Cash Assistance

3.4 Cash Assistance

Discussing the situation of Iraqi refugees, UNHCR-Egypt well as support the local infrastructures in coping with pledged assistance, but not direct cash assistance:

the impact of the presence of large Iraqi populations in CH3: their territories. Significantly, UNHCR’s support…to this

efugee elihoods

The challenge of assisting vulnerable refugees in the region

social network will also have a positive spillover effect

should not be resolved through direct cash assistance. upon host communities and the most vulnerable within.”

Liv Assistance to Iraqis in the region should be delivered to

(UNHCR Strategy for the Iraq Situation, Revised 2007: 4). host community networks, such as national social agencies

Liv

elihoods efugee

and civil society. This methodology will allow UNHCR Despite this initial policy position, UNHCR has provided cash

to simultaneously reach more beneficiaries, provide assistance to Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria (Davis and

UNHCR more leverage with host country authorities to Taylor 2012: 41). In Egypt, cash assistance is distributed by

CH3:

advocate for more effective protection standards, as Caritas; it is distributed to families on the basis of need and

9 UNHCR-Egypt and the Government of Egypt require refugees returning to their country of origin to close their cases with UN- HCR-Egypt. Refugees may re-open their case once they return. However, refugees hoping to travel frequently between Egypt and Iraq—

as in the case of this woman—have preferred not to register with UNHCR-Egypt in order to maintain their mobility.

family size, and refugees of all nationalities expressed the importance of this cash assistance in meeting their basic needs. However, because cash assistance is only distributed to refugees with open files, cash assistance is not available for the most needy population—those with closed files. Somalis, Sudanese, Ethiopians and Eritreans are more likely to receive cash assistance than Iraqis, due to the lower average wealth of African refugee families as compared to Iraqi refugee families.

Given the Egyptian government’s restrictions on refugees’ right to work and on vocational programs (the government prefers to reserve vocational training to only those refugees who signed up for voluntary repatriation programs), NGOs have had limited impact on refugees’ labor force participation and livelihoods, apart from providing limited cash and in-kind assistance. Our interviews indicate that existing cash support is insufficient and unreliable. Virtually every refugee who has been receiving cash assistance mentioned being strapped for cash at some point, having the cash assistance interrupted for no apparent reason and/or needing to re-apply, and, as a result, having difficulties making ends meet and planning their expenses.

A Sudanese woman reported receiving 380EP every two months from Caritas in the fall of 2010, after

a couple of months the amount was increased to 960EP, but then the cash assistance stopped. She was supposed to apply again in January 2011 but because of the revolution her appointment was cancelled. Her rent—about 400EP/month—was two months overdue at the time of our interview.

A Sudanese family of nine was receiving 1800EP every two months. The father reported that it was not enough to cover the family’s expenses. His children are often unable to go to school because they do not have the money for transportation. It costs him 10EP every day for breakfast and transportation for each child or 50EP for five of the school age children in the family. When the electricity bill—about 40EP per month—arrives

he does not send the children to school for a couple of days to save money to pay the bill.

Most interviews included narratives about interruptions in cash assistance, the need to re-apply and long waits for a decision regarding reinstatement of cash assistance. The research team interviewing refugees in Amman reported similar stories of interrupted cash assistance payments (Davis and Taylor 2012). The steady decrease of subsistence allowances, combined with the progressive reduction of UNHCR-Egypt support for health and education, has put many refugee families in a crisis situation.

Sadly, the situation has not improved much in the 10 years since Sperl’s study of the Iraqis (Sperl 2001) and Grabska’s research on Sudanese refugees in Cairo (Grabska 2008). The majority of NGO-operated programs do not focus on helping refugees improve their livelihoods while in Egypt, but rather aim at meeting people’s immediate needs or helping them prepare for resettlement or eventual repatriation. As our colleagues found in Amman, Jordan:

The situations of Iraqis in Jordan are no longer as “emergency” warranting relief. Thus, some funding targeting Iraqis may be better directed towards development that will benefit the refugees, the local communities, and other migrant communities. (Davis 2012: 74)

Those who have had refugee status applications rejected and are residing in Egypt illegally are excluded from any form of formal assistance. The Egyptian government does not support any irregular migrants or refugees whose claims have been rejected. We visited two different social service agencies working with poor Egyptian families— one affiliated with the Ministry of Social Welfare and one affiliated with the Coptic Church—and both reported that they could not provide much assistance for refugee families, especially in the form of cash assistance. One of the agencies provided skills training (at the time of our site visit the training focused on first aid) to a mixed group of Iraqi, Kurdish, Sudanese and Ethiopian refugees—approximately 20-25 people—and the other used to provide vocational training with UNHCR support, but the funding ended and at the time of our research they mainly provided social support or distributed donated clothing or furniture.