HCM
system, which was applied to all new greenfield sites owned by the company,
including the one referred to here. Over time, all the old brownfield sites owned
Table 2 Industrial relations characteristics associated with the traditional industrial
relations (IR) model
Characteristic
Union recognition
Multi-union site, or
Single union site
Demarcations on the basis of union membership, qualifications, etc.
Payroll deduction of union dues
Preference clause for unionists
Terms and conditions set by Award, or
Enterprise Bargaining Agreement
On-site union delegates
Union training for delegates
Meetings with delegates
Collective bargaining over wages and conditions
Use of tribunal for arbitration or conciliation of disputes
Table 3
The high commitment management (HCM) model at the greenfield and brownfield sites
HCM policies and practices
§
†
†
†
†
†
†
§
†
†
†
†
†
†
†
†
†
§
‡
†
†
†
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
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† Yes; ‡ no; § partial. BF, brownfield site; GR, greenfield site; HRM, human resource management.
BF
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Harmonised conditions between management and non-management employees
Single status for all employees
Trainability as a major selection criterion
Use of selection tests
Use of realistic job interviews
Formal system for communicating company values and systems to new staff
Deliberate development of learning organisation
Explicit requirement for annual minimum training time for all staff
Flexible job descriptions
Job design to use all skills and abilities
Team work for majority of staff
Production staff responsible for quality
Majority of workers involved in quality circles or similar
Regular use of attitude surveys
Formal, regular appraisal of all staff
Regular information sessions from management to shop floor
Provision of information about market position, company performance
Merit element in pay of all staff
Staff involvement in setting performance targets
Internal promotion as the norm
HRM policy deliberately integrated with business
HRM policies deliberately integrated with each other
GF
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by the company were also to be retro-fitted with the HCM system. The new
system incorporated most of the practices referred to in the literature as HCM.
Tables 3 and 4 compare the HCM and IR practices present at the greenfield and
brownfield sites.
It is clear from Table 3 that the HCM system as practised at the greenfield
site aligns very closely with the contemporary HRM/HCM model. It is also clear
that many of the features of HCM were not present at the brownfield site. This
is to be expected given the age and tradition of the latter site. Essentially, the
HCM model was an advanced manufacturing system incorporating computerised
production systems, team work and extensive training, which significantly altered
the management and organisation of work. In this particular case, the HCM
system was introduced because it made sense in business terms, not because the
company had adopted a benevolent managerial philosophy. In the words of the
plant manager, the principal management advocate of the new system in the
company:
The [HCM] is not a social program to make people happy – it is a business driven
program. The objective is not to enhance the quality of workplace, that would give
a lack of focus on real issues. It is not about being nice guys and working well together,
although this is one of the end results. But the real reason for doing this is business
reasons – to help us to achieve our goals better. Another misguided objective is shared
responsibility and power. That would give a lack of direction, a manager must still
lead . . . people need direction up front (Interview, 4 June 1993).
Table 4 shows a slightly different, and perhaps unexpected, picture of the IR
features of the two sites. While it is evident that the IR features were more
Table 4
The industrial relations model at the greenfield and brownfield sites
Industrial relations policies and practices
GF
Union recognition
†
Multi-union site
‡
Single union site
†
Demarcations on the basis of union membership, qualifications, etc. ‡
Payroll deduction of union dues
†
Preference clause for unionists
†
Terms and conditions set by Award
‡
Terms and conditions set by Enterprise Bargaining Agreement
†
On-site union delegates
†
Union training for delegates
‡
Meetings with delegates
Yearly
Visits from union offices
Yearly
Collective bargaining over wages and conditions
§
Use of tribunal for arbitration or conciliation of disputes
‡
† Yes; ‡ no; § partial. BF, brownfield site; GF, greenfield site.
BF
†
† (14)
‡
†
†
†
†
‡
†
†
Often
Often
†
†
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common at the brownfield site than the greenfield site, it is also the case that
the greenfield site retained some features of the traditional model, such as a union
presence. The degree to which these IR features were, in practice, subverted by
the HCM practices at the greenfield site, however, is significant, so much so that
the distinction between the two sites in terms of IR experience was therefore
greater than the list suggests. As will become clear in the discussion that follows,
the difference in the IR experience between the two sites was very important to
management. Indeed, if the sites had not been clearly differentiated in terms
of IR, management would have been disappointed, since this was one of their
principal aims in establishing the new site. A comment from the plant manager
at the greenfield site that indicated the differing IR experience at the two sites
was: ‘We can try things out – it’s a free environment, and we couldn’t experiment
in a unionised environment’ (Interview, 14.7.1995). Yet, contrary to this
manager’s understanding, the greenfield site was fully unionised!
The comparison of the two sites demonstrates that the changes introduced by
the HCM system were significant. Given the extent of the changes, the implications for employees were potentially profound and in the following section the
dangers are explored.
Dangers
This section explores some of the dangers of the new system for the employees
and the unions at both the brownfield and greenfield sites. The process of
introducing the HCM system to the brownfield site involved two phases of
change: the first was a period marked by management ‘forcing’ change on
the employees; the second was characterised by management ‘fostering’ a new
relationship with employees. (For the theory of these change strategies see Walton
et al. 1994.) During the first phase and over a period of five years employee
numbers were halved from approximately 300 to 155. This was achieved through
redundancy, retrenchments and outsourcing of maintenance work. In the same
period, union presence on the site also changed dramatically. Fourteen separate
unions representing skilled, semi-skilled and technical occupations, were reduced
by management to five unions. Two of these unions dominated, one represented
general production workers, the other storemen and packers. The result of
these changes for workers was that jobs were lost, as were job rules, most
demarcations, occupational identity and status, union culture, and in all, a degree
of control over work. In addition, a significant amount of trust in management
was lost.
In the second phase of the introduction of the new system at the brownfield
site, management fostered a new relationship with the workforce and employees
were inundated with attention. Employees were involved in work organisation
design teams, factory simulations were conducted, as were attitude and motivation
surveys, education programs, and many, many meetings. The number of
meetings proved to be a concern for employees and led one production worker
to say: ‘I actually get worried, so much time is spent in meetings, it frightens
me – where will it end? Job security is on my mind’ (Interview, 1/8/94), and
another to comment that ‘they had more meetings than Harold Park!’3
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Towards the end of this second phase most demarcations had been removed,
workforce numbers were further reduced and just two unions remained. There
remained some suspicion among employees and union delegates about the
changes relating to HCM. These suspicions were summarised by one of the union
delegates in the following way:
There has been a lot of emphasis on trust recently, with management changing their
policy on some aspects of work. For example, the removal of the bundy clock, no
more checking of bags and giving the union delegates the authority to discipline
workers. Managers are also treating workers differently, as buddies rather than
bludgers. Sometimes it’s hard to accept this, it seems that managers are being
hypocritical. Some workers have been on interview panels, and in addition there
is a new uniform which is common for managers and workers alike, this makes
it harder to tell them apart. There appears to be a blending of managers with the
workers. These changes are all new, and unexpected, and there is some apprehension
amongst workers as to what it all means. It is felt that the changes have been too
fast and the turnaround too great, and that management have not laid all their cards
on the table (Interview, 2 May 1994).
At the same time, as the changes were being introduced at the brownfield site,
the greenfield site was being established. At this site the dangers for the
employees are not so obvious for the very fact that it was a greenfield site,
without a history and without an established set of customs and practices. The
dangers, for example, lie in what cannot be seen or measured, rather than in what
exists. These are issues which cannot be grasped by a purely positivist approach
or empirical methodology, and they require some understanding of alternative
or counter-factual experiences. This is why the introduction of HCM to the
brownfield site provides a valuable contrast to its implementation at the greenfield site. For instance, at the greenfield site and in contrast to the brownfield
site, there was not a strong union or delegate presence, there was virtually no
collective bargaining, employees generally did not negotiate work rules and there
were no voiced, alternative views. Instead, workplace principles and values were
ordained by the company, sophisticated selection procedures were used to exclude
the recalcitrant or uncommitted employee and teamwork was introduced which
removed demarcations and job distinctions, and provided the forum for issues
ranging from production and plant problems to pay.
To summarise, the dangers for employees which accompanied the introduction
of the HCM to the brownfield site included loss of jobs, rising insecurity and
uncertainty, and loss of union representation and job control. At the greenfield
site, the dangers are less obvious, but include stringent selection criteria, an
absence of collective involvement, a marginalised union and concomitant rise in
unilateral decision making by management.
Employee choice
This section provides a brief analysis of the choices available to the employees
at both the brownfield and greenfield sites. One needs to ask, what were the
choices for employees at the brownfield site? Was there an alternative to the
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introduction of the HCM system? On the one hand, employees knew that
they had experienced a long period of considerable bargaining strength and
industrial muscle and they were aware that their terms and conditions were in
the upper quartile for manufacturing in their region. On the other hand, they
had witnessed the closure of the company’s other brownfield site, they knew about
the greenfield site and they were told outright that there were no job openings
for them at the new site. This was consistent with the employment practices of
many greenfield sites (Hallier 2001). Furthermore, they knew through their
unions and the media of the changes occurring in other Australian workplaces
and that they worked for a large multinational that could move production
off-shore if necessary.
In the mid-1980s, things changed dramatically. Management began to adopt
different strategies, at first moving some employees to staff positions, cautiously
re-arranging work in head office and at the sites, and of course, opening the
greenfield site. Emboldened by their success, management moved on to more
drastic action. One Friday afternoon they sacked the entire maintenance staff
(considered the most militant group) and so removed six unions. The work was
contracted out and the remaining employees became concerned for their own
job security. Initially, the unions still on site and some of the employees resisted
negotiating the changes necessary to introduce the HCM system, but management pressed on. Some further re-organisation of work took place, new technology was introduced replacing some workers, more work was contracted out
and workforce numbers declined further. In the end, the industrial dilemma of
the late 20th century confronted the employees: accept the changes or lose the
jobs.
In these circumstances, what choice did the brownfield employees have?
Not surprisingly, they eventually accepted teamwork, the abolition of all
demarcations and the move to a single union site. They undertook training,
filled in staff surveys, negotiated an enterprise specific agreement, adopted new
selection criteria, accepted new pay scales, worked hard, did not strike and became
committed to the company.
At the greenfield site the IR situation was certainly less volatile, but one
must also ask if there were genuine choices for the employees there. Firstly,
management determined that a new labour force be engaged for the greenfield
site and that none of the brownfield employees be moved to the new site.4
Secondly, the location of the greenfield plant allowed the company to take
advantage of a comparatively soft labour market and implement strict selection
criteria. For instance, in one recruitment round there were 1500 responses to 22
advertised positions. Thirdly, during the selection process the company made
applicants clearly aware that they were seeking committed employees, in return
for good working conditions, above average pay, training opportunities and
implied job security. Fourthly, the company sought a single union agreement prior
to opening the plant, offered the union a closed shop and settled the terms and
conditions before employees were appointed. All employees were engaged on
the understanding that they would work in teams, share jobs and multi-skill. When
one considers this background, it would appear that in a number of areas such
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as work organisation, job choice and union membership, the choices open to
employees once they accepted the position were very limited.
Employee voice
In this section, the opportunity for employee voice throughout the change process
to the new system at the brownfield site and within the HCM system at the greenfield site is analysed. These comments are based on the qualitative research
at both sites but also draw on the results of surveys of employee commitment
conducted at the greenfield and brownfield sites.
The second phase of the change process initiated by management at the brownfield site emphasised employee involvement. Employees were invited to join the
Design Teams formed to discuss the way that work could be reorganised. Before
this, however, senior management had discussed the outcomes they desired for
the brownfield site at their Steering Committee meetings. The design teams were
constituted of managers and employees and they met on-site and occasionally
off-site. Their task was to present a proposal for change; they had no decision
making or negotiating role.
Apart from the Design Teams the other avenue for involvement was through
the unions. The number of unions had been reduced to two, and they decided
not to be involved (or implicated) in designing the changes, instead they preferred to wait until the proposals were on the table for negotiation. The union
delegates saw it as necessary to maintain some independence and were concerned
at what they saw happening to the employee members of the Design Teams. In
the words of one delegate:
You get invited to your neighbours for dinner, you get fed a nice meal and drink
some wine, and then after that, when you’ve eaten his meal, he says something you
don’t agree with, you don’t feel its appropriate to argue with your host. This is
the sort of thing that happened to the workers on the Design Teams (Interview,
21 March 96).
The first time the proposals were presented to all of the employees for a vote
they were rejected. Management felt the HCM system ‘was dead in the water’
at the brownfield site. After a short lull in management activity, however,
attention was once again returned to introducing the changes and by the end of
the year the company had achieved their goals at the brownfield site. Of the
remaining two unions on site, management removed one by offering generous
redundancies. With only one union, management could remove the remaining
demarcations and introduce teamwork throughout the production process.
At the greenfield site there were potentially two forums for employee voice:
the union and the team structure. As the union’s voice on site is relatively silent,
teams have become the main representative forums for the employees. The wages
team provided an interesting illustration of the representative process under
HCM. This team was formed after a dispute with employees over a wage increase
had almost occurred. In the third round of enterprise bargaining the union
attempted to become more active on the site by presenting a claim that
included a demand for a wage rise in excess of management’s original offer.
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The employees responded fairly positively to the union’s efforts. More importantly, in terms of the wages issue, employees felt that management had not
accorded them the recognition or involvement they expected, especially given
the rhetoric of the high commitment system in which they worked. Management
conceded that employees should have been more directly involved and in response
established a wages committee comprised of employees. The committee’s
brief was to conduct a wage survey of comparable business in their region. This
was conducted, the results reported back to the rest of the workforce and the
matter was settled. Through this process management dissipated employee
discontent, sidestepped the union and avoided a dispute.
It could be argued that by reacting this way management facilitated employee
involvement in the wage setting process, providing employees with the means
to become informed about comparative wage levels. The result therefore was a
positive procedural outcome for employees. However, it could also be argued
that this would not have occurred had the union not been present and activated
the issue in the first place. Ironically, the result for the union was that they were
marginalised from the bargaining process further. One could speculate that with
a fully marginalised union, or a non-union site, the outcome would be different.
Without the pressure from a union, even HCM does not guarantee employee
involvement in all matters, especially in matters where employee interests are
most likely to be different from those of the organisation.
While this account focuses on an analysis of wages it might be asked, as indeed
Guest does in this volume, what the employees thought about the other HCM
policies and practices at the site. We have some insight into this from the
surveys of employee’s organisational commitment levels. Employees at the
greenfield site were surveyed twice and those at the brownfield site once. As
discussed earlier in the article, in addition to providing an aggregate measure of
organisational commitment, organisational commitment profiles for employees
at the sites were developed. These profiles provide a form of employee voice,
and a more qualitative expression of the employees’ responses to the HCM model.
At the greenfield site, the typical response from production employees
presented a mixed view of their work experience under the HCM, and did not
suggest that high organisational commitment urged them to work harder. By
way of example, a response to one of the Organisational Commitment
Questionnaires was:
I am glad I chose to work here and I am generally proud to say I work for the
company. It is a good place to work and I care about the fate of the company. However,
I am not willing to put in as much effort as I was when I was first employed and I
feel that I am not performing to the best of my ability. I would not accept any job
just to stay. I find my values and those of the company are less and less similar and
I no longer feel it is the best of all possible organisations for which to work.
This profile suggests a growing level of dissatisfaction with HCM at the site, a
conclusion supported also by the decreasing OCQ scores. In the fourteen-month
interval between the two surveys at the greenfield site, the employee’s OCQ
score dropped significantly from 5.6 to 5.1 (P
UNDERSTANDING WHAT HIGH
COMMITMENT MANAGEMENT MEANS
FOR EMPLOYEES AND UNIONS
MARIAN BAIRD*
U
sing a case study approach, this article explores the implications for employees and
unions of the introduction of a high commitment management (HCM) model to
two Australian workplaces; one a brownfield site, the other a greenfield site. The article
assesses the impact of HCM on employees using a combination of qualitative and
quantitative methods. Its central argument is structured around four themes. The first
relates to the extent and type of the changes introduced. The article briefly overviews the
features of the new HCM system at the greenfield site and contrasts them with the
traditional industrial relations (IR) extant at the brownfield site. The second theme
examines the dangers of the new system for employees and unions at both sites. The third
theme analyses the choices available to employees at each workplace and argues that
only limited choice is available. The fourth theme considers the opportunities for, and
impediments to, employee voice being heard in both the old and new systems. The
article concludes with an evaluation of the costs and benefits of the new system for all
employees and argues that in order to fully appreciate the implications of HCM, an
integration of traditional IR concerns with human resource management (HRM)
analysis is essential.
This article is concerned with exploring and understanding the implications for
employees and unions of dismantling the traditional Industrial Relations (IR)
model and introducing a High Commitment Management (HCM) model. The
analysis is based on research conducted at two Australian manufacturing
workplaces owned by the same multinational company. One site is a traditional
brownfield site, the other is a new greenfield site. Neither the company nor the
market in which it operates is identified because the article is not concerned with
the organisation per se, but with considering the implications for employees of
the transition to HCM at the brownfield site and the implementation of HCM
at the greenfield site.
The two sites provided a unique opportunity to compare ‘old IR’ with ‘new
HCM’. The research covers a period of transformation at the brownfield site
* Lecturer, Work and Organisational Studies, School of Business, The University of Sydney,
NSW 2006. Email: m.baird@econ.usyd.edu.au The author wishes to thank the reviewers for their
very helpful and instructive comments.
THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 44, NO. 3, SEPTEMBER 2002, 359–375
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that resulted in the dismantling of an industrial relationship built on multiunionism and collective bargaining, pluralism and adversarialism, and the introduction of an HCM model. By contrast, the greenfield site was entirely new,
and from the outset adopted an integrated bundle of employment policies and
practices that have come to be recognised as high commitment management.
Employment numbers at the greenfield site grew to approximately 115 and at
the brownfield site stabilised at around 150. Strategic recruitment and selection
strategies that emphasised personal initiative and adaptability, willingness to be
trained, and suitability for team work ensured that the majority of greenfield
employees were male, in their thirties and generally inexperienced in factory work.
By contrast, the employees at the brownfield site were older, experienced factory
workers and long term union members. In studying the two sites the comparison
is not like with like, but rather old with new, or, traditional IR with new human
resource management (HRM). If we are to see the difference for employees
between old IR and new HRM anywhere, we will see it in these two workplaces
which represented a typical brownfield site and an ‘ideal-type’ greenfield site
(Baird 2001).
This article is divided into three parts. Part one explains the methodology
adopted for the research. Part two provides both objective and subjective evaluations of the impact of HCM on employees. As the intention of the article is to
both analyse the objective data and explore in a more speculative way the impact
on employees of high commitment management, the article does not provide a
traditional chronological account or description of change at the two sites. Instead,
in the second part of the article, four themes are addressed under the titles of
changes, dangers, choice and voice. In the theme of changes, the article provides a
brief overview of the changes represented by the new HCM model, the significance of these changes and their resonance with contemporary HRM theory. The
second theme highlights the potential dangers of the high commitment model
for employees and unions. The third theme analyses the choices available to
employees under the new high commitment model at both the brownfield and
greenfield sites. In the fourth theme the opportunity for employees to express
their voice in the old and new systems is explored. In conclusion, the costs and
benefits for employees of the HCM system are briefly outlined and it is argued
that the HCM/IR dichotomy oversimplifies the complexity of employee
experience.
METHODOLOGY
The research and analysis presented in this article arises from a six-year case study
of organisational change. Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al. (1995: 13) have lamented
the fact that there are few detailed accounts of significant change programs at
the organisational level, yet, as they say, ‘it is only by tracing the twists and turns
in the change process that we can fully appreciate why the pathways to change
are so complex’. An appropriate way to trace such pathways and importantly,
where they lead, is through the case study. Case study methodology provides the
tools for in-depth study of ‘contemporary’, ‘real-life’ phenomena and allows for
the use of multiple sources of evidence (Yin 1984: 23).
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Both qualitative and quantitative methods were used in this case study. The
qualitative methods were extensive and included over one hundred structured
and semi-structured interviews with a wide range of managers, employees and
union officials at the two workplaces as well as senior managers at the company’s
headquarters in Australia and New York. The qualitative tools also included a
number of site visits and fieldwork, observation of workers and their work,
participation in work activities, training sessions and meetings. Additionally, to
provide contextual and historical information, company documents and archives
were closely examined.
The central feature of the company’s organisational change program was the
introduction of a high commitment work system. Accordingly, the quantitative
aspect of the research tested the organisational commitment levels of both managers and employees at each of the workplaces. However, it is the employees’
level of commitment with which this article is primarily concerned. Organisational
commitment levels were measured using the Mowday, Steers and Porter (1979)
Organisational Commitment Questionnaire (OCQ).1 The OCQ measures
commitment in relation to the Mowday et al. (1979: 226) definition: ‘[T]he
relative strength of an individual’s identification with and involvement in a
particular organisation’, which is characterised by three related factors, ‘a strong
belief in and acceptance of the organisation’s goals, a willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organisation, and a strong desire to maintain
membership of the organisation’.
Similarly, Walton incorporates these three dimensions in his conceptualisation
of organisational commitment (Walton 1980; 1982).
The nine item OCQ was used to measure organisational commitment levels
at both sites. To establish changes over time in organisational commitment at
the greenfield site, two data measurement points, with a fourteen month interval,
were used. To determine the significance of different organisational commitment
levels between the workplaces, occupational groups and time periods, independent t-tests of the mean organisational commitment levels were conducted. Over
the course of the three surveys, a total of 354 questionnaires were distributed
to employees and 240 were returned, representing a response rate of 68%.
Independence from the company and anonymity of responses was guaranteed
to all respondents.
The response format used a 7-point Likert scale with the anchors ranging
from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). The final commitment score is
an average of the responses to all the items. The highest possible score is therefore 7, interpreted as a very high level of organisational commitment; the lowest is 1, or very low commitment. As the responses to the questionnaires were
anonymous they could not be paired over the two time periods. Independent
t-tests were thus the most appropriate method to determine the statistical significance of the results.
The OCQ scores for production employees at the greenfield site were 5.6
(Time 1) and 5.1 (Time 2). At the brownfield site, which had a different job
classification system, production employees scored 5.1 and store employees’
commitment levels measured 3.3.2 In addition to measuring the aggregate
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levels of organisational commitment, employee responses to the individual items
were explored along each of the dimensions of organisational commitment
referred to in the definition; that is, loyalty to, effort for and continuance with
the organisation. On the basis of these answers, generic employee responses were
developed. These are called ‘organisational commitment profiles’ and provide a
more qualitative form of response from the employees.
In summary, the research for this particular case was longitudinal and comprehensive, providing rich and detailed information of a process of IR transformation and the implications for employees of the introduction of high commitment
management, albeit in one particular company. This raises one final issue with
regard to the case study methodology: to what extent can we generalise from
these results? One response must be that in a purely statistical sense generalisations cannot be made. What can be substantiated by the use of the empirical
material are the patterns and outcomes of change. If similar changes are reported
in other research, then wider conclusions can be drawn. The fact that to date
there has been little research on the employee’s experience of HRM and HCM
(Guest 1999), therefore making it difficult to generalise more widely than this
case study, raises important questions of researchers, rather than the generalisability of case study methodology. Finally, the case study necessitates the interpretation of observations and results, requiring the voice of the researcher to be heard.
It is recognised here that these conclusions are therefore, by virtue of the research
process and the subject matter, open for debate and further analysis.
EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF HIGH COMMITMENT MANAGEMENT ON
EMPLOYEES
Changes
This section commences with a review of the general characteristics of HCM
and its links with HRM. It goes on to focus on the HCM that was applied at the
case study greenfield site. The greenfield and brownfield sites are then compared
in terms of their HCM and IR characteristics, a process which serves to
highlight the significance of the HCM changes.
It is generally accepted that HRM is a distinctive approach to managing the
employment relationship and that it is supposed to impact positively on organisational performance, either directly or as a moderating influence (Snell & Dean
1996). The strategic HRM approach typically combines and integrates a set of
policies and practices ‘for the full and positive utilisation of human resources’
(Guest 1987: 506). These clusters or bundles of strategic HRM policies and
practices are usually designed to elicit high levels of organisational commitment
from employees. Consequently, HRM has become closely linked with characteristics associated with high performance work systems (HPWS) and HCM; so
much so that HRM is now often considered synonymous with HCM (Storey 1995;
Wood 1999). The emphasis in mainstream research has been on how policies
and practices associated with HCM or HPWS enhance employee performance,
reduce labour turnover and improve organisational performance and profitability
(Ichniowski 1990; Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1991; Arthur 1994; Huselid 1995;
MacDuffie 1995; Huselid & Becker 1996). In some cases, employee satisfaction
U N D E R S TA N D I N G W H AT H I G H C O M M I T M E N T M E A N S
363
has been included as the intervening variable (see for example, Berg 1999), but
much of this research has failed to demonstrate any interest in truly understanding
employee opinions and union reactions to the implementation of these new
systems.
The emphasis on organisational performance and commitment, rather than
commitment to unions for example, suggested that the orientation of HRM was
opposed to that of traditional IR, where one of the fundamental interests was
unionism. In apparent support of this distinction between IR and HRM, Guest
noted that within the HRM model ‘collective industrial relations have, at best,
only a minor role’ (Guest 1987: 503). Later, Guest and Hoque (1994: 2) also
argued that we should be ‘developing frameworks and dimensions which allow
us to study aspects of employment relations and HRM without distinctive
reference to the union issue’. Boxall and Dowling (1990) on the other hand, concluded that HRM and IR were complementary and that HRM was not ‘uniformly
anti-union’. Furthermore, they argued that HRM could contribute to IR theory
and research in understanding ‘management as an actor, enterprise-level
Table 1 Human resource management (HRM) policies and practices associated with
the high commitment management (HCM) model
HCM policies and practices*
Harmonised conditions between management and non-management employees
Single status for all employees
Trainability as a major selection criterion
Use of selection tests
Use of realistic job interviews
Formal system for communicating company values and systems to new staff
Deliberate development of learning organisation
Explicit requirement for annual minimum training time for all staff
Flexible job descriptions
Job design to use all skills and abilities
Team work for majority of staff
Production staff responsible for quality
Majority of workers involved in quality circles or similar
Regular use of attitude surveys
Formal, regular appraisal of all staff
Regular information sessions from management to shop floor
Provision of information about market position, company performance
Merit element in pay of all staff
Staff involvement in setting performance targets
Internal promotion as the norm
HRM policy deliberately integrated with business
HRM policies deliberately integrated with each other
* Features based on Guest and Hoque (1994).
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phenomena and direct management-employee relations’ (Boxall & Dowling
1990: 210). Ironically, given that all three aspects have received greater
attention from IR researchers, it is now time to incorporate the traditional
IR dimensions of collectivism, unionism and employee representation into
the study of HRM, especially where the emphasis is on HCM. Certainly,
this article seeks to do so, because it is argued that by excluding the ‘union
issue’ and other IR factors, one obtains only a partial understanding of the
implications for employees of organisational change and the introduction
of HCM.
Various authors have summarised the practices and policies associated with the
distinctive HRM model (see for example, Guest & Hoque 1994; Wood &
Albanese 1995). These practices and policies are listed in Table 1.
Given the discussion about the compatibility (or not) of IR and HRM, it is
notable that a number of traditional IR characteristics are absent from Table 1.
To overcome this omission, Table 2 provides a list of characteristics most
frequently associated with the traditional IR model. The case study reported in
this article explores the changes in both IR and HRM that result from the introduction of an HCM system. This is a more comprehensive approach to understanding the impact on employees than focusing on the introduction of HCM
practices alone, which tends to be the approach adopted in the majority of
studies.
During the 1980s the organisation under investigation sought to improve
market position, performance and profitability. The key to this, as management
saw it, was to change the way in which work was conducted and the way
workers were managed. To achieve this objective, they introduced an HCM
system, which was applied to all new greenfield sites owned by the company,
including the one referred to here. Over time, all the old brownfield sites owned
Table 2 Industrial relations characteristics associated with the traditional industrial
relations (IR) model
Characteristic
Union recognition
Multi-union site, or
Single union site
Demarcations on the basis of union membership, qualifications, etc.
Payroll deduction of union dues
Preference clause for unionists
Terms and conditions set by Award, or
Enterprise Bargaining Agreement
On-site union delegates
Union training for delegates
Meetings with delegates
Collective bargaining over wages and conditions
Use of tribunal for arbitration or conciliation of disputes
Table 3
The high commitment management (HCM) model at the greenfield and brownfield sites
HCM policies and practices
§
†
†
†
†
†
†
§
†
†
†
†
†
†
†
†
†
§
‡
†
†
†
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
365
† Yes; ‡ no; § partial. BF, brownfield site; GR, greenfield site; HRM, human resource management.
BF
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Harmonised conditions between management and non-management employees
Single status for all employees
Trainability as a major selection criterion
Use of selection tests
Use of realistic job interviews
Formal system for communicating company values and systems to new staff
Deliberate development of learning organisation
Explicit requirement for annual minimum training time for all staff
Flexible job descriptions
Job design to use all skills and abilities
Team work for majority of staff
Production staff responsible for quality
Majority of workers involved in quality circles or similar
Regular use of attitude surveys
Formal, regular appraisal of all staff
Regular information sessions from management to shop floor
Provision of information about market position, company performance
Merit element in pay of all staff
Staff involvement in setting performance targets
Internal promotion as the norm
HRM policy deliberately integrated with business
HRM policies deliberately integrated with each other
GF
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by the company were also to be retro-fitted with the HCM system. The new
system incorporated most of the practices referred to in the literature as HCM.
Tables 3 and 4 compare the HCM and IR practices present at the greenfield and
brownfield sites.
It is clear from Table 3 that the HCM system as practised at the greenfield
site aligns very closely with the contemporary HRM/HCM model. It is also clear
that many of the features of HCM were not present at the brownfield site. This
is to be expected given the age and tradition of the latter site. Essentially, the
HCM model was an advanced manufacturing system incorporating computerised
production systems, team work and extensive training, which significantly altered
the management and organisation of work. In this particular case, the HCM
system was introduced because it made sense in business terms, not because the
company had adopted a benevolent managerial philosophy. In the words of the
plant manager, the principal management advocate of the new system in the
company:
The [HCM] is not a social program to make people happy – it is a business driven
program. The objective is not to enhance the quality of workplace, that would give
a lack of focus on real issues. It is not about being nice guys and working well together,
although this is one of the end results. But the real reason for doing this is business
reasons – to help us to achieve our goals better. Another misguided objective is shared
responsibility and power. That would give a lack of direction, a manager must still
lead . . . people need direction up front (Interview, 4 June 1993).
Table 4 shows a slightly different, and perhaps unexpected, picture of the IR
features of the two sites. While it is evident that the IR features were more
Table 4
The industrial relations model at the greenfield and brownfield sites
Industrial relations policies and practices
GF
Union recognition
†
Multi-union site
‡
Single union site
†
Demarcations on the basis of union membership, qualifications, etc. ‡
Payroll deduction of union dues
†
Preference clause for unionists
†
Terms and conditions set by Award
‡
Terms and conditions set by Enterprise Bargaining Agreement
†
On-site union delegates
†
Union training for delegates
‡
Meetings with delegates
Yearly
Visits from union offices
Yearly
Collective bargaining over wages and conditions
§
Use of tribunal for arbitration or conciliation of disputes
‡
† Yes; ‡ no; § partial. BF, brownfield site; GF, greenfield site.
BF
†
† (14)
‡
†
†
†
†
‡
†
†
Often
Often
†
†
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367
common at the brownfield site than the greenfield site, it is also the case that
the greenfield site retained some features of the traditional model, such as a union
presence. The degree to which these IR features were, in practice, subverted by
the HCM practices at the greenfield site, however, is significant, so much so that
the distinction between the two sites in terms of IR experience was therefore
greater than the list suggests. As will become clear in the discussion that follows,
the difference in the IR experience between the two sites was very important to
management. Indeed, if the sites had not been clearly differentiated in terms
of IR, management would have been disappointed, since this was one of their
principal aims in establishing the new site. A comment from the plant manager
at the greenfield site that indicated the differing IR experience at the two sites
was: ‘We can try things out – it’s a free environment, and we couldn’t experiment
in a unionised environment’ (Interview, 14.7.1995). Yet, contrary to this
manager’s understanding, the greenfield site was fully unionised!
The comparison of the two sites demonstrates that the changes introduced by
the HCM system were significant. Given the extent of the changes, the implications for employees were potentially profound and in the following section the
dangers are explored.
Dangers
This section explores some of the dangers of the new system for the employees
and the unions at both the brownfield and greenfield sites. The process of
introducing the HCM system to the brownfield site involved two phases of
change: the first was a period marked by management ‘forcing’ change on
the employees; the second was characterised by management ‘fostering’ a new
relationship with employees. (For the theory of these change strategies see Walton
et al. 1994.) During the first phase and over a period of five years employee
numbers were halved from approximately 300 to 155. This was achieved through
redundancy, retrenchments and outsourcing of maintenance work. In the same
period, union presence on the site also changed dramatically. Fourteen separate
unions representing skilled, semi-skilled and technical occupations, were reduced
by management to five unions. Two of these unions dominated, one represented
general production workers, the other storemen and packers. The result of
these changes for workers was that jobs were lost, as were job rules, most
demarcations, occupational identity and status, union culture, and in all, a degree
of control over work. In addition, a significant amount of trust in management
was lost.
In the second phase of the introduction of the new system at the brownfield
site, management fostered a new relationship with the workforce and employees
were inundated with attention. Employees were involved in work organisation
design teams, factory simulations were conducted, as were attitude and motivation
surveys, education programs, and many, many meetings. The number of
meetings proved to be a concern for employees and led one production worker
to say: ‘I actually get worried, so much time is spent in meetings, it frightens
me – where will it end? Job security is on my mind’ (Interview, 1/8/94), and
another to comment that ‘they had more meetings than Harold Park!’3
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Towards the end of this second phase most demarcations had been removed,
workforce numbers were further reduced and just two unions remained. There
remained some suspicion among employees and union delegates about the
changes relating to HCM. These suspicions were summarised by one of the union
delegates in the following way:
There has been a lot of emphasis on trust recently, with management changing their
policy on some aspects of work. For example, the removal of the bundy clock, no
more checking of bags and giving the union delegates the authority to discipline
workers. Managers are also treating workers differently, as buddies rather than
bludgers. Sometimes it’s hard to accept this, it seems that managers are being
hypocritical. Some workers have been on interview panels, and in addition there
is a new uniform which is common for managers and workers alike, this makes
it harder to tell them apart. There appears to be a blending of managers with the
workers. These changes are all new, and unexpected, and there is some apprehension
amongst workers as to what it all means. It is felt that the changes have been too
fast and the turnaround too great, and that management have not laid all their cards
on the table (Interview, 2 May 1994).
At the same time, as the changes were being introduced at the brownfield site,
the greenfield site was being established. At this site the dangers for the
employees are not so obvious for the very fact that it was a greenfield site,
without a history and without an established set of customs and practices. The
dangers, for example, lie in what cannot be seen or measured, rather than in what
exists. These are issues which cannot be grasped by a purely positivist approach
or empirical methodology, and they require some understanding of alternative
or counter-factual experiences. This is why the introduction of HCM to the
brownfield site provides a valuable contrast to its implementation at the greenfield site. For instance, at the greenfield site and in contrast to the brownfield
site, there was not a strong union or delegate presence, there was virtually no
collective bargaining, employees generally did not negotiate work rules and there
were no voiced, alternative views. Instead, workplace principles and values were
ordained by the company, sophisticated selection procedures were used to exclude
the recalcitrant or uncommitted employee and teamwork was introduced which
removed demarcations and job distinctions, and provided the forum for issues
ranging from production and plant problems to pay.
To summarise, the dangers for employees which accompanied the introduction
of the HCM to the brownfield site included loss of jobs, rising insecurity and
uncertainty, and loss of union representation and job control. At the greenfield
site, the dangers are less obvious, but include stringent selection criteria, an
absence of collective involvement, a marginalised union and concomitant rise in
unilateral decision making by management.
Employee choice
This section provides a brief analysis of the choices available to the employees
at both the brownfield and greenfield sites. One needs to ask, what were the
choices for employees at the brownfield site? Was there an alternative to the
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introduction of the HCM system? On the one hand, employees knew that
they had experienced a long period of considerable bargaining strength and
industrial muscle and they were aware that their terms and conditions were in
the upper quartile for manufacturing in their region. On the other hand, they
had witnessed the closure of the company’s other brownfield site, they knew about
the greenfield site and they were told outright that there were no job openings
for them at the new site. This was consistent with the employment practices of
many greenfield sites (Hallier 2001). Furthermore, they knew through their
unions and the media of the changes occurring in other Australian workplaces
and that they worked for a large multinational that could move production
off-shore if necessary.
In the mid-1980s, things changed dramatically. Management began to adopt
different strategies, at first moving some employees to staff positions, cautiously
re-arranging work in head office and at the sites, and of course, opening the
greenfield site. Emboldened by their success, management moved on to more
drastic action. One Friday afternoon they sacked the entire maintenance staff
(considered the most militant group) and so removed six unions. The work was
contracted out and the remaining employees became concerned for their own
job security. Initially, the unions still on site and some of the employees resisted
negotiating the changes necessary to introduce the HCM system, but management pressed on. Some further re-organisation of work took place, new technology was introduced replacing some workers, more work was contracted out
and workforce numbers declined further. In the end, the industrial dilemma of
the late 20th century confronted the employees: accept the changes or lose the
jobs.
In these circumstances, what choice did the brownfield employees have?
Not surprisingly, they eventually accepted teamwork, the abolition of all
demarcations and the move to a single union site. They undertook training,
filled in staff surveys, negotiated an enterprise specific agreement, adopted new
selection criteria, accepted new pay scales, worked hard, did not strike and became
committed to the company.
At the greenfield site the IR situation was certainly less volatile, but one
must also ask if there were genuine choices for the employees there. Firstly,
management determined that a new labour force be engaged for the greenfield
site and that none of the brownfield employees be moved to the new site.4
Secondly, the location of the greenfield plant allowed the company to take
advantage of a comparatively soft labour market and implement strict selection
criteria. For instance, in one recruitment round there were 1500 responses to 22
advertised positions. Thirdly, during the selection process the company made
applicants clearly aware that they were seeking committed employees, in return
for good working conditions, above average pay, training opportunities and
implied job security. Fourthly, the company sought a single union agreement prior
to opening the plant, offered the union a closed shop and settled the terms and
conditions before employees were appointed. All employees were engaged on
the understanding that they would work in teams, share jobs and multi-skill. When
one considers this background, it would appear that in a number of areas such
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as work organisation, job choice and union membership, the choices open to
employees once they accepted the position were very limited.
Employee voice
In this section, the opportunity for employee voice throughout the change process
to the new system at the brownfield site and within the HCM system at the greenfield site is analysed. These comments are based on the qualitative research
at both sites but also draw on the results of surveys of employee commitment
conducted at the greenfield and brownfield sites.
The second phase of the change process initiated by management at the brownfield site emphasised employee involvement. Employees were invited to join the
Design Teams formed to discuss the way that work could be reorganised. Before
this, however, senior management had discussed the outcomes they desired for
the brownfield site at their Steering Committee meetings. The design teams were
constituted of managers and employees and they met on-site and occasionally
off-site. Their task was to present a proposal for change; they had no decision
making or negotiating role.
Apart from the Design Teams the other avenue for involvement was through
the unions. The number of unions had been reduced to two, and they decided
not to be involved (or implicated) in designing the changes, instead they preferred to wait until the proposals were on the table for negotiation. The union
delegates saw it as necessary to maintain some independence and were concerned
at what they saw happening to the employee members of the Design Teams. In
the words of one delegate:
You get invited to your neighbours for dinner, you get fed a nice meal and drink
some wine, and then after that, when you’ve eaten his meal, he says something you
don’t agree with, you don’t feel its appropriate to argue with your host. This is
the sort of thing that happened to the workers on the Design Teams (Interview,
21 March 96).
The first time the proposals were presented to all of the employees for a vote
they were rejected. Management felt the HCM system ‘was dead in the water’
at the brownfield site. After a short lull in management activity, however,
attention was once again returned to introducing the changes and by the end of
the year the company had achieved their goals at the brownfield site. Of the
remaining two unions on site, management removed one by offering generous
redundancies. With only one union, management could remove the remaining
demarcations and introduce teamwork throughout the production process.
At the greenfield site there were potentially two forums for employee voice:
the union and the team structure. As the union’s voice on site is relatively silent,
teams have become the main representative forums for the employees. The wages
team provided an interesting illustration of the representative process under
HCM. This team was formed after a dispute with employees over a wage increase
had almost occurred. In the third round of enterprise bargaining the union
attempted to become more active on the site by presenting a claim that
included a demand for a wage rise in excess of management’s original offer.
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The employees responded fairly positively to the union’s efforts. More importantly, in terms of the wages issue, employees felt that management had not
accorded them the recognition or involvement they expected, especially given
the rhetoric of the high commitment system in which they worked. Management
conceded that employees should have been more directly involved and in response
established a wages committee comprised of employees. The committee’s
brief was to conduct a wage survey of comparable business in their region. This
was conducted, the results reported back to the rest of the workforce and the
matter was settled. Through this process management dissipated employee
discontent, sidestepped the union and avoided a dispute.
It could be argued that by reacting this way management facilitated employee
involvement in the wage setting process, providing employees with the means
to become informed about comparative wage levels. The result therefore was a
positive procedural outcome for employees. However, it could also be argued
that this would not have occurred had the union not been present and activated
the issue in the first place. Ironically, the result for the union was that they were
marginalised from the bargaining process further. One could speculate that with
a fully marginalised union, or a non-union site, the outcome would be different.
Without the pressure from a union, even HCM does not guarantee employee
involvement in all matters, especially in matters where employee interests are
most likely to be different from those of the organisation.
While this account focuses on an analysis of wages it might be asked, as indeed
Guest does in this volume, what the employees thought about the other HCM
policies and practices at the site. We have some insight into this from the
surveys of employee’s organisational commitment levels. Employees at the
greenfield site were surveyed twice and those at the brownfield site once. As
discussed earlier in the article, in addition to providing an aggregate measure of
organisational commitment, organisational commitment profiles for employees
at the sites were developed. These profiles provide a form of employee voice,
and a more qualitative expression of the employees’ responses to the HCM model.
At the greenfield site, the typical response from production employees
presented a mixed view of their work experience under the HCM, and did not
suggest that high organisational commitment urged them to work harder. By
way of example, a response to one of the Organisational Commitment
Questionnaires was:
I am glad I chose to work here and I am generally proud to say I work for the
company. It is a good place to work and I care about the fate of the company. However,
I am not willing to put in as much effort as I was when I was first employed and I
feel that I am not performing to the best of my ability. I would not accept any job
just to stay. I find my values and those of the company are less and less similar and
I no longer feel it is the best of all possible organisations for which to work.
This profile suggests a growing level of dissatisfaction with HCM at the site, a
conclusion supported also by the decreasing OCQ scores. In the fourteen-month
interval between the two surveys at the greenfield site, the employee’s OCQ
score dropped significantly from 5.6 to 5.1 (P