Keywords
:
R ecreation management; Yellowstone; Crowding
1. Introduction
N atural resource managers often confront the dual objectives of encouraging recreation while
simultaneously preserving the ecosystems they manage. U nfortunately, human behavior often
degrades natural processes. The recreationists who visit and enjoy the planet’s protected natural
areas cause serious ecological damage to the very lands they enjoy Alden, 1997. To maintain
ecosystem integrity, park managers must increas- ingly focus on recreation management as a vital
part of their jobs.
The choice of recreation management strategy requires that objectives be delineated and that the
efficacy of the many tools at their disposal be evaluated Alden, 1997. Choices are complicated
by the fact that the use of some tools may retard progress toward certain objectives. Alden 1997
suggests that market mechanisms interfere with intra-generational equity goals and M cCarville et
al. 1999 report that residents especially object to activity-specific
fees. Conversely,
a proposed
recreation planning framework for U S national parks favors market methods over quantity con-
straints because recreationists thereby retain more freedom of choice G raefe et al., 1990, p. 7.
In spite of these differences, managers agree on the importance of pursuing objectives using the
least cost mix of tools G raefe et al., 1990; Alden, 1997. An important consideration in choosing
the least cost mix of tools is the responses of recreationists to conditions created by their own
behavior. We term these responses ‘self-regula- tion’. F or example, recreationists may self-regu-
late by visiting an area less frequently after overuse degrades its amenities. H ere, self-regula-
tion leads to reduced rates of visitation and of degradation. Alternatively, crowds may signal a
high quality recreational experience to potential visitors and result in more intensive use.
The implications of self-regulation may be de- sirable or undesirable, but managers will want to
understand its nature for three reasons. F irstly, self-regulation may be an inexpensive, low-profile
alternative to more direct tools. Secondly, the stimuli for self-regulation, such as crowding or
site degradation, directly impact recreation-based welfare. Thirdly, self-regulatory behavior is com-
plex. Its impacts are not always be in the expected direction, and self-regulating recreationists may
modify their activities in ways that adversely im- pact other parts of the ecosystem K uss et al.,
1990.
1
R ecreation management is especially salient in many U S N ational Parks. Visitation has risen at
an annual rate of 3.3 over the past decade. N ational Park Service N PS 1995 anticipates an
additional 60 – 90 million visitors by the year 2000 Wilkinson, 1995. F or years, the N ational Parks
and Conservation Association has asked the N PS to address the problem of the human carrying
capacity Wilkinson, 1995.
Indeed, many question the validity of much of the human activity in the parks. R ecreational
fishing is especially problematic. M cClanahan 1990, p. 5 writes, ‘Preservation will be difficult
with the parks’ many external influences, but will be impossible if internal management allows
recreation and resource use to supersede preserva- tion. The subjectivity of the fishing – hunting di-
chotomy must be relinquished to a more objective management plan that preserves aquatic resources
in the same manner as terrestrial species and ecosystems.’ The
former associate
editor of
N ational Parks, Yvette La Pierre 1994, p. 38 writes ‘A growing number of people question the
practice of fishing in the parks. Their argument is simple — the harvest of fish by angling is funda-
mentally at odds with the mandate of the park
1
Our objective here is not to determine the optimal level of recreation use in regulated ecosystems. This depends on the
relative weights given to recreation, environmental protection, equity and other goals. F isher and K rutilla 1972 and Cic-
chetti and Smith 1973 provide approaches to this problem, but their models do not allow for self-regulation.
service to maintain natural ecosystems in an unimpaired condition’.
R esponding to such criticism and to some clear cases of over fishing, the N PS now manages
nearly all waters in Yellowstone N ational Park YN P as catch-and-release fisheries. Still, some
streams in and near YN P are heavily impacted by anglers. F or example, the wild, Yellowstone cut-
throat trout S almo clarki bou6ieri of the Yellow- stone R iver inside YN P are caught an average 9.7
times during the 45-day summer season Schill et al., 1986. Although managed as a catch-and-re-
lease fishery, studies suggest that between 3 and 30 of the fish from these waters will die at
anglers’ hands each season H unsaker et al., 1970; Schill et al., 1986.
Besides this obvious impact, anglers cause streambank erosion, contribute to air, water and
litter pollution, disturb wildlife and, for some, degrade the park’s scenic quality.
2
YN P’s 1995 R esource M anagement Plan 1995; p.16 recog-
nizes the ‘fundamental balancing act between pre- serving park resources and allowing human use.
This issue particularly affects the park’s fisheries and back country programs, two of Yellowstone’s
most popular visitor activities. H abituation and poaching of wildlife, disturbance of nesting birds,
influx of exotic plant species, impacts to air and water quality, all relate to types and levels of
human use’.
The N PS has an array of tools to attempt the ‘balancing act’ referred to above, including many
that influence human behavior. They include edu- cation, various fees, queuing and the proscription
of activities G raefe et al., 1990. In the case of fisheries, the N PS may use regulations regarding
the species and size of fish that may be kept. In some cases these tools may be effective; in others
they are ineffective, expensive, unpopular, or in- consistent with other park management objectives
Alden, 1997.
A possible alternative or complement to these tools is a reliance on park users’ self-regulation. If
park users, interacting with other visitors and the environment, behave so that the adverse impacts
of visitation are mitigated, then a laissez-faire approach is more appealing. One likely stimulus
for self-regulation is crowding; that is, as park visitors become more numerous, recreationists
will change their behavior by possibly visiting less often, changing the areas they visit, or changing
their activities while visiting.
In this paper, we empirically examine the be- havior of anglers visiting the blue-ribbon trout
fishery of the greater Yellowstone ecosystem G YE, the bioregion that surrounds YN P. We
use data obtained from a 1993 survey of anglers at five of the most popular G YE fishing sites. We
address the efficacy of several management tools for influencing anglers’ behavior. These tools in-
volve changes in anglers’ costs per trip, costs per day, site-specific costs, direct fisheries regulation
regarding the harvesting allowed by species, size, or number and crowding’s contribution to an-
glers’ self-regulation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the modeling of anglers’ behavior. Sec-
tion 3 briefly describes the angler survey we used to obtain data and presents the equations used for
estimation. Section 4 discusses the statistical re- sults. Section 5 summarizes.
2. Anglers’ behavior and crowding-based self-regulation
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