Manajemen | Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji 2002 9
ON DIFFERENT PLANETS: A RESPONSE TO
‘HEADING INTO ORBIT?’
BRAHAM DABSCHECK*
It appears that not only in social life, but wherever there is life, there is conflict.
(Dahrendorf 1959: 208)
What is required is both theoretically informed empirical analysis and empirically
grounded theory.
(Hyman 1994: 172)
I
n the September 2001 issue of The Journal of Industrial Relations Michelson
and Westcott have presented a critical commentary on my writings on industrial relations theory; particularly my attempt to develop one possible version of
a theory of industrial relations (Dabscheck 1994; 1995). They maintain that the
development of my ideas was influenced by ‘historical specificities’ (Michelson
and Westcott 2001: 309), and attempt to relate such events to the evolution of
my ideas. In trying to develop a general theory of Australian industrial relations
it is difficult to know how I, or anyone for that matter, could not be influenced
by Australian empirics. They posit a simple linear relationship between ‘ideas’
and ‘specificities’. However, the connection between the two did not occur in
the way that they suggest. Undoubtedly, the worst example of this is where Theories
of Regulation (Dabscheck 1981) is linked to the end of wage indexation and the
changed role of the Commission in 1981 (Michelson and Westcott 2001:
313–314). Such ‘ideas’ were used to inform research on an arbitrator long dead
(Dabscheck 1983a). The evolution of the General Theory took (too) many years.
It occurred by happenstance being a function of my ability––or more correctly,
inability––to discipline myself to think; to think in conceptual and abstract terms.
The real world is confusing and chaotic. My life is no exception.
At a number of points Michelson and Westcott pass comment on my reliance
and use of Dahrendorf (1959). In examining An Analytical Model (Dabscheck 1980)
they state the ‘choice of Dahrendorf’s relations of authority is left unexplained . . .
and in the absence of any indication . . . it is necessary to surmise why this might
be the case’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 311). I, in fact, provided three major
reasons for choosing Dahrendorf. They were: problems with Dunlop’s systems
model (Dunlop 1958), the potential for developing motivational/behavioural
* Associate Professor, School of Industrial Relations and Organisational Behaviour, University of
New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052. Email: [email protected]
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assumptions for various actors, and that the term could be applied to struggles
within, as well as between, actors (Dabscheck 1980: 198–200). In subsequent paragraphs after the above quotation, Michelson and Westcott paraphrase the first
and third reasons (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 311–312). I have committed many
crimes, but I have never been a person of straw.
In examining the General Theory, per se, they state: ‘It is not entirely transparent why “authority” has been privileged in the theory other than to give
the framework its cohesion and coherence’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 322, my
emphasis). In developing a theory based on abstract thought, is there anything
more you can ask of a concept, than to give the said theory’s framework its
cohesion and coherence?
Michelson and Westcott comment on, and seemingly question, why I drew on
Dahrendorf in preference to materialist or Marxist theories of conflict (though
see below their championing of a model which gives greater emphasis to cooperation). They then present material concerning Dahrendorf which appears confusing. At one point they reproduce a statement from him that ‘Control over the
means of production is but a special case of authority’ (Dahrendorf 1959: 136;
Michelson & Westcott 2001: 311). Compare this with their interpretation of
him that ‘groups that contest authority are neither theoretically nor empirically
determined by material conditions’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 312). They have
obliterated Dahrendorf’s ‘special case’. Dahrendorf’s theory is capable of incorporating Marxian class struggle if various groups and organisations marshalled
themselves to pursue such a struggle. For Dahrendorf, the types of authority struggles which occur are questions of empirics.
Michelson and Westcott point out that Dahrendorf explored conditions necessary for the effective regulation of conflict (Dahrendorf 1959: 223–231;
Michelson & Westcott 2001: 312–313). It, of course, follows that if such conditions are not present, conflict cannot be effectively regulated. They state that
this aspect of Dahrendorf ‘goes unmentioned’ in my work (Michelson & Westcott
2001: 312). It was, in fact, examined in Industrial Relations in Australia (Dabscheck
& Niland 1981: 53–56).
In commenting on An Analytical Model, Michelson and Westcott note how I
moved away from Dunlop’s three actor model, to one which incorporated a large
number of actors. Part of this transition was accomplished by criticising Dunlop’s
third actor, ‘specialised governmental agencies . . . concerned with workers, enterprises and their relationships’ (Dunlop 1958: 7). Dunlop’s two other actors were
manager and worker representatives, respectively. I criticised Dunlop on the basis
that the involvement of the ‘state’ was more complex than the role of specialised
governmental agencies. Michelson and Westcott state that I contend ‘that
Dunlop’s term “governmental agencies” . . . is not all-encompassing in that it
excludes both industrial tribunals and the various courts’ (Michelson & Westcott
2001: 310). This is something that I did not do (see Dabscheck 1980: 200–201).
What is more alarming, however, is that Michelson and Westcott do not seem
to be aware that industrial tribunals are ‘specialised governmental agencies’, a la
Dunlop. Courts, on the other hand, are non-specialised or ‘general’ organisations
brought into being by Constitutions of nation states and/or their respective
governments.
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Michelson and Westcott draw attention to Theories of Regulation (Dabscheck
1981), which provided the basis of the first chapter of Arbitrator at Work
(Dabscheck 1983a). They did not refer to this latter work; presumably being
unaware of its existence. In both I abandoned the survival thesis. In its stead I
developed a theory of activist arbitration. Michelson and Westcott maintain that
in Theories of Regulation I began ‘to move away from the rather crude explanation
that tribunals are motivated only by survival, to a more sophisticated view that
tribunals, while still largely motivated by survival, also pursue an activist regulatory approach when performing their functions’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001:
314). The survival thesis denotes passivity, which is the opposite of activism.
Arbitrator at Work, to repeat, a work which they have not consulted, provided
empirical proof1 of an activist arbitrator, in the person of Sir William Raymond
Kelly. His activism was such, that those opposed to him brought about the destruction of the tribunal over which he presided.
Scholars employ different theories to explain phenomena. Distinctions are
drawn between micro, macro and general theories. Micro analysis is concerned
with small parts, or particular aspects of social phenomena. For example, industrial relations scholars conduct research into unions/a particular union, firms/a
particular firm, activities of various organs of the state, industrial disputes, negotiations and so on. Macro analysis is concerned with a national system as a whole,
perceiving social phenomena in aggregated or monolithic terms. Broad statements
will be made about unions (as a whole), employers (as a whole) and the state.
General theories are an alternative to macro analysis. They make statements
which incorporate all micro phenomena, explaining the inter-relationships and
inter-connections therein. A general theory makes general statements about the
totality of micro phenomena.
The reason I have returned to basics is the problems Michelson and Westcott
have in understanding macro and general theories. At one point they state that
I did not explain ‘what a macro model actually entails’ (Michelson & Westcott
2001: 321). I did, and moreover they could have consulted Of Mountains and Routes
Over Them as well (Dabscheck 1983b; 1995: 12). They could have also asked someone to explain to them what macro theories entail.
They say if my theory ‘is indeed a general theory, it will have the capacity to
explain industrial relations generally, not Australia exclusively. If the theory is
one that accounts for Australian industrial relations, as indeed it seems to be
framed, then it is not a general theory’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 321).
Michelson and Westcott are in ignorance of what a general theory is (see above).
Irrespective of this, I will tackle the above quotation head-on. Would it be so
difficult to apply this general theory of Australian industrial relations to other
nations? Would it be so difficult to generalise this general theory? It is so simple. All that needs to be done is to make some minor modifications to Proposition
1 of the General Theory. For example, Proposition 1 could be changed from
‘Australian industrial relations comprises n interactors’ to ‘[The name/adjective
of any country/nation state] industrial relations comprises n interactors’. Or alternatively, to completely abstract the General Theory, removing any taint of empiri-
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cism, Proposition 1 could be reformulated to state ‘Industrial relations in any
country/nation state comprises n interactors’. Or, being truly ambitious, it could
be reformulated again to ‘Global industrial relations comprises n interactors’.
Having concluded that I have not developed a general theory, Michelson and
Westcott then proceed to contradict themselves. They say ‘the theory can be
applied to any set of social interactors’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 325. See
p. 324 for a similar statement). The ability of a theory to explain more, rather
than fewer, phenomena constitutes a strength, rather than a weakness, of the said
theory.
Michelson and Westcott express misgivings about the notion of an authority
struggle. They ask, ‘what benefit(s) do interactors derive from enhancing their
authority in a given orbit?’ They also state that ‘a discussion of motivation is
absent’ in the General Theory, and ‘the struggle for authority can be construed as
both the dependent and independent variable’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 322).
Before proceeding further it should be pointed out that Michelson and Westcott
acknowledge the importance of general concepts, and abstraction, in constructing a theory which can potentially explain a ‘large amount’ of social phenomena.
They approvingly quote or, alternatively, do not pass any (negative) comment
on, Cooke who said, ‘The greater the set of phenomena that any theory attempts
to explain, the more general will be its axioms and theorems, and the more
simplified and abstract will be the catalyst(s) that drive the relationships’ (Cooke
1985: 224; Michelson & Westcott 2001: 317).
The benefits interactors derive from enhancing their authority––if, in fact, they
do––is the realisation of some of their objectives. Alternatively, not seeking to
realise objectives, or to defend achievements of the past, will mean the ceding of
authority/objectives to others. A discussion of motivation is not absent from the
General Theory. Proposition 6 explicitly incorporates motivation. The desire to
enhance authority is the ‘abstract catalyst’, per Cooke, that motivates interactors
and ‘drives their relationships’. Michelson and Westcott want me to provide more
specific, unique information concerning the motivation of (various) interactors.
The actual manifestations of authority struggles, the actual goals and objectives
of interactors are empirical questions, which will conceivably vary from case to
case. It is unnecessary for a general theory to specify them. Authority struggles
are the independent variable, and the various equilibria which result from such
struggles are the dependent variable in the General Theory.
Michelson and Westcott maintain that the desire to prevail in interactions
‘may not be the pre-eminent motive’, and ‘that there are both competitive and
co-operative attributes within industrial relations’. Theories are developed to
simplify and make sense of the confusion and chaos that is the real world. Theories
comprise as if statements about the real world. In the case of the General Theory,
what is being stated is that it is useful to view the behaviour of interactors as if
they are motivated by the desire to prevail in the interactions that occur. It should
also be remembered that Dahrendorf maintained that authority struggles could
be more or less effectively regulated––if the preconditions for such effective
regulation are present (which is problematic).
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Michelson and Westcott lament over problems they have in knowing how to
apply the General Theory; what they refer to as my failure ‘to specify the terrain . . . [the] theory attempts to cover’. In particular, they point to problems in
‘identifying when interactors are involved in activities that are within the province
of industrial relations and when they are involved in activities that are not’. They
refer to Flanders (1970: 86) and Hyman (1975: 9–11) who have apparently said
that ‘industrial relations does not attempt to explain all activities at work’, while
I have no such limitation (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 324).
Interactors can simultaneously inhabit industrial relations and non industrial
relations orbits. Such is life. The question of whether or not an interactor is
involved in industrial relations, or what aspects of their ‘life’ involve industrial
relations, is a matter for empirical investigation. The ‘activities at work’ incorporated in the General Theory are those that pertain to authority struggles.
The General Theory focuses on the ‘totality’ of interactions generated by such
struggles.
Michelson and Westcott state that ‘interactors may deliberately “lose” in one
orbit to increase their influence in another’. In doing so they refer to a particular page of the General Theory as apparent support for the above statement
(Dabscheck 1994: 13; Michelson & Westcott 2001: 324). I know I didn’t make
such a statement, or write words to similar effect. This can be easily confirmed
by examining their source. More generally, it is inconsistent with the logic of
seeking to prevail in authority struggles. Furthermore, the General Theory
postulates that interactors will ‘activate’ other orbits to enhance their chances of
success, and/or because of difficulties they experience in ‘winning’ in a particular orbit.
They quote me correctly as saying, ‘To know the part it is necessary to know
the whole, to know the whole it is necessary to know the parts’ (Dabscheck 1995:
17). They then state that ‘this [statement] is not reflected in the overall statement of the theory’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 323). How can they possibly
say that something that was said in developing and explicating a theory was, at
one and the same time, not said? They also claim that interactors forming into
coalitions or cartels pose a problem for the General Theory. They say that
‘the essential nature of a coalition is that it entails mutual dependence among
those involved’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 324). ‘Mutual dependence’ and
authority struggles exist both between and within organisations/non-individual
interactors.
A number of matters concerning the ‘explanatory value’ of the General Theory
are raised by Michelson and Westcott. First, they ask, ‘in what sense can some
of the propositions (such as Propositions 1 and 3) be tested? What type of evidence is relevant? How can it be demonstrated that an interactor is important
or not? Moreover, the difficulty with Proposition 2 is that it borders on the tautological. Translation of some propositions into empirical measure appears highly
problematic’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 325).2
Theories are evaluated in terms of their explanatory power, not the empirical
testing of their assumptions. Having said that, the ‘verification’ of Propositions
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1 and 3 could be achieved by examining the real world. Moreover, support for
the notion that Australian industrial relations comprises n, or a large number of
interactors, could be obtained by examining the indexes of major industrial relations works, such as textbooks. Proposition 2 is a tautology. Then, as Dahrendorf
has said, ‘there are tautologies which are worth stating’ (Dahrendorf 1959: 173).
An interactor, per se, will assume importance, in an industrial relations sense,
when it becomes involved in industrial relations––to state another tautology. If
by ‘importance’ they mean ‘something more’ than being involved in authority
contests––such as ‘winning’ them––this is a matter for empirical investigation.
Michelson and Westcott ask: ‘As conflict or struggle is inherent in the theory,
is it possible to empirically verify?’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 325). Yes, it is.
For empirical examples of industrial conflict they could consult reports of
various industrial tribunals. They could begin, for example, with volume 1 of
Commonwealth Arbitration Reports, if interested in the federal tribunal. They
could also examine articles, books and monographs published on industrial relations over the generations––starting with the seminal work of the Webbs (Webb
& Webb 1897)––for countless examples of conflict. Scholars who write about
work sans conflict, are pursuing scholarship in other disciplines, such as
economics/econometrics and psychology (see Cappelli 1985).
They also state that ‘in the absence of statements about cause and effect (other
than the general “struggle for authority”) the theory has little predictive value’
(Michelson & Westcott 2001: 325). The causal, independent variable in the
General Theory is the ‘struggle for authority’. The above quotation is another
example of misrepresentation; of saying that the General Theory does not do that
which in fact it does. The material in brackets is an attempt to rob the General
Theory of its ‘driving force’. The General Theory is predictive. The various equilibria, the results of various authority struggles, are the effects of the theory. The
General Theory does not provide specific predictions. The results of various authority struggles are a matter for empirical investigation.
In 1969 Somers edited a series of essays on industrial relations theory (Somers
1969a). In a chapter of his own he maintained ‘that the survival of industrial relations as a separate discipline and its growth as a respectable field requires a broad
conceptual framework’. He went on to add: ‘if it were not for this pressing need,
one would hardly venture onto such treacherous terrain, for to serve its integrating
purpose, the conceptual framework must be very broad and, in attempting to explain
everything a general theory runs the risk of explaining nothing’ (Somers 1969b).
Michelson and Westcott reproduce the material italicised in the above sentence
(Michelson & Westcott 2001: 320–321). They have misrepresented Somers. Their
use of these words was simply a device to say that development of general
theories is a waste of time and effort.
Contrast this with their position on Dunlop. They maintain: ‘While Dunlop’s
systems approach has attracted considerable criticism, its very logic is, nonetheless, supported by the limits of a discrete, relatively self-contained “system” ’
(Michelson & Westcott 2001: 328, n8). Dunlop believed that his model constituted a general theory of industrial relations––see his last chapter (Dunlop 1958:
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380–390). Michelson and Westcott have contradicted themselves. Alternatively,
they don’t mind general theories per se; they just don’t like one in particular. Or
again, the above quotation reveals a cavalier approach to scholarship; an approach
which says ‘Dunlop will do’.3
Generations of industrial relations scholars have been concerned with the discipline’s theoretical impoverishment. Such impoverishment will only be overcome,
tautologically, by such scholars developing theories. My General Theory is one
such attempt. It constitutes a second generation general theory, following on from
the pioneering work of Dunlop (1958). Michelson and Westcott are critical of
my attempt, which is their right and privilege. While noting their inconsistent
admiration of Dunlop, they are dismissive of general theory per se. They say
‘academics who study industrial relations may be better served by trying to develop
more thorough explanations for the phenomena they observe’ (Michelson &
Westcott 2001: 327). This is precisely what I have been attempting to do!––not
that I needed such advice in the first place. For more time than I care to remember I have been seeking ‘to develop [a] more thorough explanation’ of Australian
industrial relations. For good or for bad I have developed a general theory of
industrial relations based on Australian experience; a theory which can easily be
adapted, applied, or generalised, to other countries nation/states.
Their critique is confused and contradictory. They have misquoted, misrepresented and failed to understand various aspects of my work. Such problems
result from their inability to understand and comprehend theory construction
and the use of conceptual and abstract thought. I am particularly disturbed at
their recommendation that certain types of research should not be pursued. Those
who conduct research should follow their own intellectual interests. To do otherwise is to stifle initiative, creativity and the development of alternative, or new,
insights and theories.
The saddest aspect of their critique is its academic nihilism. It contains
nothing new; it offers no alternatives. As I approached their critique I hoped to
encounter new insights and concepts concerning industrial relations theoretical
discourse. I was sadly disappointed. The reason why Michelson and Westcott
reached backwards to Dunlop, in a reflex action as it were, was because they could
not go forward. An opportunity lost. Persons who are so limited in their understanding of theoretical, conceptual and abstract thought––as Michelson and
Westcott have demonstrated in their critique––are the least capable of developing theories of their own.
NOTES
1. The usefulness of theories is dependent on their ‘fit’ with real world phenomena. Dabscheck
(2001) examines how, in recent years, the Commission has embraced passivity in its approach
to industrial relations regulation.
2. They also struggled with accepting the ‘idea’ of interactors interacting. They said ‘The test of
the theory is whether interactors do in fact interact. Given the broad range of interactors and
the blurring [not a term that I used] of interactors and orbits it is difficult to refute a claim
that interactors do in fact interact’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 325).
3. To the extent that they are attached to Dunlop, why didn’t they demolish the ‘considerable
criticisms’ of his systems model. This may have provided a more successful route to undermining the General Theory.
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REFERENCES
Cappelli P (1985) Theory construction in IR and some implications for research. Industrial Relations
24(1), 90–112.
Commonwealth Arbitration Reports (CAR).
Cooke WN (1985) Toward a general theory of industrial relations. In: Lipsky DB, ed., Advances
in Industrial Relations and Labor Relations 2, pp. 223–252. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press.
Dabscheck B (1980) The Australian system of industrial relations: An analytical model. Journal of
Industrial Relations 22(2), 196–218.
Dabscheck B (1981) Theories of regulation and Australian industrial relations. Journal of Industrial
Relations 23(4), 430–446.
Dabscheck B (1983a) Arbitrator at Work: Sir William Raymond Kelly and the Regulation of Australian
Industrial Relations. Sydney: George Allen and Unwin.
Dabscheck B (1983b) Of mountains and routes over them: A survey of theories of industrial
relations. Journal of Industrial Relations 25(4), 485–506.
Dabscheck B (1989) Australian Industrial Relations in the 1980s. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
Dabscheck B (1994) A general theory of (Australian) industrial relations. Journal of Industrial Relations
36(1), 3–17.
Dabscheck B (1995) The Struggle for Australian Industrial Relations. Melbourne: Oxford University
Press.
Dabscheck B (2001) The slow and agonising death of the Australian experiment with conciliation
and arbitration. Journal of Industrial Relations 43(3), 277–293.
Dabscheck B, Niland J (1981) Industrial Relations in Australia. Sydney: George Allen and Unwin.
Dahrendorf R (1959) Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial Society. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul.
Dunlop J (1958) Industrial Relations Systems. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Flanders A (1970) Management and Unions: The Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations. London:
Faber and Faber.
Hyman R (1975) Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction. London: Macmillan.
Hyman R (1994) Theory and industrial relations. British Journal of Industrial Relations 32(2),
165–180.
Michelson G, Westcott M (2001) Heading into orbit? Braham Dabscheck and industrial relations
theory. Journal of Industrial Relations 43(3), 308–329.
Somers GG, ed. (1969a) Essays in Industrial Relations Theory. Ames: Iowa State University Press.
Somers GG (1969b) Bargaining power and industrial relations theory. In: Somers GG, ed., Essays
in Industrial Relations Theory. Ames: Iowa State University Press.
Webb S, Webb B (1897) Industrial Democracy. London: Longman Green.
‘HEADING INTO ORBIT?’
BRAHAM DABSCHECK*
It appears that not only in social life, but wherever there is life, there is conflict.
(Dahrendorf 1959: 208)
What is required is both theoretically informed empirical analysis and empirically
grounded theory.
(Hyman 1994: 172)
I
n the September 2001 issue of The Journal of Industrial Relations Michelson
and Westcott have presented a critical commentary on my writings on industrial relations theory; particularly my attempt to develop one possible version of
a theory of industrial relations (Dabscheck 1994; 1995). They maintain that the
development of my ideas was influenced by ‘historical specificities’ (Michelson
and Westcott 2001: 309), and attempt to relate such events to the evolution of
my ideas. In trying to develop a general theory of Australian industrial relations
it is difficult to know how I, or anyone for that matter, could not be influenced
by Australian empirics. They posit a simple linear relationship between ‘ideas’
and ‘specificities’. However, the connection between the two did not occur in
the way that they suggest. Undoubtedly, the worst example of this is where Theories
of Regulation (Dabscheck 1981) is linked to the end of wage indexation and the
changed role of the Commission in 1981 (Michelson and Westcott 2001:
313–314). Such ‘ideas’ were used to inform research on an arbitrator long dead
(Dabscheck 1983a). The evolution of the General Theory took (too) many years.
It occurred by happenstance being a function of my ability––or more correctly,
inability––to discipline myself to think; to think in conceptual and abstract terms.
The real world is confusing and chaotic. My life is no exception.
At a number of points Michelson and Westcott pass comment on my reliance
and use of Dahrendorf (1959). In examining An Analytical Model (Dabscheck 1980)
they state the ‘choice of Dahrendorf’s relations of authority is left unexplained . . .
and in the absence of any indication . . . it is necessary to surmise why this might
be the case’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 311). I, in fact, provided three major
reasons for choosing Dahrendorf. They were: problems with Dunlop’s systems
model (Dunlop 1958), the potential for developing motivational/behavioural
* Associate Professor, School of Industrial Relations and Organisational Behaviour, University of
New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052. Email: [email protected]
THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 44, NO. 1, MARCH 2002, 136–143
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assumptions for various actors, and that the term could be applied to struggles
within, as well as between, actors (Dabscheck 1980: 198–200). In subsequent paragraphs after the above quotation, Michelson and Westcott paraphrase the first
and third reasons (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 311–312). I have committed many
crimes, but I have never been a person of straw.
In examining the General Theory, per se, they state: ‘It is not entirely transparent why “authority” has been privileged in the theory other than to give
the framework its cohesion and coherence’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 322, my
emphasis). In developing a theory based on abstract thought, is there anything
more you can ask of a concept, than to give the said theory’s framework its
cohesion and coherence?
Michelson and Westcott comment on, and seemingly question, why I drew on
Dahrendorf in preference to materialist or Marxist theories of conflict (though
see below their championing of a model which gives greater emphasis to cooperation). They then present material concerning Dahrendorf which appears confusing. At one point they reproduce a statement from him that ‘Control over the
means of production is but a special case of authority’ (Dahrendorf 1959: 136;
Michelson & Westcott 2001: 311). Compare this with their interpretation of
him that ‘groups that contest authority are neither theoretically nor empirically
determined by material conditions’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 312). They have
obliterated Dahrendorf’s ‘special case’. Dahrendorf’s theory is capable of incorporating Marxian class struggle if various groups and organisations marshalled
themselves to pursue such a struggle. For Dahrendorf, the types of authority struggles which occur are questions of empirics.
Michelson and Westcott point out that Dahrendorf explored conditions necessary for the effective regulation of conflict (Dahrendorf 1959: 223–231;
Michelson & Westcott 2001: 312–313). It, of course, follows that if such conditions are not present, conflict cannot be effectively regulated. They state that
this aspect of Dahrendorf ‘goes unmentioned’ in my work (Michelson & Westcott
2001: 312). It was, in fact, examined in Industrial Relations in Australia (Dabscheck
& Niland 1981: 53–56).
In commenting on An Analytical Model, Michelson and Westcott note how I
moved away from Dunlop’s three actor model, to one which incorporated a large
number of actors. Part of this transition was accomplished by criticising Dunlop’s
third actor, ‘specialised governmental agencies . . . concerned with workers, enterprises and their relationships’ (Dunlop 1958: 7). Dunlop’s two other actors were
manager and worker representatives, respectively. I criticised Dunlop on the basis
that the involvement of the ‘state’ was more complex than the role of specialised
governmental agencies. Michelson and Westcott state that I contend ‘that
Dunlop’s term “governmental agencies” . . . is not all-encompassing in that it
excludes both industrial tribunals and the various courts’ (Michelson & Westcott
2001: 310). This is something that I did not do (see Dabscheck 1980: 200–201).
What is more alarming, however, is that Michelson and Westcott do not seem
to be aware that industrial tribunals are ‘specialised governmental agencies’, a la
Dunlop. Courts, on the other hand, are non-specialised or ‘general’ organisations
brought into being by Constitutions of nation states and/or their respective
governments.
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Michelson and Westcott draw attention to Theories of Regulation (Dabscheck
1981), which provided the basis of the first chapter of Arbitrator at Work
(Dabscheck 1983a). They did not refer to this latter work; presumably being
unaware of its existence. In both I abandoned the survival thesis. In its stead I
developed a theory of activist arbitration. Michelson and Westcott maintain that
in Theories of Regulation I began ‘to move away from the rather crude explanation
that tribunals are motivated only by survival, to a more sophisticated view that
tribunals, while still largely motivated by survival, also pursue an activist regulatory approach when performing their functions’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001:
314). The survival thesis denotes passivity, which is the opposite of activism.
Arbitrator at Work, to repeat, a work which they have not consulted, provided
empirical proof1 of an activist arbitrator, in the person of Sir William Raymond
Kelly. His activism was such, that those opposed to him brought about the destruction of the tribunal over which he presided.
Scholars employ different theories to explain phenomena. Distinctions are
drawn between micro, macro and general theories. Micro analysis is concerned
with small parts, or particular aspects of social phenomena. For example, industrial relations scholars conduct research into unions/a particular union, firms/a
particular firm, activities of various organs of the state, industrial disputes, negotiations and so on. Macro analysis is concerned with a national system as a whole,
perceiving social phenomena in aggregated or monolithic terms. Broad statements
will be made about unions (as a whole), employers (as a whole) and the state.
General theories are an alternative to macro analysis. They make statements
which incorporate all micro phenomena, explaining the inter-relationships and
inter-connections therein. A general theory makes general statements about the
totality of micro phenomena.
The reason I have returned to basics is the problems Michelson and Westcott
have in understanding macro and general theories. At one point they state that
I did not explain ‘what a macro model actually entails’ (Michelson & Westcott
2001: 321). I did, and moreover they could have consulted Of Mountains and Routes
Over Them as well (Dabscheck 1983b; 1995: 12). They could have also asked someone to explain to them what macro theories entail.
They say if my theory ‘is indeed a general theory, it will have the capacity to
explain industrial relations generally, not Australia exclusively. If the theory is
one that accounts for Australian industrial relations, as indeed it seems to be
framed, then it is not a general theory’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 321).
Michelson and Westcott are in ignorance of what a general theory is (see above).
Irrespective of this, I will tackle the above quotation head-on. Would it be so
difficult to apply this general theory of Australian industrial relations to other
nations? Would it be so difficult to generalise this general theory? It is so simple. All that needs to be done is to make some minor modifications to Proposition
1 of the General Theory. For example, Proposition 1 could be changed from
‘Australian industrial relations comprises n interactors’ to ‘[The name/adjective
of any country/nation state] industrial relations comprises n interactors’. Or alternatively, to completely abstract the General Theory, removing any taint of empiri-
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cism, Proposition 1 could be reformulated to state ‘Industrial relations in any
country/nation state comprises n interactors’. Or, being truly ambitious, it could
be reformulated again to ‘Global industrial relations comprises n interactors’.
Having concluded that I have not developed a general theory, Michelson and
Westcott then proceed to contradict themselves. They say ‘the theory can be
applied to any set of social interactors’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 325. See
p. 324 for a similar statement). The ability of a theory to explain more, rather
than fewer, phenomena constitutes a strength, rather than a weakness, of the said
theory.
Michelson and Westcott express misgivings about the notion of an authority
struggle. They ask, ‘what benefit(s) do interactors derive from enhancing their
authority in a given orbit?’ They also state that ‘a discussion of motivation is
absent’ in the General Theory, and ‘the struggle for authority can be construed as
both the dependent and independent variable’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 322).
Before proceeding further it should be pointed out that Michelson and Westcott
acknowledge the importance of general concepts, and abstraction, in constructing a theory which can potentially explain a ‘large amount’ of social phenomena.
They approvingly quote or, alternatively, do not pass any (negative) comment
on, Cooke who said, ‘The greater the set of phenomena that any theory attempts
to explain, the more general will be its axioms and theorems, and the more
simplified and abstract will be the catalyst(s) that drive the relationships’ (Cooke
1985: 224; Michelson & Westcott 2001: 317).
The benefits interactors derive from enhancing their authority––if, in fact, they
do––is the realisation of some of their objectives. Alternatively, not seeking to
realise objectives, or to defend achievements of the past, will mean the ceding of
authority/objectives to others. A discussion of motivation is not absent from the
General Theory. Proposition 6 explicitly incorporates motivation. The desire to
enhance authority is the ‘abstract catalyst’, per Cooke, that motivates interactors
and ‘drives their relationships’. Michelson and Westcott want me to provide more
specific, unique information concerning the motivation of (various) interactors.
The actual manifestations of authority struggles, the actual goals and objectives
of interactors are empirical questions, which will conceivably vary from case to
case. It is unnecessary for a general theory to specify them. Authority struggles
are the independent variable, and the various equilibria which result from such
struggles are the dependent variable in the General Theory.
Michelson and Westcott maintain that the desire to prevail in interactions
‘may not be the pre-eminent motive’, and ‘that there are both competitive and
co-operative attributes within industrial relations’. Theories are developed to
simplify and make sense of the confusion and chaos that is the real world. Theories
comprise as if statements about the real world. In the case of the General Theory,
what is being stated is that it is useful to view the behaviour of interactors as if
they are motivated by the desire to prevail in the interactions that occur. It should
also be remembered that Dahrendorf maintained that authority struggles could
be more or less effectively regulated––if the preconditions for such effective
regulation are present (which is problematic).
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Michelson and Westcott lament over problems they have in knowing how to
apply the General Theory; what they refer to as my failure ‘to specify the terrain . . . [the] theory attempts to cover’. In particular, they point to problems in
‘identifying when interactors are involved in activities that are within the province
of industrial relations and when they are involved in activities that are not’. They
refer to Flanders (1970: 86) and Hyman (1975: 9–11) who have apparently said
that ‘industrial relations does not attempt to explain all activities at work’, while
I have no such limitation (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 324).
Interactors can simultaneously inhabit industrial relations and non industrial
relations orbits. Such is life. The question of whether or not an interactor is
involved in industrial relations, or what aspects of their ‘life’ involve industrial
relations, is a matter for empirical investigation. The ‘activities at work’ incorporated in the General Theory are those that pertain to authority struggles.
The General Theory focuses on the ‘totality’ of interactions generated by such
struggles.
Michelson and Westcott state that ‘interactors may deliberately “lose” in one
orbit to increase their influence in another’. In doing so they refer to a particular page of the General Theory as apparent support for the above statement
(Dabscheck 1994: 13; Michelson & Westcott 2001: 324). I know I didn’t make
such a statement, or write words to similar effect. This can be easily confirmed
by examining their source. More generally, it is inconsistent with the logic of
seeking to prevail in authority struggles. Furthermore, the General Theory
postulates that interactors will ‘activate’ other orbits to enhance their chances of
success, and/or because of difficulties they experience in ‘winning’ in a particular orbit.
They quote me correctly as saying, ‘To know the part it is necessary to know
the whole, to know the whole it is necessary to know the parts’ (Dabscheck 1995:
17). They then state that ‘this [statement] is not reflected in the overall statement of the theory’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 323). How can they possibly
say that something that was said in developing and explicating a theory was, at
one and the same time, not said? They also claim that interactors forming into
coalitions or cartels pose a problem for the General Theory. They say that
‘the essential nature of a coalition is that it entails mutual dependence among
those involved’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 324). ‘Mutual dependence’ and
authority struggles exist both between and within organisations/non-individual
interactors.
A number of matters concerning the ‘explanatory value’ of the General Theory
are raised by Michelson and Westcott. First, they ask, ‘in what sense can some
of the propositions (such as Propositions 1 and 3) be tested? What type of evidence is relevant? How can it be demonstrated that an interactor is important
or not? Moreover, the difficulty with Proposition 2 is that it borders on the tautological. Translation of some propositions into empirical measure appears highly
problematic’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 325).2
Theories are evaluated in terms of their explanatory power, not the empirical
testing of their assumptions. Having said that, the ‘verification’ of Propositions
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1 and 3 could be achieved by examining the real world. Moreover, support for
the notion that Australian industrial relations comprises n, or a large number of
interactors, could be obtained by examining the indexes of major industrial relations works, such as textbooks. Proposition 2 is a tautology. Then, as Dahrendorf
has said, ‘there are tautologies which are worth stating’ (Dahrendorf 1959: 173).
An interactor, per se, will assume importance, in an industrial relations sense,
when it becomes involved in industrial relations––to state another tautology. If
by ‘importance’ they mean ‘something more’ than being involved in authority
contests––such as ‘winning’ them––this is a matter for empirical investigation.
Michelson and Westcott ask: ‘As conflict or struggle is inherent in the theory,
is it possible to empirically verify?’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 325). Yes, it is.
For empirical examples of industrial conflict they could consult reports of
various industrial tribunals. They could begin, for example, with volume 1 of
Commonwealth Arbitration Reports, if interested in the federal tribunal. They
could also examine articles, books and monographs published on industrial relations over the generations––starting with the seminal work of the Webbs (Webb
& Webb 1897)––for countless examples of conflict. Scholars who write about
work sans conflict, are pursuing scholarship in other disciplines, such as
economics/econometrics and psychology (see Cappelli 1985).
They also state that ‘in the absence of statements about cause and effect (other
than the general “struggle for authority”) the theory has little predictive value’
(Michelson & Westcott 2001: 325). The causal, independent variable in the
General Theory is the ‘struggle for authority’. The above quotation is another
example of misrepresentation; of saying that the General Theory does not do that
which in fact it does. The material in brackets is an attempt to rob the General
Theory of its ‘driving force’. The General Theory is predictive. The various equilibria, the results of various authority struggles, are the effects of the theory. The
General Theory does not provide specific predictions. The results of various authority struggles are a matter for empirical investigation.
In 1969 Somers edited a series of essays on industrial relations theory (Somers
1969a). In a chapter of his own he maintained ‘that the survival of industrial relations as a separate discipline and its growth as a respectable field requires a broad
conceptual framework’. He went on to add: ‘if it were not for this pressing need,
one would hardly venture onto such treacherous terrain, for to serve its integrating
purpose, the conceptual framework must be very broad and, in attempting to explain
everything a general theory runs the risk of explaining nothing’ (Somers 1969b).
Michelson and Westcott reproduce the material italicised in the above sentence
(Michelson & Westcott 2001: 320–321). They have misrepresented Somers. Their
use of these words was simply a device to say that development of general
theories is a waste of time and effort.
Contrast this with their position on Dunlop. They maintain: ‘While Dunlop’s
systems approach has attracted considerable criticism, its very logic is, nonetheless, supported by the limits of a discrete, relatively self-contained “system” ’
(Michelson & Westcott 2001: 328, n8). Dunlop believed that his model constituted a general theory of industrial relations––see his last chapter (Dunlop 1958:
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380–390). Michelson and Westcott have contradicted themselves. Alternatively,
they don’t mind general theories per se; they just don’t like one in particular. Or
again, the above quotation reveals a cavalier approach to scholarship; an approach
which says ‘Dunlop will do’.3
Generations of industrial relations scholars have been concerned with the discipline’s theoretical impoverishment. Such impoverishment will only be overcome,
tautologically, by such scholars developing theories. My General Theory is one
such attempt. It constitutes a second generation general theory, following on from
the pioneering work of Dunlop (1958). Michelson and Westcott are critical of
my attempt, which is their right and privilege. While noting their inconsistent
admiration of Dunlop, they are dismissive of general theory per se. They say
‘academics who study industrial relations may be better served by trying to develop
more thorough explanations for the phenomena they observe’ (Michelson &
Westcott 2001: 327). This is precisely what I have been attempting to do!––not
that I needed such advice in the first place. For more time than I care to remember I have been seeking ‘to develop [a] more thorough explanation’ of Australian
industrial relations. For good or for bad I have developed a general theory of
industrial relations based on Australian experience; a theory which can easily be
adapted, applied, or generalised, to other countries nation/states.
Their critique is confused and contradictory. They have misquoted, misrepresented and failed to understand various aspects of my work. Such problems
result from their inability to understand and comprehend theory construction
and the use of conceptual and abstract thought. I am particularly disturbed at
their recommendation that certain types of research should not be pursued. Those
who conduct research should follow their own intellectual interests. To do otherwise is to stifle initiative, creativity and the development of alternative, or new,
insights and theories.
The saddest aspect of their critique is its academic nihilism. It contains
nothing new; it offers no alternatives. As I approached their critique I hoped to
encounter new insights and concepts concerning industrial relations theoretical
discourse. I was sadly disappointed. The reason why Michelson and Westcott
reached backwards to Dunlop, in a reflex action as it were, was because they could
not go forward. An opportunity lost. Persons who are so limited in their understanding of theoretical, conceptual and abstract thought––as Michelson and
Westcott have demonstrated in their critique––are the least capable of developing theories of their own.
NOTES
1. The usefulness of theories is dependent on their ‘fit’ with real world phenomena. Dabscheck
(2001) examines how, in recent years, the Commission has embraced passivity in its approach
to industrial relations regulation.
2. They also struggled with accepting the ‘idea’ of interactors interacting. They said ‘The test of
the theory is whether interactors do in fact interact. Given the broad range of interactors and
the blurring [not a term that I used] of interactors and orbits it is difficult to refute a claim
that interactors do in fact interact’ (Michelson & Westcott 2001: 325).
3. To the extent that they are attached to Dunlop, why didn’t they demolish the ‘considerable
criticisms’ of his systems model. This may have provided a more successful route to undermining the General Theory.
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