Chapter 4. Interfaith Coalition against Corruption
Introduction
Fighting Corruption
From Aceh To Papua
10 Stories on Corruption Eradication in Indonesia
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
Fighting Corruption:
From Aceh to Papua
10 Stores on Combatng Corrupton n Indonesa
Copyrght © Partnershp for Governance Reform n Indonesa
Frst Edton ssued
By the Partnershp for Governance Reform n Indonesa, Aprl 2006
Jl. MH Thamrn Kav.9 Jakarta 10350, Indonesa
Telp. [61 21] 3902566, 3902626
Fax [62 21] 2302933, 2303924
www.kemtraan.or.d
Editor of English version: Soie Arjon Schuette
Edtor of Indonesan verson: Dadang Trsasongko, Veven Sp. Wardhana,
Soie Arjon Schuette
Assstant Edtor: Inda Loekman
Translaton: James Boyd
Illustraton & cover desgn: Muhammad Syafuddn (Ifoed)
Prntng Company: PT Penebar Swadaya
ISBN: 979-99791-7-X
Introduction
Table of Contents
1. Foreword (H.S. Dllon, Executve Drector, Partnershp
for Governance Reform n Indonesa) ...............................
v
2. Introduction (Bambang Widjojanto, Partnership for
Governance Reform n Indonesa) .......................................
v
3. Uncoverng Corrupton n Aceh
(Akhiruddin Mahjuddin,GeRAK) ........................................
2
4. Antcorrupton Snowball n South Sulawes
(Elyas Joseph, LBHP2) ..........................................................
36
5. Somethng Rotten n the KPU
(Arf Nur Alam, Ftra) ............................................................
68
6. Interfath Coalton Aganst Corrupton
(Isnan Mualldn, LP3 UMY) .............................................
100
7. When the Kiai Help Control Local Budgetng
(A.S. Burhan, P3M) .....................................................................
118
8. When the People’s Representatves Loot the
Publc Purse (Sald Isra, FPSB) ...........................................
134
9. Trackng the Spendng of Tax Revenues
(Hen Yulanto, TI Indonesa) ..............................................
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
v
Introduction
Foreword
T
he Partnershp for Governance Reform n Indonesa s a
cooperatve arrangement between the Indonesan govern
ment, cvl socety organzatons, the prvate sector and
the nternatonal donor communty, wth the am of facltatng
and supportng governance reform n Indonesa. It s becomng ncreasngly accepted that governance systems cannot be
changed by practces mposed from outsde. Natonal ownershp
s the key to change. The Partnershp therefore brngs together
those elements n Indonesan government and socety who are
commtted to governance reform and encourages dalogue and
networkng amongst them. It supports ther efforts by developng deas, strateges and programs of acton, especally those that
can be asssted by the nternatonal communty.
During its irst two years, the Partnership for Governance
Reform produced n-depth dagnostc work on the problem of
corrupton n Indonesa.
Based on ths research and a comprehensve publc consultaton process undertaken to develop a natonal acton plan
to ight corruption, the Partnership started to implement the
strategy and suggestons n 2003. The Partnershp has launched
a number of ntatves on ts own, but has also supported selected partners in the implementation of projects that it within
the Partnershp’s strategy.
To date, the Partnershp has supported and been party to
a number of efforts and achevements that deserve to be made
publc beyond the short-lved coverage normally provded by the
prnt and electronc meda. They need to be reported n more
detal as they demonstrate unque and nventve approaches to
tacklng corrupton. The purpose of ths publcaton, “Fghtng
Corrupton from Aceh to Papua”, s to encourage dscusson and
replcaton n Indonesa and other parts of the world.
v
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
All 10 stores and the ntroducton were wrtten n Indonesan
and the Partnershp would lke to express ts grattude to James
Boyd, who managed to successfully transfer the meanng and
sprt of the orgnal texts nto Englsh. We would also lke to
express our thanks to Muhammad Syafuddn (Ifoed), who has
captured the essence of these reports n a thought-provokng
yet entertanng manner.
The indings, interpretations and conclusions are those of
the authors of each report and do not necessarily relect the
vews of the Partnershp. Nether the Partnershp, the members
of the Governng Board, the organzatons or governments they
represent, nor their afiliated organizations, may be held responsble for the accuracy of the facts and data contaned n ths
publcaton, or any consequences of whatever nature resultng
from ther use.
H.S. Dillon
Executve Drector
Jakarta, December 2005
v
Introduction
Consolidating the
Anticorruption Movement
Introduction by Bambang Widjojanto1
W
hen we menton the word “corrupton”, an nterestng
phenomenon worthy of study frequently becomes ap
parent. “Corrupton” has become a word n our vocabulary that s on everyone’s lps at the moment. The meda s
chock-a-block full of reports on corrupton. It s a man topc of
conversaton among all groups n socety, ncludng those who
are truly aganst corrupton and those who pay lp servce to the
struggle but who, n fact, regularly engage n varous forms of
graft n ther day-to-day actvtes. In short, “corrupton” s the
talk of the town and s a hot topc n all sorts of forums and
dscourses.
Just look at the many groups nvolved n the antcorrupton
movement at the present tme, the plethora of books analyzng
corrupton from varous perspectves, and the large number of
dscussons, semnars and TV talk shows devoted to the problem. In addton, the number of non-governmental organzatons
(NGOs) involved in the ight against graft has mushroomed.
Meanwhile a signiicant number of corruption cases are currently beng nvestgated or tred, although many more have stll
to be dealt wth.
Despte the progress made to date, there are many sgns
and ndcatons that corrupton s stll wdespread throughout
Indonesa. In fact, t s qute clear that corrupton s systematc
and part of the power structure and socal fabrc n ths country.
Whle for some, all the talk about eradcatng corrupton may be
little more than political jargon, serious efforts are nevertheless
beng made to brng about good governance through wde-rang1
Bambang Widjojanto is an advisor to the Partnership.
v
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
ng governance reform.
Nevertheless, t s dsappontng to see that despte an ncreased
awareness about the need to root out corrupton, there are sgns
that the problem s actually ncreasng. Ths gves rse to two contrastng consequences. Frst, the emergence of a fatalstc atttude
to the effect that corrupton s well-ngh mpossble to eradcate.
Ths has resulted n a hgh level of permssveness towards the
problem, whch, n turn, has the potental to encourage people to
also try ther hands at graft. Second, the undertakng of varous
poneerng efforts to consoldate the antcorrupton movement n
socety through the development of corrupton free zones. Ths
encourages many people to become nvolved n the antcorrupton
movement, even if they are not able to contribute signiicantly.
The fact s, corrupton must be systematcally fought aganst and
overcome usng creatve and ntellgent approaches.
The varous wrtngs contaned n ths book are devoted
to the struggle aganst corrupton n Indonesa. The focus has
irmly been placed on the concrete efforts that have been made
by varous cvl socety groups to reduce the room for corrupton
n Indonesan socety, whle at the same tme encouragng the
development of the antcorrupton movement at the grassroots
level. Whle only 10 case studes are presented here on account
of space limitations, there are a great many others that could just
as well have been used to provde nspraton for those strugglng aganst graft, and that are capable of replcaton so as to
encourage the takng root of the movement at the grassroots
level. The followng general topcs are dealt wth n the wrtngs
contaned n ths book:
Frst, local antcorrupton efforts (“Uncoverng Corrupton
n Aceh” and “Antcorrupton Snowball n South Sulawes”).
Second, who s nvolved n the struggle aganst corrupton
(“When the Kiai help Control Local Budgetng”, “Interfath
Coalton aganst Corrupton”, and “When the People’s Representatves loot the Publc Purse”).
Thrd, the nsttutons that are partcularly prone to corrupton (the wrtngs dscussng corrupton n the General Electons
v
Introduction
Commsson and local budgetng).
Fourth, strategies for ighting against corruption (“Mobilizng the People of Papua to Fght Corrupton”, “Eradcatng
Corrupton: From Acceptance to Resstance”, and “Trackng the
Spendng of Tax Revenues”).
Ffth, developng professonal and honest antcorrupton
nsttutons (“Establshment of the Corrupton Eradcaton
Commsson”).
Wth regard to the three wrtngs dscussng lessons learned
n the effort to eradcate corrupton n Aceh, Papua, and South
Sulawes, t s worth notng that two of these areas (Aceh and
Papua) possess specal characterstcs wth the result that they have
been accorded what s termed “specal autonomy” to manage
ther own affars. Ironcally, ths has become one of the prncpal
causes of ncreased corrupton n these regons.
Aceh was accorded specal autonomy status by Law Number
18 of 2001, and has subsequently been granted signiicant addtonal revenues. In 2001, Aceh only had revenues of Rp 543
billion, but this igure increased dramatically over the following
two years to Rp 1.6 trllon. However, accordng to studes carred out by the Antcorrupton Soldarty Movement (SoRAK),
ths ncrease n revenue was n no wse accompaned by a corresponding improvement in the province’s inancial management
capacty, or by ncreased nternal and external oversght/supervson. The emergency n Aceh was also avaled of by local power
holders to pursue programs that primarily beneited themselves
– somethng made possble by the almost total lack of control
mechansms. As a result of ths combnaton of factors, anythng
was possible in Aceh for those in positions of inluence.
In South Sulawes, the Indonesan Women’s Empowerment
Legal Ad Insttute (LBH-P2) kcked off ts campagn aganst
corrupton wth a study on the lnks between corrupton and
poverty. Ths was carred out followng a realzaton that the tradtonal local values encapsulated n the terms “sr” (self-respect),
“lempu” (honesty) and “getteng” (steadfastness n upholdng
tradtonal, legal and relgous values), were beng abandoned by
x
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
socety. It was based on ths, and the evdent lnks between corrupton and poverty, that the Insttute’s grassroots antcorrupton
campagn was predcated.
In Papua, the Insttute for Cvl Socety Strengthenng (ICS)
speciically found that “as a consequence of the fact that there
were no clear accountablty procedures n place, or poltcal or
socal control over the spendng of the addtonal fundng, the
way was left wde open for ncreased corrupton on the part of
the power-holders and ther crones.”
Gven the crcumstances prevalng on the ground, concrete
acton was requred to stop the further spread of corrupton.
The actvtes undertaken ncluded the followng:
• The Antcorrupton Soldarty Movement (SoRAK) carred
out a detaled assessment of the allocaton and utlzaton of
development funds n the local budget, and comprehensvely
and eficiently recorded the information it obtained as a
result of ths assessment;
• SoRAK identiied a number of key cases believed to involve
corrupton, and mapped out the relatonshps that facltated
corrupton among the elte;
• SoRAK successfully managed to consoldate ts antcorrupton
network and to brng pressure to bear on those nvolved
n perpetratng corrupton through a wde-rangng meda
campagn; and
• SoRAK successfully persuaded the courts to recognze the
legal standng of cvl socety organzatons n representng
the publc so as to allow them to brng class actons n respect of corruption cases that had prejudiced the interests
of the publc.
SoRAK managed to construct an antcorrupton network that
reached up to the natonal level by concentratng on only a few
key corrupton cases. The brngng to lght of the corrupton
case nvolvng now-dsmssed Aceh governor Abdullah Puteh s
one of the outstandng achevements notched up by SoRAK n
its efforts to accelerate the ight against corruption in Aceh.
Meanwhle n South Sulawes, the LBH-P2 successfully led a
coalton of about 60 NGOs and other cvl socety organzatons
x
Introduction
as part of a campagn nvolvng the provson of educaton and
tranng on corrupton montorng n respect of publc servces
at the grassroots level. A wde varety of groups from dverse
backgrounds partcpated n ths campagn, ncludng buldng
workers, miners, trishaw drivers, ishermen, sidewalk hawkers,
artsts, housewves, students, commercal sex workers, pmps,
and sub-district and district oficials.
It s also nterestng to note the success of the LBH-P2
and ts network partners n makng the best possble use of the
resources avalable to them n campagnng and provdng antcorrupton tranng through alternatve meda, such as comedy and
theater troupes, ncludng the People’s Comedy Theater Group
(Kelompok Teater Komed Rakyat), the Bugs-Makassar Troupe
(Khas Bugs-Makassar), the Theater Communty (Korupa), and
Petta Puang Players.
At least two aspects of the LBH-P2 campagn are worthy
of partcular note:
1. Focus was placed on forms of corrupton that affected the
provson of publc servces at the grassroots level, thereby
drectly affectng the people, ncludng the sze of the water
blls charged by the local water utlty and the levyng of
unoficial school fees.
2. The LBH-P2, n collaboraton wth local rado statons and
newspapers, successfully packaged ts campagn n terms of
the forms of corrupton that affected the poor n ther everyday lves. Ths provded mmense momentum for encouragng
the poor to participate in the ight against corruption.
In Papua, there are at least two major things that have been,
and are stll beng, done by the ICS n ts efforts to combat corrupton. Frst, the ICS has establshed a coalton made up of
ndvduals drawn from NGOs, trbal organzatons, academa,
local government, the journalistic profession, the prosecution
servce, and the polce n seven regences and muncpaltes. The
ICS has played the role of ntator and facltator n formulatng
antcorrupton strateges n partnershp wth the coalton. Second,
the coalton then undertook two thngs, namely:
1. Revealng corrupton cases nvolvng 22 leaders and treasurx
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
ers in connection with development projects funded out
of the 2002/2003 provncal budget, and encouragng the
commencement of legal proceedngs aganst them. Ths
process was asssted by the conductng of audts by the
Development and Fnance Audt Board (BPKP) and other
supervsory organs. As a consequence, the cases, whch were
orgnally expected to be resolved admnstratvely, were n
the end brought before the crmnal courts.
2. Draftng model local regulatons capable of provdng a
bass for the further development of the antcorrupton
movement n Papua. A number of draft regulatons were
drawn up, ncludng a regulaton on publc partcpaton and
transparency n the governance of Papua, and a regulaton
on an ombudsman commsson for Papua.
Another nterestng case study nvolved the effort to encourage the participation of religious communities in the ight against
corrupton. The Indonesan Socety for Pesantren and Communty
Development (P3M) found that there was somethng wrong wth
our relgous thnkng. In the case of many people, the stuaton
could be summed up as one of “relgon yes, corrupton yes”.
Perhaps there were also those among the belevers who were
genuinely concerned about ighting against corruption? As a
result of the actons taken, an antcorrupton coalton emerged
n Yogyakarta that was devoted to spreadng the antcorrupton
message through educaton. Over the long term, educaton would
be employed to mpart, explan and dssemnate relgous teachngs
about corrupton, whle n the short term, antcorrupton materals were designed and applied in a number of subjects so as to
encourage the various religions to accept the challenge of ighting
against corruption as a joint challenge and a precondition for the
development of an effectve antcorrupton movement.
The agreement between the two largest popular organzatons
n Indonesa, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadyah, to work
together to further the goals of the antcorrupton movement
formed the prncpal pont of entry for encouragng belevers
to become more nvolved n the struggle and for establshng a
pesantren-based antcorrupton movement. Based on the prevalng
x
Introduction
modaltes n socety and the desre to establsh a more progressve vew of zakat (Islamc alms-gvng), t was decded to focus
on the revtalzaton of the bahtsul masail forums for the purpose
of ensurng effectve control over publc polcy. Such forums
were establshed n 12 ctes and were avaled of by mams and
pesantren leaders to exercse control over local budgetng and
government spendng. In fact, the bahtsul masail forums came
to serve as effectve forms of control n the effort to reduce
corruption and ensure greater social justice.
Three aspects of the Indonesan Socety for Pesantren and
Communty Development (P3M)’s program are worthy of partcular note, namely:
1. The process of nculcatng antcorrupton awareness as part
of the revtalzaton of the bahtsul masail forums not only
ncreased awareness of the evls of corrupton from the
moral perspective, but also irmly positioned the problem
as a cultural, poltcal, economc and legal ssue that that
greatly prejudiced the well-being of the people;
2. the revtalzaton movement also produced a new breed of
young, pesantren-based kiai who properly understood the
nature of corrupton – somethng that encouraged them
to establsh crtcal study and budget-montorng forums n
many areas; and
3. a strct socal sancton was ntroduced for those nvolved n
corrupton n the form of a refusal to say funeral prayers
for deceased “corruptors” untl such tme as the money had
been returned.
The Yogyakarta Muhammadyah Unversty’s Educatonal
Development Research Insttute (LP3-UMY) not only managed
to develop antcorrupton materals but also tested them n 11
hgher learnng nsttutes n Yogyakarta through ther ncorporation in a number of subjects. The results turned out to be highly
encouragng. A number of these nsttutes agreed to contnue
usng the materals. In addton, the local government Relgon
and Educaton Agency n Yogyakarta Specal Provnce afforded
opportuntes to the LP3-UMY to gve lectures on the materals to head teachers, other teachers, and relgon nstructors and
x
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
preachers.
There are three other nterestng aspects worthy of note
based on the experences of the LP3-UMY, namely:
1. The antcorrupton educatonal materals were not only
targeted at unversty crcles but also at relgous actvsts,
preachers and relgous communtes;
2. tranng on the use of the educatonal materals was provded
to those responsble for teachng them so as to ensure full
mastery of the materals; and
3. the growth of a moral development and acton movement
was also encouraged among young relgous actvsts so as
to ensure ther full partcpaton n the war on corrupton.
The actvtes carred out by the Indonesan Forum for Budget
Transparency (Ftra) and Transparency Internatonal Indonesa
(TI-I) are also worthy of study. Fitra was the irst organization
to reveal signiicant corruption in the General Elections Commsson (KPU), whle TI-I has been successful n buldng up
a publc awareness about corrupton and taxaton ssues. Ftra’s
experiences provide important lessons as regards ighting against
corrupton n partcular organzatons. Among the lessons learned
were the followng:
Frst, the ablty to secure documents and nformaton s of
the utmost mportance durng the ntal stages. In ths case, Ftra
was able to get ts hands on detaled, comprehensve nformaton
and documents revealng budget and spendng rregulartes.
Second, a number of mportant strateges were employed
by Ftra at dfferent stages n order to obtan nformaton and
communicate its indings. These approaches including both cooperatve and confrontatonal approaches.
Thrd, Ftra was aware that a systematc, serous and ndepth nvestgaton would be requred before drawng any conclusons.
Fourth, whle pursung all of the above processes, Ftra was
also fully aware of the need for a strategc allance of antcorrupton organzatons. Ths was not only necessary so as to
ncrease publc pressure but also so as to ensure an approprate
xv
Introduction
dvson of labor n conductng the nvestgaton and n obtaning access to the oficial agencies capable of bringing the work
to a successful concluson; and
Ffth, the forgng of good relatons and communcatons wth
the meda s essental not only for the purpose of communcatng
indings, but also for developing supervisory methods, applying
publc pressure and ensurng program accountablty.
The varous efforts undertaken by Ftra n the end bore
frut and brought before the eyes of the publc the realty of
wdespread corrupton n the KPU.
Meanwhle, TI-I s one of those organzatons that s partcularly serous about keepng the ssue of taxaton n the forefront of publc dscourse. TI-I has consstently lamented a lack
of awareness on the part of the publc about taxaton ssues
– somethng that s due to a lack of nformaton of taxaton
and local government charges. In addton, most people have no
dea about how to go about complanng. In fact, most people
are not even aware of the location of their local taxation ofice,
partcularly outsde the sland of Java. Ths s despte the fact
that more than 60 percent of government revenue now orgnates
from taxes. The trial projects undertaken by TI-I to heighten
publc awareness of taxaton ssues n a number of regences,
ncludng Tanah Datar, Wonosobo, Kotabaru, and Bulukumba,
turned out to be resoundng successes.
In these areas, not only were taxpayer forums establshed, but
regular meetngs were also held for the purpose of mprovng
the knowledge and awareness of the publc so as to allow people
to crtcally analyze and montor budget and taxaton polces.
Interestingly, the relevant local governments and tax ofices were
qute supportve of these efforts. As a result, members of the
publc became more vocal n askng questons such as how the
money they had pad as taxpayers was beng used, why were
health servces so expensve, why were dlapdated schools not
beng repared, etc. In short, an awareness was nculcated n
socety of the rghts that accrued to people as a result of ther
payng taxes, ncludng the rght to be provded wth proper
xv
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
publc servces by the government.
Equally mportantly, the TI-I program encouraged regency
admnstratons to ncrease the supply of nformaton on local
taxaton and to create separate accounts for each type of tax,
whle a heghtened awareness was created on the part of the
publc as regards the mportance of montorng the allocaton
of tax revenues n local government budgets.
Partcularly encouragng was the success acheved n West
Sumatra n tacklng corrupton wthn the Local Legslatve Councl. As a result of the efforts made, 43 members of the Local
Legslatve Councl for the 1999-2004 term were found gulty of
graft, wth the tral court’s decson eventually beng upheld on
appeal by the Supreme Court.
Ths success provded nspraton to NGOs n many other
areas and spurred the prosecuton servce nto takng acton n
respect of smlar Legslatve Councl corrupton cases.
One mportant lesson that may be gleaned from the artcle
ttled “When the People’s Representatves loot the Publc Purse”
s that corrupton cases, even at the hghest levels, can be brought
to lght f systematc, creatve and ntellgent approaches are
employed. Perseverance and doggedness are also essental prerequstes to success. In addton, other mportant lessons learned
from the West Sumatra experence are as follows:
• An ability to properly describe and deine issues is required
so that approprate follow-up acton may be taken;
• The ndcatons of corrupton, the methods employed and
the nature of the crime need to be properly deined so as
to make sure that all the elements of a crme are present.
• Focus must be mantaned at all tmes, whle the attenton
of the publc and law enforcement agences needs to be
properly drected n lne wth the gravty of the problem
and the set of prortes that has been adopted. In ths way,
t may be ensured that prorty cases contnue to attract the
attenton of the publc over a prolonged perod; and
• varous approaches need to be employed so as to nvolve
as wde a range of groups as possble. The West Sumatra
xv
Introduction
Concern Forum (FPSB) started off employng a persuasve
approach, but later swtched to a “repressve” legal approach.
Another hghly encouragng success story concerned the establshment of the Corrupton Eradcaton Commsson (KPK).
The Commsson s currently breathng new lfe nto the antcorrupton effort, and has won the admraton and trust of the publc
for ts efforts n the war aganst graft. The successes notched
up to date by the KPK represent extraordnary achevements on
the part of ts leaders and others concerned wth eradcatng the
cancer of corrupton from Indonesan socety.
The irst issue that the KPK had to address was trustbuldng. The ablty to wn the trust of the publc was of the
utmost mportance to buldng up the capacty of the KPK as
a professonal nsttuton vested wth wde-rangng powers. The
drawng up of codes of ethcs and conduct, the adopton of
workng procedures and standards, the recrutment of the staff
t needed, and the tranng of ts staff were all carred out transparently and wth a hgh level of accountablty. Every process
was gone through based on strct and consstent complance
wth the prncples of good governance.
Three mportant aspects are worthy of note as regards the
nsttutonal development of the KPK:
1. The KPK accurately deined its needs and was capable of
puttng ts varous plans nto effect n program form;
2. The KPK was from the outset aware of the need to prortze
the setting up an eficient information technology system;
and
3. the leadershp of the KPK was aware of the need to systematcally communcate wth all sdes so as to make optmum
use of the socal captal possessed by varous elements n
socety and government.
Indonesan Corrupton Watch (ICW) has earned tself a
reputaton as one of the most steadfast champons n the war
aganst corrupton, and n ths book descrbes a number of
nterestng and llumnatng lessons learned durng the course
xv
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
of ts struggle to date. After conductng an evaluaton of the
efforts to eradcate corrupton n Indonesa, ICW started out
from the proposton that the apparent nablty to accelerate the
ight against graft was not the result of fundamental weaknesses
n the state, but rather mbalances n the relatonshp between
the state and ts ctzens. Takng ths as the pont of departure,
the corrupton eradcaton program had to also pay attenton to
strengthenng the role of the publc. Ths was not merely because
members of the publc were the prncpal vctms of corrupton,
but also because a sold and educated publc would be much
better equpped for furtherng the antcorrupton cause.
The ICW appled an upstream-downstream approach to the
ight against graft. This meant that the program was not only
conined to the “upstream” level (encouraging the bringing of
prosecutons and montorng of the courts), but also nvolved
the spreadng of the seeds of the antcorrupton deal, maxmzing the beneits of investigations conducted by the public, and
engagng n campagnng and advocacy.
At least three major breakthroughs were pioneered by ICW,
namely:
1. Encouragng the settng up of antcorrupton watchdogs n
many areas and co-optng them as strategc partners concentrating on specialized ields.
2. Introducng an ntal concept for conductng antcorrupton
investigations and advocacy, and examining judicial decisions
that offended against the public sense of justice;
3. tryng out the “report-card system” for publc partcpaton
n montorng and mprovng the qualty of publc servces
n the educaton sector. Ths approach had earler been poneered by the Publc Affars Center n Bangalore, Inda.
The experences set out n ths book show that the eradcaton of corrupton s not an mpossblty. Of course, actvsm
on its own will rarely be suficient to defeat graft. Professional
and well-thought out approaches are also essental, ncludng the
gatherng of nformaton and documents, managng and analyzing indings, designing and applying result-orientated strategies,
buldng up strategc allances, and fosterng communcatons
xv
Introduction
wth all nvolved – partcularly professonal groups, the meda,
and law enforcers.
The case studes set out n ths book provde ample nspraton for promotng and developng the antcorrupton movement,
and campagnng on graft cases. Many of the methods employed
are capable of being replicated or ine-tuned to suit different
contexts. Of course, t must always be remembered that the
learnng process n the war on graft s stll contnung.
In concluson, more ntellgent and well-thought out breakthroughs are stll requred before Indonesa’s systematc and
deeply entrenched corrupton can be eradcated. Now s the
tme to stop complanng and start resstng, to start offerng
concrete solutons to the problem, and to change our atttudes
so that corrupton s no longer acceptable n any shape or form
n Indonesa.
As time passes, I am becoming increasingly conident that
the war on corrupton can be won thanks to the sort of comprehensve, ntellgent and systematc approaches that are descrbed
n the followng pages.
Bambang Widjojanto
xx
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
xx
Uncovering Corruption in Aceh
CHAPTER 1
1
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
Uncovering Corruption in
Aceh1
Akhiruddin Mahjuddin
The Corrupt and Untouchable
T
he extension of Special Autonomy to the Aceh Special
District, and its renaming as Aceh by Law Number 18 of
2001, has apparently only succeeded in increasing the
sizes of the provincial and regency/municipalities budgets. In
2002, the total value of the provincial and regency/municipality
budgets in the province stood at Rp 5.2 trillion, while this igure
increased to Rp 5.4 trillion in 2003. Ironically, the increase in
the amount of money available to administrations in Aceh has
in no wise been followed by an improvement in the quality of
life of the Acehnese people.
Just take, for example, the disastrous situation in the education sector, where no signs of improvement have been evident
to date. In the 1980s, Aceh was in the top ive best performing
provinces in the education sector out of a total of 27 provinces
in Indonesia, and in the top ten out of 27 provinces in the 1990s.
However, according to the available statistical data, by the year 2000
the province’s position had declined drastically to 27th out of 31
provinces in Indonesia. Besides education, the situation as regards
poverty and unemployment has also worsened dramatically.
These realities obviously give rise to a number of questions.
1
2
This paper describes the empirical history of the program titled “Strengthening the Public’s
Role in Advocating Good Local Financial Management in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam”, which
ran from 19 May 2003 to 31 October 2004 and was funded by the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia. It was implemented by SoRAK which has since then split and
the new organization Gerak Aceh is headed by the author. GeRAK Aceh then collaborated
with the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia for the purpose of encouraging
people to establish Budget Monitoring Committees at the regency and municipality levels,
including in Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, Pidie, Aceh Utara-Lhokseumawe-Aceh Jeumpa, Aceh
Barat and Aceh Jaya (August 2004-May 2005).
Uncovering Corruption
Aceh in Aceh
UncoveringinCorruption
Why has the increase in local budgets not been accompanied by
a corresponding increase in the quality of life of the Acehnese
people? The answer to this may be found in a recapitulation of
the data on the extent of corruption, which shows that a total
of 137 corruption cases came to light in the province between
2001 and 2003. The system of public administration in Aceh is
currently at an all-time low, as shown by a survey conduct by
the Bank Indonesia’s Central Bank Study and Education Center
(Pusat Pendidikan dan Studi Kebanksentralan, PPSK) and Padjajaran University’s School of Economics (FE-Unpad), which was
published in “Daya Saing Daerah: Konsep dan Pengukurannya
di Indonesia” (The Competitiveness of Regions: Concepts and
Assessment in Indonesia), in February 2002. This survey found
that Aceh was the most corrupt region in Indonesia.
Given the many other problems they have, the people of Aceh
no longer pay much heed to the chaotic state of governance in
their province, or to the corruption, collusion and nepotism that
has infected the entire state apparatus. As a result, the pillaging
of public funds has continued unabated, and has even shown an
increasing tendency. Many of the people’s empowerment programs
run by the government have become fertile ground for the embezzlers and misfeasors, and are unashamedly looted to ensure the
enrichment of those in positions of inluence. Among the schemes
that have gained notoriety in this regard are the Gema Assalam
program, the Social Economy Empowerment Fund (PER), and
the Victims’ Compensation Fund.
Aceh is the scene of a long-running conlict that has been
accompanied by a breakdown in effective public service management. This has had a major impact on the management of public
funds. From a different perspective, we may say that a logical
consequence of the situation in Aceh has been the emergence
of local leaders who are at liberty to do virtually whatever they
want, no matter how arbitrary. Take, for example, the case of
Abdullah Puteh, the Aceh governor, who was the holder of
supreme executive power at the local level and was free to do
almost whatever he pleased as a result of the powerlessness of
3
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
the Acehnese people to demand transparency and accountability.
As a member of the Golkar Party, Puteh had plenty of support at the national level with the result that he was well-nigh
untouchable by the law.
Furthermore, under Law Number 22 of 2000 on local
government, a governor may only be questioned in connection
with a criminal investigation after the granting of permission by
the President via the Minister of Home Affairs. This requirement was further tightened by Law Number 18 of 2001 on
Autonomy for Aceh Special District and its renaming as the
Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. The situation was
further exacerbated by the imposition of a civil emergency in
the province, which meant that the governor was at liberty to
make unilateral decisions in lagrant disregard of the views of
others. These conditions all combined to strengthen the position of Puteh vis-à-vis the law. In reality, however, Puteh only
represented the tip of an enormous iceberg of corruption in
Aceh, with most of those involved in the corruption being well
beyond the reach of the law.
Conlict and Corruption
Aceh is awash in natural resources. It produces oil and gas
(which is converted into liqueied natural gas), and agricultural
commodities such as palm oil, nutmeg, coffee, cacao, coconuts,
etc. It also plays host to an amazing range of biological diversity in the Leuser mountain range, which traverses the province.
Despite this abundance of natural wealth, however, the vast
majority of Acehnese live in abject poverty. In fact, the level
of poverty is extraordinary. Based on igures set out in the
governor’s accountability statement for 2003, the poverty rate
in Aceh is increasing from year to year. In 2001, 25 percent of
the Acehnese were categorized as being below the poverty line.
This had risen to 33 percent in 2002, and reached 40 percent
of the total population of Aceh in 2003.
This is obviously a source of great concern, especially given
that the size of the province’s budget is also increasing from
4
Uncovering Corruption
Aceh in Aceh
UncoveringinCorruption
year to year. In 2001, the Aceh provincial budget amounted to
Rp 543 billion. This increased to Rp 1.5 trillion in 2002, and
further increased to Rp 1.6 trillion in 2003. This sort of money
was never available in the province previously, such as when it
was governed by Prof. Dr. Ibrahim Hassan, MBA, or Prof. Dr.
Syamsuddin Mahmmud in the 1980s and 1990s respectively.
The failure to make proper use of the available funds so as
to beneit the public is clearly linked to the system of inancial
management employed by Aceh province, which opens the door to
misfeasance and other forms of corruption on a large scale. Such
enormous sums lowing into the provincial treasury should obviously be capable of improving the welfare and lot of the people,
rather than what is happening at the moment, whereby these
monies are merely serving to feather the nests of the bureaucrats
and their cronies. Just look at the budget allocations in Aceh for
education, which must amount to at least 30 percent of the overall
budget. A total of Rp 700 billion has been earmarked for education in each of the last three years. Thus, from 2002 to 2004 the
total education budget in Aceh amounted to Rp 2.1 trillion. This
represents the potential for quite signiicant improvements in the
education sector, especially compared to other regions where the
budget allocations for education only amount to 20 percent.
It is, of course, true that the needs of education in Aceh
are great, and that Rp 2.1 trillion pales into insigniicance when
one realizes just how great the damage caused to the sector has
been over the last ive years. The long-running conlict and the
disruption it has caused in the sector have had a serious impact
on the education of the province’s children. However, given the
monies available over the last three years, much more could, and
should, have been done than what we see today. As things stand
at the moment, it would appear that even Rp 2.1 trillion is not
suficient to improve the education received by the children of
Aceh. This represents nothing more than a great embarrassment
for the world of education in Indonesia. It appears that even if
the education budget were to be increased tenfold, it would still
be unable to provide a solution to the problems in the sector
due to the prevalence of corruption and malfeasance at every
5
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
turn. This is particularly sad given that education represents the
best hope for a new and more prosperous Aceh.
Based on the above analysis, it will be clear that much of
the poverty in Aceh is the cause of two key factors: the longrunning conlict and corruption.
Thirteen Anticorruption Organizations
As things stand, both the public and NGOs tend to see the
Aceh question in terms of crisis resolution, while the government
in Jakarta tends to view the issue as one of human rights alone.
In reality, however, the problems assailing Aceh are the result of
economic injustice resulting from the excessively centralized and
inequitable economic policies imposed by the central government.
These have resulted in glaring disparities, rather then justice, in
the allocation of resources by Jakarta to Aceh.
Anticorruption organizations have an essential role to play
in highlighting the problem of corruption in Aceh and bringing
it into the realm of public discourse. The establishment of such
organizations in Aceh was heralded by the emergence of the anticorruption movement at the national level. An example of this
is Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), which was established to
bring cases of corruption perpetrated by the dictatorial government
of Soeharto into the full glare of the public spotlight.
Similarly in Aceh, various anticorruption organizations
were established in response to the rampant corruption being
perpetrated by local administrations. The irst anticorruption
organization was set up in Aceh in 2000, and this was quickly
followed by more – some working at the provincial level and
others at the regency/municipality level. The emergence of these
anticorruption organizations more or less coincided with the
rolling out of Special Autonomy in Aceh.
At the present time, there are 13 anticorruption organizations in Aceh. These are as follows: the Anticorruption Movement (GeRAK), Anticorruption Solidarity Movement (SoRAK),
and People’s Solidarity against Corruption (SAMAK) in Banda
Aceh; the Gerakan Anti Korupsi (GeRAK) in Aceh Besar; the
6
Uncovering Corruption
Aceh in Aceh
UncoveringinCorruption
Aceh Anticorruption Grassroots Network (JARAK) in Pidie;
the Anticorruption Solidarity Association (GaSAK) in Bireun;
the Anticorruption Movement (GeRAK) in Lhokseumawe and
Aceh Utara; the Singkil Anticorruption Community (MaTRAS)
in Singkil; People’s Solidarity for Democracy and Justice (SRDK)
in Kuta Cane; the Aceh Anticorruption Grassroots Network
(JARAK) in Aceh Selatan; Solidarity for Anticorruption (SuAK)
in Meulaboh; Solidarity for Transparency (SAKSI) in Simeulue;
and the Aceh Jaya Transparency Community in Calang.
Every cloud has a silver lining, and in these areas the issue of
rampant corruption is actually moving society in the direction
of greater transparency and democracy. This is automatically
providing greater room for the people of Aceh to speak out
about what is happening in their homeland. This process will be
further advanced if the people ind that the courts are willing
to convict those involved in corruption as opposed to the past
when this would have been virtually inconceivable.
The ight against corruption in Aceh is also serving to advance
the democratic cause at the national level. As cases come before
the courts and convictions ensue, a number of knock-on effects
will become apparent, including the following: First, greater care
and diligence on the part of the bureaucrats in managing the
public purse in Aceh province; Second, the public will become
more courageous and outspoken in revealing irregularities without
having to be afraid of being labeled a separatist – a label that
would often mean death or disappearance in the past.
The process of heightening public awareness would obviously
be more effective if it was backed up by concrete examples of
the prosecution and conviction of public oficials on corruption
charges. This is essential so that the spirit of the people can be
restored. In reality, we may say that this long process was all
about restoring the trust of the public in the local and central
governments, even though this was not recognized by many.
While the granting of Special Autonomy was intended in
part to reduce the intensity of the conlict in Aceh, it also resulted in signiicant increases in the funding made available to
the province. The beneits of this increase in funding should
7
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
logically have been directly felt by the public. However, to date
no signiicant changes in the lot of the Acehnese people have
occurred – in fact, things have got much worse in the wake
of the tsunami. It was this reality that spurred us to critically
scrutinize the Aceh provincial budget against a background of
ineffective supervision and oversight by the Aceh Provincial
Legislative Assembly.
As part of this process, we were particularly concerned with
the following aspects: the formulation of the local budget – a
process that is supposed to involve the public at large; the needs
of the community and the budget’s responses to these, particularly as regards primary needs such as education and healthcare;
and, inally, the implementation of the budget.
The Special Autonomy funds being paid out to Aceh province, which are obviously intended to improve the welfare and
well-being of the Acehnese people, have not in fact been able to
do so. According to Law Number 18 of 2001, Aceh province’s
revenues are made up of its own-source revenue, payments
from the equilibrium fund, provincial receipts under the Special
Autonomy scheme, loans taken out by the local government,
and other lawful sources.
From all of these sources, Aceh province is receiving much
more at the present time than prior to the introduction of Special
Autonomy. Since the entry into effect of the Special Autonomy
legislation, Aceh has also being receiving special funds consisting
of payments out of the equilibrium fund. Another new source
of funding is zakat (in Aceh, mandatory contributions to Islamic
charities), which is included as an item in the province’s ownsource revenue account.
As a result of all these new sources of revenue, Aceh
province’s budget has expanded exponentially, from Rp 543 billion in 2001 to Rp 1.5 trillion in 2002, Rp 1.6 trillion in 2003,
and Rp 2.2 trillion in 2004. This increase in funding should be
accompanied by the instituting of inancial management that
is based upon the principles of good governance and better
inancial supervision and management supported by both internal
8
Uncovering Corruption
Aceh in Aceh
UncoveringinCorruption
and external oversight. However, in reality both the internal and
external auditors charged with inspecting the province’s accounts
lack the powers they need to do the job properly.
Emasculation of Audit Bodies
The emasculation of the audit bodies is the result of the
issuance of Local Regulation Number 11 of 2001 on the
structure of local audit boards. This regulation provides that
the provincial audit board has the power to inspect the accounts of the provincial government. However, the provincial
audit board is also part of the government it is supposed to be
auditing. Thus, how will it be possible for the audit board to
act independently, objectively and professionally in performing
its duties if the body it is auditing is also the body that employs
the auditors? Even more incongruous, the results of the audits
that are undertaken must be reported to the governor through
the provincial secretary. Is this sort of oversight – susceptible
as it is to manipulation and collusion – the sort of oversight
that is likely to win the conidence of the public?
As regards the local ofice of the Development and Finance
Audit Board (BPKP), Local Regulation Number 11 of 2001 also
serves to head off external oversight. As things stand at the
moment, the BPKP may only audit the provincial budget if it
obtains the consent of the governor.
Emasculation of Law Enforcement Institutions and the
Courts
The apparent impossibility of seeing those involved in corruption being tried and convicted in the courts led to widespread
apathy among the public. It was an open secret that the law
could not be relied upon. The law in Aceh had long been used
as an instrument of repression to deal with the security problem, and appeared to be entirely uninterested in corruption and
malfeasance committed by public servants in the province.
Against the background of a barely functioning legal system,
legal and human rights activists began to push for breakthroughs
9
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
in the legal sphere that would allow the public to demand that
justice be done. The sort of breakthroughs that were being
sought included the permitting of class action and a widening
of the deinition of legal standing. There were two principal
targets in this regard:
1. results target: the achievement of maximum results in changing the paradigms adhered to by the law in Aceh so as to
make it more favorably disposed towards the public;
2. process target: the educating of the Acehnese people as
regards their right to sue the government – something that
was previously taboo but which in reality was legitimate and
the right of every Indonesian citizen.
The weaknesses aflicting the law enforcement institutions
resulted from the legislative framework that had been put in
place in Aceh as part of the Special Autonomy arrangements.
Article 21(6) of Chapter X of the Aceh Special Autonomy Law
(Number 18 of 2001) states that the appointment of the Aceh
Provincial Police chief shall be made by the Republic of Indonesia National Police chief with the approval of the governor
of Aceh, while Article 24(2) of Chapter IX of this Law states
that the
Fighting Corruption
From Aceh To Papua
10 Stories on Corruption Eradication in Indonesia
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
Fighting Corruption:
From Aceh to Papua
10 Stores on Combatng Corrupton n Indonesa
Copyrght © Partnershp for Governance Reform n Indonesa
Frst Edton ssued
By the Partnershp for Governance Reform n Indonesa, Aprl 2006
Jl. MH Thamrn Kav.9 Jakarta 10350, Indonesa
Telp. [61 21] 3902566, 3902626
Fax [62 21] 2302933, 2303924
www.kemtraan.or.d
Editor of English version: Soie Arjon Schuette
Edtor of Indonesan verson: Dadang Trsasongko, Veven Sp. Wardhana,
Soie Arjon Schuette
Assstant Edtor: Inda Loekman
Translaton: James Boyd
Illustraton & cover desgn: Muhammad Syafuddn (Ifoed)
Prntng Company: PT Penebar Swadaya
ISBN: 979-99791-7-X
Introduction
Table of Contents
1. Foreword (H.S. Dllon, Executve Drector, Partnershp
for Governance Reform n Indonesa) ...............................
v
2. Introduction (Bambang Widjojanto, Partnership for
Governance Reform n Indonesa) .......................................
v
3. Uncoverng Corrupton n Aceh
(Akhiruddin Mahjuddin,GeRAK) ........................................
2
4. Antcorrupton Snowball n South Sulawes
(Elyas Joseph, LBHP2) ..........................................................
36
5. Somethng Rotten n the KPU
(Arf Nur Alam, Ftra) ............................................................
68
6. Interfath Coalton Aganst Corrupton
(Isnan Mualldn, LP3 UMY) .............................................
100
7. When the Kiai Help Control Local Budgetng
(A.S. Burhan, P3M) .....................................................................
118
8. When the People’s Representatves Loot the
Publc Purse (Sald Isra, FPSB) ...........................................
134
9. Trackng the Spendng of Tax Revenues
(Hen Yulanto, TI Indonesa) ..............................................
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
v
Introduction
Foreword
T
he Partnershp for Governance Reform n Indonesa s a
cooperatve arrangement between the Indonesan govern
ment, cvl socety organzatons, the prvate sector and
the nternatonal donor communty, wth the am of facltatng
and supportng governance reform n Indonesa. It s becomng ncreasngly accepted that governance systems cannot be
changed by practces mposed from outsde. Natonal ownershp
s the key to change. The Partnershp therefore brngs together
those elements n Indonesan government and socety who are
commtted to governance reform and encourages dalogue and
networkng amongst them. It supports ther efforts by developng deas, strateges and programs of acton, especally those that
can be asssted by the nternatonal communty.
During its irst two years, the Partnership for Governance
Reform produced n-depth dagnostc work on the problem of
corrupton n Indonesa.
Based on ths research and a comprehensve publc consultaton process undertaken to develop a natonal acton plan
to ight corruption, the Partnership started to implement the
strategy and suggestons n 2003. The Partnershp has launched
a number of ntatves on ts own, but has also supported selected partners in the implementation of projects that it within
the Partnershp’s strategy.
To date, the Partnershp has supported and been party to
a number of efforts and achevements that deserve to be made
publc beyond the short-lved coverage normally provded by the
prnt and electronc meda. They need to be reported n more
detal as they demonstrate unque and nventve approaches to
tacklng corrupton. The purpose of ths publcaton, “Fghtng
Corrupton from Aceh to Papua”, s to encourage dscusson and
replcaton n Indonesa and other parts of the world.
v
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
All 10 stores and the ntroducton were wrtten n Indonesan
and the Partnershp would lke to express ts grattude to James
Boyd, who managed to successfully transfer the meanng and
sprt of the orgnal texts nto Englsh. We would also lke to
express our thanks to Muhammad Syafuddn (Ifoed), who has
captured the essence of these reports n a thought-provokng
yet entertanng manner.
The indings, interpretations and conclusions are those of
the authors of each report and do not necessarily relect the
vews of the Partnershp. Nether the Partnershp, the members
of the Governng Board, the organzatons or governments they
represent, nor their afiliated organizations, may be held responsble for the accuracy of the facts and data contaned n ths
publcaton, or any consequences of whatever nature resultng
from ther use.
H.S. Dillon
Executve Drector
Jakarta, December 2005
v
Introduction
Consolidating the
Anticorruption Movement
Introduction by Bambang Widjojanto1
W
hen we menton the word “corrupton”, an nterestng
phenomenon worthy of study frequently becomes ap
parent. “Corrupton” has become a word n our vocabulary that s on everyone’s lps at the moment. The meda s
chock-a-block full of reports on corrupton. It s a man topc of
conversaton among all groups n socety, ncludng those who
are truly aganst corrupton and those who pay lp servce to the
struggle but who, n fact, regularly engage n varous forms of
graft n ther day-to-day actvtes. In short, “corrupton” s the
talk of the town and s a hot topc n all sorts of forums and
dscourses.
Just look at the many groups nvolved n the antcorrupton
movement at the present tme, the plethora of books analyzng
corrupton from varous perspectves, and the large number of
dscussons, semnars and TV talk shows devoted to the problem. In addton, the number of non-governmental organzatons
(NGOs) involved in the ight against graft has mushroomed.
Meanwhile a signiicant number of corruption cases are currently beng nvestgated or tred, although many more have stll
to be dealt wth.
Despte the progress made to date, there are many sgns
and ndcatons that corrupton s stll wdespread throughout
Indonesa. In fact, t s qute clear that corrupton s systematc
and part of the power structure and socal fabrc n ths country.
Whle for some, all the talk about eradcatng corrupton may be
little more than political jargon, serious efforts are nevertheless
beng made to brng about good governance through wde-rang1
Bambang Widjojanto is an advisor to the Partnership.
v
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
ng governance reform.
Nevertheless, t s dsappontng to see that despte an ncreased
awareness about the need to root out corrupton, there are sgns
that the problem s actually ncreasng. Ths gves rse to two contrastng consequences. Frst, the emergence of a fatalstc atttude
to the effect that corrupton s well-ngh mpossble to eradcate.
Ths has resulted n a hgh level of permssveness towards the
problem, whch, n turn, has the potental to encourage people to
also try ther hands at graft. Second, the undertakng of varous
poneerng efforts to consoldate the antcorrupton movement n
socety through the development of corrupton free zones. Ths
encourages many people to become nvolved n the antcorrupton
movement, even if they are not able to contribute signiicantly.
The fact s, corrupton must be systematcally fought aganst and
overcome usng creatve and ntellgent approaches.
The varous wrtngs contaned n ths book are devoted
to the struggle aganst corrupton n Indonesa. The focus has
irmly been placed on the concrete efforts that have been made
by varous cvl socety groups to reduce the room for corrupton
n Indonesan socety, whle at the same tme encouragng the
development of the antcorrupton movement at the grassroots
level. Whle only 10 case studes are presented here on account
of space limitations, there are a great many others that could just
as well have been used to provde nspraton for those strugglng aganst graft, and that are capable of replcaton so as to
encourage the takng root of the movement at the grassroots
level. The followng general topcs are dealt wth n the wrtngs
contaned n ths book:
Frst, local antcorrupton efforts (“Uncoverng Corrupton
n Aceh” and “Antcorrupton Snowball n South Sulawes”).
Second, who s nvolved n the struggle aganst corrupton
(“When the Kiai help Control Local Budgetng”, “Interfath
Coalton aganst Corrupton”, and “When the People’s Representatves loot the Publc Purse”).
Thrd, the nsttutons that are partcularly prone to corrupton (the wrtngs dscussng corrupton n the General Electons
v
Introduction
Commsson and local budgetng).
Fourth, strategies for ighting against corruption (“Mobilizng the People of Papua to Fght Corrupton”, “Eradcatng
Corrupton: From Acceptance to Resstance”, and “Trackng the
Spendng of Tax Revenues”).
Ffth, developng professonal and honest antcorrupton
nsttutons (“Establshment of the Corrupton Eradcaton
Commsson”).
Wth regard to the three wrtngs dscussng lessons learned
n the effort to eradcate corrupton n Aceh, Papua, and South
Sulawes, t s worth notng that two of these areas (Aceh and
Papua) possess specal characterstcs wth the result that they have
been accorded what s termed “specal autonomy” to manage
ther own affars. Ironcally, ths has become one of the prncpal
causes of ncreased corrupton n these regons.
Aceh was accorded specal autonomy status by Law Number
18 of 2001, and has subsequently been granted signiicant addtonal revenues. In 2001, Aceh only had revenues of Rp 543
billion, but this igure increased dramatically over the following
two years to Rp 1.6 trllon. However, accordng to studes carred out by the Antcorrupton Soldarty Movement (SoRAK),
ths ncrease n revenue was n no wse accompaned by a corresponding improvement in the province’s inancial management
capacty, or by ncreased nternal and external oversght/supervson. The emergency n Aceh was also avaled of by local power
holders to pursue programs that primarily beneited themselves
– somethng made possble by the almost total lack of control
mechansms. As a result of ths combnaton of factors, anythng
was possible in Aceh for those in positions of inluence.
In South Sulawes, the Indonesan Women’s Empowerment
Legal Ad Insttute (LBH-P2) kcked off ts campagn aganst
corrupton wth a study on the lnks between corrupton and
poverty. Ths was carred out followng a realzaton that the tradtonal local values encapsulated n the terms “sr” (self-respect),
“lempu” (honesty) and “getteng” (steadfastness n upholdng
tradtonal, legal and relgous values), were beng abandoned by
x
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
socety. It was based on ths, and the evdent lnks between corrupton and poverty, that the Insttute’s grassroots antcorrupton
campagn was predcated.
In Papua, the Insttute for Cvl Socety Strengthenng (ICS)
speciically found that “as a consequence of the fact that there
were no clear accountablty procedures n place, or poltcal or
socal control over the spendng of the addtonal fundng, the
way was left wde open for ncreased corrupton on the part of
the power-holders and ther crones.”
Gven the crcumstances prevalng on the ground, concrete
acton was requred to stop the further spread of corrupton.
The actvtes undertaken ncluded the followng:
• The Antcorrupton Soldarty Movement (SoRAK) carred
out a detaled assessment of the allocaton and utlzaton of
development funds n the local budget, and comprehensvely
and eficiently recorded the information it obtained as a
result of ths assessment;
• SoRAK identiied a number of key cases believed to involve
corrupton, and mapped out the relatonshps that facltated
corrupton among the elte;
• SoRAK successfully managed to consoldate ts antcorrupton
network and to brng pressure to bear on those nvolved
n perpetratng corrupton through a wde-rangng meda
campagn; and
• SoRAK successfully persuaded the courts to recognze the
legal standng of cvl socety organzatons n representng
the publc so as to allow them to brng class actons n respect of corruption cases that had prejudiced the interests
of the publc.
SoRAK managed to construct an antcorrupton network that
reached up to the natonal level by concentratng on only a few
key corrupton cases. The brngng to lght of the corrupton
case nvolvng now-dsmssed Aceh governor Abdullah Puteh s
one of the outstandng achevements notched up by SoRAK n
its efforts to accelerate the ight against corruption in Aceh.
Meanwhle n South Sulawes, the LBH-P2 successfully led a
coalton of about 60 NGOs and other cvl socety organzatons
x
Introduction
as part of a campagn nvolvng the provson of educaton and
tranng on corrupton montorng n respect of publc servces
at the grassroots level. A wde varety of groups from dverse
backgrounds partcpated n ths campagn, ncludng buldng
workers, miners, trishaw drivers, ishermen, sidewalk hawkers,
artsts, housewves, students, commercal sex workers, pmps,
and sub-district and district oficials.
It s also nterestng to note the success of the LBH-P2
and ts network partners n makng the best possble use of the
resources avalable to them n campagnng and provdng antcorrupton tranng through alternatve meda, such as comedy and
theater troupes, ncludng the People’s Comedy Theater Group
(Kelompok Teater Komed Rakyat), the Bugs-Makassar Troupe
(Khas Bugs-Makassar), the Theater Communty (Korupa), and
Petta Puang Players.
At least two aspects of the LBH-P2 campagn are worthy
of partcular note:
1. Focus was placed on forms of corrupton that affected the
provson of publc servces at the grassroots level, thereby
drectly affectng the people, ncludng the sze of the water
blls charged by the local water utlty and the levyng of
unoficial school fees.
2. The LBH-P2, n collaboraton wth local rado statons and
newspapers, successfully packaged ts campagn n terms of
the forms of corrupton that affected the poor n ther everyday lves. Ths provded mmense momentum for encouragng
the poor to participate in the ight against corruption.
In Papua, there are at least two major things that have been,
and are stll beng, done by the ICS n ts efforts to combat corrupton. Frst, the ICS has establshed a coalton made up of
ndvduals drawn from NGOs, trbal organzatons, academa,
local government, the journalistic profession, the prosecution
servce, and the polce n seven regences and muncpaltes. The
ICS has played the role of ntator and facltator n formulatng
antcorrupton strateges n partnershp wth the coalton. Second,
the coalton then undertook two thngs, namely:
1. Revealng corrupton cases nvolvng 22 leaders and treasurx
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
ers in connection with development projects funded out
of the 2002/2003 provncal budget, and encouragng the
commencement of legal proceedngs aganst them. Ths
process was asssted by the conductng of audts by the
Development and Fnance Audt Board (BPKP) and other
supervsory organs. As a consequence, the cases, whch were
orgnally expected to be resolved admnstratvely, were n
the end brought before the crmnal courts.
2. Draftng model local regulatons capable of provdng a
bass for the further development of the antcorrupton
movement n Papua. A number of draft regulatons were
drawn up, ncludng a regulaton on publc partcpaton and
transparency n the governance of Papua, and a regulaton
on an ombudsman commsson for Papua.
Another nterestng case study nvolved the effort to encourage the participation of religious communities in the ight against
corrupton. The Indonesan Socety for Pesantren and Communty
Development (P3M) found that there was somethng wrong wth
our relgous thnkng. In the case of many people, the stuaton
could be summed up as one of “relgon yes, corrupton yes”.
Perhaps there were also those among the belevers who were
genuinely concerned about ighting against corruption? As a
result of the actons taken, an antcorrupton coalton emerged
n Yogyakarta that was devoted to spreadng the antcorrupton
message through educaton. Over the long term, educaton would
be employed to mpart, explan and dssemnate relgous teachngs
about corrupton, whle n the short term, antcorrupton materals were designed and applied in a number of subjects so as to
encourage the various religions to accept the challenge of ighting
against corruption as a joint challenge and a precondition for the
development of an effectve antcorrupton movement.
The agreement between the two largest popular organzatons
n Indonesa, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadyah, to work
together to further the goals of the antcorrupton movement
formed the prncpal pont of entry for encouragng belevers
to become more nvolved n the struggle and for establshng a
pesantren-based antcorrupton movement. Based on the prevalng
x
Introduction
modaltes n socety and the desre to establsh a more progressve vew of zakat (Islamc alms-gvng), t was decded to focus
on the revtalzaton of the bahtsul masail forums for the purpose
of ensurng effectve control over publc polcy. Such forums
were establshed n 12 ctes and were avaled of by mams and
pesantren leaders to exercse control over local budgetng and
government spendng. In fact, the bahtsul masail forums came
to serve as effectve forms of control n the effort to reduce
corruption and ensure greater social justice.
Three aspects of the Indonesan Socety for Pesantren and
Communty Development (P3M)’s program are worthy of partcular note, namely:
1. The process of nculcatng antcorrupton awareness as part
of the revtalzaton of the bahtsul masail forums not only
ncreased awareness of the evls of corrupton from the
moral perspective, but also irmly positioned the problem
as a cultural, poltcal, economc and legal ssue that that
greatly prejudiced the well-being of the people;
2. the revtalzaton movement also produced a new breed of
young, pesantren-based kiai who properly understood the
nature of corrupton – somethng that encouraged them
to establsh crtcal study and budget-montorng forums n
many areas; and
3. a strct socal sancton was ntroduced for those nvolved n
corrupton n the form of a refusal to say funeral prayers
for deceased “corruptors” untl such tme as the money had
been returned.
The Yogyakarta Muhammadyah Unversty’s Educatonal
Development Research Insttute (LP3-UMY) not only managed
to develop antcorrupton materals but also tested them n 11
hgher learnng nsttutes n Yogyakarta through ther ncorporation in a number of subjects. The results turned out to be highly
encouragng. A number of these nsttutes agreed to contnue
usng the materals. In addton, the local government Relgon
and Educaton Agency n Yogyakarta Specal Provnce afforded
opportuntes to the LP3-UMY to gve lectures on the materals to head teachers, other teachers, and relgon nstructors and
x
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
preachers.
There are three other nterestng aspects worthy of note
based on the experences of the LP3-UMY, namely:
1. The antcorrupton educatonal materals were not only
targeted at unversty crcles but also at relgous actvsts,
preachers and relgous communtes;
2. tranng on the use of the educatonal materals was provded
to those responsble for teachng them so as to ensure full
mastery of the materals; and
3. the growth of a moral development and acton movement
was also encouraged among young relgous actvsts so as
to ensure ther full partcpaton n the war on corrupton.
The actvtes carred out by the Indonesan Forum for Budget
Transparency (Ftra) and Transparency Internatonal Indonesa
(TI-I) are also worthy of study. Fitra was the irst organization
to reveal signiicant corruption in the General Elections Commsson (KPU), whle TI-I has been successful n buldng up
a publc awareness about corrupton and taxaton ssues. Ftra’s
experiences provide important lessons as regards ighting against
corrupton n partcular organzatons. Among the lessons learned
were the followng:
Frst, the ablty to secure documents and nformaton s of
the utmost mportance durng the ntal stages. In ths case, Ftra
was able to get ts hands on detaled, comprehensve nformaton
and documents revealng budget and spendng rregulartes.
Second, a number of mportant strateges were employed
by Ftra at dfferent stages n order to obtan nformaton and
communicate its indings. These approaches including both cooperatve and confrontatonal approaches.
Thrd, Ftra was aware that a systematc, serous and ndepth nvestgaton would be requred before drawng any conclusons.
Fourth, whle pursung all of the above processes, Ftra was
also fully aware of the need for a strategc allance of antcorrupton organzatons. Ths was not only necessary so as to
ncrease publc pressure but also so as to ensure an approprate
xv
Introduction
dvson of labor n conductng the nvestgaton and n obtaning access to the oficial agencies capable of bringing the work
to a successful concluson; and
Ffth, the forgng of good relatons and communcatons wth
the meda s essental not only for the purpose of communcatng
indings, but also for developing supervisory methods, applying
publc pressure and ensurng program accountablty.
The varous efforts undertaken by Ftra n the end bore
frut and brought before the eyes of the publc the realty of
wdespread corrupton n the KPU.
Meanwhle, TI-I s one of those organzatons that s partcularly serous about keepng the ssue of taxaton n the forefront of publc dscourse. TI-I has consstently lamented a lack
of awareness on the part of the publc about taxaton ssues
– somethng that s due to a lack of nformaton of taxaton
and local government charges. In addton, most people have no
dea about how to go about complanng. In fact, most people
are not even aware of the location of their local taxation ofice,
partcularly outsde the sland of Java. Ths s despte the fact
that more than 60 percent of government revenue now orgnates
from taxes. The trial projects undertaken by TI-I to heighten
publc awareness of taxaton ssues n a number of regences,
ncludng Tanah Datar, Wonosobo, Kotabaru, and Bulukumba,
turned out to be resoundng successes.
In these areas, not only were taxpayer forums establshed, but
regular meetngs were also held for the purpose of mprovng
the knowledge and awareness of the publc so as to allow people
to crtcally analyze and montor budget and taxaton polces.
Interestingly, the relevant local governments and tax ofices were
qute supportve of these efforts. As a result, members of the
publc became more vocal n askng questons such as how the
money they had pad as taxpayers was beng used, why were
health servces so expensve, why were dlapdated schools not
beng repared, etc. In short, an awareness was nculcated n
socety of the rghts that accrued to people as a result of ther
payng taxes, ncludng the rght to be provded wth proper
xv
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
publc servces by the government.
Equally mportantly, the TI-I program encouraged regency
admnstratons to ncrease the supply of nformaton on local
taxaton and to create separate accounts for each type of tax,
whle a heghtened awareness was created on the part of the
publc as regards the mportance of montorng the allocaton
of tax revenues n local government budgets.
Partcularly encouragng was the success acheved n West
Sumatra n tacklng corrupton wthn the Local Legslatve Councl. As a result of the efforts made, 43 members of the Local
Legslatve Councl for the 1999-2004 term were found gulty of
graft, wth the tral court’s decson eventually beng upheld on
appeal by the Supreme Court.
Ths success provded nspraton to NGOs n many other
areas and spurred the prosecuton servce nto takng acton n
respect of smlar Legslatve Councl corrupton cases.
One mportant lesson that may be gleaned from the artcle
ttled “When the People’s Representatves loot the Publc Purse”
s that corrupton cases, even at the hghest levels, can be brought
to lght f systematc, creatve and ntellgent approaches are
employed. Perseverance and doggedness are also essental prerequstes to success. In addton, other mportant lessons learned
from the West Sumatra experence are as follows:
• An ability to properly describe and deine issues is required
so that approprate follow-up acton may be taken;
• The ndcatons of corrupton, the methods employed and
the nature of the crime need to be properly deined so as
to make sure that all the elements of a crme are present.
• Focus must be mantaned at all tmes, whle the attenton
of the publc and law enforcement agences needs to be
properly drected n lne wth the gravty of the problem
and the set of prortes that has been adopted. In ths way,
t may be ensured that prorty cases contnue to attract the
attenton of the publc over a prolonged perod; and
• varous approaches need to be employed so as to nvolve
as wde a range of groups as possble. The West Sumatra
xv
Introduction
Concern Forum (FPSB) started off employng a persuasve
approach, but later swtched to a “repressve” legal approach.
Another hghly encouragng success story concerned the establshment of the Corrupton Eradcaton Commsson (KPK).
The Commsson s currently breathng new lfe nto the antcorrupton effort, and has won the admraton and trust of the publc
for ts efforts n the war aganst graft. The successes notched
up to date by the KPK represent extraordnary achevements on
the part of ts leaders and others concerned wth eradcatng the
cancer of corrupton from Indonesan socety.
The irst issue that the KPK had to address was trustbuldng. The ablty to wn the trust of the publc was of the
utmost mportance to buldng up the capacty of the KPK as
a professonal nsttuton vested wth wde-rangng powers. The
drawng up of codes of ethcs and conduct, the adopton of
workng procedures and standards, the recrutment of the staff
t needed, and the tranng of ts staff were all carred out transparently and wth a hgh level of accountablty. Every process
was gone through based on strct and consstent complance
wth the prncples of good governance.
Three mportant aspects are worthy of note as regards the
nsttutonal development of the KPK:
1. The KPK accurately deined its needs and was capable of
puttng ts varous plans nto effect n program form;
2. The KPK was from the outset aware of the need to prortze
the setting up an eficient information technology system;
and
3. the leadershp of the KPK was aware of the need to systematcally communcate wth all sdes so as to make optmum
use of the socal captal possessed by varous elements n
socety and government.
Indonesan Corrupton Watch (ICW) has earned tself a
reputaton as one of the most steadfast champons n the war
aganst corrupton, and n ths book descrbes a number of
nterestng and llumnatng lessons learned durng the course
xv
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
of ts struggle to date. After conductng an evaluaton of the
efforts to eradcate corrupton n Indonesa, ICW started out
from the proposton that the apparent nablty to accelerate the
ight against graft was not the result of fundamental weaknesses
n the state, but rather mbalances n the relatonshp between
the state and ts ctzens. Takng ths as the pont of departure,
the corrupton eradcaton program had to also pay attenton to
strengthenng the role of the publc. Ths was not merely because
members of the publc were the prncpal vctms of corrupton,
but also because a sold and educated publc would be much
better equpped for furtherng the antcorrupton cause.
The ICW appled an upstream-downstream approach to the
ight against graft. This meant that the program was not only
conined to the “upstream” level (encouraging the bringing of
prosecutons and montorng of the courts), but also nvolved
the spreadng of the seeds of the antcorrupton deal, maxmzing the beneits of investigations conducted by the public, and
engagng n campagnng and advocacy.
At least three major breakthroughs were pioneered by ICW,
namely:
1. Encouragng the settng up of antcorrupton watchdogs n
many areas and co-optng them as strategc partners concentrating on specialized ields.
2. Introducng an ntal concept for conductng antcorrupton
investigations and advocacy, and examining judicial decisions
that offended against the public sense of justice;
3. tryng out the “report-card system” for publc partcpaton
n montorng and mprovng the qualty of publc servces
n the educaton sector. Ths approach had earler been poneered by the Publc Affars Center n Bangalore, Inda.
The experences set out n ths book show that the eradcaton of corrupton s not an mpossblty. Of course, actvsm
on its own will rarely be suficient to defeat graft. Professional
and well-thought out approaches are also essental, ncludng the
gatherng of nformaton and documents, managng and analyzing indings, designing and applying result-orientated strategies,
buldng up strategc allances, and fosterng communcatons
xv
Introduction
wth all nvolved – partcularly professonal groups, the meda,
and law enforcers.
The case studes set out n ths book provde ample nspraton for promotng and developng the antcorrupton movement,
and campagnng on graft cases. Many of the methods employed
are capable of being replicated or ine-tuned to suit different
contexts. Of course, t must always be remembered that the
learnng process n the war on graft s stll contnung.
In concluson, more ntellgent and well-thought out breakthroughs are stll requred before Indonesa’s systematc and
deeply entrenched corrupton can be eradcated. Now s the
tme to stop complanng and start resstng, to start offerng
concrete solutons to the problem, and to change our atttudes
so that corrupton s no longer acceptable n any shape or form
n Indonesa.
As time passes, I am becoming increasingly conident that
the war on corrupton can be won thanks to the sort of comprehensve, ntellgent and systematc approaches that are descrbed
n the followng pages.
Bambang Widjojanto
xx
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
xx
Uncovering Corruption in Aceh
CHAPTER 1
1
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
Uncovering Corruption in
Aceh1
Akhiruddin Mahjuddin
The Corrupt and Untouchable
T
he extension of Special Autonomy to the Aceh Special
District, and its renaming as Aceh by Law Number 18 of
2001, has apparently only succeeded in increasing the
sizes of the provincial and regency/municipalities budgets. In
2002, the total value of the provincial and regency/municipality
budgets in the province stood at Rp 5.2 trillion, while this igure
increased to Rp 5.4 trillion in 2003. Ironically, the increase in
the amount of money available to administrations in Aceh has
in no wise been followed by an improvement in the quality of
life of the Acehnese people.
Just take, for example, the disastrous situation in the education sector, where no signs of improvement have been evident
to date. In the 1980s, Aceh was in the top ive best performing
provinces in the education sector out of a total of 27 provinces
in Indonesia, and in the top ten out of 27 provinces in the 1990s.
However, according to the available statistical data, by the year 2000
the province’s position had declined drastically to 27th out of 31
provinces in Indonesia. Besides education, the situation as regards
poverty and unemployment has also worsened dramatically.
These realities obviously give rise to a number of questions.
1
2
This paper describes the empirical history of the program titled “Strengthening the Public’s
Role in Advocating Good Local Financial Management in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam”, which
ran from 19 May 2003 to 31 October 2004 and was funded by the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia. It was implemented by SoRAK which has since then split and
the new organization Gerak Aceh is headed by the author. GeRAK Aceh then collaborated
with the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia for the purpose of encouraging
people to establish Budget Monitoring Committees at the regency and municipality levels,
including in Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, Pidie, Aceh Utara-Lhokseumawe-Aceh Jeumpa, Aceh
Barat and Aceh Jaya (August 2004-May 2005).
Uncovering Corruption
Aceh in Aceh
UncoveringinCorruption
Why has the increase in local budgets not been accompanied by
a corresponding increase in the quality of life of the Acehnese
people? The answer to this may be found in a recapitulation of
the data on the extent of corruption, which shows that a total
of 137 corruption cases came to light in the province between
2001 and 2003. The system of public administration in Aceh is
currently at an all-time low, as shown by a survey conduct by
the Bank Indonesia’s Central Bank Study and Education Center
(Pusat Pendidikan dan Studi Kebanksentralan, PPSK) and Padjajaran University’s School of Economics (FE-Unpad), which was
published in “Daya Saing Daerah: Konsep dan Pengukurannya
di Indonesia” (The Competitiveness of Regions: Concepts and
Assessment in Indonesia), in February 2002. This survey found
that Aceh was the most corrupt region in Indonesia.
Given the many other problems they have, the people of Aceh
no longer pay much heed to the chaotic state of governance in
their province, or to the corruption, collusion and nepotism that
has infected the entire state apparatus. As a result, the pillaging
of public funds has continued unabated, and has even shown an
increasing tendency. Many of the people’s empowerment programs
run by the government have become fertile ground for the embezzlers and misfeasors, and are unashamedly looted to ensure the
enrichment of those in positions of inluence. Among the schemes
that have gained notoriety in this regard are the Gema Assalam
program, the Social Economy Empowerment Fund (PER), and
the Victims’ Compensation Fund.
Aceh is the scene of a long-running conlict that has been
accompanied by a breakdown in effective public service management. This has had a major impact on the management of public
funds. From a different perspective, we may say that a logical
consequence of the situation in Aceh has been the emergence
of local leaders who are at liberty to do virtually whatever they
want, no matter how arbitrary. Take, for example, the case of
Abdullah Puteh, the Aceh governor, who was the holder of
supreme executive power at the local level and was free to do
almost whatever he pleased as a result of the powerlessness of
3
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
the Acehnese people to demand transparency and accountability.
As a member of the Golkar Party, Puteh had plenty of support at the national level with the result that he was well-nigh
untouchable by the law.
Furthermore, under Law Number 22 of 2000 on local
government, a governor may only be questioned in connection
with a criminal investigation after the granting of permission by
the President via the Minister of Home Affairs. This requirement was further tightened by Law Number 18 of 2001 on
Autonomy for Aceh Special District and its renaming as the
Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. The situation was
further exacerbated by the imposition of a civil emergency in
the province, which meant that the governor was at liberty to
make unilateral decisions in lagrant disregard of the views of
others. These conditions all combined to strengthen the position of Puteh vis-à-vis the law. In reality, however, Puteh only
represented the tip of an enormous iceberg of corruption in
Aceh, with most of those involved in the corruption being well
beyond the reach of the law.
Conlict and Corruption
Aceh is awash in natural resources. It produces oil and gas
(which is converted into liqueied natural gas), and agricultural
commodities such as palm oil, nutmeg, coffee, cacao, coconuts,
etc. It also plays host to an amazing range of biological diversity in the Leuser mountain range, which traverses the province.
Despite this abundance of natural wealth, however, the vast
majority of Acehnese live in abject poverty. In fact, the level
of poverty is extraordinary. Based on igures set out in the
governor’s accountability statement for 2003, the poverty rate
in Aceh is increasing from year to year. In 2001, 25 percent of
the Acehnese were categorized as being below the poverty line.
This had risen to 33 percent in 2002, and reached 40 percent
of the total population of Aceh in 2003.
This is obviously a source of great concern, especially given
that the size of the province’s budget is also increasing from
4
Uncovering Corruption
Aceh in Aceh
UncoveringinCorruption
year to year. In 2001, the Aceh provincial budget amounted to
Rp 543 billion. This increased to Rp 1.5 trillion in 2002, and
further increased to Rp 1.6 trillion in 2003. This sort of money
was never available in the province previously, such as when it
was governed by Prof. Dr. Ibrahim Hassan, MBA, or Prof. Dr.
Syamsuddin Mahmmud in the 1980s and 1990s respectively.
The failure to make proper use of the available funds so as
to beneit the public is clearly linked to the system of inancial
management employed by Aceh province, which opens the door to
misfeasance and other forms of corruption on a large scale. Such
enormous sums lowing into the provincial treasury should obviously be capable of improving the welfare and lot of the people,
rather than what is happening at the moment, whereby these
monies are merely serving to feather the nests of the bureaucrats
and their cronies. Just look at the budget allocations in Aceh for
education, which must amount to at least 30 percent of the overall
budget. A total of Rp 700 billion has been earmarked for education in each of the last three years. Thus, from 2002 to 2004 the
total education budget in Aceh amounted to Rp 2.1 trillion. This
represents the potential for quite signiicant improvements in the
education sector, especially compared to other regions where the
budget allocations for education only amount to 20 percent.
It is, of course, true that the needs of education in Aceh
are great, and that Rp 2.1 trillion pales into insigniicance when
one realizes just how great the damage caused to the sector has
been over the last ive years. The long-running conlict and the
disruption it has caused in the sector have had a serious impact
on the education of the province’s children. However, given the
monies available over the last three years, much more could, and
should, have been done than what we see today. As things stand
at the moment, it would appear that even Rp 2.1 trillion is not
suficient to improve the education received by the children of
Aceh. This represents nothing more than a great embarrassment
for the world of education in Indonesia. It appears that even if
the education budget were to be increased tenfold, it would still
be unable to provide a solution to the problems in the sector
due to the prevalence of corruption and malfeasance at every
5
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
turn. This is particularly sad given that education represents the
best hope for a new and more prosperous Aceh.
Based on the above analysis, it will be clear that much of
the poverty in Aceh is the cause of two key factors: the longrunning conlict and corruption.
Thirteen Anticorruption Organizations
As things stand, both the public and NGOs tend to see the
Aceh question in terms of crisis resolution, while the government
in Jakarta tends to view the issue as one of human rights alone.
In reality, however, the problems assailing Aceh are the result of
economic injustice resulting from the excessively centralized and
inequitable economic policies imposed by the central government.
These have resulted in glaring disparities, rather then justice, in
the allocation of resources by Jakarta to Aceh.
Anticorruption organizations have an essential role to play
in highlighting the problem of corruption in Aceh and bringing
it into the realm of public discourse. The establishment of such
organizations in Aceh was heralded by the emergence of the anticorruption movement at the national level. An example of this
is Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), which was established to
bring cases of corruption perpetrated by the dictatorial government
of Soeharto into the full glare of the public spotlight.
Similarly in Aceh, various anticorruption organizations
were established in response to the rampant corruption being
perpetrated by local administrations. The irst anticorruption
organization was set up in Aceh in 2000, and this was quickly
followed by more – some working at the provincial level and
others at the regency/municipality level. The emergence of these
anticorruption organizations more or less coincided with the
rolling out of Special Autonomy in Aceh.
At the present time, there are 13 anticorruption organizations in Aceh. These are as follows: the Anticorruption Movement (GeRAK), Anticorruption Solidarity Movement (SoRAK),
and People’s Solidarity against Corruption (SAMAK) in Banda
Aceh; the Gerakan Anti Korupsi (GeRAK) in Aceh Besar; the
6
Uncovering Corruption
Aceh in Aceh
UncoveringinCorruption
Aceh Anticorruption Grassroots Network (JARAK) in Pidie;
the Anticorruption Solidarity Association (GaSAK) in Bireun;
the Anticorruption Movement (GeRAK) in Lhokseumawe and
Aceh Utara; the Singkil Anticorruption Community (MaTRAS)
in Singkil; People’s Solidarity for Democracy and Justice (SRDK)
in Kuta Cane; the Aceh Anticorruption Grassroots Network
(JARAK) in Aceh Selatan; Solidarity for Anticorruption (SuAK)
in Meulaboh; Solidarity for Transparency (SAKSI) in Simeulue;
and the Aceh Jaya Transparency Community in Calang.
Every cloud has a silver lining, and in these areas the issue of
rampant corruption is actually moving society in the direction
of greater transparency and democracy. This is automatically
providing greater room for the people of Aceh to speak out
about what is happening in their homeland. This process will be
further advanced if the people ind that the courts are willing
to convict those involved in corruption as opposed to the past
when this would have been virtually inconceivable.
The ight against corruption in Aceh is also serving to advance
the democratic cause at the national level. As cases come before
the courts and convictions ensue, a number of knock-on effects
will become apparent, including the following: First, greater care
and diligence on the part of the bureaucrats in managing the
public purse in Aceh province; Second, the public will become
more courageous and outspoken in revealing irregularities without
having to be afraid of being labeled a separatist – a label that
would often mean death or disappearance in the past.
The process of heightening public awareness would obviously
be more effective if it was backed up by concrete examples of
the prosecution and conviction of public oficials on corruption
charges. This is essential so that the spirit of the people can be
restored. In reality, we may say that this long process was all
about restoring the trust of the public in the local and central
governments, even though this was not recognized by many.
While the granting of Special Autonomy was intended in
part to reduce the intensity of the conlict in Aceh, it also resulted in signiicant increases in the funding made available to
the province. The beneits of this increase in funding should
7
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
logically have been directly felt by the public. However, to date
no signiicant changes in the lot of the Acehnese people have
occurred – in fact, things have got much worse in the wake
of the tsunami. It was this reality that spurred us to critically
scrutinize the Aceh provincial budget against a background of
ineffective supervision and oversight by the Aceh Provincial
Legislative Assembly.
As part of this process, we were particularly concerned with
the following aspects: the formulation of the local budget – a
process that is supposed to involve the public at large; the needs
of the community and the budget’s responses to these, particularly as regards primary needs such as education and healthcare;
and, inally, the implementation of the budget.
The Special Autonomy funds being paid out to Aceh province, which are obviously intended to improve the welfare and
well-being of the Acehnese people, have not in fact been able to
do so. According to Law Number 18 of 2001, Aceh province’s
revenues are made up of its own-source revenue, payments
from the equilibrium fund, provincial receipts under the Special
Autonomy scheme, loans taken out by the local government,
and other lawful sources.
From all of these sources, Aceh province is receiving much
more at the present time than prior to the introduction of Special
Autonomy. Since the entry into effect of the Special Autonomy
legislation, Aceh has also being receiving special funds consisting
of payments out of the equilibrium fund. Another new source
of funding is zakat (in Aceh, mandatory contributions to Islamic
charities), which is included as an item in the province’s ownsource revenue account.
As a result of all these new sources of revenue, Aceh
province’s budget has expanded exponentially, from Rp 543 billion in 2001 to Rp 1.5 trillion in 2002, Rp 1.6 trillion in 2003,
and Rp 2.2 trillion in 2004. This increase in funding should be
accompanied by the instituting of inancial management that
is based upon the principles of good governance and better
inancial supervision and management supported by both internal
8
Uncovering Corruption
Aceh in Aceh
UncoveringinCorruption
and external oversight. However, in reality both the internal and
external auditors charged with inspecting the province’s accounts
lack the powers they need to do the job properly.
Emasculation of Audit Bodies
The emasculation of the audit bodies is the result of the
issuance of Local Regulation Number 11 of 2001 on the
structure of local audit boards. This regulation provides that
the provincial audit board has the power to inspect the accounts of the provincial government. However, the provincial
audit board is also part of the government it is supposed to be
auditing. Thus, how will it be possible for the audit board to
act independently, objectively and professionally in performing
its duties if the body it is auditing is also the body that employs
the auditors? Even more incongruous, the results of the audits
that are undertaken must be reported to the governor through
the provincial secretary. Is this sort of oversight – susceptible
as it is to manipulation and collusion – the sort of oversight
that is likely to win the conidence of the public?
As regards the local ofice of the Development and Finance
Audit Board (BPKP), Local Regulation Number 11 of 2001 also
serves to head off external oversight. As things stand at the
moment, the BPKP may only audit the provincial budget if it
obtains the consent of the governor.
Emasculation of Law Enforcement Institutions and the
Courts
The apparent impossibility of seeing those involved in corruption being tried and convicted in the courts led to widespread
apathy among the public. It was an open secret that the law
could not be relied upon. The law in Aceh had long been used
as an instrument of repression to deal with the security problem, and appeared to be entirely uninterested in corruption and
malfeasance committed by public servants in the province.
Against the background of a barely functioning legal system,
legal and human rights activists began to push for breakthroughs
9
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
in the legal sphere that would allow the public to demand that
justice be done. The sort of breakthroughs that were being
sought included the permitting of class action and a widening
of the deinition of legal standing. There were two principal
targets in this regard:
1. results target: the achievement of maximum results in changing the paradigms adhered to by the law in Aceh so as to
make it more favorably disposed towards the public;
2. process target: the educating of the Acehnese people as
regards their right to sue the government – something that
was previously taboo but which in reality was legitimate and
the right of every Indonesian citizen.
The weaknesses aflicting the law enforcement institutions
resulted from the legislative framework that had been put in
place in Aceh as part of the Special Autonomy arrangements.
Article 21(6) of Chapter X of the Aceh Special Autonomy Law
(Number 18 of 2001) states that the appointment of the Aceh
Provincial Police chief shall be made by the Republic of Indonesia National Police chief with the approval of the governor
of Aceh, while Article 24(2) of Chapter IX of this Law states
that the