Shaping the Bargaining Agenda The Audit
Ian Roper, Paul Higgins and Phil James
Shaping the Bargaining Agenda? The Audit Commission and Public Service
Reform in British Local Government
Abstract
This article examines the role of the Audit Commission (AC) in local government collective bargaining. While the AC has no official role in such bargaining, it has a role in monitoring the performance of local government services. In this role the AC
has a clear potential, in the context of the government’s ‘modernisation’ agenda – as manife sted in its ‘Best Value’ regime, for influencing both the content of collective agreements, and the process of collective bargaining, where these are seen to conflict with other Best Value objectives – particularly in relation to external competition. The research conducted involved a content analysis of AC inspection reports on human resource services and longitudinal case studies of two local authority union branches’ experiences of Best Value and the role of the AC. The findings from the inspection reports indicate that, while the AC is actually acting to promote activities that could be seen as supportive of union bargaining agendas, notably in relation to equality type issues, they are also supporting service externalisation and thereby acting to limit the scope of their impact. The reports also indicate that, despite there being prescribed ‘best practice’ for local government employment relations (‘social partnership’ with unions), the AC is not promoting any such engagement with unions. Evidence from the case studies add weight to these observations: the AC, in one case, was deeply suspicious of an attempted union management agreement on procurement, while in the other, the AC made no criticism of the costly effects that externalisation had on union-management relations.
Contact:
Ian Roper Middlesex University The Burroughs London NW4 4BT
Shaping the Bargaining Agenda? The Audit Commission and Public Service
Reform in British Local Government
It has been common in analyses of national systems of employment relations to distinguish between the roles and related actions of governments, employers and trade unions. In the case of government, it has also been common to focus on its role of economic regulator, employer, legislator and provider of various advisory and dispute resolution processes or services. Each of these aspects of the governmental role remains relevant. However, at least in the case of Britain, they have come to be supplemented by the actions of government sponsored regulatory bodies whose remit is to oversee the value-for-money and quality of public services, whether these services are provided by public, private or non-for-profit organisations. A number of such bodies have been created over the last two decades and marked differences exist regarding their areas of activity and the precise roles that they play. For example, some owe their existence to a perceived need to monitor and control the actions and performance of privatised enterprises which have the potential to exploit monopolistic market positions to inflate prices.
Whatever their precise remit, the work of such bodies has potentially important implications for both the bargaining agenda and roles of trade unions within their fields of activity through shaping their surrounding economic context and/or more directly influencing them. Given this, there seems a clear case for exploring the nature of these effects. This is, moreover, particularly so given the evidence that British initiatives aimed at improving the delivery of public services have been exerting an important influence over the way in which other countries are seeking to obtain public service improvements (Bach et al, 1999; Pollitt, 1993).
This article consequently examines the impact of one such body, the Audit Commission (AC), on the bargaining agenda and institutional position of trade unions in British local government by reference to the regulatory role that it plays under the
British government’s modernisation and reform agenda. This examination embodies two levels of analysis: (1) an empirical investigation of AC inspections of personnel
functions and (2) case study research which sheds light on union experiences of the AC inspection process.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Initially, some background information is provided on the nature and changing context of employment relations within British local government, including the place that public service reform occupies within this and its impact on collective bargaining processes. The origins of the AC and the way in which its role has evolved are then examined. This examination is,
then, followed by an explanation of the present study’s methodology and a presentation of its findings. Finally, the last section draws together the key points to emerge from
the preceeding analysis and, in doing so, concludes that the activities of the AC are, indeed serving to shape the bargaining agenda of unions in a way that is broadly – though not exclusively - detrimental to the interests of unions and their members in local government.
The changing context of local government employment relations
Trade unions and the process of collective bargaining constitute central elements of the system of employment regulation within British local government. Union recognition for bargaining purposes, for example, is universal and membership density remains
high: in 2005 the ‘public administration’ category of employment – of which local government employment contributes a significant proportion of the total - recorded an average density of 57.1 per cent, the highest density for all major employment categories in the UK (Grainger, 2006: 21). In addition, unions’ institutional centrality is further demonstrated by the fact that local level management-union relationships take place within a framework of national bargaining arrangements incorporating not only administrative, professional, technical and clerical (APT&C) staff, but also their manual counterparts, police officers and staff, school teachers, and fire service personnel. Under these frameworks, negotiations take place between the Employers’ Organisation for Local Government, the umbrella body representing local government employers, and the relevant recognised unions. The most important of these, in terms of the number of workers covered, is the National Joint Council (NJC) for local government services, which came into being in 1997 as a result of the merger of the two previously separate NJCs for manual and APT&C staff. This merged NJC now constitutes the largest NJC of any kind in the UK (Local Government Pay Commission 2003). On the union side contributions come from those unions most representative of the sector; UNISON, which holds 31 places on the NJC, followed by the GMB (16) and the Transport and General Workers Union (11).
Inevitably, given the extent to which local government services are centrally funded, government policies and related philosophies have always formed an important backcloth to (and influence on) employer-union relations, at both the local and national levels (Terry, 2000). One important such influence has been the way in which the post- 1945 period has seen marked shifts in governmental perspectives regarding the desired nature of these relationships. In essence, these paradigmatic shifts have arguably entailed a move from an acceptance of a ‘model employer’ perspective – formulated Inevitably, given the extent to which local government services are centrally funded, government policies and related philosophies have always formed an important backcloth to (and influence on) employer-union relations, at both the local and national levels (Terry, 2000). One important such influence has been the way in which the post- 1945 period has seen marked shifts in governmental perspectives regarding the desired nature of these relationships. In essence, these paradigmatic shifts have arguably entailed a move from an acceptance of a ‘model employer’ perspective – formulated
The Model Employer Era
The basis of local government employment relations practice from the end of the second world war up to the 1970s has commonly been seen as having been centred on the notion of the ‘model employer’. Whilst this notion has been legitimately challenged as overly simplistic (Thornley 1995; Thornley, Ironside and Seifert2000), as a heuristic it nevertheless remains useful as a comparator of the changing ethos of what constitutes
‘good’ employment practice in the sector. The foundations of this approach can be traced to the Whitley structures for
employer-union interaction brought into local government in 1940 (Thomson and Beaumont 1978) that were based on the principles of consultation (rather than bargaining), consensus and of national, rather than local level exchange; structures which acted to prompt the trade unions involved in local government to place an emphasis on centralised decision-making arrangements and the servicing of members by full-time officials.
Over time, national level management-union relationships came to encompass collective bargaining, as well as joint consultation, though the assumptions of consensus that underpinned this system became increasingly anachronistic as bargaining became more confrontational in the 1970s against the background of local government budgetary constraints (Fairbrother 1996). This rise in adversarialism, in turn, contributed to a break up of the party political ‘post war consensus’ on employment in public services occurred, most notably through the 1979 ‘winter of discontent’, which was disproportionately located within local government. This break up came to fruition with the coming into power of a Conservative government in 1979
and the imposition of a ‘market state’ approach to public sector employment relations.
The Market State Era
The market state approach towards employment in local government comprehensively rejected the notion of the ‘model employer’ on the neo-classical, Public Choice premise (Niskanen, 1971) that workers, through their unions, will always seek to insulate themselves from the need to adapt their working practices to improve productivity. This was, in turn, seen to be compounded by a style of management – the now, maligned, ‘public administration’ approach (Pollitt 1993) - that neither had the threat nor the
incentive of the competitive market to confront such behaviour.
The introduction of compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) sought to deal with these problems by creating ‘contestable markets’ under which public services were opened up to competition. This involved in-house, direct service organisations
(DSOs) being compelled to compete for existing work with private contractors on the basis that:
…the terms and conditions of employment by contractors of their workers or the composition of, the arrangements for the promotion, transfer or training of or the other opportunities afforded to, their workforces. (HMSO 1988)
Since local government services are essentially labour intensive, competition for local services inevitably became focused upon labour costs (Ganley and Grahl 1987, Cutler and Waine 1998, Escott & Whitfield 1995; Walsh 1995). In addition, the need under CCT to hold budgets at the individual service level provided managements with a direct incentive to devolve personnel decision-making toward the operational level and thus an encouragement to decentralise collective bargaining in line with prescribed HRM best practice of the time (Legge, 2005). As a result, this led to the importance of national terms and conditions declining and a corresponding rise occurring in the importance of local level bargaining (Beaumont, 1992; Gill, 1995) – a rise which created profound difficulties for trade unions whose internal structures were shaped to mirror the national level Whitley ones (Colling, 1995) and raised the issue of whether unions could effectively adapt their organisational structures and activities to support an effective process of joint regulation at this level.
For some analysts, unions could potentially adapt, but only under certain circumstances. Fosh (1993), for example, has argued that trade union viability could be greatly enhanced in situations where local leadership offered a collectivist outlook with
a participative leadership style which took due cognisance of the fact that that member attachment can reflect both individualistic and collectivist outlooks and hence be shaped by both ideological and instrumentalist assumptions about collectivism, In a similar vein, Fairbrother (1994; 1996; 2000) has argued, more generally, that the a participative leadership style which took due cognisance of the fact that that member attachment can reflect both individualistic and collectivist outlooks and hence be shaped by both ideological and instrumentalist assumptions about collectivism, In a similar vein, Fairbrother (1994; 1996; 2000) has argued, more generally, that the
The Evolution of a Hybridised Employment System
The employment relations system that has emerged in local government since 1997 can
be seen as a hybridised version of the previous market state approach 1 . This hybrid approach is in line with New Labour’s broad approach to employment regulation which
emphasises individual employment rights over collective ones (Pollert, 2005; Smith and Morton, 2001) and embodies an enthusiasm for market based solutions to public service reform which, although differing in significant ways to that of CCT, retain some of the regime’s key attributes. As a result, while New Labour did support the conclusion in 1997 of a union-friendly , if ‘uniquely complex’, single-status harmonisation agreement (Local Government Pay Commission, 2003: 23), the general direction of its public service reform agenda has contributed to a deterioration in national level union-government relationships.(Waddington, 2003).
When Labour replaced the Conservatives in government in 1997, it proclaimed that CCT would be scrapped in favour of a policy of ‘Best Value’ (BV). However this did not signal a return to the idealised ‘model employer’ approach because New Labour, informed by ‘third way’ prescriptions of reform (Giddens, 1998), mistrusted
1 The basis of this hybridised conception is concerned specifically with the employment aspects of welfare reform. It is recognised that more comprehensive definitions of how the New Labour approach
differs to Conservative approaches to welfare reform in the social policy literature (Deacon, 2002; Newman 2001) differs to Conservative approaches to welfare reform in the social policy literature (Deacon, 2002; Newman 2001)
The early impression given was that it did not matter how local authorities pursued BV provided that they delivered it in keeping with New Labour principles of avoiding ideological concerns about ownership (DETR, 1997). Unlike CCT, BV consequently promised to open up the range of management tools available to local government managements, albeit within the confines of the need to review the services they provided in accordance with the ‘four Cs’ of BV; a requirement that obliged them to ‘challenge’ whether a service should continue to be provided, to consult users over its cur rent and future shape and performance, to ‘compare’ the service’s current performance with that of similar services elsewhere and to subject the service to competition.
The replacement of CCT with BV has consequently not involved a clear rejection of the ‘public choice’ assumptions that informed the former. Thus, not only does ‘competition’ remain but, in addition, the role that it plays within BV provides for forms of partial outsourcing to be utilised that go beyond the ‘binary’ options of either complete in-house or complete externalisation decisions that were provided for within CCT. The BV review process, therefore, represents a cont inuation of the ‘enabling’ model of the local authority under which, while services are secured by local authorities, they are not necessarily provided by them directly.
The role of BV in promoting potentially greater external involvement does not, moreover, end with the prescriptive management tools to be used by management within the BV review process. Characteristic of the New Labour approach to public service reform is a lack of trust that, at the local level, reforms will be administered in The role of BV in promoting potentially greater external involvement does not, moreover, end with the prescriptive management tools to be used by management within the BV review process. Characteristic of the New Labour approach to public service reform is a lack of trust that, at the local level, reforms will be administered in
The introduction of BV has therefore increased the number of avenues through which the private sector can be involved in the delivery of public services and the range of situations in which staff can be transferred from public to private sector employment. Indeed BV can be argued to pose a greater threat to workers who wish to remain council employees than was the case under CCT; an argument which receives support from evidence showing that – at the level of ‘partial transfer’ – it has enabled more externalisation than CCT (Roper, James and Higgins 2005) and raises the likelihood that that the regime is leading to the types of negative effects on work intensification and job insecurity previously associated with CCT (Richardson et al, 2005)
However, some context is required. The environment within which BV operates is not directly comparable to CCT, in that it cannot straightforwardly be seen to provide
a route for directly driving down workers’ terms and conditions of employment through direct transfer to low-pay oriented contractors. Thus, while Labour have been criticised for their lack of enthusiasm in promoting collective (union) rights (Smith and Morton, 2001), they have introduced a range of measures aimed at enhancing the rights and conditions of individual workers. In the context of the local government employment relations system this operates at three levels. The first level has been the introduction of universal rights, including the national minimum wage, equalising rights for part-time a route for directly driving down workers’ terms and conditions of employment through direct transfer to low-pay oriented contractors. Thus, while Labour have been criticised for their lack of enthusiasm in promoting collective (union) rights (Smith and Morton, 2001), they have introduced a range of measures aimed at enhancing the rights and conditions of individual workers. In the context of the local government employment relations system this operates at three levels. The first level has been the introduction of universal rights, including the national minimum wage, equalising rights for part-time
national agreements that enhance the rights of staff transferred from the public sector. This has included measures addressing the so- called ‘two-tier workforce’, and, on projects affected by the Public Finance Initiatives (PFI), the concluding of the so-called
‘Warwick Agreement’ between Labour and the unions prior to the 2005 general election. The final level of protection has involved sectoral-level actions which have
affected national agreements specifically relating to local government. These actions have included the commitments to pursue ‘best practice’ initiatives on equal pay, single status and on a ‘mainstreaming equalities’ agenda (Ruberry, Grimshaw and Figueiro, 2005) – often specifically tied to BV (Local Government Pay Commission 2003; EO 2001)
These contextual developments, when taken together, suggest that while BV, like CCT before it, does embody a continued emphasis on the externalisation of external services, it does so in an environment that serves to place limits on the extent to which the terms and conditions of those employed by external providers can be lower than those set for directly employed local authority staff through local government collective bargaining machinery. It is for this reason that the issue of how the actions of the regulatory body responsible for overseeing the operation of the BV regime impact on the collective bargaining agenda of local government trade unions seems to be one that merits an investigation of the type undertaken below. For, a clear potential exists for these actions to either support or undermine (a) the content of
2 It should be noted that most of these changes have been prompted by the need to transpose the requirements of European Union directives into domestic law – and that the watered down nature of their
interpretation has, in itself, been another source of tension between the government and the unions (Waddington, 2003).
bargaining agendas that the unions wish to pursue and (b) the role that they may play in pursuance of these – or other – bargaining agendas.
T he Audit Commission’s expanding remit from CCT to BV
One of the paradoxes of the Public Choice agenda for reform is that markets for public services do not ‘make’ themselves; they have to be made artificially by the state and
then somehow regulated. In local government the operationalisation of CCT, and later BV, has been monitored by the AC, set up in 1983 to ensure a transparent tendering process and through this the application of ‘market discipline’ to staff and their unions
(Vincent-Jones and Harries 1996). This responsibility meant that the AC was implicitly drawn into the contested terrain of local government industrial relations, though it had also been a champion of some of the management reforms implicated by CCT via the stress it placed on the importance of the ‘make or buy’ decision (Audit Commission, 1987) and the ‘best practice’ guidance it published with respect to the ‘ideal’ separation
of client and contractor responsibilities (Audit Commission, 1995a). More generally, the AC has been at the forefront of promoting value for money (VFM) in local government services as defined primarily in terms of the ‘3Es’ of economy, efficiency and effectiveness - three concerns which complimented the competition/management aspirations of CCT.
Since 1983 the remit of the AC has expanded in scale and scope. In terms of scale, its remit was expanded in the early 1990s to cover the joint inspection of social services. However, with the introduction of BV, the scope the AC’s role has expanded from being an assessor of (cost) efficiency into one of being an arbiter of output performance (Cope and Goodship, 2002). The key expression of this has been the AC’s Since 1983 the remit of the AC has expanded in scale and scope. In terms of scale, its remit was expanded in the early 1990s to cover the joint inspection of social services. However, with the introduction of BV, the scope the AC’s role has expanded from being an assessor of (cost) efficiency into one of being an arbiter of output performance (Cope and Goodship, 2002). The key expression of this has been the AC’s
authorities’ adherence to CCT rules and regulations (Colling, 1999) by reaching judgements concerning the ‘current’ and ‘likely future’ performance of BV reviewed
services (Audit Commission, 2000). Current performance for these inspection purposes was then assessed as ‘poor’,
‘fair’, ‘good’ or ‘excellent’ and likely future performance as ‘poor’, ‘uncertain’, ‘promising’ and ‘excellent’. Where an unfavourable inspection judgement was made, it
was open to the Secretary of State to impose one of a number of sanctions. Under section 15 of the Local Government Act 1999, these include, the provision of external management help, the requirement that services be put out to competition, the seizure of the authority’s ability to provide services directly and the transference of service responsibility to a third party. While the ramifications of a particular inspection judgement could, therefore, be quite severe, the BV inspectorate was keen to stress that it was not merely operating a penal system. Instead, as part of the BV inspection visit, each authority received recommendations that indicated how it might improve its future service performance. Thus, as the AC (1999: 17) maintained:
‘ Councils might find it unhelpful if the inspectorate simply questioned the quality of a review, without indicating how it expected a council to make
improvements ’ . Since the introduction of BV in 1999, Labour’s reform of local government has moved
on at a rapid pace and in 2002 the tangential policy of comprehensive performance assessment (CPA) was introduced. This more recent policy initiative involves auditors and inspectors assessing local authorities’ entire performance rather than, as in BV, the performance of individual services or packages of services (Andrews, 2004).
In pursuit of service quality, the AC’s work can clearly be seen to have the potential to impact on the bargaining agendas of unions. A clear demonstration of this is the way in which its work formed an important backcloth to the 2002/03 dispute in the British fire service and its aftermath. Thus, while assessments of this dispute – or its antecedents – do not identify the AC as the key protagonist, the AC’s initial recommendations for reform (Audit Commission 1995b) have been identified as an important catalyst to the dispute and its subsequent policing of ‘modernisation’ fol lowing the dispute’s resolution, been seen as playing an role in shaping the ongoing contested situation in the service (Burchill, 2004; Fitzgerald, 2005).
Likewise, the role that AC inspectors are playing in terms of shaping local government employment relations, furthermore, receives support from the content of a briefing document that the AC has produced on managing people in local government (Audit Commission, 2003). Thus, while this provides guidance on six factors which are seen as critical to successful people management – empowering leadership, people management strategies, managing performance, capacity building, workforce diversity and recruitment and retention, it is remarkably silent as to the role of unions and union- management relations, beyond the making of a few passing references to these issues in two of the illustrative case studies provided in the document, and hence does little to encourage local government employers to work closely with unions.
In the context of reforming local government, then, it is being suggested here that the role of the AC, in its role as regulator of services influenced by Public Choice assumptions, could have a negative impact on the bargaining agendas of unions across two dimensions. The first dimension is of influencing the content of the bargaining agenda either by promoting issues detrimental to union interests (e.g. outsourcing) or by deeming certain issues off-limits (e.g. retaining in-house provision); in both cases In the context of reforming local government, then, it is being suggested here that the role of the AC, in its role as regulator of services influenced by Public Choice assumptions, could have a negative impact on the bargaining agendas of unions across two dimensions. The first dimension is of influencing the content of the bargaining agenda either by promoting issues detrimental to union interests (e.g. outsourcing) or by deeming certain issues off-limits (e.g. retaining in-house provision); in both cases
More generally, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, it is possible to identify three different ways in which the impact of the AC on the process and outcome of collective bargaining could be generated:
By encouraging the externalisation of services and in this way undermining the degree to which service provision falls within the scope of national and in-house negotiations and, via the competitive processes involved, limiting the ability of
unions to protect and enhance workers’ terms and conditions of employment; By prompting employers to seek to introduce new human resource policies and
practices in respect of staff and thereby shaping the focus and nature of in-house negotiations in a way conduicive to, or at odds, with union bargaining; and
By supporting, or undermining, the more general (institutional) position of unions and thereby role that they play in the regulation of in-house employment relations.
Methodology
To explore the impact of the AC on the bargaining agenda of local government trade unions the article draws on two different strands of analysis. Together, it is argued, To explore the impact of the AC on the bargaining agenda of local government trade unions the article draws on two different strands of analysis. Together, it is argued,
The first strand of analysis involved the examination of all 27 BV inspection reports relating to local authority human resource/personnel departments available as of February 2005. The purpose of this examination was two-fold. First, to identify (a) those aspects of the services which were deemed ‘praiseworthy’, (b) those aspects that were deemed problematic and in need of improvement, and (c) those aspects in respect of which the inspectors were moved to make recommendations. Secondly, within each of these categories, a frequency analysis of the various issues so identified was undertaken so as to highlight those which could have positive or negative implications for the content (and to a lesser extent process) of union bargaining agendas.
The second strand comprised the use of data drawn from longitudinal case studies conducted in two local authorities between 1995 and 2004 which were, more broadly, focussed on local level experiences of the transition from CCT to BV. The first case study was a large English northern metropolitan authority; the second was an English southern urban authority – with a particular focus on waste services. The main method of enquiry in both these studies was semi-structured interviews, but policy documentation, secondary sources and – in one case – a questionnaire survey was also used at the early stages. Initial interviews in the northern authority (conducted between 1995 and 1997) were with senior corporate and service managers (2), line managers (2), the UNISON branch secretary and the union workplace representatives (10). In the southern authority (conducted between 1999 and 2002) twenty four initial interviews were conducted including senior managers (4) line managers (8) contractors (3), the Council’s political leaders the GMB branch secretary and regional official. Follow-up The second strand comprised the use of data drawn from longitudinal case studies conducted in two local authorities between 1995 and 2004 which were, more broadly, focussed on local level experiences of the transition from CCT to BV. The first case study was a large English northern metropolitan authority; the second was an English southern urban authority – with a particular focus on waste services. The main method of enquiry in both these studies was semi-structured interviews, but policy documentation, secondary sources and – in one case – a questionnaire survey was also used at the early stages. Initial interviews in the northern authority (conducted between 1995 and 1997) were with senior corporate and service managers (2), line managers (2), the UNISON branch secretary and the union workplace representatives (10). In the southern authority (conducted between 1999 and 2002) twenty four initial interviews were conducted including senior managers (4) line managers (8) contractors (3), the Council’s political leaders the GMB branch secretary and regional official. Follow-up
In the northern authority, an important part of the data collected at the authority- wide level relat ed to the authority’s performance in relation to the retention of all services in-house under CCT, the challenge that BV, and associated changes in Council leadership policy, posed for such retention, the way in which the main trade union and Council management sought to address this challenge through the development of a joint agreement on ‘service procurement’ and the manner in which the development of
this agreement was shaped by both the BV regulatory regime and the actual, and anticipated, attitude of AC inspectors towards it.
As regards the southern authority, a central focus of concern within it was the examination of the experiences of its refuse collection service under both CCT and BV. As part of this examination, the degree of trade union involvement in the developments which occurred under BV was explored and insights gained into how BV inspectors viewed this involvement.
Overall, it is argued that the bringing together of these two strands of analysis, the examination of inspection reports relating to human resource/personnel departments and the reporting of case study findings shedding light on union experiences of the inspection process, enables important insights to be gained into the central issue of interest in this article, namely how the work of the AC impacts on the bargaining agendas and roles of local government unions. Thus, the first serves to highlight, on a quantitative basis, the aspects of human resource management that the AC views as being of the greatest import and hence the types of arrangements that local authorities should be seeking to pursue – remembering that the context is of a system where union Overall, it is argued that the bringing together of these two strands of analysis, the examination of inspection reports relating to human resource/personnel departments and the reporting of case study findings shedding light on union experiences of the inspection process, enables important insights to be gained into the central issue of interest in this article, namely how the work of the AC impacts on the bargaining agendas and roles of local government unions. Thus, the first serves to highlight, on a quantitative basis, the aspects of human resource management that the AC views as being of the greatest import and hence the types of arrangements that local authorities should be seeking to pursue – remembering that the context is of a system where union
Evidence from human resource inspection reports
To set the scene for the analysis of the inspection reports on human resource/personnel departments, the overall judgements on current performance and prospects for future improvement are initially provided. In the case of current performance, this examination, as Figure 1 shows, reveals that the majority (17) of the departments were judged as being ‘fair’, with a minority (8) being viewed as ‘good’ and only 2 being judged on the extremities of being either ‘poor’ or ‘excellent’. Meanwhile, in terms of prospects for future improvement, the majority (16) of the services were judged as
having ‘promising’ chances, with the prospects of most of the remainder (9) being seen as ‘uncertain’.
(insert figure 1 about here)
With regard to the aspects of human resource/personnel performance that BV inspectors viewed as praiseworthy and problematic - and on which they felt moved to make recommendations - these are detailed in Tables 1-3 below.
(insert table 1 about here)
From Table 1, it can be seen that 14 different ‘praiseworthy’ issues of relevance were identified in the inspection reports; although only four of these were mentioned more than twice. Taken together, these issues would seem to have both positive and negative implications for union bargaining agendas. Thus, on the positive side, they encompass inspector endorsement of those departments which were seen to have done well in relation to a number of aspects of performance which can be assumed to be compatible with union bargaining objectives – the promotion of equality issues, progression towards single status terms and conditions, regular consultation, the provision of good facilities for disabled workers and good standards of health and safety. On the other hand, the reports also embody inspector endorsement of a number of features of departmental performance, use of externalisation, moves towards performance related pay and workforce reductions, which unions would almost certainly view as problematic and would not, of their own volition, raise for discussion. In addition, while one of the more commonly mentioned areas of inspector praise, the improvement of sickness absence management could potentially be an area of joint management-union interest, it is strongly hinted in the language of the reports that the inspectors were more concerned with reducing ‘absence’ and less with the component of this issue that unions would be more likely to be positively interested in, namely ‘sickness’ reduction (TUC 2005).
Nevertheless, on a strictly numerical basis, the data provided in Table 1 suggests that inspectors more commonly endorse and praise aspects of human resource management that are compatible with, rather than in conflict with, likely union bargaining objectives. As a result and taken together, they provide little evidence that AC inspectors are adopting evaluation criteria that are systematically at odds with Nevertheless, on a strictly numerical basis, the data provided in Table 1 suggests that inspectors more commonly endorse and praise aspects of human resource management that are compatible with, rather than in conflict with, likely union bargaining objectives. As a result and taken together, they provide little evidence that AC inspectors are adopting evaluation criteria that are systematically at odds with
a positive and supportive approach towards union involvement.
(insert table 2 about here)
When attention is turned to the rather fewer issues that gave rise to explicit inspector criticisms of performance, a similar pattern emerges. Thus, only one of the items detailed in Table 2 above, namely the making of inadequate efforts to identify external partners, would seem clearly to relate to a matter that would be likely to conflict with union bargaining priorities, while the majority of those raised would seem compatible with them – with the partial exception, given the discussion above, of that of ‘sickness’
(insert table 3 about here)
Finally, in terms of the issues covered by inspector recommendations, it can be seen from Table 3 that equal opportunities emerges most prominently and externalisation also features strongly. Meanwhile, the issue of sickness absence management receives several mentions, as does, in various ways, the need to improve Finally, in terms of the issues covered by inspector recommendations, it can be seen from Table 3 that equal opportunities emerges most prominently and externalisation also features strongly. Meanwhile, the issue of sickness absence management receives several mentions, as does, in various ways, the need to improve
Case study 1: Northern Metropolitan Authority
The relevant findings of this case study are detailed through an exploration of three main issues. The first of these is the authority’s experiences of in-house service retention under CCT and in the early stages of BV. The second is the factors that prompted union and management in the authority to pursue the conclusion of a joint agreement on service procurement and the nature of the agreement so concluded. The third is the way in which the contents of this agreement were shaped by the requirements of BV and the attitudes, both actual and anticipated, of AC inspectors.
In-house service retention under CCT and BV
Under CCT, the UNISON branch at Northern Metropolitan Authority proactively sought to retain services in-house, in collaboration with management and the political leadership, which was Labour dominated. To this end, it therefore accommodated a variety of management initiatives aimed at securing successful in-house bids – an approach that proved a complete success..
Following the introduction of BV, however, the three-way consensus broke down, though not straight away. Thus, interestingly, UNISON was initially keen to engage with the BV agenda, the Branch Chair commenting that:
… if you go though a rigorous review and you’re actually willing to do the ‘challenge’ in the way we’re meant to, if its not around the philosophy of externalising whatever, it can be a positive process: actually involving the workforce in that type of review and how do we deliver service improvement. There has been some good practice developed here. (2004)
A new chief executive, however, was appointed who took the council’s political leadership with him on a ‘modernisation’ agenda replete with references to
commercialisation and external partnerships. As part of this new policy agenda, a proposal was made to outsource the Council’s information technology support (ITS). This was met with met with fierce union opposition – backed by the strong feelings of staff working in the affected area – which, ultimately, resulted in the union mobilising members throughout the council to undertake strike action. In the face of this action, the external ‘partner’ pulled out of the deal.
Partnership – but not as we know it?
Not long after these events, the chief executive left the council and UNISON decided that it needed to deal explicitly with the issue of procurement as a strategic issue and to do so through the securing of an agreement with management on the subject. In seeking such an agreement, the union’s approach was, in many ways, couched in the language of union- management ‘partnership’ favoured by the government. However, this language was utilised against the backcloth of the union possessing a clear and credible mobilising capacity and retaining a principled opposition to externalisation.
We developed a strategy in the branch that we took out to the city. We set up the Public Services Alliance which generally brought together community groups, the trade unions, around an anti-privatisation agend a… We were opening up a whole debate so [ITS] was a key part of that type of campaigning strategy.
[...ITS] becam e the key focus […] We said to them ‘look , we can either have this battle every time or we can actually look at a strategy that actually takes out the conflict. We may not like it – its [government] policy – [but ] there’s probably a strategy we can develop that can allow us to actually avoid this. (UNISON Branch Secretary 2004)
The resulting procurement agreement, which was signed in 2004 and amounted to 78 pages, promoted ‘ fair employment practices ’ and secured union rights to be involved in all stages of any potential outsourcing scenario – even extending into previously unregulated areas of employing agency staff and contractors.
The clear agreement is, we will develop an in-house comparator as well as look at alternative models. … My view always will be that if we get that process right then we will win hands-down every time. (UNISON Branch Secretary 2004)
The influence of external regulation on the procurement agreement
UNISON was conscious, from the early stages of BV, of the potential constraining influences of the AC on its own agenda to retain in-house service provision. This became more apparent as the results of AC inspection reports began to come through. For example the Corporate Assessment of the Council in 2002 summarised that the Council’s approach ‘… makes excessive allowance for even a demonstrably uncompetitive in-house service to benefit from a protracted opportunity to turn itself around before alternative options are considered ’. It was for this reason that the wording of the agreement was carefully vetted.
The procurement strategy is written in Audit Commission language. We took the procurement policy and re-wrote it – literally – in their language. What we said was ‘what are the key principles we want at every stage’ …What we’re tryin g to create was a level playing field. [With] the political backdrop that says ‘yes we are committed to in- house services’, if we have a level playing field; if the trade unions and workforce can play a part, I feel quite comfortable that it meets the gove rnment’s requirements [though not in the ideological sense].
The dangers of failing an AC inspection are serious, as has been noted above. As a result the council was nervous about attracting criticism from the AC. While the 2005 CPA report praised the council for the adoption of the procurement strategy- interestingly because it was claimed to have enabled framework agreements with external contractors - this assessment was preceded by criticism, in a 2002 report, of the council’s unwillingness to ‘use competition as a way of improving core council services’. This criticism was, in turn, seen as stemming from political weakness. UNISON ’s branch secretary was in no doubt as to the direction and influence of these criticisms:
I went to a seminar - a briefing - that was given by two senior inspectors from the Audit Commission. And it was incredible. They launched into [the council] because the Labour group had passed the motion – as part of the battle on ITRS, remember - they passed a motion committing themselves to in-house service provision. And you had inspectors standing up there saying ‘this is absolutely unacceptable’. I mean, I went ‘who are you? What is going on; you have no right to be doing this! ’. … And that made the management ultra cautious even though the procurement policy that went away, [was checked] with the Audit Commission, the CPA people … [T] hey are so frightened of the Audit Commission and the inspection regime. And that does influence a lot of the thinking. (2004)
Case study 2: Southern Unitary Authority
The second case study covered developments at a waste services department of a south- coast unitary authority. In a similar format to the presentation of the findings from the first case study, attention is focussed on the experiences under CCT, the early experiences of BV and the attitudes, both actual and anticipated, of AC inspectors.
Experiences under CCT