Science and the Sources of New Technology

D. Science and the Sources of New Technology

Marx commended Richard Jones (1852) for his insight “that the increase in auxil- iary capital” – Jones’s term for constant capital other than raw material – “over and above a certain level is contingent on an increase of knowledge” or “some invention by means of which the productive power of labour is increased sufficiently to repro- duce the additional capital and to produce a profit on it” (MECW 33: 361). One might expect uncertainty-bearing to appear in a discussion of knowledge creation. But this proves not to be the case, and we shall seek to understand why. 21

Marx’s emphasis is largely on applied science. This emerges in the theme that “[c]apitalist production leads to the separation of science from labour and at the same time to the application of science to material production” (364). 22 These joint propositions presume capitalist organization in its advanced form entailing “mech- anized” factories contrasting with Smithian manufacturing (above, section B), the mechanized factory being “the first mode of production where practical prob- lems are posed which can only be solved scientifically. Only now is experience and observation – and the necessities of the production process itself – on a scale which permits and necessitates the application of scientific knowledge. Exploitation of science, of the theoretical progress of humanity. Capital does not create science, but it exploits it, appropriates it to the production process” (MECW 34: 32–3). As such, it operates “as an autonomous power separated from labour” in con- trast with the earlier “collection of procedures carried on traditionally and only expanding very slowly and little by little,” reflecting the “[l]earning by experience

of the mysteries of each handicraft” (33). 23 Thus “scientific knowledge . . . is embod- ied in . . . machinery, or in the methods of producing, chemical processes, etc.”;

20 References in the Grundrisse to devices relating to information that mitigates the dissonance between production and consumption decisions, are highly relevant (MECW 28: 98; cited

Chapter 9, p. 274). 21 Rosenberg cautions that “Marx’s use of the term ‘science’ was sufficiently broad that it included

bodies of systemized knowledge far beyond what we ordinarily mean when we speak today of pure or even applied science – e.g., engineering and machine building. It was not a term which

he attempted to use with precision. In Theories of Surplus Value [MECW 34: 87], for example, he refers to science as ‘the product of mental labour’” (Rosenberg 1974: 718n). This problem

should not be exaggerated. In many of the specific extracts given below, a more precise sense of the term is intended. 22 This theme is taken up in Capital 1: “modern industry . . . makes science a productive force distinct from labour and presses it into the service of capital” (MECW 35: 366). Support for the proposition is drawn here from Thompson 1824: 274. Marx allows that “[a]dmittedly, a small class of higher workers does take shape, but this does not stand in any proportion to the masses of ‘deskilled’ workers” (MECW 34: 34). 23 Marx refers to the “concentration and . . . development into a science of the knowledge, obser- vations and craft secrets obtained by experience and handed down traditionally, for the

Is There a Marxian “Entrepreneur”?

and its application in this form “rests entirely on the separation of the intellectual potentialities of the process from the knowledge, understanding and skill of the individual worker . . .” (34).

The emphasis above is on applications to production of knowledge which itself reflects the “theoretical progress of humanity.” That knowledge-creation proceeds independently of social organization is also suggested by the observation that “[i]n the eighteenth century advances in mathematics, mechanics and chemistry and discoveries occurred at almost the same rate in England, France, Sweden, and Germany. Inventions too in France for example. But only in England were they applied in capitalist fashion at the time, because there alone were the economic relations sufficiently developed to allow the exploitation of scientific progress by

capital” (58). 24 This suggests an autonomous science. So too does Marx’s belief that the delayed growth in agricultural productivity could be explained by the late development of certain scientific disciplines, whereas industry could rely on developments that had come earlier: “Mechanics, the really scientific basis of large- scale industry, had reached a certain degree of perfection during the eighteenth century. The development of chemistry, geology and physiology, the sciences that directly form the specific basis of agriculture rather than of industry, does not take place till the nineteenth century and especially the later decades” (MECW 31: 341) – the latter a reference to the 1840s and 1850s. (On this perspective see above, Chap- ter 4, pp. 124–5). As Rosenberg points out, the fact that profitable opportunities in agriculture failed to induce the requisite knowledge, “suggests some degree of independence and autonomy on the part of science in shaping the sequence of industrial change” (1974: 726).

That the capitalist relies on the “theoretical progress of humanity” – that he exploits rather than creates science – is also suggested by the notion that knowledge creation has the character of skill creation, in that both are available free to the industrial capitalist. One context involves a commendation of Hodgskin’s denial of labor’s alleged dependency on accumulated circulating capital; for “[w]hat is really ‘stored up’ . . . is the skill of the worker, the level of development of labour,” and true accumulation must be understood as “assimilation, continual preservation and at the same time transformation of what has already been handed over and realised”

(MECW 32: 427–8). 25 Such accumulation – achieved “through practice alone” – “costs the capitalist nothing” (MECW 34: 323). And by proceeding immediately to “the accumulation and reproduction of scientific knowledge, which determines the

purpose of analysing the production process to allow the application of the natural sciences to the material production process . . . ” (MECW 34: 34). 24 Rosenberg draws on Capital 1 to demonstrate the theme that “the handicraft and manufac- turing stages of production lacked the technological basis which would permit the application of scientific knowledge to the solution of problems of industrial production. This essential technological basis emerged only with modern industry” (Rosenberg 1974: 717–18). 25 See also the relation of labor productivity to “the division of labour and transmitted skill . . .” (MECW 33: 385).

D. Science and the Sources of New Technology 421 material process of production more or less directly,” Marx implies that knowl-

edge creation has the same character. He is, in fact, explicit when he compares population growth and “scientific power” as “productive force[s]” which cost the capitalist nothing (18).

Deflection of attention from the role of the capitalist in knowledge creation actually extends to applied science. Thus we find reiterated not only that basic science reflects the “general product of social development” (429), or “the gen- eral intellectual product” of such development (457), or “the product of general historical development” (458), but also that applied science – its embodiment in “machinery” – has only “the appearance of a productive power of capital” (429; also 458), deflecting attention from knowledge-creation as a function attributable to the industrialist capitalist. From this perspective if capital is productive it is – apart from “the compulsion [it imposes] to do surplus labour” – only “as the personification and representative, the reified shape of the ‘social productive powers of labour’ or the productive powers of social labour” (459–60). It is, one is led to understand, capitalist organization that provides the key to all sources of productivity increase, but not the capitalist. 26

At first sight Marx’s perspective has much in common with that of J. S. Mill. For Mill also took for granted that the fruits of “speculative knowledge” comes free to the capitalist, theoretical discoveries reflecting the efforts of the “savant” not generally motivated by financial interest, while many practical inventions are “the direct consequences of theoretical discoveries, and every extension of knowledge of the powers of nature being fruitful of applications to the purposes of outward life . . .” (Mill 1963–91 [1848]: 42–3). A contemporary example is the “electromagnetic telegraph,” an “unexpected consequence of the experiments of Oersted and the mathematical investigations of Amp`ere.” Again: “The most marvelous of modern inventions . . . the electromagnetic telegraph – sprang into existence but a few years after the establishment of the scientific theory which it realizes and exemplifies” (706).

This parallelism must, however, be severely qualified. For we also find with Marx

a very different and more sophisticated position. Thus while the capitalist exploits rather than creates science there is nonetheless a reciprocal relationship at play: “It is the capitalist mode of production which first puts the natural sciences to the service of the direct production process, while, conversely, the development of production provides the means for the theoretical subjugation of nature” (MECW

34: 32). The “separation and autonomisation” from labor of applied knowledge, described above, “which is at first of advantage to capital alone, is at the same

26 In this context Marx treats as “superficial” J. S. Mill’s definition of the productive power of capital as “the quantity of real productive power which the capitalist, by means of his capital, can

command” (1963 [1844]: 291; cited MECW 34: 460). Insofar as Marx had in mind knowledge there is room for criticism, for Mill made little effort to explore the determinants of resources devoted to knowledge creation, much of his discussion being of an empirical rather than an analytical nature (see Hollander 1985: 226–7).

Is There a Marxian “Entrepreneur”?

time a condition for the development of the powers of science and knowledge” (57). Again: “ . . . socialised labour alone is capable of applying the general products of human development, such as mathematics, etc., to the direct production process just as, conversely, the development of the sciences presupposes that the material

production process has attained a certain level” (429). 27 These propositions imply that modern industrial capitalism is sufficiently productive to support a specialist scientific sector whose activity, though perhaps biased towards specific applica- tion, generates breakthroughs in knowledge of wider social significance in terms

of new opportunities for wealth creation. 28 And that science funding – extending apparently to basic science – falls to the industrial capitalist emerges in a further pas- sage in the Economic Manuscripts, explaining that though even knowledge relating to industrial application is the task of a specialist scientific sector, such activity is governed by the profit motive with an eye to opportunities in the industrial sector, and ultimately funded out of industrial profits – the sciences constituting “a means of enrichment by capital,” thereby becoming “a means of enrichment” for the sci- entists; thus: “The development of the natural sciences themselves (and they form the basis of all knowledge) as also the development of all knowledge with regard to the production process, itself takes place on the basis of capitalist production, which generally first produces the sciences’ material means of research, observation and experiment” (34; emphasis added).

Marx further explains that “the men of science compete with each other to discover practical applications for their science. Moreover, invention becomes a m´etier by itself. With capitalist production, therefore, the scientific factor is for the first time consciously developed, applied, and called into existence on a scale which earlier epochs could not have imaged.” That “the men of science compete with each other to discover practical applications for their science” may imply that the initiative in the discovery of new or improved technologies is taken by the science sector, though it cannot be excluded that it is the industrial capitalist who initially puts out tenders for the solution of technical problems encountered by current processes or for proposals regarding more radical improvements. We conclude

27 The complex interdependence is captured by Rosenberg who has pointed out that, in Capital 1, “science does not . . . function in history as an independent variable” (Rosenberg 1974: 714),

Marx adopting “a Toynbeean ‘challenge-response’ mechanism to account for the emergence of high productivity societies, in which the changing requirements of industry and the altering perception of economic needs . . . provide the stimulus to the pursuit of specific forms of scientific knowledge” (725); similarly: modern science itself was, for Marx, “an activity arising out of the needs of the productive process . . . the incentive structure of capitalism” (1991: 158; also 1994: 91). At the same time, the “demand-induced” approach to science is contingent on “the ability to apply science to the productive sphere [which] turns upon industry’s changing capacity to utilize such knowledge . . .” (1974: 725).

28 A striking passage to this effect appears already in the Grundrisse (see Chapter 9, p. 277): “The all-round exploration of the earth to discover both new useful objects and new uses for old

objects, such as their use as raw materials, etc.; hence the development of the natural sciences to their highest point” (MECW 28: 336).

D. Science and the Sources of New Technology 423 that despite Marx’s efforts to deny the industrial capitalist responsibility for basic

and even applied science – for any such allowance might suggest attribution of a “productive” role – in the last resort such responsibility is in fact recognized.

Marx’s allowances prove less damaging than might appear to the notion of profit as exploitation, considering an implicit downplaying of uncertainty at least with respect to applied knowledge creation. I refer to a discussion of the forces at play which release resources for “new kinds of employment,” and simultane- ously develop latent or entirely new “needs” and also the technology – or “modes of labour ” – required to satisfy them:

Capitalist production, hence the division of labour within the workshop according to certain rules, directly increases the free division of labour within society . . . by making the labour of a particular number of workers more effective, therefore by constantly setting free a part of the labour force for new kinds of employment and thereby simul- taneously developing needs which were so far latent or not present at all, and modes of labour to satisfy those needs. This process is also promoted by the increase of the pop- ulation, by the cheapening of the means of subsistence required for the reproduction and multiplication of labour capacities; also by the fact that the surplus value, which becomes a part of revenue, now seeks to realise itself in the most diverse use values (MECW 30: 314, emphasis added; also 32: 403). 29

An alternative version – following Hodgskin and Wakefield – emphasizes “the varia- gation and differentiation of commodities” or “the establishment of new branches of production and the multiplication of kinds of commodities produced,” refer- ring again both to these “new needs” and therefore to the “new means of satisfying them”:

The different phases of one and the same product, as well as the auxiliary operations (that is, the labour connected with various constituent parts, etc.) are separated and become different branches of labour, independent of one another; or various phases

29 On the generation of new products see also: “the application of machinery increases the division of labour within society, that is to say it multiplies the number of specialised branches

of industry and independent spheres of production” (MECW 30: 321); and the references to “[t]he material result of capitalist production” as “the multiplication and diversification of products,” and “the creation of use values in increasing extent, quality, diversity . . .” (MECW 34: 126). Marx cites G. Opdyke 1851 to the effect that “the augmented profits of [industry] set free

a large number of desires, increase the demand for and the production of value in its consumable forms” (56). But elsewhere Marx played down the quantitative significance of entirely “new branches of industry . . . founded on machinery” – where “one cannot of course speak of the replacement of workers by machinery” – to focus on innovation within existing industries: “this case does not in general arise until machinery is already developed; in an advanced epoch of the mode of production based on it, and even here only to an infinitesimally small extent, whether compared with commodities where human labour is displaced by machinery, or commodities which replace those produced previously by hand labour alone” (27). Again, we find in this context the term “revolution” used to designate the transition from handicraft manufacture to the mechanical workshop. See also MECW 30: 329 on this usage.

Is There a Marxian “Entrepreneur”?

of one product become different kinds of commodities. But secondly, owing to labour and capital (or labour and surplus product) becoming free; on the other hand, to the discovery of new practical applications of the same use value, either because new needs arise as a result of the modification of No. 1 [large-scale production] (for example, the need for more rapid and universal means of transport and communication arising with the application of steam in industry) and therefore new means of satisfying them, or new possibilities of utilising the same use value are discovered, or new substances or new methods (plastic-galvanisation, for instance) for treating well-known substance in different ways, etc. (MECW 32: 422).

These renditions seem to entail a notion of “discovery” as the quasi-automatic outcome of a novel problem created by “new needs,” thereby leaving little scope for

uncertainty. 30 Elsewhere we read to similar effect that “[e]very invention becomes the basis of new inventions or new, improved methods of production” (MECW

34: 32). 31 This may perhaps also be said of the inducement to engage in knowledge- creation encountered in discussion of substitution against labor. Marx intends process selection not on the basis of relative factor prices amongst a range of already available technologies or sets of blue-prints, but rather selection of an appropriate capital-intensive technique which becomes available after appropriate knowledge has been generated, the quest for which is stimulated by wage pres- sures. This perspective is outlined in a proposition regarding “[i]nvention and employment of machinery against strikes, etc., and against wage demands”; for example: “Selfactors, wool-combing machines in the spinning industry, the so- called ‘condenser’ which replaces the hand-turned ‘slubbing machine’ (in the woollen industry as well), etc., are all machines invented in order to defeat strikes” (MECW 30: 340). Similarly: “It is also demonstrated in strikes that machinery is invented and employed in direct opposition to the claims of living labour, and that it appears as a means of defeating and breaking them. (See Ricardo on the constant antagonism between machinery and living labour.)” (MECW

34: 29). In all of this there seems little room for uncertainty regarding the outcome.

30 There is, however, some question whether the quasi-automatic “new means of satisfying them” also extends to the discovery of “new possibilities of utilizing the same use value . . . or new

substances or new methods . . .” 31 As an example we may refer to the significance accorded improvement in the quality of

machinery itself produced by machinery, as a precondition of further progress both with respect to driving power and working equipment (MECW 33: 421–2). Here the anony- mous work of 1855 (see note 8) is cited: “The construction of a machine to bring iron into shape must differ very materially from one intended to deal with the soft and deli- cate fibre of silk or cotton. A far greater exercise of force is necessary for the former class of engine. Without the steam-hammer, the lathe, and the drill, such machines as the print- ing press, the powerloom, and the carding-engine could not have been constructed” (1855: 221–2).

E. Innovatory Investment