Univocal concept of freedom Equivocal or analogical concepts of freedom

15 responsible decisions. We will be judged by God for how we respond to him, and how we deal with each other.

2.2.4 Types of Predestination

According to Mark John Farrelly in Predestination, Grace, and Free Will, predestination can described under two types, with the basis for each found within their definition of free will. They are univocal or equivocal conceptions of freedom Farrelly, 1964:35. Between these poles, there is a complex variety of systematic differences, particularly difficult to describe because the foundational terms are not strictly equivalent between systems. The two poles of predestinarian belief may be usefully described in terms of their doctrinal comparison between the Creators freedom, and the creatures freedom. These can be contrasted as either univocal or equivocal conceptions of freedom.

a. Univocal concept of freedom

The univocal conception of freedom holds that human will is free of cause, even though creaturely in character. These belief systems hold that the Creator has fashioned human volition in the likeness of Gods uncreated will unequivocally comparable in terms of freedom and creativity, although different in terms of the willing subject, whether God or the creature. The resulting view is that the freedom with which men make choices is compatible with, and in some sense co-ultimate with, the freedom of the Creators choices. This univocal conception of freedom rejects as incompatible with any freedom, an overruling will of the Creator causing the particular choices of man. 16 On the other end of the spectrum is the position that the Creator or a foreign being, object, etc. exercises absolute control over human will andor that all decisions originate with some outside cause, leaving no room for freedom.

b. Equivocal or analogical concepts of freedom

At the other end of the spectrum are analogical conceptions of freedom. These versions of predestination hold that individual choice is not excluded from the fashioning work of the Creator. Mans will is free because it is determined, boundaried or created by God. In other words, apart from Gods will determining mans will in a divine sense, only chaos or enslavement to mindless and impersonal forces is possible. Mans will may be called free and responsible, but not in an absolute sense; the choice of good or of evil must be unforced in order to be free, but it is never uncreated or uncaused. The likeness of creaturely freedom to divine freedom is analogical, not univocal. Traditional Islam holds to the powerlessness of human will, apart from the aid of Allah, and yet without a doctrine of Original Sin. Thus, Islam has a simpler version of predestination, viewing all that comes to pass as the will of Allah. And yet, the Quran affirms human responsibility, saying for example: Allah changed not the condition of a people until they change that which is in their hearts. There is no significant view of predestination that entirely relieves man of responsibility for his own choices. Therefore, all significant versions of predestination account for the differences between people perhaps in life or, in death, or both by reference to the will of the Creator. Also, all versions of predestination incorporate into the 17 doctrine various concepts of human responsibility, which differ from one another in terms of the kind of volitional freedom possible for the creature. In Hinduism, which consists of four castes in society, predestination does not play an important role, as most followers believe in karma, associated with free will. For example, soul divides into three classes, one class which qualify for liberation, Mukti-yogyas, another subject to eternal rebirth or eternally transmigrating due to samsara, Nitya-samsarins, and significantly, a class that is eventually condemned to eternal hell or Andhatamas, known as Tamo-yogyas. In this case, the souls are eternal and not created by God, as in the Semitic religions. Souls depend on God for their very being and becoming. it is compared the relationship of God with souls to the relationship between a source and its reflection. Although comparable in broad terms, the differences between Christian and Islamic ideas of predestination are the most complex among others religion. These differences are due to the distinctive of each faiths belief system. In broad terms, the doctrine of predestination refers to inevitability as a general principle, and usually more particularly refers to the exercise of Gods will as it relates to the future of members of the human race, considered either as groups or as individuals, with special concern for issues of human responsibility as it relates to the sovereignty of God. Predestination always involves issues of the Creators personality and will and consequently, the different versions of the doctrine of predestination go “hand in hand” with appropriately different conceptions of the 18 contribution any creature is able to make toward its own present condition, or future destiny.

2.3 The Determinism