19 root,
vŗt, which has the meanings of ‘to turn, whirl, revolve, roll, proceed’
35
The most significant modifications indicated by Pātānjali are of five kinds and are now taken in
detail. . Various translations
have been given for this term of the Yogasūtra: ‘fluctuations’, ‘modifications’, ‘acts and functions’,
‘transformations’ etc. For our purpose we will employ the term modifications as it captures many of the nuances of the term. Again there is difficulty in finding a single label in English for
vŗtti.
a. Varieties of Vŗttis
The sixth sūtra lists the five categories of modifications which occur in the citta : valid cognition
pramāņa, misconception viparyaya, conceptualisation vikalpa, sleep nidrā and memory smrti. The word is used ten times I.2, 4-5, 10, 41; II.11,15,50: III.43 and IV.18 in the
Yogasūtra. Feuerstein contends that this is a technical term and he refers to the definition give by Bhoja in his
commentary
36
i. Pramāņa
.
This is the type of vŗtti which refers to the means of knowing or valid cognition. It allows for the
understanding of something which is fully manifested and verified through one of the three avenues, perception
pratyakșa, inference anumāna and valid testimony āgama
37
. These refer to sources
of correct knowledge and give the traditional breakdown of the cognitive process as: prāmtir the
cognising subject; prameya the cognised object; pramāņa the instrument of cognition; prama
cognition and pramāņya valid cognition
38
35
Monier-Williams online dictionary,
. The experience of objects of the world such as people,
http:www.sanskrit-lexicon.uni-koeln.demonier
36
Tookaram Tatya, The Yoga philosophy: being the text of Patanjali, with Bhoja Rajas commentary, Theosophical Society,
India, 1885 Raja Bhoja wrote a commentary, Raja-Martanada, on the Yogasutra. He defines vritti as ‘forms of
modifications with a reciprocal relationship between them’.
37
G. Feuerstein, The Yoga-sutra of Patanjali, a New Translation and Commentary, This is indicated in verse I.7
‘prataksya-anuman-agamah pramanani’
38
G. Feuerstein, The Yoga-sutra of Patanjali, p 31
20 animals, trees, earth etc., through any of the three means, belong to the category of
pramāņa modifications.
ii. Viparyaya
This type of vŗtti is termed the ‘error’ and occurs when the understanding, or the thought, does not
correspond with reality, thus apprehending something other than the reality. The most fundamental ‘error’ is the misconception about existence itself. Thus
Vyāsa in his commentary on this term equates it to another basic notion in the
Yogasūtra – ignorance or ‘avidyā’. This ignorance is not to be understood as a mere lack of knowledge but a fundamental absence of awareness of the Self as
one’s true identity and therefore false knowledge. Feuerstein says of avidyā that it is the cause of
‘the fatal epistemic dichotomisation into subject and object which Yoga seeks to remove’
39
. Avidyā
as it were, conceals the cit or pure consciousness of the purușa by establishing a false identity.
Whicher puts this in the context of suffering and dissatisfaction du
ḥ
kha when he says that avidyā ‘gives rise to the incorrect understanding that one’s identity is defined within the limits of the
individualised psycho-physical being or personality complex and not according to the unbounded nature of the
purușa or spiritual Self’
40
Whicher considers that Vyāsa’s description of the afflictions kleśa-s cuts through the ‘stereotyped
opposition between emotiveaffective and rationalcognitive. This brings forth and integral view of . Thus it is the conjunction of the ‘seer’
purușa and ‘seen’ prakŗiti which is the cause of all suffering and avidyā is the primary affliction which is the origin of
all other afflictions, including the mistaken identity of the limited ego-self or ‘I-am-ness’ asmitā.
The object of Yoga praxis is the ultimate transcendence of all afflictions including the ‘root’ affliction of mistaken identity.
39
Ibid., p62
40
I. Whicher, The Integrity of the Yoga Darsana, India, p 110
21 the mind’
41
iii. Vikalpa
. The systematic exposition of Pātānjali’s Science of Mind goes beyond the dichotomies
of mind and matter, subject and object and affection and cognition.
The third type of vŗtti is vikalpa or ‘conceptualisation’ and it is the apprehension arising out of verbal
knowledge only but whose referents are not things but words and ideas YS I.9. It does not necessarily have to be an error but can be an ‘imaginary’ cognition. Thus translations of
vikapla as hallucinations or fancy do not acknowledge the importance of ‘ideation’ in meditative concentration
– focussing on an idea to the exclusion of all others. Whicher defines vikapla as that vŗtti which
follows ‘language, knowing of words, and the knowledge provided by words, and is productive of the same where no actual thing is its referent’
42
iv. Nidrā
. The constant conceptualisation of reality through language is the ‘most powerful obstacle preventing us from experiencing reality as it really is.
The fourth type of modification is sleep or nidrā. This is translated as ‘the modification based on
upon the apprehension of non-becomingabsence’
43
and ‘a fluctuation founded on the presented- idea of the non-occurrence of other contents of consciousness’
44
. Here Vyāsa considers that sleep
is not simply the absence of mental activities such as cognition
45
. This is demonstrated by the fact that we are able to recollect whether one has slept well or badly. By sleep here
Vyāsa means the state of dreamless sleep.
41
Ibid., p 111
42
ibid., p 115
43
ibid., p 116 YS I.10 ‘ abhavapratayayalambana vrittr nidra’
44
G. Feuerstein, The Yoga-sutra of Patanjali, p 33
45
Hariharananda Aranya, Yoga Philosophy of Patanjali, New York: SUNY Press , USA, 1983 Vyasa’s Sanskrit
commentary and Aranya’s subcommentary is rendered in English by P.N. Mukerji
22
v. Smŗti
