Coordinating for Contingencies Taking St

Erik Brattberg* , **

*Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, SAIS, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 525, Washington, DC 20036, USA. E-mail: ebrattb1@jhu.edu **Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Box 27035, 10251 Stockholm, Sweden

Over a decade after September

11, American citizens are still asking themselves: ‘how

much safer are we today?’ This question is also pertinent for scholars seeking to under- stand the post-September

11 homeland security reforms. This paper, drawing on the

public administration literature and using Don Kettl’s ‘contingent coordination’ frame- work, sets out to discuss how well these efforts have addressed the central coordination challenges posed by homeland security. In doing so, it makes two contributions: one methodological (e.g., operationalizing the contingent coordination framework) and one empirical (e.g., assessing the effectiveness of post-9/ 11 homeland security reforms).The paper concludes with an overall assessment of how to find ways to further strengthen the capacity of the US homeland security system.

1. Introduction

agement and response principles and develop common planning frameworks, saw daylight.

T But when faced with another large-scale disaster –

he September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks placed

homeland security at the very top of the national the Hurricane Katrina hitting the Gulf Coast in August public policy agenda. A decade after the attacks, home-

2005 – the new preparedness and response mecha- land security remains one of the top missions for the

nisms proved toothless (Cooper & Block, 2006; Daniels, US government. But, as the National Strategy for

Kettl, & Kunreuther, 2006; Parker, Stern, Pagila, & Homeland Security argues, securing the homeland is

Brown, 2009). Hurricane Katrina illustrated competing also an extremely complex mission, requiring a coordi-

decision-making structures, information-sharing obsta- nated and integrated effort from all levels of society –

cles between federal, state and local officials, a lack of ranging from the federal government to state and local

effective preparedness among officials across the gov- governments to the private and non-profit sectors.

ernance spectrum and implementation resistance at the How to achieve coordination between these various

local level (Perrow, 2007; Cooper & Block, 2006). The actors has been the focal point of recent years’ home-

flawed response to Hurricane Katrina let to additional land security reforms. The September 11 terrorist

organizational reshuffling and further efforts to improve attacks revealed coordination problems between

the federal government’s ability to coordinate its efforts federal agencies, and varying levels of response capacity

with those of state and local authorities in the event of among local authorities (Perrow, 2007; 9/11 Commis-

large-scale disasters.

sion, 2005). These events thus created strong impetus While no new major homeland security emergency for reorganization of the national homeland security

have yet forced the current system into extreme test, system. As a result, a number of initiatives to ‘connect

experts remind us that it is only a matter of time before the dots’ between organizations, address common man-

the next ‘big one’ is likely to occur. Unprecedented

© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5973.2012.00662.x

2 Erik Brattberg

crises and disasters – whether terrorism attacks, resources are exhausted (Lindsay & O’Hanlon, 2002; natural disasters or the outbreak of serious pandemic

Sauter & Carafano, 2006).

influenzas – are on the rise, both in frequency and The September 11, 2001 attacks, however, would intensity.Taking stock of the current efforts to establish

change the US national response and emergency

a unified management of the national crisis and disaster system fundamentally. The passing of the Homeland response is therefore a pertinent undertaking, especially

Security Act of 2002, calling for the establishment of in light of the 10-year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks.

the DHS to consolidate the essential agencies charged One major limitation of this study is that it will primarily

with securing US borders and national infrastructure, focus on the role of the Department of Homeland

created impetus for a more coordinated national pre- Security (DHS), leaving out the issue of reform in the

paredness and response approach. White House intelligence community.

(2002) declared DHS responsible for comprehensive This paper employs a public administration perspec-

vulnerability assessments for critical infrastructure and tive to assess how well the post-September 11 and

key assets, by merging intelligence and information the post-Katrina policy reform efforts have addressed

analysis in order to focus on long-term preventive the central coordination challenges posed by home-

measures and coordinating and sharing of information land security, thus making America safer in an era of

with other executive branch agencies, local and state ‘new vulnerabilities’. Don Kettl’s ‘contingent coordina-

actors and with non-federal entities. tion approach’, which presents five analytical dimen-

Today, a decade after the September 11 attacks, sur- sions, allows us to make such an assessment. These

prisingly few attempts have been made to systematically are: (1) how to match place and function, (2) how to

assess to what extent the massive homeland security define a floor, (3) how to build a reliable learning

overhaul initiated after 9/11 have addressed the central system, (4) how to balance the old with the new and

homeland security challenge; namely, how to obtain an (5) how to meet citizens’ expectations in a frag-

adequate level of coordination between the numerous mented system. These dimensions provide useful

actors at federal, state and local levels involved in this metrics for identifying challenges in providing for

complex national mission. To assist us in making this homeland security and assessing institutional vulner-

assessment, we turn to the public administration litera- ability in the US homeland security system. I conclude

ture, which has a long track record of dealing with the with an overall assessment of how to find ways to

issue of coordination in public policy. further strengthen the capacity of the US homeland security system.

2. 1. Coordination in the public administration

literature

2. Homeland security as a coordination puzzle Sometimes referred to as ‘the philosopher’s stone of

public administration’ (see Seidman, 1998), coordination While coordination challenges are inescapable in any

is a classic topic in the public administration literature modern society, the institutional fragmentation and

(Morris & Morris, 2007, p. 95) and one that is notori- organizational complexity characterizing the American

ously difficult to define 1 (Helsloot, 2008, p. 174). Public federalist system is known to present exceptional coor-

administration scholars have argued that this is possible dination challenges (see, for example, Kaufman, 1960;

to bring under control the challenges posed by complex Peters, 2006, pp. 185–187). Developments of complex

governmental systems as long as the right formula for government and intergovernmental systems since the

coordination is found (see for example Seidman, 1998, 1960s have rendered a complicated set of coordination

p. 142). On the question of what the central coordina- challenges.These challenges are further exacerbated by

tion obstacles are, and what the best formula for the more recent task of providing for homeland secu-

addressing them is, we can distinguish between two rity (Kettl, 2003a, 2007).

separate conceptual approaches. Having historically lacked a comprehensive national

The first of these is the traditional ‘hierarchical response and emergency system, US emergency prepar-

approach’. Stemming from Max Weber’s classic bureau- edness and response responsibilities have traditionally

cratic model of public administration and built on the rested primarily on state and local governments and have

work of Gulick (1937), Taylor (1911) and Dahl (1947), tended to focus on natural disasters rather than on

this approach depicts organizations as being divided terrorist attacks (see CRS Report to Congress, 2006).

into specialized functional units. Coordination in a hier- Moreover, the role of the federal government has his-

archical organization is thus viewed as ‘a carefully torically been limited to supporting emergency pre-

crafted, clear, and unambiguous set of relationships paredness and management by providing resources

delineated for each element of the system, with clear before large-scale disasters, and to offer response and

lines of authority developed to link the various pieces recovery assistance after such disasters when local

together in a rational manner’ (Morris & Morris, 2007,

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p. 95). Effective coordination, from this perspective, is about dividing responsibilities within an organization and establishing clear links between functions. Or if we are speaking of interagency coordination, this view sees coordination as something occurring between units rather than between individual workers (Morris & Morris, 2007).

Contrary to this view, the more recent ‘network approach’ depicts coordination as the interaction between multiple interdependent organizations existing apart from traditional hierarchical mechanisms (Chisholm, 1992; O’Toole, 1997; Wise, 2002, p. 133; Wise, 2006, p. 311). Instead of being based on top-down authority and position, network coordination between organizations is based on a mutual need for sharing resources, authority, knowledge and technology, using negotiation and mutual adjustment instruments (Morris & Morris, 2007, p. 95).

Thus, depending on how one conceptualizes the core coordination issue – whether it is essentially a hierar- chical challenge or a network one – different solutions to the coordination dilemma follow accordingly. However, when it comes to the complex task of pro- viding for homeland security, neither model is entirely appropriate. The hierarchal approach suffers from the fact that managers in multi-organizational settings often lack authority over other organizations, making it also difficult to establish such clear top-down linkages. An additional problem is that the hierarchies can be too rigid and slow to adapt to the sudden changes and unanticipated problems typically characterizing modern security threats (Wise, 2006, p. 311). While network approaches, on the other hand, might be better suited to address the lack of authority common in many multi- organizational settings, they also fall short when it comes to accountability and measuring of performance (Wise & Nader, 2002) – two very important elements of homeland security.

Relying too heavily on one ideal type conceptualiza- tion of coordination to identify the central coordination gaps in homeland security accordingly risks overlook- ing a certain set of challenges, and consequently also the instruments, by which these challenges can be addressed. In order to assess the central coordination challenges in homeland security, and discuss suitable models for addressing these, it is therefore important that the relative insights from both approaches are given equal weight.

Fortunately, doing precisely this is Don Kettl in the article ‘Contingent Coordination’, which appeared in the American Review of Public Administration in 2003. In this article, Kettl presents a framework that is specifi- cally tailored to using coordination for addressing homeland security threats, drawing on the comparative strengths of both the hierarchical and the network approaches.This framework will constitute the basis for

our assessment of how the post-9/11 homeland secu- rity reforms have addressed the central coordination gaps.

3. The contingent coordination framework

Having learned that coordination is both the diagnosis of, and the solution to, the homeland security problem, what we now need is a clearer understanding of the nature of homeland security problems and how coor- dination can address these through better identifying and connecting the dots between the organizations and actors involved in this mission.According to Kettl, coor- dinating for homeland security in the United States poses five principal problems, which the government must address. This homeland security-specific frame- work will in turn constitute the metrics for assessing the homeland security coordination efforts in the United States following the 9/11 in this paper.

3. 1. Dimension 1: How to match place and

functions

Agencies responding to homeland security problems tend to be functionally organized, as opposed to place- based, rendering coping with incidents affecting specific locations particularly challenging. Many homeland secu- rity functions, such as law enforcement, transportation, food safety and public health, information technology and emergency management, are dispersed across a vast array of different actors ranging from the federal government to different state and local authorities to the non-profit and private sectors (Lindsay & O’Hanlon, 2002; Sauter & Carafano, 2006). Homeland security coordination must therefore occur simultaneously on the horizontal and vertical levels. Horizontally, coordi- nation may entail establishing an executive office coor- dination office or networks between the various federal departments and agencies carrying homeland security responsibilities. Vertical coordination, on the other hand, could be local officials cultivating working rela- tionships with their state and federal counterparts.

Proposing that coordination is obtainable both under hierarchical and network forms of authority, Kettl suggests that different actors, both within and outside of traditional hierarchical organizational structures, must collaborate with each other in the event of a crisis situation (Morris & Morris, 2007, p. 96). However, a common misinterpretation, he argues, is that improving homeland security coordination through the connect- ing place-based and function-based capacities inevitably requires physical reorganization and relocation of func- tions. Improving coordination through decision making is more effective than structural reorganization since the latter is typically slow to adapt to sudden changes.

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4 Erik Brattberg

Noting that any system dealing with homeland security Such a federal block–grant system would appropriate needs to be ‘lithe and flexible’, Kettl suggests that estab-

funding, while states retain responsibility for developing lishing inter-organizational networks, that is informal

statewide plans. Local governments should also be given network approaches bridging the gap between struc-

substantial power to manage their resources within the tural and individual approaches, is one practical way of

statewide strategy.

better balancing place-based and function-based capaci- ties. Using information technology, such networks can assist in identifying, linking and connecting organizations

3.3. Dimension 3: How to build a reliable

(Kettl, 2003b, p. 273). Furthermore, along the lines

learning system

of the 9/11 Commission report, Kettl recommends Establishing a well-coordinated routine response strengthening regional emergency planning and estab- system based on previous experiences is particularly lishing state-wide mutual aid agreements to reinforce difficult when it comes to the area of homeland secu- local capacities in the event of major crises. rity because of its many intrinsic irregularities and

unpredictabilities. Since homeland security incidents

3.2. Dimension 2: How to define a floor

seldom occur, actors responsible for providing home- land security need to develop other ways of learning

In many government circles, there is a growing con- from past experiences. Although the United States sensus that efforts should be result-oriented rather experienced several crises and disasters during the than focusing on inputs and processes. From a theo-

retical point of view, this perspective puts an emphasis , it was not until the September 11 attacks and

1990s 3

Hurricane Katrina that the lack of effective coordina- on effectiveness, efficiency and accountability in boost- tion routines were brought into the limelight of public ing an organization’s capacity to fulfil its mission, and discourse. Many authors have argued that Hurricane this requires that efforts are continually evaluated Katrina highlighted the need for better exercises and (Kaimen, 2005, p. 226). Naturally, this requires some simulations (see, for instance, Samaan & Verneuil, sort of basis to evaluate progress against. Since all 2009). Kettl here suggests that effective routines can homeland security events begin as local events, the

be reinforced through joint simulations, exercises and federal government’s response plan must necessarily

field drills.

be integrated with state and local ones (Kettl, 2003b, p. 283). Because homeland security incidents can occur virtually anywhere, it is also imperative to set up at

3.4. Dimension 4: How to balance the old with

least a minimum level of local preparedness across the

the new

nation. Moreover, as Lee Clarke reminds us, such plans must also be attainable and not mere ‘fantasy docu-

Following the September 11 attacks and the surge of ments’ (Clarke, 1999). But how to best do this with

interest in beefing up the nation’s crisis management limited federal power over state and local authorities,

system, government agencies previously assigned home- and with a difficult process of setting up and enforcing

land security functions now had to develop new ways of federal minimum standards for intergovernmental pro-

linking their activities with those of other actors. At grammes in emergency management?

the same time, other agencies were handed additional While observing that state and local government

homeland security responsibilities on top of their have considerably enhanced their homeland security

already existing missions. Many of the early proposals planning following September 11, Kettl advocates

for homeland security reform, including the Hart- stronger coordination in areas where local officials have

Rudman report and the 9/11 Commission report, yet been reluctant to yield autonomy to the federal

proposed that federal homeland security functions government. To achieve this, Kettl proposes a two-way

should be consolidated under one single organizational track. First, the federal government should identify clear

umbrella. Consolidating a vast number of diverse federal key baseline goals for homeland security and measure

agencies into one single cabinet-level agency (i.e., DHS) the performance of state and local actors against these

naturally gave rise to a series of new concerns: how goals through establishing strong and clear federal per-

should DHS continue to meet the existing missions of

these agencies while also strengthening the new home- Perrow argues that it is essential that these federal

formance reporting standards. 2 Along the same lines,

land security missions and at the same time integrate standards be higher than local ones, and that state and

these various missions without increasing government local authorities can exceed these minimum standards

spending? To address these challenges, Kettl suggests (Perrow, 2007, p. 36). Second, state and local authorities

that DHS leaders must seek to balance outside should be assisted goals by the federal government in

and inside organizational demands, including managing funding high-priority needs to implement these through

expectations of key external actors, and foster a well- uniform federal grant tools (Kettl, 2003b, pp. 273–274).

functioning organizational culture.

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3.5. Dimension 5: How to meet citizens’ expectations in a fragmented system

Since protection against homeland security threats is never absolute, and since some homeland security efforts inevitably bring trade-offs between risk protec- tion on the one hand and individual freedoms on the other, it is pivotal that leaders clarify to citizens what the acceptable level of risk is and how to balance freedom and security under a certain risk level (Kettl, 2003b, p. 274). In recent years, a considerable body of literature on risk communication has sprung up. This literature suggests that individuals must have experi- enced or been exposed to risks in order to respond effectively to disasters (Kaimen, 2005, p. 352). Since homeland security incidents are rare, the perceived need for preparedness also tends to decline in the absence of a major disaster ( Kaimen, 2005, p. 352). Additionally, individuals are more likely to take action when they have been forewarned about a disaster. According to Kettl, governments should concentrate on fostering a culture of preparedness that incidents will occur, develop a perception of risk and provide risk communication.

4. Assessing vulnerability in the US homeland security system

In this section, I gauge how the reforms of the US homeland security system measures on the five dimen- sions of coordination introduced above.After discussing each dimension in detail, I assess how the US is best characterized on that dimension, looking at the key

policy developments in each area. 4 I finally explore how

that characteristic may affect its capacity to cope with future crises.

4. 1. Matching place and functions

4. 1.1. Inter-organizational networks versus structural reorganization The main approach to post-9/11 homeland security reform can be described as structural insofar as sweep- ing reorganization has been favoured over inter- organizational network solutions. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, however, President George W. Bush took an inter-agency approach, estab- lishing two new entities: the Office of Homeland Secu- rity (OHS) tasked with coordinating federal, state and local homeland security efforts within the executive branch (Davis, 2002), and the Homeland Security Council (HSC) tasked with coordinating policies among the top national leaders. Amid growing congressional criticism over the ability of these entities to manage the nation’s homeland security efforts, the President even- tually shifted sands towards an interdepartmental solu-

tion; a move which would pave the way for the establishment of the DHS in January 2003 (Newmann, 2002).

The establishment of DHS came to mark the most significant transformation of the US government in several decades (Relyea, 2003). Bringing together 22

agencies 5 – containing over 100 bureaus, branches, sub- agencies and sections ((Lindsay & O’Hanlon, 2002), and employing approximately 180,000 workers – the new department became responsible for a variety of mis- sions, including identifying and developing plans for pro- tecting critical infrastructure; conducting intelligence gathering and analysis; exercising the mechanisms to enhance emergency preparedness; and coordinating and sharing of information with other executive branch agencies, local and state actors and with non-federal entities. Today, DHS is the third largest federal govern- ment department with more than 200,000 employees and an annual budget of more than $40 billion.

The creation of the DHS represented a structural approach to the nation’s homeland security problem through physically connecting many (although not all) of the agencies carrying homeland security responsibilities and promoting new command and control structures between these. Critics have argued DHS have lacked a flexible and more nimble process to ensure that it can adjust to the ever-changing circumstances of homeland security. According to Wise (2006), network manage- ment (e.g., processes that encourage the sharing of information both horizontally and vertically and more collaboration that would foster organizational learning and facilitate adaptation and improvization) has been the missing capability in the DHS organization. Some evidence of network collaboration exists though, such as the efforts to utilize technology towards connecting agencies dealing with intelligence and information as a part of so-called ‘fusion centres’.

Although the role of DHS when it comes to intelli- gence is mainly limited to assessment and dissemination of intelligence information collected by other agencies, some DHS offices, such as Customs and the Coast Guard, have retained some capabilities to gather intel- ligence information. Following the so-called ‘Second State Review’ completed in mid-2005, DHS has seen its intelligence capabilities grow somewhat though. More specifically, a reinforced Office of Intelligence and Analy- sis (I&A) was set up to provide intelligence information supporting DHS and disseminating information and intelligence to state and local actors, and assist the fusion centres in providing operational and intelligence support as well as personnel to enable the National Fusion Center Network (CRS Report to Congress, 2006, p. 2; Stimson Center, 2008, p. 11).These so-called ‘fusion centres’ function as regional hubs through which information and expertise can be accessed by federal authorities.According to the QHSR, fusion centres play

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absence of structural reorganization. In addition, a number of technology platforms serve to assist fusion centres in gathering and disseminating information such as the Joint Fusion Center Program Management office (JCF-PMO) (Harwood, 2009). To improve the sharing of ‘sensitive but unclassified’ mate- rial between federal, state, local, private sector and international partners, DHS has also established the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), a secure Internet platform (Kaimen, 2005, pp. 407–408). An integrated network called Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) was also set up to allow the federal government to disseminate information and intelligence with the states and to give fusion centre staff access to terrorism-related information from the National Coun- terterrorism Center (NCTC), which maintains a classi- fied portal of the most current terrorism-related information, and from the DoD Secret Internet Proto- col Router Network (SIPRNet), a secure network used to send classified data. Currently, HSDN has been deployed to 27 fusion centres. However, the fusion centres are not exclusively a success story. Docu- mented shortcomings include ineffectiveness at coun- terterrorism activities, the potential to be used for secondary purposes unrelated to counterterrorism and alleged violations of civil liberties of American citizens (Monahan & Palmer, 2009; German & Stanley, 2008; Fox News.com, 2009).

4. 1.2. Clarifying organizational relationships In this section, we zoom in closer on two major attempts to clarify the organizational relationships in homeland security – the National Response Framework (NRF) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS).To remedy the problem associated with the lack of relationships between the plethora of actors typically involved in emergency management incidents, Home- land Security Presidential Directive 5 of February 2003

called for the development of the National Response Plan (NRP), as part of a comprehensive national incident management system to replace a previously existing plan. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, this instru- ment was heavily criticized for overemphasizing federal preparedness and response over state and local efforts (CRS Report to Congress, 2008). Other cited problems were the emphasis on terrorism at the expense of other hazards (see Flynn & Prieto, 2006), the failure to adequately clarify the roles of the various actors par- taking in the overall response effort (Parker et al., 2009, p. 213) and to specify multi-state disaster management (Wise, 2006, p. 303), the face that some parts of the

document, such as the annexes, were still incomplete at the time of the disaster (Daniels et al., 2006, p. 258) and

a lack understanding of the requirements of the plan among DHS leaders (White House, 2007). In January 2008, the NRP was replaced by a new document incor- porating the lessons learned from the Katrina disaster called the NRF (CRS Report to Congress, 2008).While the main focus of the NRF is on short-term recovery, the document also stipulates the guiding principles for national response actions as well as the roles and responsibilities of the various actors involved through- out all phases of emergency management.The response to recent disasters such as the Hurricanes Gustav and Ike and the 2008 Midwest floods suggest that the NRF has at least been more successful than its predecessor (see Fowler, 2008a,b,c).

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 also called for NIMS to serve as ‘a structured framework used nationwide for both governmental and nongovern- mental agencies to respond to natural disasters and or terrorist attacks at the local, state and federal levels of government’ (CRS Report to Congress, 2008).The ben- efits of NIMS supposedly include a unified approach to incident management, standard command and manage- ment structures and emphasis on joint preparedness (including planning, training, qualifications and certifica- tions), mutual aid and resource management. Also pro- viding common terminology, NIMS is designed to foster more effective communication among agencies and organizations jointly responding to incidents.All federal agencies are required to adopt and apply NIMS, and since 2006 federal preparedness assistance (e.g., grants, contracts and other activities) for state and local pre- paredness is also tied to compliance with the NIMS. Nevertheless, state and local governments are not ‘pre- emptively’ compelled to adopt and use the NIMS but are merely encouraged to do so (Sylves, 2008, p. 150). The flawed response to Hurricane Katrina casted light on several implementation problems regarding NIMS. For example, the existence of parallel command struc- tures between federal and state personnel operating in the state of Louisiana had given rise to questions such as ‘who is in charge’, complicating responsibility and accountability (Daniels et al., 2006, p. 251). It was also evident that state authorities lacked knowledge about NIMS, preventing them from effectively taking advan- tage of it (see Lester & Krejci, 2007). NIMS has also been subject to criticism for failing to adequately address other types of jurisdiction, authority and lead- ership issues. Yet, such criticism has often missed the point as NIMS was designed to merely provide an effec- tive vehicle for joint command but not imposing cen- tralized command. Naturally it will take some time before leaders become accustomed with the NIMS through more training and practice. Perhaps even more important though is that the implementation of the

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NIMS is accompanied by further attempts to foster a common vision and mission between major player involved in disaster response, and that organizational cultures undergo change.

4. 1.3. Mutual aid agreements Mutual aid agreements predate DHS but have increas- ingly become prioritized in recent years as mutual aid has become an integrated part of the NIMS (see above). Moreover, in an effort to enhance regional planning, DHS has allocated funds to encourage mutual aid agree- ments across local public sectors to enhance coordina- tion. In particular, large urban areas can access funding from the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). One recent study found that ‘regional collaboration as a consequence of both federal UASI guidance and UASI networks may increase the participation of different types of organizations to take part in homeland security

and preparedness activities, such as regional exercises and training’ (Jordan, 2010).A prominent example here is the Metropolitan Washington Council of Govern- ments (COG), which has taken several critical steps to further develop a regional emergency coordination plan based on UASI grants (Kaimen, 2005, pp. 297–310).

While the UASI initiative has allowed for increased state access to regional planning funding, several imple- mentation problems are also noted.A task force report to Congress recently concluded that moving forward on establishing and funding ‘a national comprehensive mutual aid system based on the National Incident Man- agement System (NIMS) to enable all levels of govern- ment to tap into assets and capabilities around the country before, during, and after incidents remains a priority’. Another potentially problematic aspect of UASI is that it demands that states disperse 80% of homeland security funding to local governments, thus limiting state authorities’ freedom to spend the money where they think they are needed the most.

4.2. Defining a floor

4.2. 1. Federal baseline goals and standards Several documents stipulating federal baseline goals and standards have been adopted since 9/11. The principal of these is the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The first such strategy was published in 2002. In July 2007, an updated version incorporating lessons from Hurricane Katrina was released. Besides this document, DHS also has its own strategic plan laying out the department’s mission and identifying its key goals.These goals have a number of objectives against which per- formance can be measured. DHS’ Office of Inspector General (OIG) also releases an Annual Performance Plan, presenting performance information as well as

information about resources management. 6 The 2003

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 called for DHS to develop a national domestic all-hazards prepar- edness goal. As a result, the National Preparedness Guidelines – stating the vision, capabilities and priorities for national preparedness – was adopted.At its disposal, the Guidelines have four critical elements: the National Preparedness Vision, providing a concise statement of core national preparedness goals; the National Planning Scenarios, depicting 15 different potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters; the Universal Task List (UTL), a list of 1,600 different tasks that can facilitate efforts in the National Planning Scenarios; and the Target Capabilities List (TCL), defining 37 different capabilities that all actors should possess in order to respond to disasters. According to a Heritage Founda- tion report, while ‘the scenarios and capabilities list [in the TCL] addressed a long-standing glaring shortfall in national leadership by providing standards for perform- ance and capabilities that could be used to assess the readiness of responders and to identify additional capa- bilities that are needed to make Americans safer’, prob- lems remain when it comes to ensuring that fede- ral, state and local authorities put these into action (Carafano & Mayer, 2007).

4.2.2. High-priority federal grants Since 2003, DHS homeland security assistance pro- grammes are administrated by the DHS’ Office of Grant Programs (OGP). OGP allocates homeland secu- rity assistance to different states and local actors to bolster national preparedness capabilities and protect critical infrastructure (CRS Report to Congress, 2008). Its primary funding mechanism is the Homeland Secu- rity Grant Program (HSGP), which consolidated six programmes into one application in order to improve coordination of funding and administration (Haddow, Bullock, Coppola, & Yeletaysi, 2008). HSGP presents a number of priorities for DHS’ risk-based funding and the capability-based planning process. In addition to this programme, OGP also administers non-competitive grants programmes, which are allocated to different agencies or jurisdictions using threat and risk assess- ments. Finally, UASI exists ‘to address the unique plan-

ning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise needs of high-threat, high-density urban areas, and assists them in building an enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism’ (CRS Report to Congress, 2008).

While overall federal funding to DHS has grown quite modestly ($42.4 billion in FY 2003 to $56.3 billion in FY 2011) over the past decade, federal homeland security assistance to state and local authorities has skyrocketed. Still, merely spending more money does not guarantee that the money is well spent.After all, one of the 9/11 Commission report’s recommendations for

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setting priorities in national preparedness was the importance of basing homeland security assistance strictly on assessments of risk and vulnerabilities. In a June 2005 report, the Congressional Research Service noted that DHS had yet to allocate funding to state and local actors based on risk. Congress has also repeat- edly voiced concern over that DHS funding has focused on terrorism at the expense of other priorities (see Washington Post, 2006b). For example, most of the homeland security grants under the Patriot Act to the states take no consideration whatsoever to risk or needs assessment (Scavo, Kearney, & Kilroy, 2007). Since then, DHS has begun applying a risk methodology ‘to identify critical areas eligible for homeland security grants, accounting for threats, population, economic output, and prevalence of critical infrastructure.’ In the fiscal year of 2009, DHS identified five grants based on risk as well as an initiative to measure the impact and effectiveness of homeland security federal grant funds. However, the Government Accountability Office has directed criticism against its risk-based grant method- ology, which it concludes lacks a proper way to measure variations in vulnerability (GAO Report to Congres- sional Committees, 2008).Another study conducted by the Heritage Foundation criticizes Congress for treat- ing homeland security grants ‘as simply another entitle- ment, not as a national security instrument . . . by crafting legislative grant formulas that guarantee every state and city some federal role for homeland security, Congress ensures that it spends a little on everything and does nothing well’ (Carafano & Mayer, 2007). In other words, what appear to be lacking is clear priori- ties. Countless examples also exist of federal homeland security funding going to the wrong ‘stuff’ or places. Criticism of the HSGP includes its distribution of funds, which for most parts is evenly allocated across all recipients regardless of population. As a result, Wyoming has received more than four times the amount of funding per citizen given to either California or New York (Haddow et al., 2008, p. 103). Despite increased federal homeland security funding for state and local authorities over the past decade, problems with ensuring that state and local authorities use the TCL as a blueprint their homeland security grants have been widespread. More specifically, DHS reportedly still lacks the ability to determine how well state and local governments abide by its standards (Carafano & Mayer, 2007). The UASI has applied its own risk-formula slashed funding in 2006 for New York City and Washington DC while significantly boosting support for such ‘urban areas’ as Louisville, Omaha and Char- lotte (Mayer, 2009).

4.2.3. Federal performance reporting In February 2010, DHS published its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), a comprehensive

assessment of the National Strategy for Homeland Security (see above) outlining the long-term strategy and priorities for homeland security and guidance on DHS’ programmes, assets, capabilities, budget, poli- cies and authorities. It subsequently also produced a ‘bottom-up review’ (BUR), with the purpose of system- atically linking strategy to programme to budget. The overall goals of the QHSR are to prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks; protect citizens, critical infrastructure and key resources; respond to and recover from inci- dents that do occur and continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long-term success (White House, 2002). While both certainly helpful documents in taking stock of the DHS performance to date, the QHSR and BUR, according to the Government Accountability Office, lacked assessments about DHS’ management systems, budget and accounting systems, human resource systems and procurement systems.

4.3. Building a reliable learning system

The current national emergency preparedness doctrine has evolved over time. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act introduced new efforts to establish a national exercise planning programme (CRS Report to Congress, 2008). A number of activities have also been taken to strengthen preparedness through training and exercises, including the establishment of a National Exercise Program (NEP) to improve the deliv- ery and organization involved with planning for, devel- oping and executing preparedness-related exercises for the federal government. In addition, the National Integration Center (NIC) implements an integration- focused strategy for training and exercises within the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); the Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) prepares state, local, federal and the private sector first respond- ers for dealing with all-hazards and weapons of mass destruction threats through training, education, techni- cal assistance and general support activities; and the Training and Exercise Integration (TEI/TO) train first responders in preparing the nation to prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from incidents of terrorism and catastrophic events. Besides these activi- ties, the Homeland Security Exercise and Evalua- tion Program (HSEEP) functions as a capabilities and performance-based exercise programme intended to provide a common exercise policy and programme guidance constituting a national exercise standard, build- ing on the NRF and NIMS. FEMA also manages the Comprehensive Exercise Program (CEP) to develop and implement comprehensive, all-hazards, risk-based exercise programme. While the development of a reli- able learning system certainly appears to have gone forward, especially after Hurricane Katrina, problems with regard to the leadership of these programmes,

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particularly the role of FEMA, remain unclear. Moreover, NEP has been criticized for excluding non-federal par- ticipants (CRS Report to Congress, 2009).

4.4. Balancing the old with the new

Naturally, a major challenge for DHS has been to foster

a new ‘mission culture’, replacing – or at least comple- menting – those of the individual departments and agencies it absorbed – many of which already had a strong ‘esprit de corps’ of their own (e.g., the Coast Guards, the Transportation Security Administration, FEMA, etc.). As a Homeland Security Council Task Force report from 2007 reports, ‘it will require a con- tinuum of progress over a period of many years before optimum cultural unity and affinity can be achieved. It must be further acknowledged that establishing and maintaining a cultural “esprit de corps” is not a one- time or incident-based process – it is an unceasing journey’ (White House, 2007). One complicating factor is that most DHS staff are not concentrated in the DHS headquarters in Washington, DC but scattered across the country, thus making the task of fostering a single organizational culture even more difficult. Employee morale at DHS is catastrophically low, with DHS employees accused of fraud and waste (New York Times, 2006). In the 2007 federal workforce survey, DHS was listed as worst place in the federal govern- ment to work. Commenting on the survey findings, a former inspector general at DHS said that ‘it is still the case that the department is just a collection of dispa- rate, dysfunction agencies . . . [t]here is yet to be an integrated, cohesive whole’ (ABC.com, 2007). Since then, things appear to have improved somewhat. In the Partnership for Public Service’s 2010 rankings of Best Places to Work in the Federal Government, DHS had climbed to 28 out of 32 agencies on scores for employee satisfaction and commitment. 7

Few agencies have struggled with balancing old and new responsibilities as much as FEMA.After 9/11, when the need for prevention, mitigation and response to terrorist attacks gained attention, FEMA’s traditional

focus on natural disasters was reoriented to responding to terrorism events (Waugh & Streib, 2006, p. 136). After the 2004 Florida hurricanes and Hurricane Katrina, FEMA was criticized for having revamped national response capabilities around terrorism while neglecting natural disasters (Cilluffo, Janiewski, Lane, Lord, & Keith, 2009). These events also demonstrated that FEMA’s traditionally strong working relationships with state and local counterparts had deteriorated. Some critics even argued that FEMA should be taken out of DHS alto- gether,allowing it to report directly to the President (see Washington Post,2006a).Following the enactment of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, a new Preparedness Directorate within DHS,

comprising all the functions of FEMA,elevating the status of FEMA within the agency and providing a direct line to the President, FEMA came to remain within DHS (GAO Report to Congressional Committees, 2009). After Katrina, further proposals were put forward to establish regional offices and roles for DHS (Heyman & Carafano, 2004; Meese, Carafano, & Weitz, 2005).

4.5. Meeting citizens’ expectations in a

fragmented system

4.5. 1. Fostering a culture of preparedness Although the United States had a culture of civil defence during the Cold War, much of this was lost after the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Still, recent dis- asters point to the need for citizens to be well prepared to face an emergency. Since 9/11, one major early attempt to better communicate preparedness to citi- zens is through a readiness website operated by the DHS called Ready.gov.Through this web site, which was heavily advertised for across the Internet, DHS sought to communicate preparedness measures to ordinary citizens and businesses. However, Ready.gov has also been intensely criticized – even ridiculed – for being overly alarmist. For example, one of the first announce- ments that garnered widespread public attention of this campaign was the advice to, in the case of a chemical

attack, citizens should use duct tape and plastic sheeting to build a homemade bunker, or ‘sheltering in place’ to protect themselves.A detailed report by the Federation for American Scientists (FAS) from 2006 concluded that problems included ‘generic advice, unnecessarily lengthy descriptions, and verbatim repetition of details on mul- tiple pages, all encapsulated within a confusing naviga- tional structure’ (Homeland Security Weekly, 2006). According to FAS, in some cases the advice given was even incorrect, such as the recommendation to take cover underground in the case of a nuclear attack; despite the fact the nuclear explosions do not provide the luxuries of time or evasion.

4.5.2. Informing the public about risks Since 9/11, the federal government has sought to step up its risk communication capabilities. Nevertheless, no single integrated system of risk communication is yet in place. Up until recently, DHS’ primary public service tool was the National Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), first created in 2002. Using a five-step colour guide, this system was meant to direct law enforcement and alert citizens about the current home- land security risk level. However, HSAS has been subject to heavy criticism.According to the Secretary of Home- land Security, Janet Napolitano, the colour-coded system fell short when it came to risk communication, often presenting ‘little practical information’ to the

Post 9/

11 Homeland Security Reforms

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