00074910012331339013
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies
ISSN: 0007-4918 (Print) 1472-7234 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cbie20
Schooling in A Decentralised Indonesia: New
Approaches to Access and Decision Making
Mayling Oey Gardiner
To cite this article: Mayling Oey Gardiner (2000) Schooling in A Decentralised Indonesia: New
Approaches to Access and Decision Making, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 36:3,
127-134
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00074910012331339013
Published online: 18 Aug 2006.
Submit your article to this journal
Article views: 95
View related articles
Citing articles: 2 View citing articles
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cbie20
Download by: [Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji], [UNIVERSITAS MARITIM RA JA ALI HA JI
TANJUNGPINANG, KEPULAUAN RIAU]
Date: 19 January 2016, At: 22:07
y [Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji], [UNIVERSITAS MARITIM RAJA ALI HAJI TANJUNGPINANG, KEPULAUAN RIAU] at 22:07 19
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies
Vol 36 No 3, December 2000, pp. 127–34
SCHOOLING IN A DECENTRALISED
INDONESIA: NEW APPROACHES TO ACCESS
AND DECISION MAKING
Mayling Oey-Gardiner
Insan Hitawasana Sejahtera, Jakarta
Thanks to a highly centralised supply-side policy in providing education
services—through widespread construction of schools and rapid
expansion of teacher recruitment and training—Indonesia has made
remarkable progress in enrolling children in school and narrowing gaps
between boys and girls. In 1971, among those of elementary school age
(7–12), only about 60% were attending school. Figures for junior and
senior high school aged children (13–15 and 16–18) were even lower,
around 45% and 22% respectively. By 1999, according to special
tabulations from the 1999 Susenas (National Socio-economic Survey),
these figures had risen dramatically—to around 96% at ages 7–12, 79%
at 13–15 and 51% at 16–18. Gender gaps, significant at secondary school
ages in 1971, had virtually disappeared by the end of the 1990s.
However, gaps remain—between rural and urban areas and, perhaps
even more critically, between the rich and the poor—and these gaps widen
significantly with increases in schooling level. Thus the urban–rural gap
in age-specific enrolment rates is relatively small among primary school
age children (98% versus 94%). But it widens at junior secondary age
(88% versus 74%) and becomes even wider for senior high school age
children (69% versus 38%). Gaps between the rich and the poor are even
more disturbing. Among primary school age children from the poorest
quintile of households in 1999,1 92% were in school. Among the richest
quintile, the figure was 99%. At junior secondary ages the gap increases—
93% for the richest versus 66% for the poorest quintile. And at senior
secondary ages it is even larger: 75% versus only 29% for the richest and
poorest quintiles respectively (Insan Hitawasana Sejahtera 2000).
This raises two important concerns. First, many poorer and/or rural
children are still entering labour markets with primary or, at best, a few
years of junior secondary education. This places limits on their upward
y [Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji], [UNIVERSITAS MARITIM RAJA ALI HAJI TANJUNGPINANG, KEPULAUAN RIAU] at 22:07 19
128
Mayling Oey-Gardiner
mobility. If the quality of this education is poor (as is widely believed to
be true), their potential for upward mobility will be hindered even further.
Second, a substantial number of children from wealthier families who
should be able to afford the costs are still not carrying on through a full
cycle of primary and secondary schooling. Many are joining the labour
market while still at secondary school age. In fact, among school age
children in the top quintile who are not attending school, one-fifth are
working or seeking work, according to the 1999 data.
If even among the rich a good proportion attach so little value to
available educational services in the country, it may be time for a serious
examination of conditions in schools. This clearly relates not just to the
quantity but also to the quality of education that is being provided, and
to the roles of the public and the private sector. And concerns here are
likely to rise in the near future as authority and responsibility for service
delivery are devolved to local, district-level government under the new
laws on regional autonomy and finance.2
A Closed System with Misplaced Quality Control
The educational drive in Indonesia has historically been highly centralised
and ‘top-down’. Until recently, state school teachers across the country
were central government employees, and their hiring and placement were
determined by the centre—not by the districts or communities in which
they worked. Determination of numbers of schools in various locations
and funding for school construction came from the top. Fee structures
(with the exception of parental contributions, administered by school
bodies known as BP3) were also set at the national level.
Quality was seen, and is still seen by many, as being achieved through
control and standardisation, with highly structured staffing patterns and
curricula, and rigid rules governing both students and delivery of
educational services. Children are required to progress through the system
in an orderly fashion, with promotion being determined by performance
at the previous level—be it school level or even grade within each school.
No skipping of grades is allowed. And all students—in both public and
private schools—are required to take nationally set examinations known
as Ebtanas (Evaluasi Belajar Tahap Akhir Nasional, National School
Leaving Examinations) that are intended to provide a consistent measure
of student quality and to determine students’ potential for further
progression in the education system.
Ebtanas provides an interesting case of an aspect of rigidity and control
that appears to contribute little to the quality of education, but that drains
considerable resources from students and their families, while providing
a valuable source of income to those responsible for its administration.
y [Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji], [UNIVERSITAS MARITIM RAJA ALI HAJI TANJUNGPINANG, KEPULAUAN RIAU] at 22:07 19
Schooling in a Decentralised Indonesia
129
Ebtanas examinations are held at the end of each school cycle—for
elementary school at grade 6, and for both junior and senior high school
at grade 3. Taking the examination is a requirement for graduation. A
diploma cannot be issued by the school (and this applies to both public
and private schools) unless the student has sat for the examination.
Ebtanas is also a requirement for progression. Inability to show a
certificate indicating that the student has taken the Ebtanas for the
previous level prohibits a school from accepting that student, irrespective
of whether the school is public or private. Thus neither schools nor
students have the freedom to choose. Schools are simply forced to
administer the examinations, while students must sit for them if they
want to graduate or progress further in the education system.
The education bureaucracy defends Ebtanas as a means of controlling
for variations in the quality of school level grading systems, and hence
as a stimulus for schools to improve their quality. The examinations are
also defended as a means to provide greater certainty in selection of
students for progression to higher levels. To date, however, the validity
of these suppositions has never been proven. In fact, examination scores
appear to have little influence on graduation or school quality.
Grading of the national examinations is based on a scale from 0 to 10.
But, as can be seen in table 1, average grades are generally quite low (on
normal report cards, 6 is usually considered a minimum passing grade),
while graduation rates remain very high, all well in excess of 90%. The
TABLE 1 Low Final Examination Scores but High Graduation Rates, 1998/99
School Type and Level
Participants
Graduates
Average Graduation
Grade
Rate
(%)
Public
Junior secondary
General senior secondary
Vocational senior secondary
1,571,012
461,086
155,440
1,546,216
446,547
153,555
5.75
3.99
5.09
98
97
99
Private
Junior secondary
General senior secondary
Vocational senior secondary
775,314
351,303
380,985
768,900
344.156
348,647
5.22
3.19
4.68
99
98
92
Source: Based on Ministry of Education statistics obtained from .
y [Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji], [UNIVERSITAS MARITIM RAJA ALI HAJI TANJUNGPINANG, KEPULAUAN RIAU] at 22:07 19
130
Mayling Oey-Gardiner
worst cases are among general senior high school students, who managed
to score on average less than 4 on Ebtanas in 1998/99 (table 1). Yet
97–98% still graduated. This relationship, or absence of one, has never
been examined. Instead, the bureaucracy has defended the system, while
civil society has remained helpless, unable to ignore this requirement.
Clearly, Ebtanas provides little or no control over the quality of
graduates. The policy of requiring students to sit for the examination, in
addition to normal school testing and grading, in order to graduate must
thus be open to question. The low scores, and questions that have been
raised over just what the tests are measuring (not to mention frequent
allegations related to leakage of examination materials and manipulation
of scores), cast doubt on its value as a screening tool for progression to
higher levels in the education system. If screening beyond grades and
other school-based performance measures is required, it would probably
be far more efficient for testing of prospective students to be carried out
by individual schools, using whatever standards they deem necessary.
For state universities, where selection is a major issue, there is already a
separate entrance examination, the UMPTN (Ujian Masuk Perguruan
Tinggi Negeri, State Higher Education Entrance Examination), that is
used as a basis for screening applicants.3 Some more elite high schools
require applicants to take special aptitude tests, either designed by the
school or through private testing services.
Vested Interests in Maintaining the System
Without taking the examination students are not allowed to graduate,
and without the piece of paper indicating their examination scores they
cannot progress to the next level in the education hierarchy or apply for
a job in the civil service. Thus parents have no choice but to pay the
examination fees if they want their children to have a chance at further
education, or even simply proof of completion at their current level.
And these payments are substantial. For example, official fees for
secondary level Ebtanas in Jakarta are generally two or more times official
monthly fees for public school attendance. 4 They also provide a
substantial windfall to administrators. For the 1999/2000 academic year
end examinations, the Jakarta government avoided giving a total budget
(stating expenditures only on a per student basis). However, multiplying
per student fees by an expected number of participants suggests that
total returns would probably reach at least Rp 22 billion, or close to
$3 million.5 Around 42% of this budget was allocated to administration,
including meetings of officials at various levels. Some of this may have
y [Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji], [UNIVERSITAS MARITIM RAJA ALI HAJI TANJUNGPINANG, KEPULAUAN RIAU] at 22:07 19
Schooling in a Decentralised Indonesia
131
been legitimate, but there were substantial amounts allowed for meetings
and honoraria that must be questioned, given that the participants were
salaried government officials.
These concerns have been echoed in the press, with several reports
on the amounts of money involved, as well as on the hardships these
imposed on students and their families (Kompas, 22/5/00 and 23/5/00;
Media Indonesia, 23/5/00). Articles have also reflected an increasingly
widespread view in favour of eliminating the Ebtanas altogether (Kompas,
24/5/00 and 25/5/00; Suara Pembaruan, 23/5/00). Yet, given the overall
amount of money involved, it should not be surprising that the vested
interests in maintaining the system are very strong.
New Initiatives in Access and Decision Making
However, some initiatives are being taken to improve educational access
and decentralise decision making. For instance, in response to the crisis
the government, with loans from the Asian Development Bank and the
World Bank, has established an educational social safety net program to
prevent an increase in school dropouts. This program provides
scholarships to poor students and operational funds for poor schools,
known as DBO (Dana Bantuan Operasional). These are distributed
directly to the beneficiary students and schools, thereby avoiding possible
‘leakage’ along the way. The program has been hailed as successful,
earning a World Bank award.
In response to a World Bank education sector analysis (World Bank
1998), Dr Fasli Djalal of Bappenas took the initiative to have Indonesian
researchers conduct further analysis of the implications of the crisis and
of impending moves toward greater decentralisation and regional
autonomy. An initial group of studies led to the formation of four task
forces that were approved for ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) funding
administered by the World Bank. These task forces covered philosophy,
teachers, higher education, and educational finance.
Some of the output of the task forces is of interest. For example,
following experience in other countries (Burki, Perry and Dillinger 1999;
Jimenez, Paqueo and de Vera Ma 1988; King and Ozler 1998; and Patrinos
and Ariasingam 1997), the Educational Finance Task Force proposed a
radical decentralisation—from central government all the way down to
individual schools. Moreover, it was argued that decentralisation should
cover not only operational costs (which usually constitute less than 20%
of recurrent budgets) but also teacher and staff salary costs (constituting
the remaining 80%). This included giving schools the right to manage,
hire and fire teachers.6
y [Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji], [UNIVERSITAS MARITIM RAJA ALI HAJI TANJUNGPINANG, KEPULAUAN RIAU] at 22:07 19
132
Mayling Oey-Gardiner
The vision contained in this study was to move from quantity (equity)
to quantity and quality; and from a supply to a demand orientation—the
argument being that, if properly managed under the supervision of school
boards and school committees, schools will be in the best position to
decide what they need and what they can achieve. School boards would
oversee a number of schools in an area, and would consist of non-salaried
members who are political appointees selected by the local community.
The boards would be responsible for preparing selection criteria for
teachers and students, and for selecting independent institutions to
conduct school performance audits. They would also decide on subsidy
recipients and allocation of subsidies to schools. School committees would
operate at individual school level. They would consist of parents and
teachers, including school principals, but school principals would not be
able to become chairpersons, and all members would have equal voting
rights. Of course, each school committee would be required to make its
decisions transparent and to be accountable to all parents and teachers
of the school. There is already in place a precursor of school committees,
known as BP3 (Badan Pembinaan dan Penyelenggaraan Pendidikan,
Board of Educational Development and Administration), but so far these
have had only a limited role, deciding on issues such as school uniforms,
and setting the level of parental contributions (JP, 31/7/00).
Even if there is now fairly widespread consensus about the poor
quality of Indonesian schools, there is still debate about how to remedy
it. The views expressed above have not yet achieved wide acceptance,
and there are many who still believe that quality can be imposed by central
control and rigid common standards. There also are many who see the
roots of low quality in low teacher salaries and poor teacher training.
This may be part of the problem, but it begs the even more critical question
of just what the schools and students will get in return for a higher
investment in education. How will teachers, schools and the education
system in general be held accountable for the investments that are made?
Some Official Responses to New Ideas
There appears to be an increasingly positive response in government to
the recommendation for decentralisation to the school level. A few people
at least seem to be embracing the opportunities arising from the
introduction of Laws No. 22 and 25 of 1999 on regional autonomy and
regional finance. Following intensive media reporting on the ills of
Ebtanas, and suggestions for elimination of this costly exercise, Ministry
of National Education spokesmen did express their willingness to
y [Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji], [UNIVERSITAS MARITIM RAJA ALI HAJI TANJUNGPINANG, KEPULAUAN RIAU] at 22:07 19
Schooling in a Decentralised Indonesia
133
evaluate its implementation (Suara Pembaruan, 7/7/00), and the head of
the Ministry’s Research and Development Office said that Ebtanas might
even be replaced (JP, 22/7/00).
In contrast with its past adherence to an ideology of equity in a
centralised and standardised system, the Ministry of National Education
now acknowledges that difference is not necessarily a bad thing, including
difference in the quality of schools. In an important move to relax past
rigidities in the curriculum, and to begin to allow choice at school level,
in 2001 schools will be offered the freedom to choose one of three curricula.
These are structured at novice, intermediate and expert levels, and are
designed to give schools greater flexibility to adapt their programs to
their own capabilities and those of their students. This will apply to
schools throughout the country, whether public, private or religious. The
emphasis is on output, with basic minimum standards having to be
fulfilled by graduates no matter which curriculum their school adopts.
Schools will also have greater flexibility in deciding on appropriate
teaching methods, books and other technical materials. The Ministry will
only provide references (JP, 22/7/00).
More encouraging, the head of the Jakarta office of the education
ministry stated that parent–teacher bodies (school committees) will have
greater power under regional autonomy, beyond just deciding on school
uniforms and setting fees (Suara Pembaruan, 26/7/00). Attempts will be
made to involve parents more, including in decisions about the quality
of services provided by the respective schools. However, only time will
tell what the bureaucracy is really willing to give up, and where parents
may have greater authority over school operations.
NOTES
1
These figures are based on special tabulations of the 1999 Susenas, classifying
households into expenditure quintiles based on reported total monthly per
capita household expenditure.
2
Laws No. 22 and 25 of 1999 on Regional Autonomy and Regional Finance are
scheduled to begin formal implementation in January 2001.
3
The UMPTN administration is considering dropping the requirement to submit
Ebtanas results or NEM (Nilai Ebtanas Murni, Raw Ebtanas Scores) with
applications to sit for the public university entrance exam (Kompas, 27/5/00).
4
Ebtanas fees for 1999/2000 were Rp 55,650 at junior secondary level, Rp 75,100
at general senior secondary level and Rp 115,400 for vocational senior
secondary schools. Monthly fees for public schools are around Rp 20–30,000
at junior secondary level and somewhat higher at senior secondary level.
y [Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji], [UNIVERSITAS MARITIM RAJA ALI HAJI TANJUNGPINANG, KEPULAUAN RIAU] at 22:07 19
134
Mayling Oey-Gardiner
5
Just under 300,000 students took secondary level Ebtanas in 1998/99.
6
The idea of school-based management and activities to further this objective
is not new in Indonesia. However, I believe that this is the first time a
recommendation has been made for the ‘radical’ option, covering not only
the development budget but also the routine budget for staff salaries, and
including the right to manage the teaching staff.
REFERENCES
Burki, Shahid Javed, Guillermo E. Perry and William R. Dillinger (1999), Beyond
the Centre: Decentralizing the State, World Bank, Washington DC.
Insan Hitawasana Sejahtera (2000), Provincial Poverty and Social Indicators,
Susenas 1993–1999, Report submitted to the Asian Development Bank, Manila.
Jimenez, Emmanuel, Vincente Paqueo and Lourdes de Vera Ma (1988), ‘Does Local
Financing Make Primary Schools More Efficient? The Philippine Case’, World
Bank Policy Planning and Research Working Papers, Education and
Employment, WPS 69, World Bank, Washington DC.
King, Elizabeth M., and Berk Ozler (1998), What’s Decentralization Got To Do
With Learning? The Case of Nicaragua’s School Autonomy Reform, Paper
presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Educational Research
Association, San Diego CA, 13–17 April.
Patrinos, Harry Anthony, and David Laksmanan Ariasingam (1997),
Decentralization of Education: Demand-Side Financing, The International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, June, Washington DC.
World Bank (1998), Education in Indonesia: From Crisis to Recovery, Report No. 18651IND, Washington DC.
ISSN: 0007-4918 (Print) 1472-7234 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cbie20
Schooling in A Decentralised Indonesia: New
Approaches to Access and Decision Making
Mayling Oey Gardiner
To cite this article: Mayling Oey Gardiner (2000) Schooling in A Decentralised Indonesia: New
Approaches to Access and Decision Making, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 36:3,
127-134
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00074910012331339013
Published online: 18 Aug 2006.
Submit your article to this journal
Article views: 95
View related articles
Citing articles: 2 View citing articles
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cbie20
Download by: [Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji], [UNIVERSITAS MARITIM RA JA ALI HA JI
TANJUNGPINANG, KEPULAUAN RIAU]
Date: 19 January 2016, At: 22:07
y [Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji], [UNIVERSITAS MARITIM RAJA ALI HAJI TANJUNGPINANG, KEPULAUAN RIAU] at 22:07 19
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies
Vol 36 No 3, December 2000, pp. 127–34
SCHOOLING IN A DECENTRALISED
INDONESIA: NEW APPROACHES TO ACCESS
AND DECISION MAKING
Mayling Oey-Gardiner
Insan Hitawasana Sejahtera, Jakarta
Thanks to a highly centralised supply-side policy in providing education
services—through widespread construction of schools and rapid
expansion of teacher recruitment and training—Indonesia has made
remarkable progress in enrolling children in school and narrowing gaps
between boys and girls. In 1971, among those of elementary school age
(7–12), only about 60% were attending school. Figures for junior and
senior high school aged children (13–15 and 16–18) were even lower,
around 45% and 22% respectively. By 1999, according to special
tabulations from the 1999 Susenas (National Socio-economic Survey),
these figures had risen dramatically—to around 96% at ages 7–12, 79%
at 13–15 and 51% at 16–18. Gender gaps, significant at secondary school
ages in 1971, had virtually disappeared by the end of the 1990s.
However, gaps remain—between rural and urban areas and, perhaps
even more critically, between the rich and the poor—and these gaps widen
significantly with increases in schooling level. Thus the urban–rural gap
in age-specific enrolment rates is relatively small among primary school
age children (98% versus 94%). But it widens at junior secondary age
(88% versus 74%) and becomes even wider for senior high school age
children (69% versus 38%). Gaps between the rich and the poor are even
more disturbing. Among primary school age children from the poorest
quintile of households in 1999,1 92% were in school. Among the richest
quintile, the figure was 99%. At junior secondary ages the gap increases—
93% for the richest versus 66% for the poorest quintile. And at senior
secondary ages it is even larger: 75% versus only 29% for the richest and
poorest quintiles respectively (Insan Hitawasana Sejahtera 2000).
This raises two important concerns. First, many poorer and/or rural
children are still entering labour markets with primary or, at best, a few
years of junior secondary education. This places limits on their upward
y [Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji], [UNIVERSITAS MARITIM RAJA ALI HAJI TANJUNGPINANG, KEPULAUAN RIAU] at 22:07 19
128
Mayling Oey-Gardiner
mobility. If the quality of this education is poor (as is widely believed to
be true), their potential for upward mobility will be hindered even further.
Second, a substantial number of children from wealthier families who
should be able to afford the costs are still not carrying on through a full
cycle of primary and secondary schooling. Many are joining the labour
market while still at secondary school age. In fact, among school age
children in the top quintile who are not attending school, one-fifth are
working or seeking work, according to the 1999 data.
If even among the rich a good proportion attach so little value to
available educational services in the country, it may be time for a serious
examination of conditions in schools. This clearly relates not just to the
quantity but also to the quality of education that is being provided, and
to the roles of the public and the private sector. And concerns here are
likely to rise in the near future as authority and responsibility for service
delivery are devolved to local, district-level government under the new
laws on regional autonomy and finance.2
A Closed System with Misplaced Quality Control
The educational drive in Indonesia has historically been highly centralised
and ‘top-down’. Until recently, state school teachers across the country
were central government employees, and their hiring and placement were
determined by the centre—not by the districts or communities in which
they worked. Determination of numbers of schools in various locations
and funding for school construction came from the top. Fee structures
(with the exception of parental contributions, administered by school
bodies known as BP3) were also set at the national level.
Quality was seen, and is still seen by many, as being achieved through
control and standardisation, with highly structured staffing patterns and
curricula, and rigid rules governing both students and delivery of
educational services. Children are required to progress through the system
in an orderly fashion, with promotion being determined by performance
at the previous level—be it school level or even grade within each school.
No skipping of grades is allowed. And all students—in both public and
private schools—are required to take nationally set examinations known
as Ebtanas (Evaluasi Belajar Tahap Akhir Nasional, National School
Leaving Examinations) that are intended to provide a consistent measure
of student quality and to determine students’ potential for further
progression in the education system.
Ebtanas provides an interesting case of an aspect of rigidity and control
that appears to contribute little to the quality of education, but that drains
considerable resources from students and their families, while providing
a valuable source of income to those responsible for its administration.
y [Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji], [UNIVERSITAS MARITIM RAJA ALI HAJI TANJUNGPINANG, KEPULAUAN RIAU] at 22:07 19
Schooling in a Decentralised Indonesia
129
Ebtanas examinations are held at the end of each school cycle—for
elementary school at grade 6, and for both junior and senior high school
at grade 3. Taking the examination is a requirement for graduation. A
diploma cannot be issued by the school (and this applies to both public
and private schools) unless the student has sat for the examination.
Ebtanas is also a requirement for progression. Inability to show a
certificate indicating that the student has taken the Ebtanas for the
previous level prohibits a school from accepting that student, irrespective
of whether the school is public or private. Thus neither schools nor
students have the freedom to choose. Schools are simply forced to
administer the examinations, while students must sit for them if they
want to graduate or progress further in the education system.
The education bureaucracy defends Ebtanas as a means of controlling
for variations in the quality of school level grading systems, and hence
as a stimulus for schools to improve their quality. The examinations are
also defended as a means to provide greater certainty in selection of
students for progression to higher levels. To date, however, the validity
of these suppositions has never been proven. In fact, examination scores
appear to have little influence on graduation or school quality.
Grading of the national examinations is based on a scale from 0 to 10.
But, as can be seen in table 1, average grades are generally quite low (on
normal report cards, 6 is usually considered a minimum passing grade),
while graduation rates remain very high, all well in excess of 90%. The
TABLE 1 Low Final Examination Scores but High Graduation Rates, 1998/99
School Type and Level
Participants
Graduates
Average Graduation
Grade
Rate
(%)
Public
Junior secondary
General senior secondary
Vocational senior secondary
1,571,012
461,086
155,440
1,546,216
446,547
153,555
5.75
3.99
5.09
98
97
99
Private
Junior secondary
General senior secondary
Vocational senior secondary
775,314
351,303
380,985
768,900
344.156
348,647
5.22
3.19
4.68
99
98
92
Source: Based on Ministry of Education statistics obtained from .
y [Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji], [UNIVERSITAS MARITIM RAJA ALI HAJI TANJUNGPINANG, KEPULAUAN RIAU] at 22:07 19
130
Mayling Oey-Gardiner
worst cases are among general senior high school students, who managed
to score on average less than 4 on Ebtanas in 1998/99 (table 1). Yet
97–98% still graduated. This relationship, or absence of one, has never
been examined. Instead, the bureaucracy has defended the system, while
civil society has remained helpless, unable to ignore this requirement.
Clearly, Ebtanas provides little or no control over the quality of
graduates. The policy of requiring students to sit for the examination, in
addition to normal school testing and grading, in order to graduate must
thus be open to question. The low scores, and questions that have been
raised over just what the tests are measuring (not to mention frequent
allegations related to leakage of examination materials and manipulation
of scores), cast doubt on its value as a screening tool for progression to
higher levels in the education system. If screening beyond grades and
other school-based performance measures is required, it would probably
be far more efficient for testing of prospective students to be carried out
by individual schools, using whatever standards they deem necessary.
For state universities, where selection is a major issue, there is already a
separate entrance examination, the UMPTN (Ujian Masuk Perguruan
Tinggi Negeri, State Higher Education Entrance Examination), that is
used as a basis for screening applicants.3 Some more elite high schools
require applicants to take special aptitude tests, either designed by the
school or through private testing services.
Vested Interests in Maintaining the System
Without taking the examination students are not allowed to graduate,
and without the piece of paper indicating their examination scores they
cannot progress to the next level in the education hierarchy or apply for
a job in the civil service. Thus parents have no choice but to pay the
examination fees if they want their children to have a chance at further
education, or even simply proof of completion at their current level.
And these payments are substantial. For example, official fees for
secondary level Ebtanas in Jakarta are generally two or more times official
monthly fees for public school attendance. 4 They also provide a
substantial windfall to administrators. For the 1999/2000 academic year
end examinations, the Jakarta government avoided giving a total budget
(stating expenditures only on a per student basis). However, multiplying
per student fees by an expected number of participants suggests that
total returns would probably reach at least Rp 22 billion, or close to
$3 million.5 Around 42% of this budget was allocated to administration,
including meetings of officials at various levels. Some of this may have
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Schooling in a Decentralised Indonesia
131
been legitimate, but there were substantial amounts allowed for meetings
and honoraria that must be questioned, given that the participants were
salaried government officials.
These concerns have been echoed in the press, with several reports
on the amounts of money involved, as well as on the hardships these
imposed on students and their families (Kompas, 22/5/00 and 23/5/00;
Media Indonesia, 23/5/00). Articles have also reflected an increasingly
widespread view in favour of eliminating the Ebtanas altogether (Kompas,
24/5/00 and 25/5/00; Suara Pembaruan, 23/5/00). Yet, given the overall
amount of money involved, it should not be surprising that the vested
interests in maintaining the system are very strong.
New Initiatives in Access and Decision Making
However, some initiatives are being taken to improve educational access
and decentralise decision making. For instance, in response to the crisis
the government, with loans from the Asian Development Bank and the
World Bank, has established an educational social safety net program to
prevent an increase in school dropouts. This program provides
scholarships to poor students and operational funds for poor schools,
known as DBO (Dana Bantuan Operasional). These are distributed
directly to the beneficiary students and schools, thereby avoiding possible
‘leakage’ along the way. The program has been hailed as successful,
earning a World Bank award.
In response to a World Bank education sector analysis (World Bank
1998), Dr Fasli Djalal of Bappenas took the initiative to have Indonesian
researchers conduct further analysis of the implications of the crisis and
of impending moves toward greater decentralisation and regional
autonomy. An initial group of studies led to the formation of four task
forces that were approved for ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) funding
administered by the World Bank. These task forces covered philosophy,
teachers, higher education, and educational finance.
Some of the output of the task forces is of interest. For example,
following experience in other countries (Burki, Perry and Dillinger 1999;
Jimenez, Paqueo and de Vera Ma 1988; King and Ozler 1998; and Patrinos
and Ariasingam 1997), the Educational Finance Task Force proposed a
radical decentralisation—from central government all the way down to
individual schools. Moreover, it was argued that decentralisation should
cover not only operational costs (which usually constitute less than 20%
of recurrent budgets) but also teacher and staff salary costs (constituting
the remaining 80%). This included giving schools the right to manage,
hire and fire teachers.6
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Mayling Oey-Gardiner
The vision contained in this study was to move from quantity (equity)
to quantity and quality; and from a supply to a demand orientation—the
argument being that, if properly managed under the supervision of school
boards and school committees, schools will be in the best position to
decide what they need and what they can achieve. School boards would
oversee a number of schools in an area, and would consist of non-salaried
members who are political appointees selected by the local community.
The boards would be responsible for preparing selection criteria for
teachers and students, and for selecting independent institutions to
conduct school performance audits. They would also decide on subsidy
recipients and allocation of subsidies to schools. School committees would
operate at individual school level. They would consist of parents and
teachers, including school principals, but school principals would not be
able to become chairpersons, and all members would have equal voting
rights. Of course, each school committee would be required to make its
decisions transparent and to be accountable to all parents and teachers
of the school. There is already in place a precursor of school committees,
known as BP3 (Badan Pembinaan dan Penyelenggaraan Pendidikan,
Board of Educational Development and Administration), but so far these
have had only a limited role, deciding on issues such as school uniforms,
and setting the level of parental contributions (JP, 31/7/00).
Even if there is now fairly widespread consensus about the poor
quality of Indonesian schools, there is still debate about how to remedy
it. The views expressed above have not yet achieved wide acceptance,
and there are many who still believe that quality can be imposed by central
control and rigid common standards. There also are many who see the
roots of low quality in low teacher salaries and poor teacher training.
This may be part of the problem, but it begs the even more critical question
of just what the schools and students will get in return for a higher
investment in education. How will teachers, schools and the education
system in general be held accountable for the investments that are made?
Some Official Responses to New Ideas
There appears to be an increasingly positive response in government to
the recommendation for decentralisation to the school level. A few people
at least seem to be embracing the opportunities arising from the
introduction of Laws No. 22 and 25 of 1999 on regional autonomy and
regional finance. Following intensive media reporting on the ills of
Ebtanas, and suggestions for elimination of this costly exercise, Ministry
of National Education spokesmen did express their willingness to
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Schooling in a Decentralised Indonesia
133
evaluate its implementation (Suara Pembaruan, 7/7/00), and the head of
the Ministry’s Research and Development Office said that Ebtanas might
even be replaced (JP, 22/7/00).
In contrast with its past adherence to an ideology of equity in a
centralised and standardised system, the Ministry of National Education
now acknowledges that difference is not necessarily a bad thing, including
difference in the quality of schools. In an important move to relax past
rigidities in the curriculum, and to begin to allow choice at school level,
in 2001 schools will be offered the freedom to choose one of three curricula.
These are structured at novice, intermediate and expert levels, and are
designed to give schools greater flexibility to adapt their programs to
their own capabilities and those of their students. This will apply to
schools throughout the country, whether public, private or religious. The
emphasis is on output, with basic minimum standards having to be
fulfilled by graduates no matter which curriculum their school adopts.
Schools will also have greater flexibility in deciding on appropriate
teaching methods, books and other technical materials. The Ministry will
only provide references (JP, 22/7/00).
More encouraging, the head of the Jakarta office of the education
ministry stated that parent–teacher bodies (school committees) will have
greater power under regional autonomy, beyond just deciding on school
uniforms and setting fees (Suara Pembaruan, 26/7/00). Attempts will be
made to involve parents more, including in decisions about the quality
of services provided by the respective schools. However, only time will
tell what the bureaucracy is really willing to give up, and where parents
may have greater authority over school operations.
NOTES
1
These figures are based on special tabulations of the 1999 Susenas, classifying
households into expenditure quintiles based on reported total monthly per
capita household expenditure.
2
Laws No. 22 and 25 of 1999 on Regional Autonomy and Regional Finance are
scheduled to begin formal implementation in January 2001.
3
The UMPTN administration is considering dropping the requirement to submit
Ebtanas results or NEM (Nilai Ebtanas Murni, Raw Ebtanas Scores) with
applications to sit for the public university entrance exam (Kompas, 27/5/00).
4
Ebtanas fees for 1999/2000 were Rp 55,650 at junior secondary level, Rp 75,100
at general senior secondary level and Rp 115,400 for vocational senior
secondary schools. Monthly fees for public schools are around Rp 20–30,000
at junior secondary level and somewhat higher at senior secondary level.
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Mayling Oey-Gardiner
5
Just under 300,000 students took secondary level Ebtanas in 1998/99.
6
The idea of school-based management and activities to further this objective
is not new in Indonesia. However, I believe that this is the first time a
recommendation has been made for the ‘radical’ option, covering not only
the development budget but also the routine budget for staff salaries, and
including the right to manage the teaching staff.
REFERENCES
Burki, Shahid Javed, Guillermo E. Perry and William R. Dillinger (1999), Beyond
the Centre: Decentralizing the State, World Bank, Washington DC.
Insan Hitawasana Sejahtera (2000), Provincial Poverty and Social Indicators,
Susenas 1993–1999, Report submitted to the Asian Development Bank, Manila.
Jimenez, Emmanuel, Vincente Paqueo and Lourdes de Vera Ma (1988), ‘Does Local
Financing Make Primary Schools More Efficient? The Philippine Case’, World
Bank Policy Planning and Research Working Papers, Education and
Employment, WPS 69, World Bank, Washington DC.
King, Elizabeth M., and Berk Ozler (1998), What’s Decentralization Got To Do
With Learning? The Case of Nicaragua’s School Autonomy Reform, Paper
presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Educational Research
Association, San Diego CA, 13–17 April.
Patrinos, Harry Anthony, and David Laksmanan Ariasingam (1997),
Decentralization of Education: Demand-Side Financing, The International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, June, Washington DC.
World Bank (1998), Education in Indonesia: From Crisis to Recovery, Report No. 18651IND, Washington DC.