ones. O’Brien and Buckingham 1989 comment in the context of the broads ESA that to ensure
success in restoring bird populations, such as red- shank, lapwing and oystercatcher, it is important
to have whole river catchments entering tier two of the ESA scheme which involves raising water
levels.
1
One more specific example is that a mini- mum of 20 ha of wet reedbed is necessary for the
successful breeding of bitterns Royal Society for the Protection of Birds research, Jeff Kew, per-
sonal communication, 1997. It is very likely that the appropriate area for restoration would not fall
exclusively within the land owned by one farmer.
3. Relevant findings from social science literature
In the social science literature, wetland benefits would be regarded as a type of public good since
they display characteristics of non-excludability and non-rivalry in consumption. This provides the
rationale for government intervention in the form of various agri-environment schemes.
As argued in Section 2, the production of this good requires collective action by farmers. Due to
technical constraints and the costs of water man- agement, often wetland restoration will not be
possible unless all producers co-operate within a specific location. This is analogous to the exam-
ple put forward by Mueller 1980 as the crew of a sailing boat. He argues that in such cases co-op-
erative behaviour will be voluntarily forthcoming; no one can gain from non-co-operation. This is in
contrast to other common property situations where individual producers have an incentive for
non-co-operation or ‘free-riding’, given the co- operation of other producers. In the wetlands
context, ‘free-riding’ is not likely to be an issue because it is not clear that the farmer as a
producer will gain by non-co-operation, given the co-operation of other farmers. In this context,
Mueller’s argument would suggest that if private incentives are high enough i.e. subsidies in agri-
environment schemes, adjacent farmers will par- ticipate and co-ordination will be achieved.
However, there are some very practical reasons for arguing that even if private incentives are
high, collective provision will not happen sponta- neously by producers acting independently. Pro-
ducers must have the information on the technical requirements of wetland restoration and the im-
plications for water management in the catch- ment. A level of communication and agreement is
needed between farmers before individuals can participate in the scheme i.e. if wetland restora-
tion requires altering water levels in the catch- ment.
This process
involves acquiring
information and incurring the transaction costs of coming to agreement. It is quite possible that such
factors might outweigh the effect of government incentives, thus preventing wetland restoration.
In this context, the role of an external agent or water management organisations becomes very
important. This is an issue considered by White and Runge 1995 in their analysis of the emer-
gence and evolution of collective action in water- shed management in Haiti. In this case study, a
non-governmental organisation NGO is at- tributed with a major role in initiating collective
action among resource users. Among their find- ings is that the NGO acted as a ‘political en-
trepreneur’ by facilitating dialogue over watershed interdependencies and alternative solutions. It
also bore the transaction costs of encouraging co-ordination through the hiring and training of
extension agents. The authors argue that the emergence of collective action is explained by a
‘critical mass’ of practical knowledge of potential benefits and not by variables indicating physical
scale or social heterogeneity.
There is now a substantial body of research in experimental economics regarding the conditions
under which individuals will co-operate. For ex- ample, face-to-face communication among re-
source users is a critical factor in the resolution of dilemmas involving common property resources
Hackett et al., 1994. In his review of the litera- ture of experimental research in relation to public
1
Within ESAs, the lower tiers of agreement that a farmer may enter are designated primarily to prevent further damage.
Any farmer within the eligible ESA area can volunteer land for this tier. If farmers wish to enter raised water tiers, this is
at the discretion of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and is limited to those sites where the engineering of
raised water levels is likely to be possible.
goods, Ledyard 1995 finds that communication and high marginal payoffs are the two factors that
have a very well-documented effect on contribu- tions to the voluntary provision of public goods.
Thus, it might be expected that some external agent or water management organisation which
facilitates communication between farmers, pro- vides information and incurs transactions costs,
would help overcome the problems of collective action in a wetlands context. Furthermore, water
management within a catchment can involve more complex issues beyond serving the collective needs
of farmers. Importantly, there are implications of water management for flood control in the river
basin. Water management also has implications for urban and industrial interests. The complexity
of managing water levels for multiple interests means that decisions may be taken by some tier of
local government or formal water management organisation with statutory duties. Since these
organisations, and not just individual farmers or collectives, have decision-making powers, it is
also relevant to consider the incentives that they face.
4. Policy and water management institutions in the UK
