Conceptual Framework of Marriage and Divorce

disability. In the United States, nearly one-fifth of male heads-of-household between the ages of 22 and 64 report being disabled Meyer and Mok 2008, yet the economic welfare of the disabled is one of the most understudied topics in labor economics Burkhauser, Moffit, and Scholz 2010. Ostensibly, marriage is intended to insure against disabilities, as couples often vow to remain together “in sickness and in health.” But if a disability is unanticipated, or has a large effect on marital value, then a disability may precipitate divorce. The main data come from topical module two of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, panel years 1990 through 1996. These data contain retro- spective information on marriage, divorce, and disability onset. The SIPP data are matched to administrative data on longitudinal earnings, maintained by the Social Security Administration. The administrative data, named the Detailed Earnings Rec- ord, are useful to examine the longitudinal effect of disability on earnings. The study focuses on shocks to males, similar to most economic studies on marital instability, though the results for females are briefly discussed. Using event-study methods, the results show that the effect of disability onset on divorce is greatest among males who experience a work-preventing, rather than a work-limiting, disability. Moreover, the effect of a work-preventing disability is greatest among males who are younger and more educated. The results are robust to controls for the type of disabling condition, which is shown to vary by age and education. The results are consistent with the proposed model of disability and di- vorce, as the young and educated have greater expected earnings, longer remaining work-years, and a lower incidence of disability onset. To suggest that the results are not driven by reverse causation, they are compared to a recent study on divorce and mental stress. The results differ from those of Charles and Stephens 2004, who find no asso- ciation between disability onset and divorce. The difference in findings may reflect that Charles and Stephens, using the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, measure the effect of disability on divorce across all marriages, regardless of disability se- verity. 1 A similar result occurs when using the SIPP: When the effect of any dis- ability is estimated among the full sample, regardless of severity, the result is sta- tistically insignificant not shown. Thus, this study suggests that measuring the effects of shocks on divorce at the population level may obscure heterogeneous effects at sublevels, especially if the shocks occur predominately among those whose divorce decisions change the least; in this case, disability onset among the aged. This study shows that disability not only affects divorce in some cases, but does in a manner consistent with theory.

II. Background

A. Conceptual Framework of Marriage and Divorce

The conceptual framework of marriage and divorce is developed respectively by Becker 1974 and Becker, Landes, and Michael 1977. According to Becker, mar- 1. Charles and Stephens also examine heterogeneous effects by marriage tenure but find no statistically significant effects. riage occurs if the joint benefit of marriage exceeds the joint benefit of remaining single. The proposition is premised on the notion that welfare is transferable between spouses. If the welfare of each partner increases independently upon marriage, then both partners agree to marry without the need for transfers. If the welfare of one partner declines, then one partner can transfer welfare to the other such that both partners agree to marry. This framework lends to the prevailing model of marital instability: Divorce occurs when the combined benefit of separating exceeds the combined benefit of remaining married. From these models, Becker, Landes, and Michael 1977 raise an important ques- tion: What factors determine the gains from marriage to explain the observed patterns of divorce? The authors discuss two factors. The first factor is initial match quality. Intuitively, a union between any two individuals yields a level of match quality, and only couples whose quality surpasses a specific threshold will result in marriage. However, this threshold declines as search costs to finding a mate increase or traits for a successful match become harder to find. Lower-quality marriages, in turn, are more susceptible to divorce. The second factor is that the value of marriage is dynamic and uncertain, so individuals must rely on expectations of value when deciding to marry. Over time, however, the expected value of marriage may deviate from the realized value. These deviations, referred to as “shocks” in the literature, affect the value of marriage and the value of outside alternatives such that any shock—for better or for worse—increases the likelihood of divorce.

B. Disability and Divorce