Theoretical Framework 1 Humanitarian Interventions
the conflict, inter state conflict, intra state conflict, horizontal conflict and the other conflict. The military interventions is the lasted choice from the Responsibility to Protect perspective.
We took before that Responsibility to Protect have three aspect or three step by doing and duty. Responsibility to prevent is began of opereation by humanitarian interventions. Preventif
approaches is the important one, because every conflict have to disscue before. The element of prevent like economic, sosial, law as humanitarian assisntent.
If the Responsibility to prevent not effective the we can do Responsibility to react. In this case the state or international organizations can do it with the military interventions. The
second step focus how kept the civilizations by violating, mass killing and others. Military interventions uses to protect civilizations by their state or group do unhumanitarian
interventions. But this step it have big consequenses, because the military perspective is used. Author thing is the general view or general perspective by Responsibility to react. Reactions
means if the consolidations and reunifications did not work to hit the conflict.
After military interventions Responsibility to react we have Responsibility to rebuild. The last step is not also uses by state which do Responsibility to protect. Develop country after
military interventions is importan one. But in fact, the last step seldom uses by country or state used Responsibility to protect, because the reason of actor, we are just kept your civil but in
development after that is your responsibility. So the new doctrine of Responsibility to protect must be have rule for the actor to build and develop the subject of Responsibility to protect and
its include as your responsibility.
ASEAN is the biggest international oragnizations in south east asia as representative by state have duty to make condition and situation be secure in regionalism. ASEAN have function
to make collective assignment to kept the regional by violating of human right of kept by humanity issue. Several days ago Myanmar have the big problem about humanity. Rohingnya
as auntentic or original people in Myanmar has drove out by government of Myanmar. Author thing that phenomenon is unusual, because Myanmar have strike the human issue like
rohingnya. ASEAN must have attentions and direct participants by this issue. It have to action, and have kept rohingya by murdered, government of Myanmar as legal institutions to kept their
people instead strike and kill rohingnya. Author thing it is the unhumanitarian problem. ASEAN must be take responsibility by this phenomenon.
B. Theoretical Framework B.1 Humanitarian Interventions
It is increasingly apparent that the greatest challenge to the notion of internastional society comes the new found proclivity on the part of major power as well as international and regional
organizatios to intervene in the domestic affairs of juridically sovereign states for ontensibly humanitarian purpose. in addition to bifurcating international society into civilized and
uncivilized zones, the concept of humanitarian intervention raises a number of additional questions. A major problem emerges from the fact that new interventionary logic ‘ presupposes
the existence of meaningful international community in whose name may be carry out Mohamed Ayoob :2002:85. Ayood has opinion that humanitarian intervention need to do for
some state which the chaos situation. UN as the internastional organization have tools to strike humanitarian interventions with several condition. Security Council have failed to use their
authority for make better condition in chaos country like Rwanda and Kosovo. Humatarian
intervention must bulid and make better situation than, but it was not just for mass killing, genoside and ethnic cleansing, it have recocnation about disaster, air accident and anothers.
Indeed, it is much harder to find someone who completely supports nonintervention nowadays. The lack of action in Rwanda or, more accurately,lack of effective action and the
subsequent genocide has had a massive impact on the theory and practice of intervention. Even those who are deeply suspicious of armed humanitarian intervention and deeply sceptical about
its prospects of success may still admit that it might, in theory, be justified when a humanitarian crisis is sufficiently serious. James Pattison:2010:43 Building on the Just War principle of
‘right authority’, it is often claimed that humanitarian intervention must be authorized by the appropriate body, by which most mean the UN Security Council. As discussed in Chapter 1, in
their endorsement of the responsibility to protect, states at the 2005 World Summit asserted that any robust action should be undertaken through the Security Council UN: 2005: 30 . in
Rwanda case there are not states have responsibility to taken it, authors suggest there are not interest by big country to like United States to have respon and responsibility.
It should also be noted that the ICISS 2001a argue for the abandonment of the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ in favour of the language of the ‘responsibility to protect’. The
reasons they give include the international opposition to the notion of ‘humanitarian intervention’ ICISS 2001a: 9 and that the language of the humanitarian intervention focuses
attention on the claims, rights, and prerogatives of interveners rather than potential beneficiaries 2001a: 16–18. The risk is that general opposition to humanitarian intervention
will transfer to the notion of the responsibility to protect, and therefore risk jeopardizing the potential contributions of the latter beyond humanitarian intervention e.g. the acceptance of
sovereignty as responsibility see Bellamy 2009a: 112. It is better then, as Bellamy2009b: 198 argues, to distinguish sharply between the responsibility to protect and humanitarian
intervention to avoid the responsibility to protect being seen solely as humanitarian intervention in disguise. To do this, we need separate terms. Indeed, the ICISS implicitly seem to
recognize the need still for the notion of humanitarian intervention, since they repeatedly use the cumbersome phrase ‘intervention for human protection purposes’ throughout their report as
a synonym for humanitarian intervention. james pattison : 2010 : 25
There are four defining conditions of humanitarian intervention. The first concerns the activity of intervention. To start with, humanitarian intervention is military e.g. Roberts 1993:
445. This distinguishes it Before beginning, it is important to distinguish the definitional issue of the qualities that an agent needs to be engaged in humanitarian intervention from the
normative issue concerning the qualities it needs to be engaged legitimately in humanitarian intervention. By defining humanitarian intervention, the ensuing discussion will provide an
account of certain qualities that an intervener must have if it is to be engaged in ‘humanitarian intervention’. These qualities help to define a humanitarian intervener, rather than what counts
as a legitimate humanitarian intervener. This is not to prejudge the legitimacy of an intervener: an intervener that is engaged in ‘humanitarian intervention’ according to the definition that I
outline might still be illegitimate. This contrasts with a definition of justifiable humanitarian intervention, which, by including a number of normative criteria, builds the rectitude of
humanitarian intervention into its definition. The difficulty with this sort of definition is that it risks twisting the definition of humanitarian intervention to exclude morally problematic cases
of humanitarian intervention, which, despite their difficulties, are still generally regarded as instances of ‘humanitarian intervention james pattison : 2010 : 25-26
The second defining condition concerns the circumstances of intervention: humanitarian intervention takes place where there is actual or impending grievous suffering or loss of life.
This condition concerns only the circumstances in the target state that enable us to say that an intervener is engaged in ‘humanitarian intervention’ rather than those that relate to its being
justifiably engaged in humanitarian intervention. Of course, as argued earlier, for humanitarian intervention to be justifiable, this humanitarian crisis may have to be serious. The third defining
condition concerns who can undertake humanitarian intervention. In short, humanitarian intervention is conducted by an external agent. This means that a state resolving its own
humanitarian crisis or an insurrection by a group within the state to end a crisis are not examples of a ‘humanitarian intervention’, whereas a state intervening to resolve another state’s
humanitarian crisis is. Thus, humanitarian intervention must be transboundary. Such ‘outside parties’ can range from the UN to other states to PMCs.
Fourth, it is widely held that humanitarian intervention must have a humanitarian intention e.g. Seybolt 2007: 7; Teso´n 2005c. That is to say, to be ‘humanitarian’, an intervention must
have the predominant purpose of preventing, reducing, or halting actual or impending loss of life and human suffering, whatever the underlying reasons—its ‘motives’—for wishing to do
so. Chapter 6 defends this claim, and the difference between an intervener’s motives and its intentions, in more detail I also reject the definitional significance of humanitarian motives and
outcomes. For now, it will suffice to note that an agent’s intentions are key to classifying its actions and, as such, to be engaged in the action of ‘humanitarian intervention’, it is necessary
that an intervener has a humanitarian intention. It follows that humanitarian intervention is not the same as intervention for other purposes, such as intervention for self-defence and collective
security unless these interventions contain a significant humanitarian purpose. The main objective of anintervener must be to tackle an ongoing humanitarian crisis in the target state,
such as ethnic cleansing, genocide, and the mass violation of basichuman rights. James Pattison : 2010 : 26-27
B.2 Responsibility to protect
It is important to note, however, that the responsibility to protect is both broader and narrower than humanitarian intervention, and, more generally, the status of the responsibility to
protect is still subject to much dispute. The international community should also pursue other measures, short of military intervention, such as military, diplomatic, and economic incentives
and sanctions, and the use of international criminal prosecutions e.g. referral to the International Criminal Court. Moreover, in the post-conflict phase, there is the responsibility to
rebuild to ensure that the conditions that prompted the military intervention do not repeat themselves.
More broadly, the responsibility to protect is concerned with encouraging states to live up to their responsibilities to protect their citizens’ human rights—to realize that sovereignty entails
responsibility. Humanitarian intervention is only one part of this much larger effort. Indeed, defenders of the responsibility to protect are often at pains to highlight that one of the major
implications of the doctrine is to move away from the narrow choice of military intervention or no action, to a broad array of non-military measures before, during, and after the crisis. On the
other hand, the responsibility to protect doctrine is narrower than humanitarian intervention. As I will define it in Section 1.5, ‘humanitarian intervention’ can be undertaken in response to a
variety of humanitarian crises and does not require Security Council authorization. Humanitarian intervention under the responsibility to protect umbrella is much more
circumscribed. The degree to which this is the case depends on the particular account of the responsibility to protect adopted. Paul Williams : 2008 : 23-18
To see this, consider some of the key differences between the ICISS doctrine and the agreement at theWorld Summit.15 On the ICISS version of the responsibility to protect, a the
responsibility to protect transfers to the international community when the state involved is unable or unwilling to look after its citizens’ human rights. bMilitary intervention will meet
the just cause threshold in circumstances of ‘serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur’ and, in particular, actual or apprehended “large-scale loss
of life” or “large-scale ethnic cleansing”’ ICISS 2001a: XII. c When the state primarily responsible for its people fails to act, reacting robustly to the crisis is a fall-back responsibility
of the international community in general ICISS 2001a: 17. d The Security Council should be the first port of call for humanitarian intervention, but alternative sources of authority such
as the Uniting for Peace procedure are not to be completely discounted ICISS 2001a: 53. e Interventionmust meet four additional precautionary principles right intention, last resort,
proportional means, and reasonable prospects ICISS 2001a: XII. Paul Williams : 2008 : 40- 45
R2P’s next milestone came in 2009, when UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released the report “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,” outlining three principles, or “pillars,” of
R2P.3 The first pillar describes the new approach in relation to sovereignty, highlighting that states have the primary responsibility to protect their own civilians against mass atrocities
crimes. Pillar two asserts that the international community is committed to providing assistance to states to build their capacities to prevent such mass atrocities, and that “prevention is a key
ingredient for a successful strategy for the responsibility to protect.” The third pillar says that in cases where a state is unable to provide protection for its citizens, the international community
has the responsibility to respond “collectively in a timely and decisive manner… to provide such protection.”4 The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution ARES63308, taking
note of the report and subsequent debate within the UNGA
Alex Stark :2007:4 .
International commission on inetervention and state sovereignty ICISS report is premised on the motion that when states are unwilling on unrable to protect their citizens from grave
harm, the principle of non-interference ‘yield’ to the responsibility to protect. The concept of R2P was intended as way of escaping the logic of sovereignty versus human right by focusing
not on what interventers are entitle to do a right of intervention but on in what is necessary to protect people in dire need and responsibilities of various actors to provide such protection
Alex. J. Bellamy:2008: 427.
The R2P seeks to bring an end to gross and systematic violations of human rights. It proposes the authorization of ‘action taken against a state or its leaders,
without its or their consent, for purposes which are claimed to be humanitarian or protective’. The R2P embraces three specific responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, the
responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. It is said that‘[p]revention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect Eve Massingham:2009:807.
Thomas Weiss traces the evolution of the R2P concept since its inception in 2001. Weiss notes that although R2P is often described as an “emerging” norm, it has already played a
decisive role in shaping international debates about human rights violations and humanitarian response. He points to a tension and challenge that lies at the heart of conceptualizing and
operationalizing R2P. On the one hand it must not be defined too broadly, as “broadening perspectives has opened the floodgates to an overflow of appeals to address too many
problems.” Yet on the other hand, it must not be defined too narrowly, as R2P “is not only about the use of military force
Alex Stark :2007:5 .
Alex J. Bellami explain there are three concept of R2P : Responsibility to Prevent, Responsibility to React and Responsibility to Rebuild. First, Responsibility to Prevent,
Responsibility is the prevention of deadly conflict is one of the fundamental goals of UN. Indeed , the whole endeavor of UN peacekeeping grew out oh the secretary general’s belief tht
the primary contribution that world organization could make to international peace and security was in the prevention and resolution of armed conflict. Then ICISS called for the UN Security
Council to play a leading role and identified four keys dimensions of root cause prevention : Political relating good governance, human right, confidence –building, Economic realting to
proverty, inequality and economic ooportunity, Legal relating to the rule of law and accountability and Military realating to disarmament, reintegration and sectoral reform Alex
J. Bellami: 2008 : 427.
Second, Responsibility to React as one of specific question of humanitarian intervention, what the ICISS called. Two crusial aspirations informed the commission’s approach. First, it
wanted to avoid future situation like Kosovo, when the UN security council was paralyzed vy division. Second, it wanted to avoid future disaster like Rwanda, when the world stood aside of
genoside unfolded Alex J. Bellami: 2008 : 427. Third, the label Responsibility to Rebuild is something of misnomer because the aim after an episode of genoside, mass killing, or ethnic
cleansing is not to ‘rebuild’ a society by returning it to pre-war state but to transform it into something new. After all, the pre-war society contained within it the seeds of mass killing
destruction. The ICISS argued that potential interventers should have a strategic plan about how they intend to transform societies Alex J. Bellami: 2008 : 432. States which have interest in
interventions such as R2P must reinterpred all condition before do, because if the states made decision to intervens so theya must have considerate three aspec about responsibility to protect.
It’s the main of condition and consideration behave.
B.3 Sovereignty
Sovereignty has come to signify, in the Westphalian concept, the legal identity of a state in international law. It is a concept which provides order, stability and predictability in
international relations since sovereign states are regarded as equal, regardless of comparative size or wealth. The principle of sovereign equality of states is enshrined in Article 2.1 of the UN
Charter. Internally, sovereignty signifies the capacity to make authoritative decisions with regard to the people and resources within the territory of the state. Generally, however, the
authority of the state is not regarded as absolute, but constrained and regulated internally by
constitutional power sharing arrangements. A condition of any one state’s sovereignty is a corresponding obligation to respect every other state’s sovereignty: the norm of non-
intervention is enshrined in Article 2.7 of the UN Charter. A sovereign state is empowered in international law to exercise exclusive and total jurisdiction within its territorial borders. Other
states have the corresponding duty not to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. If that duty is violated, the victim state has the further right to defend its territorial integrity and
political independence. In the era of decolonization, the sovereign equality of states and the correlative norm of nonintervention received its most emphatic affirmation from the newly
independent states.
At the same time, while intervention for human protection purposes was extremely rare, during the Cold War years state practice reflected the unwillingness of many countries to give
up the use of intervention for political or other purposes as an instrument of policy. Leaders on both sides of the ideological divide intervened in support of friendly leaders against local
populations, while also supporting rebel movements and other opposition causes in states to which they were ideologically opposed. None were prepared to rule out a priori the use of force
in another country in order to rescue nationals who were trapped and threatened there. ICISS : 2001 : 12-13
Membership of the United Nations was the final symbol of independent sovereign statehood and thus the seal of acceptance into the community of nations. The UN also became the
principal international forum for collaborative action in the shared pursuit of the three goals of state building, nation building and economic development. The UN was therefore the main
arena for the jealous protection, not the casual abrogation, of state sovereignty. The UN is an organization dedicated to the maintenance of international peace and security on the basis of
protecting the territorial integrity, political independence and national sovereignty of its member states. But the overwhelming majority of today’s armed conflicts are internal, not inter-state.
Moreover, the proportion of civilians killed in them increased from about one in ten at the start of the 20th century to around nine in ten by its close. ICISS : 2001 : 13
This has presented the organization with a major difficulty: how to reconcile its foundational principles of member states’ sovereignty and the accompanying primary mandate to maintain
international peace and security “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” – with the equally compelling mission to promote the interests and welfare of people within those
states “We the peoples of the United Nations”. The Secretary-General has discussed the dilemma in the conceptual language of two notions of sovereignty, one vesting in the state, the
second in the people and in individuals. His approach reflects the ever-increasing commitment around the world to democratic government of, by and for the people and greater popular
freedoms. The second notion of sovereignty to which he refers should not be seen as any kind of challenge to the traditional notion of state sovereignty. Rather it is a way of saying that the more
traditional notion of state sovereignty should be able comfortably to embrace the goal of greater self-empowerment and freedom for people, both individually and collectively.ICISS : 2001:14
B.4 Human Security
There is little doubt that human security studies are attracting growing attention in the wider International Relations and social science literatures. The expanding UN agenda of human
security concerns among them war-affected children, racial discrimination, women’s rights, refugees, coupled with former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s personal interest in and
commitment to human security activism, catapulted these questions to the forefront of the scholarly and policy research agenda in the 1990s see MacFarlane and Khong 2006. This
agenda accompanied the long-standing human security concerns of students and practitioners of international development – an agenda that. has generally tended to focus on the ways that
globalization dynamics have damaged the prospects for human development and the provision of basichuman needs.
Despite the growing investment of research and interest in human security, to date, there is no real consensus on what can or should constitute the focus of what are still loosely termed
human security studies. There continues to be considerable methodological, definitional and conceptual disquiet about the real meaning of human security, and about the implications of the
human security paradigm for the study or the practice of International Relations. This should come as no surprise, given the nature of the academic enterprise and the different disciplinary
and methodological backgrounds informing the work of scholars engaged in human security research. Even so, the evident inability of scholars to advance beyond theoretical debates over
definitions towards practical policy recommendations understandably frustrates practitioners in the policy community. There is also a great unevenness in the depth and breadth of research
on particular themes. Some issues, such as anti-personnel landmines or small arms, are well ploughed; the literature on these subjects is rich not only in analysis of particular problems and
causes, but also in implications for public policy. Other problems, such as gender-directed violence, are only just beginning to receive the sort of attention they deserve as evils in their
own right and as sources and symptoms of human insecurity. Paul Williams :2008 :229-230
There are arguably three distinct conceptions of human security that shape current debates. The first is what might be termed the natural rightsrule of law conception of human security,
anchored in the fundamental liberal assumption of basic individual rights to ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’, and of the international community’s obligation to protect and
promote these rights Alston 1992, Lauren 1998, Morsink 1998. A second view of human security is humanitarian. This is the view of human security that, for example, informs
international efforts to deepen and strengthen international law, particularly regarding genocide and war crimes, and to abolish weapons that are especially harmful to civilians and non-
combatants Boutros-Ghali 1992, Moore 1996, UN 1995, 1999, UNDP 1997.
This view lies at the heart of humanitarian interventions directed at improving the basic living conditions of refugees, and anyone uprooted by conflict from their homes and
communities. On those rare occasions when military force has been used ostensibly to avert genocide or ethnic cleansing, it has also been justified usually on rather specific humanitarian
grounds such as the need to restore basic human rights and dignity. These two views of human security, which focus on basic human rights and their deprivation, stand in sharp contrast to a
broader view, which suggests that human security should be widely constructed to include economic, environmental, social and other forms of harm to the overall livelihood and well-
being of individuals. There is a strong social justice component in this broader conception of human security, as well as a wider consideration of threats real and potential to the survival
and health of individuals. According to this third view, perhaps the most controversial of the three conceptions of human security, the state of the global economy, the forces of
globalization, and the health of the environment, including the world’s atmosphere and oceans, are all legitimate subjects of concern in terms of how they affect the ‘security’ of the individual
UNDP 1994, Nef 2002
.