Directory UMM :Data Elmu:jurnal:J-a:Journal Of Business Research:Vol47.Issue2.2000:

Effect of a Buy-National Campaign
on Member Firm Performance
Graham D. Fenwick
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY

Cameron I. Wright
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY

Country of origin (COO) effects on consumer purchasing processes have
been studied extensively, but the effectiveness of using this cue to encourage
buying of domestically produced goods is poorly understood. The performance of firms belonging to the Buy New Zealand-Made Campaign over
its first 5 years is compared with that of nonparticipating firms in four
industries. Annual sales and staff numbers changed over the period, but
differences between campaign members and nonmembers within each
industry were not significant. These findings are discussed in terms of
benefits to and attributes of member and nonmember firms and consumer
responses to buy-national campaigns. J BUSN RES 2000. 47.135–145.
 1999 Elsevier Science Inc.

T

he role of country of origin information in consumer
decision processes has attracted intense interest from
researchers (e.g. Bilkey and Nes, 1982; Wall, Liefeld,
and Heslop, 1991; Ozsomer and Cavusgil, 1991; Peterson
and Jolibert, 1995), and some workers identified practical
implications of their findings (e.g. Ahmed and d’Astous,
1993). However, given the volume of research on this issue,
there have been remarkably few attempts to apply this knowledge, perhaps because of the complex and confusing relationship that has emerged between country of origin (COO) information and consumer decision processes. Among the more
visible application of COO information are the buy-national
campaigns established in the U.S.A., Canada, Germany, Australia, and New Zealand. The extent to which these initiatives
were based on research findings or simply relied on some
patriotic appeal is uncertain. A few studies sought to understand the effects of these campaigns in changing attitudes and
behaviors of their target consumers, but none examined the
benefits accruing to firms sponsoring the campaigns. This

Address correspondence to Dr. Graham D. Fenwick, Department of Management, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand.
E-mail: g.fenwick@mang.canterbury.ac.nz
Journal of Business Research 47, 135–145 (2000)
 1999 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
655 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10010

research investigates the effect of the Buy New Zealand-Made
Campaign (BNZM) on performance of member firms over a
6-year period from just prior to the campaign’s launch.

COO Effects on Consumers
Despite the substantial academic attention given to COO effects on consumer purchasing processes, it has yielded few
unequivocal generalizations for practical application in marketing. Largely, this is because of methodological problems
with several of the earlier studies (Bilkey and Nes, 1982;
Ozsomer and Cavusgil, 1991), but considerable progress has
been made following successive reviews and refocusing of
research. Some key points on COO effects are summarized here.
The image of products from some countries is very positive,
but negative for others, and this image tends to extend across
products and product categories as stereotypes (Ozsomer and
Cavusgil, 1991; Wall, Liefeld, and Heslop, 1991; Lawrence,
Marr, and Prendergast, 1992; Ahmed and d’Astous, 1995;
Andaleeb, 1995; Chao and Gupta, 1995). These COO perceptions may change over time (Ozsomer and Cavusgil, 1991).
Furthermore, it seems that COO product images usually are
not influenced by nationalistic preferences of consumers, although such biases do exist for some industrial markets (Ozsomer and Cavusgil). Consumer nationality does affect product ratings, but these ratings do not necessarily reflect biases in

favor of domestically produced products (Johansson, Douglas,
and Nonaka, 1985; Papadopoulos, Heslop, and Beracs, 1990;
Cattin, Jolibert, and Lohnes, 1982), contrary to earlier studies
(Reierson, 1966; Nagashima, 1970). Also notable is that, although consumers’ attitudes toward domestically produced
goods may be more positive (Dickerson, 1982; Wall and Heslop, 1986; Peris, Newman, Bigne, and Chansarkar, 1993),
they may be negative (Johannson, Douglas, and Nonaka, 1985;
Kaynak and Cavusgil, 1983). Different demographic groups
may have quite different responses to COO cues (Lillis and
ISSN 0148-2963/00/$–see front matter
PII S0148-2963(98)00045-9

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Narayama, 1974; Johansson, Douglas, and Nonaka, 1985;
Lawrence, Marr, and Prendergast, 1992; Chao and Rajendran,
1993). In some circumstances, normative influences, especially social pressures in specific market segments, may result
in COO becoming an important influence on consumer decision-making (Ozsomer and Cavusgil, 1991).

COO cues tend to have the greatest effect on product
evaluations for consumers with little or no product familiarity,
where the COO cues serve as indicators of quality (Cattin,
Jolibert, and Lohnes, 1982; Eroglu and Machliet, 1989; Elliot
and Cameron, 1994), and there is a positive relationship between perceived product quality and the economic development of the COO (Gaedeke, 1973). Subsequent research indicates that COO cues are used more by consumers with higher
product familiarity. Together, these findings indicate that
COO provides a halo from which consumers infer beliefs
about unfamiliar products; whereas, country image summarizes consumers’ beliefs about product attributes for familiar
products (Han, 1989; Mahesaran, 1994). Normally, the COO
cue is just one of many extrinsic product cues, and significant
interaction with these other cues has been reported (Johansson, Douglas, and Nonaka, 1989; Thorelli, Lim, and Ye, 1989;
Ozsomer and Cavusgil, 1991). However, the effect of COO
on consumer evaluations of product quality is greater than
the effect of brand name for consumers in some countries
with some products, but the opposite is true for consumers
in other countries when considering the same products (Ahmed
and d’Astous, 1993). The distinctive aspects of some COO
images are generalized across product categories (Cattin, Jolibert, and Lohnes, 1982). Closer examination revealed that
COO influences evaluations of specific product dimensions
rather than overall product ratings (Johansson, Douglas, and

Nonaka, 1985; Strutton, True, and Rody, 1995) and that COO
effects vary between dimesions of the same product. The
relative size of the effect of different cues varies between
dimensions of the same product (Ozsomer and Cavusgil,
1991).
COO is just one of several different product dimensions
used in the consumer purchasing decision process and tradeoffs between COO and other attributes are usual (Lee, Kim,
and Miller, 1992). Meta analysis of COO effects revealed that,
across all studies, COO explained 26% of the variance in
consumer responses (Peterson and Jolibert, 1995). Okechuku’s (1994) and Peris, Newman, Bigne, and Chansarkar’s
(1993) empiricial studies confirmed the relative importance
of COO for different product categories across consumers in
different countries. Importantly, COO explained more (30%)
of the variance in consumer evaluations of product quality/
reliability, but less (19%) of the variance in consumer purchase
intentions, indicating that COO cues are less important in
purchasing decisions and that more intervening variables are
involved in getting to this stage in the decision process (Lim,
Darley, Summers, 1994; Peterson and Jolibert, 1995).

G. D. Fenwick and C. I. Wright

Buy-National Campaigns
Most buy-national campaigns are launched with the intention
of generating a patriotic bias for buyers to select domestically
manufactured goods, and, thus, increase the sales of domestic
goods relative to imported goods (Elliot and Cameron, 1994).
These campaigns are usually established and funded largely
by the domestic manufacturing industries (e.g. the Made in
the USA Campaign was sponsored by a group of U.S. textile
and apparel suppliers [Ettenson, Wagner, and Gaeth, 1988]),
although some government assistance may be involved. Two
campaigns, the Buy Canadian and Buy Australian-Made, were
instigated by their respective governments (Ettenson, Wagner,
and Gaeth, 1998; Elliot and Cameron, 1994).
The Buy New Zealand-Made (BNZM) Campaign was established jointly by the New Zealand Manufacturers Federation
(NZMF) and the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions with
no financial support from government. Its specific objective
is to “influence the attitudes and, therefore, the purchasing
behaviour of mainstream New Zealanders to favour New

Zealand made goods over foreign made goods” (Garland,
Burra, and Newman, 1991, p.6). Initially, the Campaign was
intended to protect domestic manufacturers from rapidly increasing imported goods following extensive deregulation of
New Zealand’s trade. The Campaign operates as a separate
entity within the umbrella of the NZMF. Its primary activities
have involved various major national television advertising
campaigns and promotions (over $NZ4 million by 1991)
aimed at encouraging consumers and industrial buyers to buy
domestically manufactured goods (Buy New Zealand-Made
Campaign, 1991).
An academic investigation of the Campaign’s effect on grocery shoppers found that 27% of consumers made a conscious
effort to buy N.Z.-made items and carried this out by spending
significantly less on significantly fewer imported grocery items
than other respondents (n 5 96, Garland and Coy, 1993).
Note, however, that consumers who reported consciously buying N.Z.-made bought fewer grocery items and spent less on
groceries, on average, than did respondents making no such
claim (Garland and Coy, 1993). On this basis, it is uncertain
whether the BNZM Campaign can be deemed successful.
Research evaluating the performance of other buy-national
campaigns is scant and similarly inconclusive. Anecdotal reports concluded that these campaigns are effective (e.g. Cedrone, 1991; Sheehy, 1988; Chao and Rajendran, 1993);

whereas, others indicate the opposite (Ettenson, Wagner, and
Gaeth, 1988; Liefeld, 1991; Wall and Heslop, 1986), apparently, in part, because consumers often could not identify a
product’s country of origin (Wall and Heslop, 1986; Showers
and Showers, 1993). One of the few rigorous investigations
of a buy-national campaign, other than the BNZM Campaign,
is Ettenson, Wagner, and Gaeth’s (1988) pre–post design consumer survey examining the effect of the Made in the USA
Campaign’s television campaign over its first 4 months. The
study concluded that the Campaign had no effect on the

Effect of Buy-National Campaign

decisions of most participants (n 5 55) and that the importance of “made in the USA” reported in previous studies was
probably “a consequence of participants wanting to respond
in a socially desirable manner” (Ettenson, Wagner, and Gaeth,
1988). In an experimental approach with special reference to
the Buy Australian Campaign, Elliot and Cameron (1994)
concluded that, although COO is generally of low importance
in the purchase decision process, its “effects generally and
‘Buy Local’ campaigns in particular, are indeed potentially
important influences on consumers’ purchase decision making

behaviour” (Elliot and Cameron, 1994, p. 59). A more recent
study considered consumer perceptions of “made in USA.”
This COO cue was found to be not important for consumers
considering either simple, familiar or complex, unfamiliar
products (Maronick, 1995). The study concluded that adding
“made in USA” to an advertisement or label does not ensure
more positive beliefs about a product or its quality (Maronick,
1995).
Thus, the very little empirical evidence available on the
effectiveness of buy-national campaigns is quite inconclusive.
Research on COO effects offers no clearer answers, suggesting
that the effect of a buy-national campaign is likely to be small,
at best, and dependent upon the characteristics of the country
concerned and the segments targeted. Consequently, the expected effect of the BNZM Campaign during the late 1980s
to early 1990s is uncertain. At that time, the New Zealand
manufacturing industry was emerging from a period of heavy
government protectionism, which had induced a strong production focus within most sectors (Crocombe, Enright, and
Porter, 1991). New Zealand-made goods tended to be relatively lower in quality than equivalent imported goods, with
competition primarily on price (Crocombe, Enright, and Porter, 1991; Wooding, 1993). Foreign-made goods were, therefore, often preferred by consumers over their domestic equivalents.
As a result of the increased availability of superior foreignmade goods at increasingly competitive prices as tariffs were

progressively withdrawn and a logical consumer preference for
these, many domestic manufacturers faced major difficulties
adjusting to the new international competition within local
markets. Many retrenched, and others failed (Hamilton and
Shergill, 1993). These retrenchments and failures within manufacturing, along with major restructuring and a focus on
increased efficiencies through the use of more technology and
increased labor productivity, caused substantial job losses and
high unemployment (Statistics New Zealand, 1993; Hamilton
and Shergill, 1993; Clark and Williams, 1995) in the period
leading up to the BNZM Campaign and during its early years.
These problems were exacerbated by the 1987 share market
crash, which hit New Zealand particularly severely (Crocombe, Enright, and Porter, 1991).
What significant effects was the BNZM Campaign likely to
have within this environment? Prior research on the effects
of buy-national campaigns focusing on changes to attitudes,

J Busn Res
2000:47:135–145

137

purchasing intentions, and purchasing behavior toward domestically produced goods, was generally inconclusive because of difficulties obtaining sufficiently large sample sizes
and/or because of problems associated with the extent to
which attitudes and intentions translate into behavior. Given
the limited success of these studies and the intention of most
buy-national campaigns to assist member firms, a different
approach is taken here. This investigation examines the effect
of the BNZM Campaign on member firms using a pre–post,
matched group design spanning prelaunch and the Campaign’s first 5 years. As such, this seems to be the first investigation of the effects of a buy-national campaign on participating
businesses.
The true test of a campaign is whether it imbues its participants with a distinct advantage so that their performance
increases over time relative to the performance of nonparticipants over the same period. Within a business, the possession
of competitive advantage is usually evident in profitability and
sales, although sales do not necessarily equate to profits. For
the purposes of this investigation, sales is a better and more
immediate measure of the Campaign’s effectiveness than is
profitability, because numerous internal, company-specific
factors may intervene between sales revenues obtained and
profits realized. Thus, sales is the primary dependent variable
of interest here and is operationalized as the percentage change
in sales each year relative to the pre-Campaign (1987) sales.
Changes in employee numbers is a second dependent variable included in this study, primarily because the Campaign
explicitly sought to influence national levels of unemployment
(Campaign labels during this period read “‘BUY N.Z. MADE’ &
Keep Your Country Working”) (Buy New Zealand Made Campaign, 1991) through members’ retention or acquisition of
staff. This assumes a generally positive relationship between
sales and employee numbers for firms within a given industry.
If successful, the Campaign would be expected to increase
sales for member firms over the period of the Campaign,
which, in turn, would generate a need for retaining or acquiring more employees than in equivalent firms that do not
participate in the Campaign. It must be noted, however, that
employee numbers is expected to be a less sensitive and less
reliable indicator of the Campaign’s success because several
internal, firm-specific factors are likely to intervene between
sales and its need for employees. Thus, firms with similar
levels of sales within the same industry could, conceivably,
have different numbers of employees, especially if their manufacturing technologies differ appreciably.

Methodology
The approach taken here was to evaluate the effectiveness of
the Buy New Zealand-Made Campaign from the perspective
of its members in terms of both its influence on the performance of these member firms and its stated aim (to “keep
New Zealand working”). Thus, a time series experimental

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G. D. Fenwick and C. I. Wright

Table 1. Numbers of Buy NZ-Made Campaign Member and Nonmember Firms in Each Industry Sent Questionnaires and Returning
Completed Questionnaires
Members
Industry

Table 2. Mean Staff Numbers for Buy NZ-Made Campaign Member
and Nonmember Firms During the Study Period (t-values Corrected
for Unequal Variances)

Nonmembers

1987

Sample

Responses

Sample

Responses

Membership

Mean

Apparel
Furniture
Food
Engineering

129
108
60
60

26
18
12
14

80
80
80
80

12
5
5
5

Members
Nonmembers

45.86
99.29
61
44.26
75.50
26
t 5 2.07, dfs 5 85,
p 5 0.942

Total
Response

357

70

320

19.6%

SD

1992
n

Mean

SD

n

41.22
72.39
70
37.30
69.96
28
t 5 2.25, dfs 5 51.39,
p 5 0.805

27
8.4%

design was employed. Four industries with more than 50 firms
belonging to the Campaign were identified as appropriate for
examination (Table 1). A census of these firms was attempted
giving a total treatment sample of 357 independent businesses.
A further 320 firms among these four industries were selected
randomly from the NZMF database and included in the study
as nonmember controls.
A one page, self-administered questionnaire comprising
nine questions was mailed to all firms. The mailing included
a reply-paid envelope, a nonpersonalized covering letter on
Campaign letterhead signed by the Director of the Campaign
and an entry form for a prize draw offering $200 toward
Campaign membership or merchandise. Concerns over the
confidentiality of responses raised during pretesting and preliminary discussions precluded numbering of questionnaires.
This meant that no follow-up mailings were possible. The
questionnaire requested numbers of employees, Campaign
membership, domestic sales, and promotional expenditure
for the years 1987 (one year prior to the Campaign’s commencement) to 1992. To reduce sensitivity and maximize
response rates, the two potentially sensitive variables, annual
domestic sales and promotional expenditure, were requested
as percentages of respondent’s 1987 values. Two simple worksheets, each clearly stating that these were not to be returned
with the questionnaire, were included to ensure correct calculation of these two variables.
Thus, the study’s design enables examination of the effect
of the Campaign on member firms by comparing 1987 and
1992 figures for two dependent variables: percentage change
in domestic sales and change in numbers of staff. Investigation
of concomitant changes in nonmember firms from the same
industries provide a control for unrelated changes in firms in
these industries over this period of economic change in New
Zealand.

Results
Respondent Firms
Staff size frequency distributions of NZMF members and all
NZ manufacturers generally (Statistics New Zealand, 1993)

were essentially identical (Chi-square 5 0.005, dfs 5 4, p ,
0.99), but both differed significantly from the size frequency
of BNZM Campaign members overall (Chi-square 5 132.8–
133.2, dfs 5 4, p , 0.001). This difference was attributable
to substantial under-representation of small (1–5 staff) firms
among BNZM Campaign members.
A total of 98 valid responses was received giving a response
rate of 15% overall. However, small firms (1–9 staff) were
under-represented among respondents for both nonmembers
and members of the Campaign, compared with all NZ manufacturers (Chi-square 5 210.0–223.0, dfs 5 4, p , 0.001)
and NZMF members (Chi-square 5 209.9–224.2,
dfs 5 4, p , 0.001). In addition, although staff size frequency
distributions of all Campaign member firms and responding
member firms did not differ significantly (Chi-square 5 8.61,
dfs 5 4, p 5 0.07), there were conspicuously fewer smaller
firms among respondents relative to the Campaign membership overall (30.5% cf. 40.1% of members overall). Thus,
not only were smaller firms under-represented within the
Campaign generally, but they were also under-represented
among responding member (not at a statistically significant
level) and nonmember firms.
Size frequencies of member and nonmember respondents
were equivalent (Chi-square 5 .345, dfs 5 1, p 5 0.56).
However, the average size of BNZM member respondents
was substantially (but not significantly) smaller than that of
nonmembers at both the beginning (t 5 5.97, dfs 5 23.8,
p 5 0.340) and end (t 5 0.91, dfs 5 26.2, p 5 0.371) of
the period investigated. Closer examination of the data reveals
that one large (. 1,500 staff) nonmember respondent unduly
influenced these figures. Its removal produced essentially
equivalent mean sizes for responding and nonmember firms
(Table 2).
Together, these observations show that nonmember and
member respondents were equivalent to each other in terms
of size frequencies and mean numbers of staff. They also show
that both samples under-represented small firms compared
with their parent populations. This effect may have been overcome by matched elimination, but the consequent gains in
representativeness and external validity would not offset concomitant losses in statistical power because of further reduc-

Effect of Buy-National Campaign

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139

Table 3. Frequencies (%) of Different Sizes of Staff Changes and Domestic Sales for Campaign Member and Nonmember Firms During the
Study Period
Staff Numbers Changes
Change
.250%
211 to 250%
210 to 110%
111 to 150%
.150%
n

Members

Domestic Sales Changes

Nonmembers

8
29
22
14
27
28
Chi-square 5 2.11, dfs 5 4, p

tion in the sample size. The implications of this under sampling of smaller firms are considered below.

Overall Changes in Staff Number and
Domestic Sales
Staff numbers increased and decreased by more than 100%
in both representative member and nonmember firms over
the Campaign’s first 5 years (Table 3). More member firms
(37%) than nonmember firms (29%) experienced decreases
in staff exceeding 10%, and more nonmembers (50%) than
members (41%) experienced increases in staff numbers by
more than 10% (Table 3). However, the frequencies of such
changes were not significantly different between members and
nonmembers over the period.
Staff numbers over this initial period of the Campaign
increased for 49% of respondent firms, decreased for 39%,
and remained unchanged for the other 12%. Mean sizes and
variation of both groups decreased during the period. The
mean size of nonmember firms decreased more dramatically
than for member firms (Table 2), but these changes were
not significant (members: t 5 0.52, dfs 5 60, p 5 0.603;
nonmembers: t 5 1.13, dfs 5 25, p 5 0.269). These decreases
in mean sizes were attributable to reductions in numbers of
staff and not to any large firms withdrawing from the Campaign; the only respondent firms to discontinue membership
were five that each joined for only 1 of the intervening years.
Mean changes convey little, because of the very wide range
of these changes reported: staff number changes, 2100 to
1400%; domestics sales, 277 to 2900%. Much of this variation is attributable to just three firms, with variation of most
firms within a narrower range. Thus, these three outliers were
removed from subsequent analysis, because their extreme
growth in staff numbers and domestic sales unduly influenced
the results. These outliers grew from start-up operations comprising 1–2 staff in 1987 to firms of 6–16 staff by 1992. Two
of these firms were food manufacturers and the other an
apparel manufacturer. Thus, they differed substantially from
other firms only in their extreme values for one or both of
changes in staff numbers or changes in domestic sales.

4
25
21
21
29
51
5 0.7

Members

Nonmembers

2
18
20
17
43
51
Chi-square 5 8.09, dfs 5 4, p

0
28
17
31
24
29
5 0.1

Repetition of the above comparisons with outliers excluded
results in no appreciable changes. For example, changes in
staff numbers over the 5 years remained not significant for
both members and non-members.
Whereas more member firms than nonmembers experienced decreases in staff numbers, the trend was reversed for
domestic sales: decreases exceeding 10% were observed in
more nonmembers (28%) than members (20%) (Table 3).
Domestic sales decreased by over 10% for relatively more
nonmembers (28%) than members (20%). Similarly, relatively
more members (43%) than nonmembers (24%) reported domestic sales increases of 50% or more. These differences between members and nonmembers are not statistically significant and there are no consistent trends.
The most common reasons given for changes in staff numbers were increases/decreases in sales (including exports), increased imports, the economy, and increased efficiency (Table
4). Marketing, quality/service focus, and product development
were the most frequently cited reasons for increased domestic
sales; whereas, the economy and increased imports were most
commonly perceived as the causes of decreased domestic sales.
Notable among these is that the economy was believed responsible for both increases and decreases in staff numbers and
sales. Also notable is that reasons given for increases in sales
were marketing-related; whereas, those given for decreased
sales suggest an inability to adjust to the new marketing environment postderegulation.

Industry-Specific Changes
Further analysis was confined to correlation analysis and t-tests
because of the relatively small sample sizes, the uneven distribution of firms among the industry-Campaign membership
treatments and the unequal variances of the different groups.
There were no correlations between the independent variables
(except the highly significant correlation between membership
and number of years as a member [Chi-square 5 78.62,
dfs 5 5, p , 0.001]), and neither industry nor Campaign
membership was correlated with the dependent variables.
However, both dependent variables were significantly corre-

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G. D. Fenwick and C. I. Wright

Table 4. Frequencies (%) of Reasons Given for Changes in Staff Numbers and Domestic Sales for Responding Firms
Staff Numbers
Reason

Increases

Increased sales
Increased exports
Firm expansion
The economy
Increased imports
Vertical integration
Decreased sales
Increased efficiency
Marketing
Quality and service focus
Product development
Buy NZ-Made Campaign
Decreased demand
Other
n

57
20
14
12
8
6

Domestic Sales
Decreases

Increases

Decreases

26
29

19

48
48

24
18
40
21
18
11
61
49

53
38

lated with each other (r 5 0.495, n 5 80, p , 0.001) and
with change in domestic promotion (sales change: r 5 0.282,
n 5 74, p 5 0.015; staff change: r 5 0.518, n 5 68, p ,
0.001).
The effect of the Campaign on staff numbers for firms in
each industry over its first 5 years was examined by comparing:
(1) changes in staff numbers experienced by members and
nonmembers (M2 5 M1 3 N2 2 N1); and (2) changes in mean
sizes within each group (members and nonmembers) over the
time of the Campaign (M1 3 M2; N1 3 N2). Two additional
comparisons served as controls: (1) differences between mem-

29
39
31

69
62

bers and nonmembers prior to the Campaign (M1 3 N1); (2)
differences between members and nonmembers in 1992 after
the Campaign had run for 5 years (M2 3 N2).
In all industries, there were appreciable differences in mean
numbers of staff between member and nonmember firms prior
to the Campaign’s commencement (Table 5). However, these
differences were not significant (t-test corrected for unequal
variances as needed, p 5 0.33 2 .72), except for the furniture
sector (t 5 22.65, dfs 5 16.88, p 5 0.017), largely because
of the wide variation within each group (Table 5), despite the
exclusion of three outliers. Similarly, the only sector exhibiting

Table 5. Comparisons of Staff Numbers for Members and Nonmembers at the Beginning and End of the Period Investigated
1987

Apparel
Members M
Non-members N
Furniture
Members M
Non-members N
Food
Members M
Non-members N
Industrial
Members M
Non-members N

1992

Mean (A)

SD

27.30

36.40

246.64
38.19
10.60
92.22
177.33
62.75
35.60

n

Mean (B)

22
28.76
MA 3 MB: t 5 .39, dfs 5 21, p 5 0.702
715.29
11
143.33
NA 3 NB: t 5 1.08, dfs 5 10, p 5 0.304
40.30

16
34.47
MA 3 MB: t 5 .25, dfs 5 15, p 5 0.808
5.98
5
10.50
NA 3 NB: t 5 1.01, dfs 5 5, p 5 0.357

169.71

9
90.00
MA 3 MB: t 5 2.55, dfs 5 8, p 5 0.598
151.93
3
148.00
NA 3 NB: t 5 .18, dfs 5 2, p 5 0.877
157.74

12
37.50
MA 3 MB: t 5 .92, dfs 5 11, p 5 0.378
61.30
5
18.40
NA 3 NB: t 5 .88, dfs 5 5, p 5 0.421

SD

n

34.33

25

419.69

12

29.68

18

6.40

5

150.87

11

147.55

4

66.95

14

18.17

5

Note: degrees of freedom differ between some tests because tests between years use matched pairs only. M, members; N, nonmembers; A, 1987; B, 1992.

Effect of Buy-National Campaign

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141

Table 6. Mean Changes in Staff Numbers and Domestic Sales (%) for Member and Nonmember Firms in Each Industry Over the Period
1987–1992
Change in Staff Numbers
Mean
Apparel
Members
Non-members
Furniture
Members
Non-members
Food
Members
Non-members
Engineering
Members
Non-members

SD

Change in Domestic Sales (%)
n

22.71
32.65
22
290.73
277.59
11
t 5 21.05*, dfs 5 10.14, p 5 0.319

Mean

SD

68.30
138.72
111.60
286.97
t 5 2.59, dfs 5 31, p 5 0.560

n
23
10

21.16
18.68
23.08
7.45
t 5 2.24, dfs 5 20, p 5 0.811

16
6

37.40
23.75
t 5 .34,

75.09
54.58
dfs 5 17, p 5 0.740

15
4

13.00
70.98
29.67
95.49
t 5 2.44, dfs 5 10, p 5 0.666

9
3

36.33
34.00
t 5 .11,

35.29
35.53
dfs 5 11, p 5 0.915

9
4

223.08
86.96
214.33
40.11
t 5 2.23, dfs 5 16, p 5 0.820

12
6

37.00
26.20
t 5 .32,

69.69
41.59
dfs 5 15, p 5 0.753

12
5

* test corrected for unequal variances.

significant differences between members and nonmembers in
1992 was furniture (t 5 23.17, dfs 5 20.70, p 5 0.005).
Thus, furniture was the only sector in which staff numbers
differed with membership, indicating that any significant effect
of membership observed for firms in this sector could equally
be attributable to size differences.
Staff numbers over the period investigated decreased for
both members and nonmembers of all sectors (except Campaign members within the apparel industry). However, although these changes over time were large in many cases, none
was significant. Comparing changes in mean staff numbers for
members and nonmembers over the period (Table 6) revealed
no significant effect of membership here also. Replication of
these analyses using firms that had belonged to the Campaign
for 2 or more years only yielded some differences in mean
values, but consistently nonsignificant t-values. Thus, membership in the Campaign had no significant effect on staff
numbers for firms in these sectors of manufacturing over the
first 5 years of the Buy New Zealand-Made Campaign.
Equivalent tests on changes in domestic sales are not possible, because this variable was measured as percentage changes
only. Differences in mean percentage changes within each
sector over the time period were not significant (Table 6). It
is, however, notable that, although not significant, all changes
were positive and that these increases were greater for members than for nonmembers in three of the four manufacturing
sectors (Table 6).

Discussion
The 15% response rate to this survey was low, but members
responded at double the rate of nonmembers. It is uncertain

whether this increased response rate among members was
attributable to their membership itself or to the predominance
of larger firms among members relative to nonmembers. Campaign members were more likely to respond than nonmembers
because of their direct interest and financial stake in the Campaign. Nonmembers had already rejected the Campaign as a
worthwhile opportunity for their own business and, thus, had
no incentive to respond. On the other hand, larger firms,
which were more frequent among members, probably respond
to such surveys more readily than smaller firms, because the
relative effort required to handle these enquires is insignificant
for large firms, but more significant for small firms.
Overall, these data indicate no significant effect of the Buy
New Zealand-Made Campaign on member firms in terms of
the Campaign’s stated objective of retaining employees in
manufacturing, nor in terms of increasing domestic sales of
members relative to those of nonmembers. There is, however,
limited, nonsignificant evidence to suggest that the Campaign
did have benefits for members that may have been statistically
significant with larger samples to overcome the effects of high
variation among responding firms. The overall mean size of
member firms decreased (10.1%) substantially less than the
concomitant decrease in mean size of nonmember firms
(15.7%). More nonmembers (28%) than members (20%) experienced decreases in domestic sales, and more members
(43%) than nonmembers (24%) achieved domestic sales increases exceeding 50% of 1987 sales by 1992. Mean decreases
in staff numbers were more severe for nonmembers in three
sectors and increases in domestic sales were greater for members in three sectors.
The full extent of these and other positive changes conceivably attributable to Campaign membership were probably

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obscured by the undersampling of small firms (1–9 staff),
which are often young and growing, for two reasons. First,
small firms’ brands are usually poorly known compared with
those of larger firms manufacturing equivalent products, because of the disparities in firms’ promotional efforts. COO
labeling, therefore, seems likely to have the greatest effect on
unfamiliar brands, simply because it adds a patriotic appeal
to enhance the brand’s attractiveness (Cordell, 1992). Second,
the small increments in sales or additions of just one or two
staff anticipated by the Campaign (e.g., Buy New ZealandMade Campaign, 1991), would add substantially to a small
firm, but little to a larger firm, especially when these absolute
increments are reported as percentages. Consequently, this
study’s undersampling of small firms probably means that
the Campaign’s effectiveness is underestimated, because these
smaller firms were probably those most sensitive to the Campaign’s activities.
Although it is tempting to suggest that such benefits would
be statistically significant given larger samples, it is debatable
whether these benefits are attributable to membership per se,
or to some underlying factors that are manifested, in part,
through the act of joining the BNZM Campaign. Indeed, there
is some evidence suggesting that member firms are more
marketing focused and less product/production focused than
nonmember firms: most member firms gave eight marketing
activity-related reasons for changes in their staff numbers
(74.0%) and domestic sales (77.8%); whereas, fewer nonmembers attributed their changes in these variables to just three
marketing-related factors (43.4% and 47.7% respectively).
Thus, the Campaign may have attracted firms that were better
marketers and would perform better than average for their
industries, regardless of the Campaign.
There is scant information on the effectiveness of buynational campaigns. In the most rigorous study, Ettenson,
Wagner, and Gaeth (1988) concluded that the Made in the
USA Campaign had not resulted in any significant increase
in purchasing of US-made apparel. Thus, they concluded that
retailers should use patriotic themes in promotion with caution (Ettenson, Wagner, and Gaeth). Liefeld (1991) reported
that neither the Made in the USA nor the Buy Canadian
Campaigns had produced any significant increases in sales of
domestically manufactured goods. The present study, therefore, reiterates Ettenson, Wagner, and Gaeth’s conclusion that
the benefits of patriotic themes in promotion are uncertain.
The lack of any significant effect of Campaign membership
on firm performance can be considered in light of research
on COO effects on consumer behavior. The Campaign sought
to improve the performance of member firms by means of
changing aspects of consumers’ purchasing behavior. Specifically, the Campaign sought to increase awareness of COO
as a purchase decision-making criterion and to increase the
importance of this to consumers personally by establishing a
link between buying New Zealand-made goods and maximizing local employment. Implicit within the Campaign was the

G. D. Fenwick and C. I. Wright

notion that consumers would play an important role in maximizing employment and enhancing national economic conditions by buying domestically made products and, thus, benefit
personally in the medium term.
Peterson and Jolibert (1995) concluded from their metaanalysis that the COO effect was “somewhat generalizable,”
because the COO cue explains a considerable amount of the
variance in perceptions of product quality/reliability (30% on
average) and a lesser amount (19% on average) of the variance
in purchase intentions. Drawing on prior consumer behavior
research, they believed that “the impact of an informational
cue will be less when the required response implies a greater
degree of personal commitment or is somewhat removed from
a direct evaluation of the underlying stimulus” (Peterson and
Jolibert p. 895). In other words, a quality/reliability judgment
implies considerably less commitment than does a purchase
intention so that consumers will be more willing to be positive
about quality/reliability than about their intention to purchase
the product. Also, a purchase intention is likely to involve
more intervening variables, so COO cues are likely to be better
at explaining variance in quality/reliability judgments than
variance in purchase intentions. Examining the relationship
between the Campaign and firm performance is, in effect,
extending this logic two steps beyond purchase intention.
Additional intervening variables would be expected when actual purchases are considered as the dependent variable and
another set of intervening variables will be important in determining the effect that COO cues have on firm performance.
On this basis then, the COO effect is likely to explain even
less of the variance in actual purchases than it does for either
purchase intentions or quality/reliability evaluations and explain very little of the variance in performance of member
firms relative to nonmember firms.
Members included several large national firms and multinational firms (e.g., 12 of the 60 food industry Campaign members were national firms, including five New Zealand divisions
of multinationals), as well as small, local operators. This diversity of firms among members almost certainly masked effects
of the Campaign, because of the interaction between brand
reputation and perceived quality/performance risk observed
by Cordell (1992). Conceivably, Campaign membership did
not affect sales or employee numbers for firms with wellestablished brands, but had a more marked effect for firms
with unfamiliar brands (Cordell). Extrapolating Cordell’s findings, the Campaign’s effect on an unfamiliar brand will depend
upon the consumer’s perception of New Zealand manufacturers as producers of quality for that product category. That is,
if consumers regard New Zealand-made honey, for example,
as being high quality, then COO labeling should enhance
consumers’ perceptions of an unfamiliar brand of New Zealand
honey. On the other hand, COO labeling of an unfamiliar
brand may increase its perceived performance risk if New
Zealand is regarded as a nonspecialist manufacturer of the
brand’s product category. Both situations probably occurred

Effect of Buy-National Campaign

in all four industries examined here. Because New Zealand’s
reputation for products in each sector was not evaluated here,
the effects of the Campaign on unfamiliar and well-known
brands probably cancelled each other. Thus, the positive effects of the Campaign on unfamiliar brands of product categories for which New Zealand was known were probably obscured by the negative effects of the Campaign’s COO labeling
of brands of products for which New Zealand manufacturers
have a poor reputation.
Another reason for this study’s failure to find any statistically significant effect of the BNZM Campaign on member
firm performance is the possibility that both member and
nonmember firms benefited similarly. The Campaign may
have been successful in raising consumers’ awareness of the
COO and in increasing the importance of this criterion in
their purchase decision-making. However, the Campaign did
little to benefit members directly, other than licensing them
to use the BNZM logo in their labeling and promoting the
logo. Individual firms used their discretion in package design
and in the location of any BNZM logos (minimum size 19-mm
vertical height) included in their labeling. Thus, any benefits
from the Campaign may have been shared reasonably equally
by members and nonmembers alike.
Perhaps more importantly, Garland and Coy’s (1993) study
indicated that the Campaign did not convert the majority of
grocery shoppers to focusing on New Zealand made goods,
despite a high awareness (c. 70%) and high correct recall
(60%) for the Campaign (Garland, Burra, and Newman,
1991). The study found that only 27% of a sample (n 5 96)
of consumers claimed to buy New Zealand-made groceries
consciously, but that this group bought significantly fewer
imported grocery items than those respondents who claimed
not to consider the COO of groceries (Garland and Coy,
1993). If this grocery shopping study indicates the extent to
which consumers buy New Zealand-made products for the
industries considered here, then the lack of any significantly
enhanced performance for member firms is not unexpected.
Given the likely dilution effects of these four factors, the
better performance of Campaign members observed here takes
on greater importance, although not statistically significant.
Members do seem to perform better than nonmembers in all
industries except apparel. This previously heavily protected
industry was hit particularly hard by competition from countries with low labor costs during the period of the study, and
the findings suggest that severe staff cutting was the best route
to survival. The question over whether the observed effect
was a result of the Campaign or attributable more to the firms
themselves, which, for unknown reasons, were predisposed
to join the Campaign, remains unknown. However, it seems
that any buy-national campaign is unlikely to bestow benefits
specifically on its member firms because nonmember firms
seem destined to reap some benefits coincidentally. Unless
there is some mechanism for members to benefit directly from
each purchase or incremental purchase that can be attributed

J Busn Res
2000:47:135–145

143

to the campaign, such campaigns must be viewed more as
altruism and not providing any competitive advantage over
other domestic producers.
In some respects, buy-national campaigns resemble causerelated marketing activities (Varadarajan and Menon, 1988),
but there are also some important differences. Typically,
cause-related marketing campaigns identify a specific, credible cause and specifically designate how the firm will help
the cause each time the consumer purchases/uses the product/
service. In the case of buy-national campaigns, the cause is
usually clearly identitifed, but the link between the consumer’s
actions toward the firm and assisting the cause is less obvious
and less convincing. In the BNZM Campaign, the cause is
implicit within the slogan (“BUY N. Z. MADE” & Keep Your
Country Working), but may not be obvious to all consumers.
Although commercial research reported high acceptance (76–
86%) of the buy-national-unemployment relationship, the extent to which consumers actually believe that their personal
contribution is important and, thus, practice selection of domestically made products, is markedly lower (e.g., 27% for
groceries [Garland and Coy, 1993]). The link between unemployment and increasing imports is not simple. Much of the
increased unemployment at that time resulted from major
restructuring of primary industries as international markets
were transformed and as new technologies were introduced.
On the other hand, increased imports were attributable to
increased demand for luxury items (e.g., cars, televisions,
videos) or for components required for manufacturing for
which there were no domestic manufacturers. In reality, consumers may not see the cause in a buy-national campaign of
this type as distinct from the firm; whereas, the firm and the
cause are usually very different types of organizations involved
in quite different activities in most cause-related marketing
campaigns. The Buy Canadian and Buy Australian-Made Campaigns were both initiated and funded by their respective
governments (Liefeld, 1991; Elliot and Cameron, 1994). The
BNZM Campaign differed in that it was run by the NZMF,
an entity representing the interests of large and small manufacturers in New Zealand. In this respect, it is similar to the Made
in the USA Campaign, which was sponsored by a coalition of
245 U.S. textile and apparel suppliers (Ettenson, Wagner, and
Gaeth, 1988). Perhaps buy-national campaigns would be more
successful if they were modeled on successful cause-related
marketing campaigns: the cause itself should be more distinct
from the contributing firms to minimize the extent to which
such campaigns can be perceived as self-serving, rather than
truly cause-oriented, and contributions from sponsoring
(member) firms should be specified and tied closely to volumes purchased by consumers.

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