Unfortunately, since the IPEDS does not contain information by state of residence on either the number of upperclassmen or the number of students who graduate, we
are not able to examine DCTAG’s effects on retention or graduation rates, but only on the likelihood that students enroll as college freshmen. It would be of interest to know
how the program affects students’ decisions to remain in college and their success in completing college, and it may be possible to address these questions in future
research using different data sources.
IV. The Effects of DCTAG on College Application and Enrollment Decisions
As already indicated, making the transition from high school to enrollment at a college or university is a multi-stage process during which a student faces multiple decision
points. By changing students’ perceptions of affordability, the DCTAG program could encourage more students to consider college attendance andor attendance at an eligible
public institution, thereby increasing the number of applicants. The program also could affect enrollments by increasing the share of applicants who actually enroll as college
freshmen. Our analysis examines the effects of the DCTAG program on outcomes at two decision points—the point at which students decide whether to apply to one or more
colleges and the point at which they decide whether to enroll at a particular college.
A. DCTAG’s Effect on Applications to Four-Year Colleges
One important objective of the DCTAG program is to encourage D.C. residents who would not otherwise have done so to apply to four-year colleges or universities. The
total number of D.C. residents sending SAT scores to a four-year college clearly increased following the introduction of the DCTAG program, from 1,394 in 1999 to
1,540 in 2001 see Column 1 in the top panel of Table 1. As a fraction of the esti- mated population age 17 Column 2, the share of District residents sending SAT
scores to four-year colleges rose from 0.234 in 1999 to 0.281 in 2001 Column 3, reversing what appears to have been a generally downward trend. We would also like
to know whether the share of D.C. high school graduates who sent scores to four-year institutions rose following the introduction of DCTAG, but cannot calculate those
figures because we do not know the number of District residents who graduate from private high schools each year.
7
We can, however, compare the number of D.C. pub- lic
high school students sending SAT scores to four-year colleges with the number of The Journal of Human Resources
586
7. Data on high school graduation are collected from schools rather than students, and reporting by state is based on school location rather than student residence. In 1999, according to figures from the National
Center for Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data and Private School Survey, 2,675 students graduated from the D.C. public high schools and 1,231 students graduated from private high schools located in the
District. Many of the students who attend private high schools located in the District, however, are residents of Maryland or Virginia, and conversely, some D.C. residents attend private high schools located outside of
the District’s boundaries in the Maryland and Virginia suburbs. While data on both residence and school
D.C. public high school graduates. Although the demographics of the public school population differ in some important ways from those of the full population of D.C.
high school graduates, this group of students is of interest in its own right.
8
Overall, in each year from 1994 through 2001, roughly two-thirds of SAT-takers living in D.C.
attended public high schools. The number of D.C. public high school graduates tak- ing the SAT increased considerably after the implementation of DCTAG, from 957 in
1999 to 1,084 in 2001 Column 4. Although the number of students graduating from the District’s public high schools also increased over this period Column 5, the share
of District public high school graduates who took the SAT and had their scores sent to at least one four-year college increased by about 10 percent in 2000 and remained
high in 2001 Column 6, rising from 35.8 percent in 1999 to 38.6 percent in 2001.
In contrast to the experience in the District of Columbia, the number of SAT-takers actually fell in our comparison cities between 1999 and 2001, both overall Column 1 in
the bottom panel of Table 1 and among public high school students Column 4. The share of public high school graduates in the comparison cities who took the SAT declined
by about 6 percent over the same time period Column 6, from 40.2 percent in 1999 to 37.7 percent in 2001.
9
These figures suggest that the DCTAG program encouraged stu- dents who might not otherwise have done so to apply to a four-year college.
The DCTAG program might be expected to have had an even larger effect on the types
of four-year colleges to which D.C. residents apply, as it makes public colleges and universities located in other jurisdictions considerably more affordable.
10
In 1999, 47.8 percent of D.C. SAT-takers sent their scores to at least one public four-year
Maryland or Virginia school, and 73.5 percent sent their scores to at least one public four-year institution somewhere in the country not shown in table. By 2001, these
percentages had increased substantially, with 63.3 percent of D.C. SAT-takers send- ing their scores to at least one public Maryland or Virginia school, and 87.4 percent
sending their scores to at least one public institution somewhere in the country.
location are not available for the full population of D.C. students, tabulations from the SAT database can pro- vide a general sense of high school enrollment patterns. Only 72 percent of SAT-takers who live in D.C. and
attend a private high school attend a school located in the District, with 22 percent attending a Maryland high school and 5 percent a Virginia high school. Of the SAT-takers enrolled in private high schools located in the
District, just 40 percent are District residents, 42 percent are Maryland residents, and 18 percent are Virginia residents. In contrast, 98 percent of SAT-takers who live in D.C. and attend a public high school attend a
school located in the District, and 97 percent of those attending a D.C. public high school are District residents. 8. According to the National Center for Education Statistics, only 3 percent of those who graduated from
the D.C. public high schools in 1999 were white, non-Hispanic, a share that is far below the share of white, non-Hispanics in the D.C. population of high school age. Observing both the classmates of the first author’s
children, who attend D.C. public schools, and the classmates of their friends who attend various private schools, it is also apparent that the public school population is considerably less affluent on average than the
private school population. Throughout this analysis, we categorize public high school graduates separately from charter school graduates.
9. The number of high school graduates is based on district-level reports contained in the National Center for Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data. City and school district boundaries coincide for each of the
cities used in the analysis. 10. As already noted, the DCTAG program also offers a 2,500 subsidy to students who attend selected pri-
vate colleges and universities. Most of these colleges and universities—particularly those that are included because they are located in the D.C. metropolitan area, rather than because they are historically black insti-
tutions—are quite expensive, and the DCTAG subsidy is unlikely to make them affordable for someone who would have been deterred by their high tuitions in the first place.
Abraham and Clark
587
The Journal of Human Resources 588
Table 1 Number of SAT Takers as Compared with the Number of 17-Year Olds and the
Number of Public High School Graduates
Public High School SAT All SAT Takers versus
Takers versus 17-Year-Olds in Population
Public High School Graduates SAT 17-Year-
SAT Takers Olds
Ratio Takers
Graduates Ratio
1 2
3 4
5 6
District of Columbia
1994 1,481
5,499 0.269
992 3,207
0.309 1995
1,520 5,415
0.281 1,060
2,974 0.356
1996 1,448
5,604 0.258
979 2,696
0.363 1997
1,451 5,765
0.252 990
2,853 0.347
1998 1,481
5,724 0.259
1,011 2,777
0.364 1999
1,394 5,956
0.234 957
2,675 0.358
2000 1,543
5,765 0.268
1,075 2,695
0.399 2001
1,540 5,484
0.281 1,084
2,808 0.386
Comparison cities
1994 9,974
— —
6,086 —
— 1995
9,993 —
— 6,263
— —
1996 10,350
— —
6,493 —
— 1997
10,437 —
— 6,561
— —
1998 10,805
— —
6,833 15,702
0.435 1999
10,348 —
— 6,583
16,365 0.402
2000 9,831
— —
6,145 16,546
0.371 2001
9,917 —
— 6,292
16,695 0.377
Source: SAT Score Database, Census Bureau, and National Center for Education Statistics Common Core of Data, various years.
Note: The SAT database contains information on SAT-takers sending scores to four-year colleges, and includes all black and Hispanic test takers; all test takers residing in Washington, D.C.; and a 25 percent ran-
dom sample of nonblack, non-Hispanic test takers in other states. Number of SAT takers is an actual num- ber for D.C. and a weighted estimate for the comparison cities Baltimore, Newark, Norfolk, and
Philadelphia. Census Bureau population estimates are for July 1. Estimates for 1994–99 were adjusted to accord with overall growth in population measured by the 2000 Census. Population by year of age is not
available for the comparison cities. Number of public high school graduates is based on district-level data from the Common Core of Data as reported by public school schools in the relevant cities. Each city con-
tains only one regular public school district. Data on high school graduates from comparison cities are not available for 1994–97.
Abraham and Clark
589 It is possible, of course, that other factors might have contributed to the observed
increase in applications to out-of-state public institutions. Table 2 presents results from the difference-in-differences model specified in the preceding section and
designed to account for this possibility by using SAT-takers from Baltimore, Newark, Norfolk, and Philadelphia as a comparison group. The year dummy variable coeffi-
cients in these models capture the effects of any general trend influence on the propen- sity to apply to out-of-state public institutions. These models examine the propensity
of SAT-takers to send their scores to out-of-state institutions in Maryland or Virginia Columns 1 and 2 or in any state Columns 3 and 4.
11
The year dummies capture any general underlying trend in applications to qualifying schools; the coefficients on the
interactions between the year dummies and the D.C. dummy represent the effects of anything that is D.C.-specific—most notably the DCTAG program—on District stu-
dents’ application patterns. The models are fit first without any demographic controls and then with the addition of controls for a variety of demographic covariates that
might be correlated with students’ college application decisions, including the type of high school a student attends public, private, or “other,” where “other” includes char-
ter schools and home schools, and represents less than 1 percent of the sample, the student’s raceethnicity, the level of education obtained by the student’s parents, and
the student’s combined math and verbal SAT score.
No consistent trend in the likelihood a student will send SAT scores to an out-of- state public institution is apparent in the simple year dummy coefficients. The coeffi-
cients on the DC year interactions, however, tell a clear story. Both in the models without demographic controls and in the models to which those controls have been
added, the coefficient estimates for 2000 and for 2001 imply significant increases in the likelihood that a D.C. resident who took the SAT sent those scores either to a
DCTAG-eligible institution in Maryland or Virginia or to a DCTAG-eligible institu- tion anywhere in the country.
12
An important concern for education policymakers is how tuition subsidy and finan- cial aid policies will affect students from different socioeconomic backgrounds. In
Table 3 we present results from our difference-in-differences model fit separately for various subgroups. For ease of interpretation, we present only the coefficients on the
DC year interactions, which show the change in college application behavior of D.C.
residents relative to their peers in the comparison cities and conditional on the demo- graphic characteristics described above.
We begin by examining the program’s effects on public versus private high school graduates.
13
For students in the District of Columbia, whether a student attends a public
11. In the first pair of models, the dependent variable is equal to one for Maryland residents only if they applied to a DCTAG-eligible institution in Virginia, and for Virginia residents only if they applied to a
DCTAG-eligible institution in Maryland. In the second pair of models, the dependent variable is equal to one only if the student applied to a DCTAG-eligible institution outside of his or her own state. We obtain results
that are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar when Maryland and Virginia residents are excluded from the calculations. Results also are similar if the outcome variable is an indicator for whether the student
applied to a public school in a neighboring state. 12. We also estimated a simpler difference-in-differences model that includes a single dummy variable for
post-DCTAG
in place of the year dummies, and a DC post-DCTAG interaction variable in place of the DC year
interactions, and obtained similar results. 13. Charter school students are not included in this analysis of public versus private high schools, but results
are virtually identical if charter school students are included with public school students. Although the
Table 2 Determinants of Whether Students’ SAT Scores Sent to at Least One Out-of-State
Public 4-Year College or University; Difference-in-Differences Model
Maryland or Virginia College College in Any State
1 2
3 4
Constant 0.523
0.285 0.777
0.369 0.013
0.015 0.011
0.017 1995 or later
−0.019 −0.019
0.004 0.004
0.007 0.006
0.010 0.010
1996 or later 0.020
0.020 0.012
0.011 0.007
0.007 0.010
0.010 1997 or later
−0.008 −0.009
−0.016 −0.018
0.007 0.007
0.010 0.010
1998 or later −0.005
−0.003 0.010
0.014 0.007
0.006 0.010
0.010 1999 or later
−0.008 −0.010
−0.025 −0.027
0.007 0.007
0.010 0.010
2000 or later −0.001
−0.002 0.012
0.010 0.007
0.007 0.010
0.010 2001 or later
0.008 0.005
0.012 0.007
0.007 0.007
0.010 0.010
DC 1995 or later
−0.022 −0.020
−0.007 −0.005
0.019 0.019
0.018 0.018
DC 1996 or later
−0.014 −0.016
−0.029 −0.031
0.020 0.019
0.019 0.019
DC 1997 or later
0.007 0.011
0.012 0.018
0.020 0.020
0.019 0.019
DC 1998 or later
0.041 0.039
0.014 0.013
0.020 0.020
0.019 0.019
DC 1999 or later
−0.037 −0.036
−0.017 −0.016
0.020 0.020
0.019 0.019
DC 2000 or later
0.092 0.097
0.060 0.068
0.020 0.020
0.019 0.019
DC 2001 or later
0.056 0.057
0.055 0.057
0.019 0.019
0.017 0.017
State dummies yes
yes yes
yes Demographic covariates
no yes
no yes
Observations 62,415
62,415 62,415
62,415 R
-squared 0.13
0.15 0.09
0.14 DC2000-or-later plus
0.148 0.155
0.115 0.126
DC2001-or-later 0.019
0.019 0.018
0.018
Source: SAT Score Database. Note: Sample includes SAT-takers graduating from high school in 1994 through 2001, sending scores to
four-year colleges, and residing in Washington, D.C.; Baltimore, Md.; Newark, N.J.; Norfolk, Va.; or Philadelphia, Pa. Sample includes all black and Hispanic test takers; all test takers residing in Washington,
D.C.; and a 25 percent random sample of nonblack, non-Hispanic test takers in other states. All models weighted OLS regressions. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
Abraham and Clark
591 or a private high school is highly correlated with family socioeconomic status. Many
D.C. residents who graduate from private high schools expect to attend prestigious private colleges but might also consider selected public universities. Interestingly,
these students or their parents do appear to be price sensitive, at least with respect to the set of schools they will consider. Over the two-year period from 1999 to 2001,
the share of college-bound D.C. private high school SAT-takers who sent their test scores to at least one Maryland or Virginia public college rose 19.5 percentage points
the sum of the DC2000 or later and DC2001 or later coefficients, controlling for other factors that might affect college applications. The increase for college-bound
D.C. public high school SAT-takers was somewhat smaller, just 12.7 percentage points; however, the difference between the two subgroups was not statistically sig-
nificant p-value of difference = 0.118. The gap with regard to the share sending at least one application to any public university nationwide was larger and statistically
significant, a 21.0 percentage point increase for the private high school graduates as compared with an 8.8 percentage point increase for the public high school graduates
p-value of difference = 0.003.
A similar pattern emerges for white SAT-takers as compared with black SAT- takers. The coefficients shown in Columns 5 and 6 imply that, holding other factors
constant, the share of white SAT-takers applying to any Maryland or Virginia public college rose by 20.2 percentage points between 1999 and 2001, as compared with
14.2 percentage points for black SAT-takers p-value of difference = 0.234. And the coefficients in Columns 7 and 8 imply that, again holding other factors constant, the
share of white SAT-takers applying to any public college nationwide rose by 23.2 per- centage points, as compared with 10.3 percentage points for blacks p-value of dif-
ference = 0.013.
The program also appears to have a differential effect on students according to the educational attainment of their parents. Holding other factors constant, among SAT-
takers with a parent who attended college, the share sending their scores to at least one Maryland or Virginia public college rose by 17.6 percentage points between 1999
and 2001, as compared with 8.2 percentage points for those whose parents completed no education beyond high school p-value of difference = 0.022. The comparable fig-
ures for applications to any public college nationwide are similar, showing an increase of 14.9 percentage points for those who had at least one parent who attended college,
as compared with an increase of 4.5 percentage points for those whose parents never went beyond high school p-value of difference = 0.004.
Differences between D.C. SAT-takers with above-average and below-average SAT scores are somewhat less marked. In the college-bound group with combined math
and verbal scores above 1000, the share who sent at least one application to a public Maryland or Virginia school rose 17.1 percentage points between 1999 and 2001, as
compared with an increase of 13.8 percentage points among those with combined scores of 1000 or less, but the difference is not statistically significant. The share
District of Columbia has among the highest charter school enrollment of any state, during the time period of our analysis, charter school students constituted less than 1 percent of D.C. SAT-takers. Charter school
enrollment has grown over time, but even among the 2001 cohort, only 4 percent of D.C. SAT-takers were enrolled in a charter school.
applying to at least one public college nationwide rose 16.6 percentage points among those with combined scores above 1000, as compared with 9.6 percentage points
among those with lower combined scores p-value of difference = 0.077. Overall, the results from Table 3 suggest that DCTAG had a greater impact on the
probability of applying to at least one eligible four-year colleges among students from more advantaged backgrounds. One reason for this may be that these students were
less likely to have considered public colleges and universities prior to DCTAG, mean- ing that there was more scope for the program to have altered their application behav-
ior. In 1998, only 65.4 percent of D.C. SAT-takers from private high schools sent their scores to one or more public colleges or universities, compared with 81.2 percent of
D.C. SAT-takers from public high schools, and there were similar differences in the pre-DCTAG application behavior of white as compared with black SAT-takers, SAT-
takers with college-educated parents as compared with those whose parents had not attended college, and SAT-takers with above-average as compared with below-
average test scores. In interpreting our results, it also is important to keep in mind that the SAT data allow us to look only at applications to four-year colleges and universi-
ties. It is possible that DCTAG had an equal or greater impact on the likelihood that students from less advantaged backgrounds applied to any eligible two- or four-year
institution. Although we cannot examine applications to two-year colleges with the SAT data, we will examine enrollments at these institutions in our analysis of the
IPEDS data.
A related question is how DCTAG affected the selectivity of colleges to which students apply. Does the program, for example, encourage students who otherwise
would have applied only to top-tier four-year private colleges instead to apply to eli- gible lower-tier public four-year colleges? We examine this question in various
ways in Table 4. In 1999, before DCTAG took effect, 55.1 percent of D.C. SAT- takers sent their scores to at least one top-tier school, as identified based on the U.S.
News and World Report rankings. On average, these students sent their scores to 1.71 top-tier schools and 4.00 lower-tier schools. As shown in the first column of
Table 4, DCTAG appears to have had no effect on the probability that SAT-takers sent their scores to at least one top-tier college, which remained fairly constant over
this period. DCTAG also appears to have had no effect on the average number of top-tier colleges to which D.C. residents applied Column 2; the increase in the
average number of total applications between 2000 and 2001 appears to have been driven almost entirely by a 0.262 increase in the average number of applications to
lower-tier schools Column 3. DCTAG slightly decreased the fraction of total scores students sent to top-tier colleges, although this change is not statistically sig-
nificant Column 4.
In sum, DCTAG appears to have increased the number of students applying to four- year colleges and universities; increased the likelihood that college-bound students
applied to DCTAG-eligible four-year colleges and universities; and increased the number of applications to less selective colleges, while not significantly decreasing
the number of applications to top-tier colleges. It also appears to have had a greater effect on the college application decisions of students from more advantaged back-
grounds. Although DCTAG affected where students applied, however, it may not have affected whether or where they actually enrolled. To examine this question, we turn
next to a discussion of DCTAG’s effects on college enrollment. The Journal of Human Resources
592
B. DCTAG’s Effect on College Enrollments
