goods, Ledyard 1995 finds that communication and high marginal payoffs are the two factors that
have a very well-documented effect on contribu- tions to the voluntary provision of public goods.
Thus, it might be expected that some external agent or water management organisation which
facilitates communication between farmers, pro- vides information and incurs transactions costs,
would help overcome the problems of collective action in a wetlands context. Furthermore, water
management within a catchment can involve more complex issues beyond serving the collective needs
of farmers. Importantly, there are implications of water management for flood control in the river
basin. Water management also has implications for urban and industrial interests. The complexity
of managing water levels for multiple interests means that decisions may be taken by some tier of
local government or formal water management organisation with statutory duties. Since these
organisations, and not just individual farmers or collectives, have decision-making powers, it is
also relevant to consider the incentives that they face.
4. Policy and water management institutions in the UK
Under the current structure of incentives — within the countryside stewardship scheme and
within several Environmentally Sensitive Areas — there is an opportunity for individual farmers
in addition to organisations that may own land in the area to enter agreements where wetland
restoration is the main objective. Collective action is not explicitly encouraged, although in practice,
for the reasons discussed above, this will often be necessary if alteration in the water management
infrastructure is required. Information on uptake in both the Upper Thames tributaries ESA and
the Somerset Levels and Moors ESA shows that uptake for the raised water tiers is much less than
for the lower tiers of agreement see Table 1. This suggests either that the payment for these tiers is
not high enough for the changes in agricultural practices that would be required, or that there are
other obstacles such as high transactions costs that prevent farmers from coming to an agree-
ment to enter the scheme.
In England and Wales, internal drainage boards IDBs usually decide on the feasibility of
raising water levels and may also balance the drainage requirements of different types of farm-
ing and other land uses Friend and Laffin, 1983. In many cases, IDBs started out as a ‘club’ of
local landholders who came together to organise land drainage. IDBs are now more formal institu-
tions with statutory responsibilities. As a conse- quence, they have evolved from being landholder
‘clubs’ to acting more like a tier of local govern- ment where different interests, such of those of
Table 1 Tiers
Description Payment rate per ha £
Uptake has Somerset Le6els and Moors ESA
Permanent grassland 1
130 11320
1s Tier one+raised water level area supplement
130+80 26
Wet permanent grassland 2415
2 215
Tier two+raised water level area supplement 2s
215+80 231
3 Permanent grassland raised water level areas
415 920
Upper Thames tributaries ESA Permanent grassland
1a 30
2452 1b
Extensive permanent grassland 105
1735 155
383 2
Wet grassland Reversion of arable land to extensive permanent grassland
3a 290
462 Reversion of arable land to wet grassland
3b 330
107
Fig. 1. Food and coastal defense.
local residents, are represented although in prac- tice, the extent of this change varies among loca-
tions. Given their direct role in influencing whether or not wetland restoration takes place, it
is important to consider the way in which these organisations
have changed
and to
discuss whether they contribute to the attainment of envi-
ronmental goals. IDBs may also exert an indirect influence over
whether wetland restoration takes place through their role as providers of information and in
potentially reducing transaction costs in enabling groups of farmers to reach an agreement. In this
way, they are very like the water management institutions described by Loehman and Dinar
1994 in the context of an irrigation externality problem in the Central Valley of California. Os-
trom 1990 also provides similar examples with regard to irrigation.
The statutory role of IDBs is set out in the 1976 Land Drainage Act. Their links to the Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food MAFF and to the Environment Agency are illustrated in Fig. 1.
As stipulated by the 1976 Act, the role of IDBs is to take responsibility for land drainage and flood
protection in local areas within the low-lying ar- eas of England and Wales. IDBs exercise a gen-
eral supervision of all matters relating to the
drainage of land within their district, and they have powers to carry out drainage work within all
watercourses of the internal drainage district ex- cept the main rivers, which come under the remit
of the Environment Agency. However, perhaps water management organisations would better de-
scribe their current role. Since 1991, new legisla- tion
has given
them some
conservation responsibilities. There are about 248 such organi-
sations in England and Wales, though they differ greatly in size and structure. The variation in size
partly reflects topographical differences in local river catchments and drainage systems and partly
reflects amalgamations Friend and Laffin, 1983.
Apart from their supervisory role, IDBs also carry out many of the practical tasks of water
management. This work varies from the regular clearing of weeds and ‘sludging out’ of channels in
order to maintain the required levels of water flow, to the more complex design, construction
and operation of systems to control water tables using pumping stations, sluice gates and other
apparatus.
Board members are elected by the drainage ratepayers in their area on a property-based fran-
chise in which the number of votes which an elector may cast up to a maximum of ten de-
pends on the rateable value of hisher property. Thus the system gives more votes to those occu-
piers who contribute higher drainage rates. Re- cently, local authorities have been able to
nominate members in numbers commensurate with the proportion of the Board’s total income
that they contribute. The maximum number of such nominated members provides a bare major-
ity of one over the elected members Institution of Civil Engineers, 1996.
Although legislation gives IDBs a greater role, they have often been perceived as run by local
farming cliques exclusively serving agricultural in- terests Baldock et al., 1990. In the 1960s and
1970s, IDBs were particularly active in serving the collective needs of farmers. Agricultural produc-
tion subsidies and the generous government grant aid provided for both arterial and in-field
drainage, gave a powerful incentive for farmers and their representative bodies to lower water
tables. IDBs acted as the institution through which an arterial drainage system could be agreed
upon and implemented. According to Morris 1990, IDBs also exerted an important influence
on whether or not farmers chose to take advan- tage of the opportunities presented by land
drainage. He writes that where formal IDB or informal drainage organisations were present,
‘Farmers were most aware of the potential of improved drainage, they pushed for improve-
ments to be carried out, were quick to exploit new opportunities, and the organisations ensured that
necessary follow-up work, operation or mainte- nance was carried out’. This role as an informa-
tion provider and a forum for establishing co-ordination indicates that such organisations
were able to reduce the transactions costs in- volved in coming to an agreement. This is similar
to the role of NGOs described in Section 3 concerning watershed management in Haiti. Thus
it may be expected that IDBs could also facilitate collective action in a conservation context. This
would require IDBs to have a positive attitude towards conservation — which could depend on
who is represented on the Boards and how schemes are financed.
In recent years, there has been some reform of IDBs. Among the environmental responsibilities
imposed on IDBs in the Land Drainage Act 1991 is to ‘further the conservation and enhancement
of natural beauty and the conservation of flora, fauna and geological or physiographical features
of special interest consistent with any enactments relating to their functions’. MAFF who have the
main policy responsibility for flood and coastal defence stress that the use of the term ‘to further’
implies a positive obligation and they strongly advise operating authorities to consult relevant
organisations such as English Nature or the Countryside Agency, even where it is not a statu-
tory requirement to do so, before carrying out any work. Consultations should attempt to ensure
that damage to the environment is minimised or prevented and also to encourage the conservation
and enhancement of wildlife and landscape and to create new habitats.
Since 1991, MAFF has emphasised to the oper- ating authorities the importance of preparing wa-
ter level management plans WLMPs, especially
in SSSIs. A WLMP is ‘an agreed schedule of operations for each water control structure within
a given area, outlining target water levels for specified periods during the year or agreed re-
sponses to certain conditions’ Swash, 1993. The operating authority is responsible for drawing up
the WLMP, and in the case of SSSIs, there must be close consultation with English Nature in
England or the Countryside Council for Wales. Since water level management is so important for
certain species, these WLMPs, if implemented, are potentially important in a wetland restoration
context.
The domination of IDBs by farmers, especially in this historic context of their role in land
drainage and the ensuing environmental damage, provides a reason why they have been severely
criticised by those representing environmental in- terests. For example, Buisson 1991 called for the
abolition of IDBs and transfer of their responsi- bilities to the National Rivers Authority now the
Environment Agency. A decision-making pro- cess, which places power in the hands of the
farmers and landowners, led to a ‘vociferous call for reform from the nature conservation move-
ment’. Baldock et al. 1990 also explained the negative influence that IDBs had in the Somerset
Levels and Moors. They were described as being ‘a law unto themselves’ and ‘at the heart’ of the
prevailing conservation problems on the Levels and Moors.
However, not all reports of the actions of IDBs have been so negative. George 1992 notes how
the Lower Bure, Halvergate Fleet and Acle Marshes IDB altered water levels in some of its
arterial drains so that graziers could take advan- tage of the ESA’s provision, enabling 942 ha of
marsh qualifying for tier one payments in 1988 to meet the tier two criteria. This suggests that at
least some IDBs do help facilitate farmer involve- ment in schemes and that they can respond to the
collective needs of farmers in a conservation context.
5. Summary of the findings from a survey of IDB representatives
