Applying evolutionary analysis: history, institutions and culture in Vietnam

indicates that the shared communist ideology of peasant farmers in China ‘‘inspired the mobilisa- tion of communal resources to build irrigation systems and other forms of capital’’ Ruttan, 1988, p. 250. Thus, it is argued, cultural endowments can reduce the costs of institutional change where these encourage common purpose or collective action. It seems clear that cultural influences are impor- tant in explaining the interactions between institu- tions, land use and technologies. However, analysis of cultural influences requires case-specific analy- ses, not easily lending themselves to disentangle- ment from the institutional and political factors. As Adams 1986 has commented: ‘‘The flexibilities and potentials inherent in the conjunction of individual action and a cul- tural setting are immense. They become almost overwhelmingly so when epidemic changes are introduced from external sources, as was the case in South and Southeast Asia in colonial times. Extensive cultural intrusions in combina- tion with political domination augment prob- lems of survival just as they may sometimes provide opportunities for economic, political and social advancement’’ Adams, 1986; p. 279. Extending an approach to examining institu- tions, culture and land use such that it incorporates feedbacks from natural systems into this set of interactions, adds further complexity. Climatic risks influence both institutional and cultural set- tings, and the appropriate technologies and pro- ductivity of the resource endowments in agriculture. Some of the relationships between climate and other factors are amenable to quantifi- cation and analysis, particularly those associated with the land resources and with technologies.

3. Applying evolutionary analysis: history, institutions and culture in Vietnam

3 . 1 . Lowland ‘ traditional ’ Vietnam Following the preceding discussions of the cen- tral role of institutions in the evolution of economic systems, and the potential for incorporating an evolutionary view into the interactions between these economic systems and the natural environ- ment, this section examines the historical evolution of land use and institutions in Vietnam. As already alluded to, there have been many studies of the individual interactions between institutions and technologies, and between the adaptation of new technology as related to underlying resource en- dowments e.g. Bray, 1986. This section outlines the major historical evolution of technologies and institutions which have governed them over the past millennium in Vietnam. The role of cultural endowments within this analysis is discussed, and the role of climate resources, and their associ- ation with vulnerability to climate change is exam- ined. This account focuses predominantly on this lowland rice-growing cultural context. Jamieson 1993 argues that lowland society represents the dominant cultural form of Vietnam. Seventy-five percent of the population live in this area, the ethnic groups which came to be known as Vietnamese first settled in the foothills and valleys of the Red River Delta where they first began to reclaim land in the delta itself. This lowland Vietnamese area was largely restricted to the Red River Delta in the north of present-day Vietnam and the central coastal plains. There is therefore differentiation between the lowland regions: they are usually delineated as north, central and south as reflected in the influence of both Chinese and French colo- nial forces. In addition, it is argued that the physical environments of the northern and southern deltas play a role in the dominant culture Rambo, 1973; Jamieson, 1993. Jamieson 1993 argues that the topography and the substantial land reclamation in the Red River Delta over the centuries has led to it being one of the most unsafe regions of the world, compared to the more benign Mekong Delta: ‘‘As a result, the local culture has emphasised the subordination of the individual to collective discipline of family and village… Southern vil- lages have always been more open less corpo- rate, more tolerant of individual initiative and cultural heterodoxy’’ Jamieson, 1993; p. 5. It is therefore difficult to characterise the insti- tutional and historical realms of Vietnam as ho- mogenous, but rather a series of regions with distinct character. This regionalism is manifest in present day tensions between the centralised sys- tem of government and regional autarky, as well as in distinct regional development problems and agendas e.g. Rambo et al., 1995; on highland issues. The account of Vietnamese land use history presented here demonstrates the evolution of rural livelihoods associated with rice production and lowland agriculture, and how these have been periodically subjected to stress and shocks. These stresses and shocks are as frequently caused by political upheaval and civil strife as well as by climatic extremes. The topography of the coastal plains and deltas, and the hierarchical social institutions of the populations across the regions, enabled a sophisticated system of water resource management and intensive agriculture to evolve to minimise the risks associated with cli- matic variability. Superimposed on this system as it evolved over the centuries, however, were peri- odic upheavals associated with invasion and colonisation. At particular points in time the con- vergence of climatic extremes and conflict over property rights punctuated the apparent social and political equilibrium through significant up- heavals. 3 . 2 . Colonialism and its impacts on Vietnam The major periods in the history of Vietnam which can be identified for the purposes of this paper, are the period prior to European colonisa- tion after the coming into existence of Vietnam as a nation; the French colonial period from around 1859 to 1954; the communist period which include the wars of independence; and the most recent period of economic liberalisation, including the market reforms known as Doi Moi from around the mid 1980s. These periods are not discrete, particularly since they refer principally to eras of political rule. The object of this paper is not to examine political systems, but rather the interac- tions of the implicit property rights with land use and institutions at other scales. A chronology of the major political events which define these sub-periods is presented in Table 1, with more detailed information on the most recent reform process outlined in Table 2. Within the dominant culture of lowland Vietnam, particularly in the more densely populated north of the country, social structure has been relatively stable and homogenous over the centuries. Village level organisation and systems of land tenure were similar across the lowland regions in the period prior to European interference. The village level organisation was a complex mixture of patriarchy and kinship with Confucian elements, which dom- inated the allocation of communal lands. In addi- tion there was a strong system of government at regional and even national level see Wiegersma, 1988. Thus, rather than being strictly feudal, the system of political control under both Chinese colonial rule and under independence could be characterised as having some signs of ‘private’ ownership with the basic unit of production being the independent village commune, and hav- ing a centralised monarchy Nguyen The Anh, 1995. As indicated in Table 1, the latter part of this period was characterised by national rule by a mandarinate, sometimes as part of Chinese colonial rule and at other times partially or exclu- sively independent. In this period the Emperor would be regarded as the protector of the nation and would perform symbolic duties such as ploughing the first furrow each year for a new rice crop, thereby sealing the link between the state’s position as responsible for national welfare whatever the variability of the natural environ- ment. For large periods prior to European colonisa- tion, this central government of Vietnam, particu- larly at the regional level, had strong control over land tenure and water regulation in the lowlands. But in other periods, the extensive networks of dikes and dams was not adequately maintained and protected. When this reduction of collective security resulted in enhanced risks for local popu- lations, they often coincided with peasant revolts, invasions and radical political changes. Thus, for example, the division of the country into Coch- inchina in the south, Annam in the centre, and Tonkin in the north, in the 17th and 18th cen- turies was partly caused by political institutions, exacerbating such famine and poverty conditions, particularly the Nguyen dynasty the impact of famines and poverty within the peasant societies Nguyen The Anh, 1995. Despite the numerous Table 2 A chronology of major political changes in Vietnam since reunification in 1975 a Unified ‘Communist’ period 1975–1979 Expansion of collectivised agriculture in south of Vietnam. Chinese invasion of northern Vietnam. 1979 1979 Limited introduction of household contract system in agriculture. 1981 National application of household con- tract system under Directive 100; coop- eratives and work point system still operating. Doi Moi introduced following Party 1986 Congress. Liberalisation period 1988 Agricultural reforms under Decree 10. Collectivisation of farms in Mekong Delta. Land allocation on lease system. Cooperatives to act as service opera- tions to household agriculture. Land ownership still with the state. A 1988–1993 rental market for land emerges even though illegal. 1993 Land Law instigates 15 year and longer leases of agricultural land. a Source: adapted from Fforde and de Vylder 1996 and others. Table 1 A chronology of major political changes in Vietnam till re- unification in 1975 a Pre-european colonial period Chinese colonialism and in- dependence 111 BC–905 AD Chinese colonial rule with numerous revolts 905–1427 Alternate independence and Chinese colonial rule up to the Ming dynasty 1427–1786 Independence under Le dynasty includ- ing division of north and south Viet- nam under two viceroys from 1627 1774 Revolt in northern provinces led by Tay Son brothers over high taxes 1786–1859 Unification under Tay Son and Nguyen dynasties European colonial period 1859 First French invasion of Cochinchina Concession of all of Cochinchina to 1867 France by Hue Court Expansion of territorial interests and 1867–1883 trade monopolisation by French till all of Vietnam under French rule, under Annam, Tonkin and Cochinchina. 1884–1927 Anti-colonial resistance in various re- gions of Vietnam with periodic revolts Formation of Vietnamese Nationalist 1927 Party under Ho Chi Minh 1930–1931 Nghe-Tinh soviet movement in central Vietnam Japanese invasion of Indochina with 1940 agreement from French administration ‘Communist’ period 1945 Surrender of Japan and Declaration of Independence by Ho Chi Minh 2nd September 1945 1946–1954 Franco–Vietnamese War concluded with victory at Den Bien Phu Division into North and South Viet- 1954 nam under Geneva Agreement 1960 Formation of National Liberation Front of South Vietnam US ground troops in Vietnam and 1965–1968 bombing of northern Vietnam Reunification of Vietnam 1975–1976 a Source: adapted from Hy Van Luong 1992, Popkin 1979 and others. revolts and political upheavals in the course of these centuries, however, much of lowland society appears to have retained its underlying hierarchi- cal social structures. The French expansion of its colonies into Southern Vietnam from 1859 onwards heralded a shift in the operation and governance of Vietnam and in the institutions of government and hence of land management in particular. The French colony was expanded piecemeal through a series of invasions and treaties. The French divided the Vietnamese area formally into the three states of Tonkin and Annam in the north and central, and Cochinchina in the south Table 1, areas which had only a short precedent in Vietnamese history Wiegersma, 1988. The imposition of French colonial rule, it has been argued, did not dismantle local hierarchies at the village level. But they did throw the role of these hierarchies into turmoil in terms of the institution of private property within the village system. Essentially, colonialism led to the first, if limited, formal institutionalisation of capitalism in Vietnam in the lowland agricultural areas. This became manifest in the creation of private landlord classes who controlled land and rented it to landless peasants, thereby replacing collective labour with waged labour. This capitalist penetration was, however, limited to these rice growing areas and to where tax collection systems were instituted. Many parts of Vietnamese society resisted the institutions of French colonialism and restricted their impact Ngo Vinh Long, 1973. The influence of imported colonial institutions are much less in areas more remote for the colonists than the accessible lowland delta areas. In all of highland Vietnam, forest resources were declared state property by French colonists but were admin- istered throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries solely through taxes. The ethnic minorities of the uplands, including the Hmong and Dzao minori- ties, continued to control land and forest areas through customary law and social organisation Nguyen Van Thang, 1995. In addition, as discussed above, there were stark regional differences within the land use and tenure systems in the late 19th century, whereby Tonkin and Annam were not as influenced by French colonisation as Cochinchina. Landlords in some regions acted as traditional patriarchs, tended to live within the villages where they owned land and were therefore more likely to remain part of any traditional insurance during periods of drought or flood. But critically, the French colonial system also allocated land to non-traditional landlords who were largely absentee and who became the focus for peasant resistance and unrest. An example of revolt during this colonial period is the setting up of the Soviets of Nghe An and Ha Tinh in northern Annam in 1930 and 1931. This rebellion serves to illustrate the theme of disso- nance between underlying social institutions and the imposed institutions of colonial capitalism, in the context of coping with a variable and risky environment. The rebellion leading to the setting up of these earliest Communes is described in detail by Scott 1976; pp. 114 – 119. Rapid reduction in agricultural prices precipitated by significant falls in the international commodity prices in agriculture in the late 1920s, triggered unrest in Annam. Under the colonial administrations, waged peasants were subject to relatively stable subsistence expenditures such as clothing and fuel, but also to high levels of head and land taxes, and ultimately debts. The levels of individual debt in Annam remained un- changed despite a threefold decrease in paddy rice and major cash crops output prices between 1929 and 1934. A compounding local factor in the Annam region leading to rebellion and unrest, was low agricul- tural production caused by low rainfall, leading to famine. In this context famine is defined in terms of absolute food shortages and emergency switch- ing to wild famine foods as nutrition sources. Low rainfall in the region in 1929 delayed transplanting of the first rice crop in that year. Drought exacer- bated by dry winds throughout 1930 and spring of 1931, resulted in four rice crops in succession being lost. The rebellions involved civil unrest, partly or- ganised by the Communist party which had been founded during the 1920s, and involving local level protest and direct action against the tax system and local officials. The two villages of Nghe An and Ha Tinh in Annam declared themselves as independent collectivised areas, overthrowing the colonial tax raising institutions of the villages, and returned to traditional collective allocation of labour. The rebellion in these locations, facilitated by the Com- munist Party resulted from the coincidence of the policies of colonial administrators who ensured that the peasants bore the cost of recession and the drought conditions. Colonial occupation by imposing the institutions of capitalism, was sowing the seeds of potential peasant revolt. The Soviets were short lived, but remained a symbol for more equitable alloca- tion of resources under a future independent Vietnam. Scott’s 1976 analysis of this event 3 3 Scott’s approach to the motivations of the peasantry under subsistence economies has been criticised from many angles by Marxists, neo-classical economists, anthropologists and others see Adams, 1986; Popkin, 1979; Wiegersma, 1988; Kearney, 1996. The overarching debate concerning non-capitalist peas- ant societies is whether the peasantry itself is a sustainable mode of production, and whether the peasant class will ulti- mately be brought into the market through accumulation. demonstrates that the institutional setting, in this case as dictated by colonial powers, in effect clashed with underlying culture and impacted on the actual use of land. But the example of the Annam Soviets also illustrates the interlocking of the resource endow- ment, climate, institutional and political economy aspects of social evolution. External institutional forces, both benevolent and malevolent play a major role in the evolution of land use and social organisation. Other social upheavals leading to famine in Vietnam are associated as much with political and social strife as with periodic coinci- dence of extreme climate events as argued in the context of famine more generally by Sen, 1981. The food shortages and hardships of the 1930s, for example, had a less significant impact on Vietnam’s population than those caused by wartime upheavals in 1945. As the Japanese occu- piers took over Vietnam in 1945 after the fall of the Vichy-French authority, a breakdown in food distribution resulted. In the resulting famine in northern Vietnam, one million people are re- ported to have died Jamieson, 1993; p. 191. So although not applicable in all the crises facing Vietnam in the 20th century, external climate risks have played a role in some famine situations and in the evolution of land use and social organisation. Collective action surrounding mitigation and coping with climatic extremes in Vietnam, such as through civil defense, represents an important as- pect of risk spreading and institutional adaptation to changing environmental risks. The collective action system in the rural economy is argued to have been at its most effective during wartime, due to the readiness for breaching of the Red River Delta dikes by aerial bombardment such as that attempted in April to July 1972 for example documented by Lacoste, 1973. Aerial bombing was targeted at the coastal and inland river dikes ‘‘at points where their rupture, given the varie- gated conditions of the delta, would prove a catalyst for even greater disaster and more deaths’’ Lacoste, 1973; p. 3. In 1972 the production brigades from the agri- cultural co-operatives repaired the breaches caused by bombing in 96 sites, principally in Thai Binh and Nam Ha Provinces in the Red River Delta area of North Vietnam. There was unusu- ally low precipitation in 1972 such that the low-ly- ing delta Provinces avoided large-scale flooding from the breaches. Thus the effective communal systems of land and resource management act as the primary institutions for collective security. Collectivised agriculture in North Vietnam al- lowed universal access to evacuation and health provision organised at the Commune and District level. 3 . 3 . The communist and market-oriented periods Following the re-unification of Vietnam in 1975 after three decades of the Indochina Wars, Viet- nam entered a period of evolution of its commu- nist practice, first through implementation of collectivisation and of state-owned enterprises in both north and south Table 2. Collectivisation had begun in the north around 1955, such that by 1960 86 of rural households were members of co-operatives. In the south little or no collectivisa- tion occurred prior to 1975 Kerkvliet and Selden, 1998. The period of attempted collectivisation of the whole country in the late 1970s is character- ised as a period of stagnation in agricultural output and low economic growth Fig. 1. The imposition of collectivisation in the south in 1975 was resisted and led to a sharp fall in agricultural output in that region. Where it was implemented, collectivised agricul- ture was based, at least in the lowlands of north- ern Vietnam up till 1981, on a system where village level co-operatives organised the labour allocation and distribution of external inputs and outputs. This period was short lived, primarily due to the crisis of falling output in the late 1970s Fig. 1 Vietnam General Statistical Office, 1995, which heralded the introduction of a system of household contracts in 1981, relinquishing control of at least part of the factors of production to the household level see Fforde, 1987; Beresford, 1990. The subsequent period had incremental but significant changes in the legal and institutional framework in agriculture, as described in Table 2. The Sixth Party Congress in 1986 formally intro- duced reforms which became known as Doi Moi renovation, abandoning industrialisation in fa- vour of agricultural-led growth. The fast evolving situation of land tenure and control in the Doi Moi period has been directed by a resolution of the National Assembly in 1988 Resolution No. 10 which formalised a full con- tract system of household responsibilities in agri- culture, and by a Land Law in 1993 which, in effect, allows long-term lease of land from the state and allows these leases to be tradeable. The 1993 Land Law states that ‘land is an extremely valuable national resource on which economic, cultural, social, security and national defence are constructed’. At present all land is owned by the state and agricultural co-operatives retain control over the distribution of inputs and provision of irrigation. But under the Law, households are allocated Red Books in which their leases for annual crops are 20 years and on forest land and perennial crops are 50 years Ton Gia Huyen, 1994; Hy Van Luong and Unger, 1998. The present day situation is therefore character- ised as rapid increases in marketed agricultural output facilitated both by incremental changes in the distribution system and higher real prices to farmers, as well as to incentives to invest in private agricultural land. Thus economic liberali- sation in the agricultural sector has brought about some increases in agricultural production, but with complex social and political consequences within the rural agrarian economy e.g. Watts, 1998; Hy Van Luong and Unger, 1998. Local government institutions from the Province to the District level have taken advan- tage of increased autonomy as a result of Doi Moi, but have become less influential in resource use since agricultural land has been allocated to private individuals. Institutional adaptation con- cerning flooding and typhoon impacts have led to a reduction of resources for sea dike maintenance and for early warning systems in coastal areas Adger, 1998. Although Vietnam’s transition Fig. 1. Area under crops and food staple output for Vietnam, 1976 – 1994. from state central planning is often heralded as being successful from a macro-economic perspec- tive, this masks some important aspects of social vulnerability. Collective action for the manage- ment of risk by state institutions has been under- mined by inertia in some aspects of the decentralised state planning system, while parallel spontaneous re-emergence of civil society institu- tions form a counter-balancing institutional adap- tation. Thus formal institutions are seeking to maintain their resources, powers, and their au- thority in this area at the expense of collective security. Informal institutions have offset some of these negative consequences of market liberalisa- tion and the reduction of the role of government, by evolving collective security from below. 3 . 4 . Summarising cultural and institutional e6olution The underlying cultural homogeneity of the lowland Vietnamese from the ‘traditional’ or pre- European colonial era is an important facet in the influence on both the sustainability of the institu- tions which governed the country throughout its history, and on the technologies and mechanisms of resource use. For lowland Vietnam, hierarchi- cal central government control appears to have been a necessary condition for the maintenance of the technology on which the fertility and security of the agricultural system was based, namely the sophisticated irrigation and dike system. Under this argument, technology and geography strongly influence what political system is best suited to economic advancement: it is only the excessive mismanagement of the ‘natural order’ of govern- ment, particularly under colonial times, which causes breakdowns in the institutional system. The influence of Confucianism on the Viet- namese relationship with the institutions of gov- ernment is highly controversial among Vietnamese, as well as western, commentators and historians. The influence of the humanist philoso- phy of Confucianism with its emphasis on social and political issues on the adoption of commu- nism, as well as the predisposition of Confucianist thinking towards radical rather than incremental change, are widely discussed. From the brief re- view presented here it appears that Vietnamese society persevered in land use and technological advancement under negative political conditions for long periods in their history till they managed to spark revolutionary change. However many aspects of the observed collective government of Vietnam in the pre-European colonial era cannot be characterised as Confucian, in respect to strong central government outside the patriarchal and village based system. In addition, the pragmatism and persistence of the Communist government in the past half-century demonstrate the flexibility and absence of Confucian hegemony in Viet- namese institutional structures. There are, therefore, fundamentally different ways to describe the interaction of Vietnamese culture with the institutions of government and land use. These differences are based around the conceptualisation of the Vietnamese peasan- try as either hierarchical or rational and individu- alist: ‘‘Economic decisions were not made either rationally or morally by Vietnamese peasants. Decisions were made by the village leaders and the family patriarchs in the context of tradi- tional and modern realities… peasant motiva- tions are predominantly determined by the mixture of old and new political-economic in- terrelationships and old and new technologies’’ Wiegersma, 1988; p. 15. In other words, the underlying cultural form of Vietnamese peasantry is neither strictly hierarchi- cal nor individualist, but rather a complex cul- tural mix embedded within the underlying cultural system, dominated by patriarchy and leaning, in part, towards Confucianism. As far as the result- ing institutions and their interaction with land and its use are concerned, it is argued above that in pre-European colonial times dominant central government was facilitated by this complex cul- ture and a sophisticated set of water resources which required management. Central government acted to protect the population from climate ex- tremes and other causes of income instability by enhancing agricultural specialisation through irri- gation technology and double cropping of rice. It collected stores of grain in years of successful harvests and held reserves of food and material for flood or drought years. In the European colo- nial era the institutions of capitalism, private property and private ownership were introduced to Vietnam to a large extent for the first time. They are superimposed on the essentially tradi- tional collective land tenure system. These im- posed colonial institutions were successful in the sense that they persisted and penetrated the agrar- ian society up till the time when the global agri- cultural depression of the 1920s disturbed this non-resilient institutional system. The colonial governments attempted to transfer the impact of the depression onto the peasants and failed to fulfill the security functions of central government during drought periods, thereby unleashing peas- ant rebellion against the system in the early 1930s, and promoting the nationalist cause. The post-colonial period is characterised as a period when the government system was legiti- mated by its apparent harmony with underlying cultural influences, given nationalism and the ex- ternal forces which threatened the Vietnamese state in this period. The system of government adopted under the Communist collectivisation was particularly effective in dealing with the threat of external forces, from diverse sources such as climate extremes or from wartime aerial bombing see Lacoste, 1973; Thrift and Forbes, 1986. The decollectivisation period, outlined in Table 2, involves radical changes in the institu- tional framework of resource use and the in- creased exposure of local level resource users to external forces, both in the policy environment and perhaps to the impacts of extreme events in nature. The major institutional changes which have occurred in the decollectivisation period involve the atomisation of land tenure in the progression from the household contract system of the early 1980s to the effective privatisation of agricultural land by individual households. In the agriculture sector there have been dramatic increases in agri- cultural production and marketing since the mid 1980s, as evidenced both at the national and at District levels, partly due to increased use of external inputs, primarily capital, and partly to management and food distribution. Outside the land use sector, the state owned enterprise sector has been emasculated and the country opened to foreign investment. Kolko 1997 argues that the explicit social justice goal of the Democratic Re- public of Vietnam government since reunification has been eroded by the liberalisation process, as evidenced by changes in the distribution of in- come see Adger, 1999a. Hy Van Luong and Unger, 1998 and Ngo Vinh Long 1993 both argue that the impetus for reform is greatest where collectivisation and stagnation of the econ- omy have been greatest. In terms of the capacity to cope with environ- mental risk, however, it is important to establish the potential for cultural and institutional changes and feedbacks within modern Vietnamese society. The skewed distribution of income may be offset by strengthening and re-emergence of kinship ties within Vietnamese agrarian society, as argued for example by Hy Van Luong 1993. In addition to formal changes in the 1993 Land Law, there is evidence of a re-emergence of local level institu- tions associated with local collective action, and with economic activities. Some of these institu- tions, such as local level credit schemes, or Street Associations, have always been manifest within villages but have been redefined in the Doi Moi period. The implications of the liberalisation pro- cess on the interactions between land use, re- sources and climate risk are most dependent on these institutional changes, which themselves have far reaching consequences. Vietnam is faced with present day climatic risks associated with typhoons and droughts enhanced by periodic El Nin˜o events. In the future the patterns of extreme events are likely to change as a result of global climate change. How does the recent evolution of the Vietnamese economy, soci- ety and culture prepare Vietnam for the present day and potential future risks, as well as environ- mental change in general? Institutional and politi- cal changes appear to have offsetting influences on vulnerability to climatic changes, given present patterns of land use and ownership and the re- duced role of the state in risk management Adger, 1998, 1999b. Although market liberalisa- tion has contributed to increasing incomes and a decreasing reliance on climate dependent re- sources, this has been at some cost to collective security. At the national level there are explicit trade-offs in the investment in large scale in- frastructure for development and security. In the Mekong river system for example, investment in hydro-electric dams to provide electricity for ur- ban development affects both salinity and risks of flooding in the delta. Such investment and land use decisions are clearly tied to transboundary national and regional political imperatives Sned- don and Binh Thanh Nguyen, 1999. Thus the institutional and cultural influences on land use and environmental and climate risks is an ongoing evolutionary process.

4. Implications for researching vulnerability and adaptation