Gray’s RM A Life-Cycle in Indonesia: Constraints and Limitation

This paper explains how the Colin Gray theory in steps in implementation of RMA in a state is. Indonesia as one of the core nation in South-East Asia, and have the influence in the past, was able to push its armed forces modernization by implementing RMA. This paper also will see how to face limitation and constraints in Indonesia based on Grays RMA Life-Cycle Theory.

II. Gray’s RM A Life-Cycle in Indonesia: Constraints and Limitation

The desire to modernize the armed forces has not yet become the government’s priority for the last ten years, especially after Soeharto and the New Order Regime collapsed. The government is still busy with democracy consolidation in building an effective political position, and bringing the armed forces as an instrument of defence so they shall no longer got mixed up with various non-defence activities, which have been carried out for the last forty years 6 . The problems of military reform in Indonesia for the last ten years is how Indonesia military really leave their interferences in social, politics, and economics field. There are doubts, since the character and culture of the institution of civil government in making the reform of Armed Forces walk tardily. This matter is marked by letting the military reform in Indonesia to be carried out by military leaders, while the government and parliament only giving fringes and hoping the process runs better 7 . At political area, Indonesia Armed Forces still involve indirectly and directly in practical, at the national and local level. The indirect involvement of military in politics is marked by the effort to push Generals with good potency and character as a candidate in national and local elections, as Parliament members or regional leaders. Even, the number is qualitatively and quantitative decreasing, but some successes are recorded. One example is Major General Prijanto as Deputy Governor of Jakarta. He won the election last year 8 . Example of indirect involvement is at the influence of various policies related to state regulation in social, economic, and also the unsolved problems of military business until this time. This condition makes the effort to develop the professional Indonesia military tends to be pursued, whereas equivocation of Generals in Armed Forces concerning disinclination delivers the business asset managed in the form of institution, co-operation, limited liability, is striving internal TNI so that it can fulfill prosperity of soldiers, due to the limited state budget for defence. Another is that of the business management also gives 6 For more explanation see Terence Lee.” The Nature and Future of Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia” Asia Survey, Vol. 40, No.4 Jul-Aug, 2000, see also Sebastian, Leonard C. 2006. Realpolitik: Indonesia’ s Use of Military Force . Singapore: ISEAS. Especially in Chapter V. 7 See Mietzner. Op. cit. p. 12. See also Muradi. 2006. Berpijak Di atas Bara: Kegamangan Politik TNI di M asa Transisi [Difficult to Steps: The Re-Orientation of Political Policy of Indonesia Armed Force During Democratic Transition]. Bandung: University Padjadjaran Press. Especially Chapter IV. 8 See “ Fauzi Takes Lead in Jakarta Election Quick Count” http: old.thejakartapost.com election index.php?menu=storiesdetail=112 accessed May 17, 2008 advantage and prosperity for society around the housing for soldiers. It is assumed that there is social effectiveness at the management level of military business 9 . Based on the problems, in fact, there were a few free tests to see the steps of implementation of Gray’s RMA. This matter is caused by em pirical difficulties to assure that steps can be fulfilled by Indonesia military in adopting RMA. More than anything else, Gray assures that history have noted that the effective military strategy is not yet suitable to adopt RMA 10 . It means that Indonesian military’s steps to disband Fast Response Unit will face a long path. Colin S. Gray offers nine steps to implement and adopt RMA in a state 11 . The nine steps are: Preparation, Recognition of Challenge, Parentage, Enabling Spark, Strategic Moment, Institutional Agencies, Execution and Evolving, and Feedback and Adjustment. Gray highlights that steps might possibly take place concurrently, might possibly overlap each other, or also on the contrary, during and at the different periods 12 . However, author tries to build stages according to the sequences to see how Indonesia military probability in implementation and adaptation of RMA as follows. First is Preparation. Gray describes preparation as an early step that does not plan but emitted the prerequisites of military to start the implementation and adaptation of RMA. Gray also affirms that the preparation phase can happen in the middle of the process, at an early stage, or even it may take a long time during the implementation of RMA. In Indonesia contextual steps, as Gray stated, can be found. The moment military officers of Indonesia release sixteen points as positive response to demand for Armed Forces as professional institution 13 . Starting points of the process to be professional army is the integrated part in planning step. TNI commits to release the Dual Function concept, leave practical political arena and parliament, return all military business assets to the government, and focus on the duty in defence affairs. This phase is also caught up by the change in military doctrine 14 , The White Paper of 9 See Muradi ed. 2007. Metamorfosis Bisnis Militer: Sebaran Bisnis TNI Pasca UU TNI Diterbitkan [The Metamorph of Military Business in Indonesia: The Condition of Business of Indonesia Armed Force after Issued of Law No. 34 2004]. Jakarta: FES – The RIDEP Institute. Pp. 23-29 10 See Gray, Colin S. 2002. Strategy for Chaos: Revolutionary in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History . London: Frank Cass. p. 72. 11 Gray. Ibid. pp. 75-83 12 Gray. Ibid. p. 75 13 See Banyu Perwita. 2004. Security Sector Reform in Indonesia: The Case of Indonesia’s Defence White Paper’s 2003. http: www.ssronline.org jofssm issues jofssm_0204_perwita.pdf?CFID=718840CFTOKEN =18545920 accessed May 18, 2008 see also, Andi Widjajanto 2007. “ Separatism, Terrorism Remains Indonesia’s Major Treaths” http: old.thejakartapost.com Outlook pol07b.asp accessed May 18, 2008 14 See “ TNI RemainsPowerful, No Headway to Reform” http: www.thejakartapost.com news 2002 10 04 tni-remains-powerful-no-headway- reforms.html accessed May, 18 2008 see also “ Goal for Indonesian Military Reform and Element of A US Engagement Strategy” http: rand.org pubs monograph_reports MR1599 MR1599.ch13.pdf accessed May, 18, 2008 Defence and various soft ware’s and prerequisites of professional military 15 . The mentioned items are also assured by the separation of Indonesia Police from Armed Forces in 1999 and stipulated in Law by 2000. The reform of the armed forces is at issued of Law No.3 2002 on State Defense, and Law No. 34 2004 on Indonesia Armed Forces. Both Laws become corridor for armed forces in experiencing the transformation process from conventional to professional military. The defence budget in ten years also increased up to 300 compared to defence budget during the period of Soeharto. Still, the defence budget of Indonesia military only met requirements for operation, routine posts, and weapon maintenance. The defence budget only meets 40 of all requirements; the rest is fulfilled by leaders of the Indonesian Armed Forces through business 16 . Second, the recognition of challenge. The challenge is obvious and the Indonesian existence does not cover security regions by armed forces, especially at the borders and against non-conventional crimes. In the last ten years, Indonesia has lost some territory due to poor monitoring and control, especially at the borders. Island of Sipadan and Ligitan, are finally controlled by Malaysia because of Indonesia Government was poor control on both islands 17 . Besides that, the friction between Indonesia and Malaysia also happened at the borderlines of Borneo Kalimantan 18 , and the effort of Malaysia to control Ambalat Island also becomes separated problems 19 . Not to mention intercontinental geopolitical position of Indonesia has become crossed; a position that causes various threats to the sovereignty, from illegal fishing to sea piracy, and many others. Based on the perspective of the existence of challenge, Indonesia have to respond to various challenges by modernizing the armed forces, as China did after the Korea war due to the United States’ domination in East Asia and the emerging Japan strength. After the war, Korea was divided in two and the new island country Taiwan asked for weapon supply from United States for almost 40 years. The fall of Soviet Union has also made United States as the single super power in the world. 15 See “ Legislators Blame Juwono for Slow TNI Reform” http: old.thejakartapost.com detailweekly.asp?fileid=20060707.01accessed May 18, 2008 16 See “ Modernization of Indonesia’s Military inQuestion” http: www.thejakartapost.com news 2008 02 29 modernization-indonesia039s-military- question.html accessed, May, 18 2008 17 See “ Lessons to Learn from Sipadan Ligitan” http: www.thejakartapost.com news 2002 12 26 lessons-learn-sipadanligitan.html accessed May, 18 2008 18 See “ West Kalimantan as ‘Border Area’: A Political-Demography Persfective” http: melayuonline.com article ?a=SkptL1U5bWh1MGY3D= accessed May, 18 2008 19 See “ Legislators Criticize Juwono Over Ambalat Disclosure” http: www.thejakartapost.com news 2005 03 30 legislators-criticize-juwono-over-ambalat- disclosure.html accessed May, 18 2008 see also “ RI Vows Diplomacy in Ambalat Row” http: www.thejakartapost.com news 2005 03 05 ri-vows-diplomacy-ambalat-row.html accessed May, 18 2008 However, in reality, the existence of challenges cannot be responded fully by modernizing the armed forces. The limited defence budget and also economic crisis are real problems and make the government leave the focus on modernizing the armed forces, and focus on bureaucracy and economic reforms instead. It is assumed that the mismanagement of the state caused the economic crisis. Although there is an increase in defence budget, the condition of equipments of operation budget is not increasing. In fact, the requirement of military equipments, in the end, met by cannibalism with similar equipments, especially before Soeharto stepped down. Indonesia was hit by embargo of military training and weapons. So that, in the end the improvement of various weapons cannot be done 20 . Meanwhile, strategic industry like PT. Dirgantara Indonesia, PT. PAL, PT. Pindad, PT. Dahana, PT. LEN, PT. Karakatau Steel and others cannot meet requirements of modern weapons because of poor capital and limited human resources 21 . Table 1 Defense Offset Programs in Indonesia’s Strategic Industries No. Project Partners A pproval Offset M odel Status 1. Helicopter BO - 105 MBB West Germany - IPTN 1976 Licensed Program Implemented 2. C-212 Aircraft CASA – IPTN 1976 Licensed Program Implemented 3. Sera-D Rocket Aerlikon Swiss - IPTN 1976 Licensed Program Implemented 4. FFAR 2.75Rocket F.Z. Belgium - IPTN 1976 Licensed Program Implemented 5. SUT Torpedo AEG Telefunken - IPTN 1976 Licensed Program Implemented 6. Helicopter Puma SA-330 Aerospatiale - IPTN 1977 Co production Implemented 7. Super Puma AS- 332 Aerospatiale-IPTN 1977 co production Implemented 8. CN-235 Aircraft CASA-IPTN 1979 Co production Implemented 9. FPB 57 Friedrich Luerssen Weift FLW-PT. PAL 1979 Licensed Implemented 10. FPB 28 FLW-Belgium Shipbuilding Company- PT. PA L 1979 Co production Implemented 11. Helicopter Bell 412 Bell Helicopter Textron BHT-IPTN 1982 Licensed Implemented 12. Helicopter BK - 117 BHT-Kawasaki-IPTN 1982 Licensed Implemented 13 Small Weapons FNC Fabrique NationaleHerstal FNH, Belgium - PT. PINDAD 1983 Licensed Implemented 14. Rear of F-16 General Dynamics Lockheed 1986 Co development Implemented 20 See “ Machfud M.D:’Hanya Cukup Untuk Perawatan’ [Mahfud M.D: ‘Defense Budget, Only Enough for Maintanance] http: www.inilah.com berita.php?id=10704 accessed May, 19 2008 21 See “ Politicking Behind Karakatau Steel’s Planned Sale” http: www.thejakartapost.com news 2008 05 14 the-politicking-behind-krakatau- steel039s-planned-sale.html accessed May 19, 2008 see also “ State Airplane Producer DI Wins European Award for Best Suplier” http: www.thejakartapost.com news 2008 03 13 state- airplane-producer-di-wins-european-award-best-supplier.html accessed May, 18 2008, “ Indonesia to Have 40 Corvettes by 2015” http: www.thejakartapost.com news 2007 09 01 indonesia-have-40-corvettes-2015.html-0 accessed May, 19 2008 Martin-IPTN 15. Wing and suitcase of Boeing 737 Boeing-IPTN 1996 Licensed Implemented 16 Tank Scorpion Alvis Vehicle Limited, British- PT. PINDAD 1995 Lisenced to assembling retrofit Implemented 17. AMRAI Assembling GE-Boeing-IPTN 1996 Assembly co development Implemented, but no operated since 1998,because economic crisis 18. Corvette Sigma Schelde Naval Shipbuilding-PT. PAL 2003 Co production No-implemented 19. National Corvette Orizzonte Sistem Naval Italian Navy Corvette- PT. PA L 2003 Co development Implemented 20. Warship LPD Daewoo International - PT. PA L 2005 Co production Implemented 21. Guided Rocket COSTIND PRC -PT. PINDAD 2006 Co development Running 22. Small Medium Weapons COSTIND PRC -PT. PINDAD 2006 Co production Running 23. - FSMTC-DoD 2006 - Running- Russia Govt gave US 1Billion to supported technology transfer and defense procurement. Indonesia Govt as decided use US 850 Million to defense procurement and the rest of money will use to technology transfer in offset mechanism. 24. Armored Vehicle Hyundai-PT PINDAD 2004 Co production Running 25. Submarine DAPA South Korea - DoD Not yet approved - - 26. Armored Vehicle, Helicopter India Govt -PT. PINDAD-PT. DI Not yet approved - - 27. Combat-plane, Warship, Armored Vehicle Spain Govt-PT PAL-PT PINDAD-PT DI Not yet approved - - Source: Various sources Third, Parentage. Indonesia had figures of Presidents who were greatly concerned to the armed forces. For example, Soekarno with his capability assured Soviet Union of supply and developing the Indonesia military as one of the strongest military in Asia and Pacific. Soeharto, although could not build a strong military force, was respected in the context of the South-East Asian region, at least when compared to the recent leaders. Presidents Habibie, Abdurachman Wahid, and Megawati, were not strong enough to keep this nation as a powerful state in South East Asia. Megawati even developed See the East policy just like Soekarno did, by exploiting defence technology from Russia and Eastern European countries. However, the trade level was poor because the offer of product trading system between weapons and natural products owned by Indonesia, did not give profit for the manufacturing state 22 . The purchase of Sukhoi for example, is not equipped by adequate equipment and technicians. Once it is damaged, the fighter plane cannot be used 23 . The expectation grows when Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono SBY, a former four star general, won the Presidential election in 2004. The figure of SBY and the election make SBY as the legitimated strength to get support from the Indonesian Armed Forces. However, the main idea of parentage step, as depicted by Gray is not found at his presidency. Support from the parliament is also divided into two between the supporting faction and opposition. It is not strange then that SBY cannot develop the reinforcement and transformation in the armed forces due to limitation of budget and support. The test is obvious when Malaysia tries to occupy coral islands of Ambalat, known for natural gas contents. Warships of Indonesia Navy were commissioned to take care of the archipelago. They could only chase the Malaysian warship and crash the prow to the Malaysia ship. Actually the step is effective, because the Malaysian warship finally retreat from the area, but most Indonesian people know that the collision with Malaysia warship is caused by no weapons and ammunition in Indonesia warship 24 . Fourth, enabling spark. Based on descriptions in the third step, after Soekarno and Soeharto, the effort to develop defence system, and armed forces is only just found. After Soeharto stepped down, figure leaders in Indonesia concern in modernizing armed forces. In the last era, Soekarno did not take a fancy to military circle at the time, but maintain the trust of armed forces by developing armed forces as a response of Indonesia’s geopolitical position and threat from Malaysia and Australia as ally of the UK. They were considered as a threat for Indonesia. Despite that, the desires to start the war with the Netherlands concerning Papua become a statement for Soekarno’s efforts to modernize the armed forces 25 . On the contrary, Soeharto was not highly motivated to modernize armed forces; Soeharto took care of sovereignty of the state, by giving a role on territorial defence system, which provides more space for the Army. Although it is opposed by many sides, the step was proven 22 See “ Indonesia to Buy Six Sukhoi Jets: Rusia” and also “ Indonesian Force to Acquire 1Bn Dollars-Worth of Russian Equipment” http: www.etan.org et2007 august 25 21ri2buy.htmAir20forces accessed May, 19 2008 see also Widjajanto, Andi. Makmur Keliat. 2006. Ekonomi Pertahanan Indonesia. [Indonesia’s Defense Economic]. Jakarta: INFID – Pacivis. Especially in Chapter 3. 23 See “ Tahun Depan TNI AU Akan Lengkapi Persenjataan Sukhoi” [Sukhoi will compeletely armed by Indonesia’s Air Force] http: www.gatra.com artikel.php?id=32867pil=23 accessed May, 19 2008 24 See “ TNI Commander: Number of Warships in Ambalat Not Reduced” http: www.tempointeraktif.com hg nasional 2005 04 26 brk,20050426-03,uk.html accessed May, 19 2008 25 See Herbert Feith. Op.cit. p. 990 effective to guard every area of Indonesia against foreign claim and domination 26 . At periods after Soeharto, the political leadership in Indonesia is not sturdy, even tends to drop and happened during period of Habibie and Abdurachman Wahid. Although in Gray’s perspective, leadership of a strong political figure will guarantee implementation and adoption of RMA by the state. These weaknesses make Indonesia as one of the biggest archipelagic country with big population but vulnerable against foreign military because of its weak armed forces. President Susilo is now also beginning to do a charming disperses of approaches which are not balmy among army 27 . Fifth, Strategic Moment. Indonesia experiences this step nicely. This means that strategic momentum happened almost every 30 years. The first strategic moment was when Soekarno stepped down from his presidency and released his power to military, in this case Soeharto. However, the momentum was not improved because Soeharto and New Order regime developed political and economic stability and also arrested kingpins of unsuccessful communist coup in 1948 and 1965. The problem then became complicated when Soeharto preferred military leaders as leaders in the region. Indonesia military leaders then enjoy multi task and function as part of the implementation of Nasution’s “ Middle Way’, which is formulated as a “ Dual Function” of TNI 28 . After thirty two years, Soeharto stepped down from his power in 1998. Politicians then instructed TNI to be a professional institution. This step was relatively running, but at selected phase it faces constraints. Various efforts to push professionalism in Indonesia Armed Forces were responded to, but the main idea of professionalism is still not yet fully adopted by armed forces. One of them is the handover of military business to the government and the territory defence system which puts Army as the front guard compare to Navy and Air Force 29 . The reason is very simple, because state cannot meet requirements for military budget and poor weapon system due to embargo. Besides that, the control and oversight of Parliament and executive are not running properly. The analogy is, after 10 years of reform, the armed forces have become the hard iron. It shall no longer easily form hot iron like ten years ago. Then, the strategic momentum might possibly be created by pushing accomplishment to various requirements, especially related to operation and prosperity. This one means to develop defence information technology as core of change of conventional to the professional military. 26 See Harold Crouch. “ Military Politics Under Indonesia’sNew Order” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 45.No. 2 Summer, 1972. Univ. British Columbia. pp. 202-219. 27 See “ Progress Slow in Indonesia’s Democratic Transition Says Gus Dur” http: www.wahidinstitute.org pictures 200708 PS.htm accessed May, 19 2008 28 See Ulf Sundhaussen “ Indonesia’s New Order: A Model for Myanmar?” Asian Survey, Vol.35.No. 8 Aug, 1995 University of California Press. pp. 778-780 29 See “ Security Sector Reform in Indonesia” http: www.bicc.de ssr_gtz pdf indonesia.pdf accessed May 19 2008 see also “ From Canberra to Jakarta: Reforming the Military” http: www.thejakartapost.com news 2008 04 01 from-canberra-jakarta-reforming- military.html accessed May, 19 2008 Sixth, Institutional Agency. There are efforts to develop the Indonesia military as professional military and implementation of RMA. For example, the existence of strategic industries like PT.PAL for the Navy, PT. Pindad for the Army, PT. DI for the Air Force, PT. Dahana for explosive requirements, PT. LEN for network, communications, and electronic warfare. Ministry of Defense and Headquarter of TNI also have to follow the path as expected in instructing armed forces to be professional institution, while the executive and parliament, with all limitations, should have same desire to develop professionalism in the armed forces. The commitment is assured with strategic steps and supports every step development of armed forces. The limitation is still in budget support to meet various requirement and expectation of armed forces. Even during the last ten years the budget of Indonesia military increase to 300 , but it only meets 40 of all requirements or less than 1 of Indonesia GDP 30 . The situation, in the end, let armed forces to have initiative in certain steps in fulfilling requirements and operation. Still, based on approaches of steps by Gray, the sixth step can be told fulfill the prerequisites raised by Gray as part of process for implementation RMA in Indonesia. However, the note is this institution must also develop the military culture. Meaning, the military culture in armed forces is important, so that professionalism can be placed forward, including the implementation process of RMA 31 . Seventh, instruments. At this step, Indonesia armed forces have become available. The change of organization affect the role and duty to focus at defence area only by reducing primal structure from Armed Forces, Head of Social and Political Affair and Head of Territory Commander. Despitefully, the strive to develop military concept as professional become the governmental principal, one of them is by altering the paradigm concerning state law to support the leadership. Military leaders shall no longer starve for power of politics, but deliver power to civil politician by esteeming the democracy mechanism 32 . Based on the doctrine, armed forces still adopts the pattern of total people defense system with guerrilla approaches due to limitation of military equipments, rather than developing pattern of effective coordination. The new doctrine replaces the old doctrine of Catur Dharma Eka Karma Cadek meaning Four Nobel Works for A Great Purpose into Tri Dharma Eka Karma Tridek meaning Three Nobel Works for A Great Purpose 33 . The training pattern of 30 See “ Official Renews Call for Increased Defense Budget” http: www.thejakartapost.com news 2007 11 02 official-renews-calls-increased-defense- budget.html-0 accessed May, 19 2008 31 See “ Gareth Evans: Indonesia’s Military Culture has to be Reformed” http: www.etan.org et2001c july 22-28 23us-i.htm accessed May, 19 2008 32 See “ DPR: TNI Tidak Boleh Berpolitik Praktis, Tapi Punya Hak Pilih” [Legislators: Practicing in Politic is prohibit for Indonesia’s Armed Force, but still have Political Right to choose in Election] http: www.antara.co.id arc 2007 9 20 dpr-tni-tidak-boleh-berpolitik-praktis-tapi- punya-hak-pilih accessed May 19 2008 33 See “ Doktrin TNI, Dari Catur Dhrama ke Tri Dharma” [Indonesia’s Armed Force Doctrine, From Catur Dharma to Tri Dharma] http: www.sinarharapan.co.id berita 0701 29 nas07.html accessed May, 19 2008 members of armed forces shall no longer be instructed to be political and enter the social politic area, but on how to develop professionalism in the institution 34 . Eighth, Execution and Evolvement. This step is not yet fulfilled by Indonesia. The release of Indonesia Armed Forces from non defence activities and trust from government to arrange and control regulation can develop professional institution as prerequisites for implementation of better. Some examples depict that armed forces cannot yet realize their demand to release control of military business and territory command as relevant problems of armed forces in responding changes. This condition becomes difficult for armed forces, since the expected prerequisites cannot yet be fulfilled by government, such as budget. The difficulty faced in realizing professionalism with limited budget is to develop character among officers, soldiers, and inside the institution. Level of professionalism is also stacked by the military culture as the valid owner of the Republic based on historical rights as the institution is highly active in independence wars. So, that effort disrupts the existence of the Republic, in many forms, where armed forces do various direct and indirect resistances. One example of resistance from armed forces is in the period of Soekarno and Abdurachman Wahid, where political movements at the time were supported by armed forces. Ninth, feedback and adjustment. At this step, Gray emphasizes that it is not the part of action and reaction of RMA process. This step is focused on positive existence of both sides of TNI as institution related to professionalism process and adoption of RMA. Despite efforts of adjustment from the part of the TNI to various changes systematically. At least related to the reform process, the armed force is the symbol of professional soldier. Based on the last 10 years of process, the mutual effort of armed forces and adjustment of role and function which is focused on defence is better 35 . Both sides and adjustment of new role and function is not yet felt by society. It means, there are still doubts from the internal part of the armed forces and government to support the fundamental change of armed forces, related with anew role and function 36 . These matters have implications on the relation between civil-military in Indonesia which is not yet effective. In general, civil and military groups adjust themselves due to slow reform of the armed forces, even tends to step out of the roadmap. Nonetheless, the reality cannot be argued that civil politicians tend to 34 See “ TNI AL Tambah 40 Prajurit Kopaska dan Taifib” [Indonesia’s Navy Added 40 Soldiers for Navy Special Force] http: www.antara.co.id arc 2007 9 21 tni-al-tambah-40-prajurit- kopaska-dan-taifib accessed May 19 2008 35 See “ Kasad: Reformasi TNI Belum Tercapai” [Chief of Indonesia’s Army: Army Reforms is not Finish Yet] http: www.tempointeraktif.com hg nasional 2008 01 14 brk,20080114- 115408,id.html accessed May, 20 2008 36 See “ Veteran di Aceh: Bina Kepercayaan Dalam Menjaga Damai” [MilitaryVeteran in Aceh: Keep in a Peace] http: www.tempointeraktif.com hg nusa sumatera 2005 11 10 brk,20051110- 69038,id.html accessed May, 20 2008 become a determinant factor to interrupt the reform process in the armed forces, simply by the example when President Abdurachman Wahid was toppled from Presidency, that shall be deemed to have impinged the constitution, the armed forces was entangled by civil politician but they did not support the Presidential Promulgated Decree. Based on nine steps suggested by Gray in implementation and adaptation, Indonesia has just fulfill four steps with various notes and not fully implemented the RMA as Gray intended. The limitation faced by armed forces becomes serious part of decomp osing problems of unprepared i n implementation and adaptation of RMA. The limitation is for example, first , TNI is a typology of third world military institution, where they always rely on history rights during war for independence, so they can involve highly and also in a passive way for the good and bad of the nation. So that, when the armed forces is rammed with reality that professionalism is a step to implement RMA, there is doubt in the armed forces to metamorphose as a professional institution. Because the commitment of the government of Indonesia cannot assure the military elite to soon possibly become professional armed forces 37 . Second , TNI is always proud with guerrilla war tactic during the early years of independence and also doctrine of total war 38 . Because those are concepts used to defend the independence. TNI believes that both concepts are still relevant with current situations. The pride of the army has become demand to differ the role of defence compare to navy and air force in order of balance. The pride is legitimated by the condition of states finance of being unable to develop defense system, due to limited budget. Third , limited defence budget. As the biggest state in South-East Asia, Indonesia has the smallest defence budget compared to Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, and the Philippines. The budget defence of Indonesia for 2008 is Rp. 33,7 Trilyun, or only US 3,5 billion, less than 1 of Indonesia GDP 39 . Unavailability of policy and facility to support the RMA implementation and adaptation in Indonesia is because of the ability of state in supporting the availability of supporting facilities. The limited defence budget, where government only fulfills less than 40 requirements of the budget is 37 See “ Reformasi TNI Di Mata SBY” [Indonesia’s Armed Forces Reform in SBY Persfectives] http: www.jurnalnasional.com index.php?med=Koran20Hariansec=Opinirbrk=Surat 20Pembacaid=33197 accessed May, 20 2008 38 See “ Kasad Baru dan Komponen Cadangan” [Reserves Component and New Chief Army] http: www.sinarharapan.co.id berita 0712 07 opi01.html accessed May, 20 2008 see also Eddy Prasetyono. “ Strategi Pertahanan,Dimensi Militer dan Doktrin” [Defense Strategy, Doctrine and Military Dimensions] http: www.propatria.or.id download Paper20Diskusi strategi_Pertahanan_militer_dokrin _ep.pdf accessed May, 20 2008 39 See “ Menteri Juwono, Anggaran Pertahanan 2008 TidakDipotong” [Ministry Juwono, 2008’s Defense Budget Does not Cut by Ministry of Finance] http: www.tempointeraktif.com hg nasional 2007 08 17 brk,20070817-105789,id.html accessed May, 20 2008 raised by Ministry of Defense and armed forces 40 . It is not strange if within the next 50 years, Indonesia still use the territory defence system, neglecting the potency of sea and air. It means, once the enemy enters the Indonesia Island, they will face guerrilla tactic, which was working during the independence war. The guerrilla doctrine implemented by armed forces, is not an indication that Indonesia does not wish to implement RMA in military, but the strength of military culture and low budget has made armed forces focus only at the reality. The focus is to guard the sovereignty of state by might and main, with equipments combat are patch up and limited 41 . Fourth, the existence of strategic industries in Indonesia is an advantage for armed forces because they will be able to meet requirements of combat equipments and supporting miscellaneous. However, there is no budget, raw materials, and quality human resources that make strategic industries cannot fulfill requirements of specific appliances of better weapons 42 . The strategic industries this time carry out non-military orders, which is easier to be fulfilled and using not too difficult technology compare to fulfill requirements of military equipments. So, the transformation of defence based on information and technology in Indonesia is not yet started. This matter is based on condition of equipments of Indonesia military which still use appliances made in 1960s and early 1970s 43 . Despite that, it should also be comprehended that besides mentioning limitations, theoretically, the steps on the market by Gray is precisely tested with nations with an onward phase, like nations in North and East Europe with modern political stability, nations in East Asian minus North Korea. It means, based on approaches of military professionalism of a state, Indonesia becomes one of the state not in Gray’s qualification. This means, RMA as a next step of military professionalism is not yet realized by the government of Indonesia and its armed forces in the near future. It requires at least 50 years to develop steps described by Gray, with assumption that the armed forces require 25 years to build professional institutions and another 25 years to fulfill the criteria of nine steps of RMA. 40 See “ SBY Minta TNI Hemat” [SBY Asked Indonesia’s Armed Force to Save the Budget] http: batampos.co.id edisi-harian berita-utama sby-minta-tni-hemat.html accessed May, 20 2008 41 See “ TNI Harus Solid Menjaga Keutuhan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia” [Indonesia’s Armed Forces Must be Solid to Keep and protect the United of Republik Indonesia] http: www.tni.mil.id patriotweb ?action=NewsDetailid=53catid=91ed=7 accessed May, 20 2008 42 See “ DPR Akan Panggil Agen Pembeli Heli Mi-17” [Lawmakers will Invite the Copter Mi-17 Buyer Agent] http: www.tempointeraktif.com hg nasional 2004 02 03 brk,20040203- 35,id.html accessed May, 20 2008 43 See “ TNI Siap Kandangkan Alutsista Tua” [Indonesia’s Armed Forces is Ready to Grounded old Military Equipment] http: www.antara.co.id arc 2008 2 4 tni-siap-kandangkan- alutsista-tua accessed May, 20 2008

III. Conclusion