Does Bribery Promote or Dampen Firm Exports? 1485 export, the impact of home country bribery on FDI

City University of Hong Kong (No. 7200268). The may not be the same. One potential reason is that

views developed in this paper are those of authors FDI requires greater resource commitment and

and are not those of the sponsoring institution. more capital than export. Compared with export that is relatively common among firms, FDI may

be more risky and less frequent. Due to these dif-

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