Leaving Home Building the State Iraqs In

Leaving Home, Building the State: Iraq’s Internal Displacement Crisis
Eliza Campbell
Professor Donna Lee Bowen

Abstract
Although links between economic stability and patterns of human movement have
been established, very little has been written regarding a possible relationship between
political stability and human mobility (Moses, 2011). An especially pressing concern,
especially in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring and increasing U.S. disengagement from
Iraq, is the issue of conflict-driven internal displacement of individuals within conflict
states. Historically, the issue of internal displacement has been analyzed either as
analogous to the concerns of refugees, or as a purely humanitarian issue. However,
increasing scholarship has shown that internal displacement, an issue which becomes
more pressing with every passing year, has a direct impact upon the overall stability of
post-conflict states. Using Iraq as a case study, this paper will attempt to explain the ways
in which internal displacement must be analyzed not only as a humanitarian issue, but
also as a factor having a direct impact upon political stability and governance,
particularly for post-conflict states. This will be accomplished by showing the linkages
between levels of internal displacement and several indicators of political stability and
effective governance.

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III. Framing the Issue
The topic of internal displacement is a unique and pressing issue, one which
combines the issues of refugee politics, interstate sovereignty and state conflict in new
and complex ways. The United Nations first defined internally displaced persons (IDPs)
as those “who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large
numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human
rights or natural or man-made disasters, and who are within the territory of their own
country” (Cohen, 16). This definition, contentious at the time and the subject of much
internal debate, was later updated to include a broader definition of coercion. IDPs were
then defined as those “who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or
places of habitual residence, in particular, as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of,
armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural
or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized border
state” (16). As Tanner writes, this definition sets an important precedent in distinguishing
IDPs from refugees, those who have crossed international borders as a result of conflict
or natural disaster (19). Definitions are crucial: discussions of displacement and refugee
politics have become mired in them, and aid organizations, states and international bodies
are often plagued by them. Indeed, the very nature of internal displacement, writes

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Sadako Ogata, “[challenges] state sovereignty as the founding principle of international
relations” (x).
Some 26 million people worldwide currently live in situations of internal
displacement as a result of conflict or human rights violations (O’Brien, 4). Although
internally displaced people now outnumber refugees by two to one, their plight receives
far less international attention. Why is this the case? Many IDPs are extremely
vulnerable: they remain mired in conflict zones, exposed to violence on a daily basis, and
often have limited access to employment, food, education and healthcare. IDPs often
become both the chattel and the debris of a war zone; they are caught in the crossfire of
internal conflict, and are sometimes pitted against other groups for political purposes. So
what impact does displacement have upon the world’s most conflict-ridden nations? And
when a conflict ends, how do displaced citizens affect their state’s rebuilding and
reconstruction?

From Global Overview 2011: People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence, 13.

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From Global Overview 2011: People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence, 16.
IV. Internal Conflict and Displacement Politics
Scholars and actors within the framework of displacement and refugee theory
have emerged, perhaps in the past 20 years alone, as a new voice in conflict resolution
and mitigation, as well as within humanitarian and aid agencies (Cohen, 13). With the fall
of the Berlin Wall and the ostensible collapse of a two-poled balance of conflict, Cohen
points out that an interesting conundrum arose: although fewer proxy wars were started
and fought because of Cold War politics, conflict became more internally-focused even as
the economies, societies and interconnected nature of states became more intensely
globalized. With the rise of bodies like the European Union and increasing
interconnectedness between institutions of governance, mobility, movement, and conflict
became more intricately connected to state politics, on both a macro and micro level (20).
At the same time, internal displacement has risen to its highest documented levels,
and the needs of the internally displaced have become more pressing and complex for
both states and intergovernmental organizations, even as blurry definitions and even
blurrier protocol have made action or common principles for internal displacement
almost impossible (168). According to the UNHCR’s yearly report on displacement, by
the end of 2012, 45.2 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of

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persecution, conflict and violence, including 28.8 million internally displaced persons.
The 2012 level was the highest recorded since 1994. Furthermore, more than half of all
refugees worldwide were from five countries: Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Syria, and
Sudan (UNHRC 2012). Displacement, in other words, is an unspoken consequence of
state conflict, one which promises to explain much about the nature of rebuilding in
unstable, post-conflict states (26). So what effect, if any, does internal displacement have
on a conflict state’s ability to successfully govern and secure political stability?
V. Post-Conflict Multipliers and IDPs
In this paper, I will attempt to examine the long-term effects of internal
displacement upon a post-conflict society, using the example of Iraq as a case study. I
argue that internal displacement is one of several consequences of violent conflict that
tends to 1) be understudied, ignored and allowed to fester, and 2) has a multiplying effect
on the instability of a post-conflict state. Other examples of post-conflict multipliers
might include gender-based violence, high levels of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD), high levels of treatable diseases and damaged infrastructure. The longer these
post-conflict multipliers go unaddressed and unacknowledged by post-conflict states, the
worse their impact on that state’s ability to govern and function cohesively and
effectively. I argue that Iraq’s current IDP crisis is an example of these post-conflict
multipliers, and negatively impacts the state’s political stability.
VI. Literature Review

Roberta Cohen and Francis Deng’s foundational work, Masses In Flight, is one of
the first in-depth analyses of the displacement crisis of the 20th and 21st centuries. They
take a global approach to the analysis of the internally displaced. The authors spend the
bulk of their work analyzing the ways in which the number of displaced people has
increased, and discussing the new framework needed to address this unique humanitarian

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and security crisis. Cohen and Deng also discuss the conflicts which currently limit the
ability of regions, states or institutions to address the unique needs of IDPs, and how
these limitations affects wartime politics and reconstruction, as well as the politics of
peaceful states. As they discuss, the various definitions surrounding the concept of
displaced people, as well as refugees, have long been fraught with contention and
confusion; as they note, the UNHCR, the U.S. Council on Refugees, and almost all
NGOs have differences in their definitions of refugees and IDPs, from slight technical
variations to huge and formative categorical differences. This, the authors contend, makes
addressing the problem of IDP resettlement much more difficult at a regional, state and
international level, because of the lack of normative procedures and understanding
surrounding internal displacement (61). They analyze different global regions and their
varying approaches to internal displacement, concluding that factors predisposing a state
to high levels of displacement include a history of authoritarian rule, underdevelopment,

mistreatment of ethnic groups, and external factors of cold war tension or geopolitical
conflict (71).
In the arena of post-conflict and development literature, Jos Van Gennip and other
scholars have made important arguments about the nature of “sustainable” development,
and how Western governments, lending institutions and NGOs can interfere with the
reconstruction of vulnerable states in the wake of armed conflict. Van Gennip asserts that
the post-conflict literature emerging in the 21st century focuses on four main goals: the
establishment of security through legitimate organizations, justice and reconciliation,
social and economic well-being and participatory governance (58). If any of these four
pillars is neglected, he argues, reconstruction becomes unsustainable at the local level,
and post-conflict states become both more reliant upon outside aid, as well as more prone

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to unstable governance. An increasing body of scholars joins Van Gennip in calling for a
more nuanced and holistic approach to post-conflict reconstruction, one which considers
the effect of “invisible” damage done to countries during periods of armed conflict.
Internal displacement, with its underreporting, fuzzy legal definitions and lack of data,
certainly qualifies as this type of damage (59). So what in the case of Iraq makes internal
displacement function as a post-conflict multiplier, threatening the political stability of
the state?

VII. Political Stability in Iraq: Accountability, Insurgency, Ethnic Conflict and
Regional Politics
Several main factors threaten political stability and governance in post-2003 Iraq.
Analyzing these threats, and examining the degree to which they are a result of the
American invasion and ongoing civil war, makes it possible to untangle the specific
indicators of government stability that we can use to analyze displacement’s influence on
the Iraqi state. In general, lack of government accountability, ongoing insurgencies and
ethnic politics are the key features of Iraq’s political instability that will be most helpful
in this analysis. In this section, I will attempt to outline the main links between Iraqi
political instability and the Six Key Dimensions of Governance outlined by the World
Bank, and how I will use these indicators to analyze the connection between
displacement and political instability.
Corruption, lack of accountability and deterioration of rule of law have become
key features of the Iraqi political landscape. Toby Dodge extensively outlines the ways in
which post-2007 Iraq under Prime Minister al-Maliki has become subject to increasing
decentralization of local leaders, who have encouraged the corruption of local projects
and funds, and failed to come through on civilian capacity-building projects, such as
infrastructure rebuilding and other development projects (98). An extensive report by the

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International Organization for Migration shows the ways in which this corruption and
lack of accountability are related to key citizenship struggles for displaced persons.
Disruption of traditional family structure, lack of physical security, removal from income
and education sources, language and ethnic barriers, a lack of access to legal justice and
other factors all prove debilitating barriers to participation in government on the part of
displaced persons. When local authorities have an incentive to use limited resources for
their own personal gain, or to neglect their legal and governance responsibilities to their
citizens, this exacerbates the difficulties of displaced persons. This, in turn, turns the
presence of displaced, disenfranchised citizens into a post-conflict multiplier, decreasing
citizen incentives to participate effectively in government or demand accountability from
their leaders.
Insurgency also proves a key factor in Iraq’s political instability, since constant
physical threats prevent leaders from carrying out key changes that are unpopular with
insurgent groups, and discourage the function of key aspects of governance, such as
elections. An increasing body of authors continues to examine the ways in Iraq’s security
situation and insurgencies affect governance and political stability (O’Brien, 34). A study
conducted by Ashraf al-Khalidi and Victor Tanner even defines a link between sectarian
violence and internal displacement, which they see as both a consequence and a
contributing factor to Iraq’s increasing instability from 2005 to 2006. They outline how
the lack of human resources, difficult living conditions and corruption of post-2003 Iraq

triggered anger against the transitional government, and how local authorities exploited
this (3). They show how the Ministries of Trade, Displacement, and Interior had failed to
sufficiently provide for the needs of Iraq’s displaced, and how local authorities stepped in
with a higher degree of efficacy. Groups like the Sistani Office, SCIRI, and the Sadr

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Office, as well as the Islamic Party and Association of Muslim Scholars (on the Sunni
side) gradually became the primary providers of both security and humanitarian services,
and how increasing ethnic concentration aggravated this localization of services. The
authors conclude that ethnically-focused campaigns by radical armed groups and
sectarian parties have gradually altered the demographic make-up of Iraqi society. This,
they explain, is the goal of many insurgent and armed groups: to increase the Iraqi
people’s reliance upon them, as well as to make their territory more mobilized and
homogenous (5). Other scholars, such as O’Brien (2011) have examined the link between
insurgency and political stability, and how this impacts displacement.
The topic of insurgency also has a rich background among scholars who examine
the roots of violent uprisings and political dissatisfaction, and Jones and Johnston (2013)
argue that some particular features of states make them more susceptible to insurgency.
In their article, the authors outline ethnic tension or mistreatment of minorities, history of
autocratic governance and economic volatility as the main historical contributors to

insurgency development (3). They also make predictions about the future of insurgency
based on the principles of the past and the innovations of the present, predicting that
development of insurgent techniques is a function of social “embeddedness” of groups,
and that social and information-spreading factors will become an increased factor in the
spread and success of insurgency (16). Berman, Callen and Felter (2011) provide another
view of insurgency development, which they see as being intimately related to the ability
of average citizens to obtain employment. Using Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines as
case studies, they show how the social linkages of employment, and the loss suffered to a
sense of community responsibility when work is widely unavailable, contribute enormous
psychological and practical motivations to individuals who might support or be a part of

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insurgent groups (505). They, along with other scholars, contribute to a growing body of
work that conceives of insurgent movements as developing from and through a variety of
socioeconomic stressors, ones that often have links to the ethnic politics of a state, as well
as its economic and social indicators. Figure 4 below shows a graphical representation of
the way in which levels of insurgent activity have moved almost consistently with periods
of political instability in Iraq, such as the time surrounding the 2006 Al-Askari mosque
bombing, and the controversial 2005 elections. Insurgency, in this way, becomes both an
indicator and a consequence of political instability in Iraq; it also simultaneously acts as a

linking mechanism in the creation and perpetuation of high levels of internal
displacement.
Ethnic and sectarian politics play an enormous role in the shaping of Iraq’s
political instability. As Sassoon and others point out, the initial U.S. military campaigns
against the earliest insurgent groups created a high degree of internal communal tension,
causing many Iraqis to flee Baghdad’s more mixed areas and flock to surrounding areas
of the city dominated by their own ethnic or sectarian group. This was exacerbated by the
return of many Shia who had fled to Iran during Saddam’s rule, 80% of whom in the
north and 30% of whom in the south ended up displaced and unable to return home, due
to security concerns and an overall lack of resources (Sassoon, 20). As Tanner notes:
“Both sides use sectarian violence as a device to bolster their power and legitimacy. They
are both seeking to consolidate their power for the long haul. The first rule is to impose
order on one’s own community. It is for instance unimaginable to speak out against
Muqtada al-Sadr in Shu‘ala or Sadr City, or against the insurgents (or the former regime,
for that matter) in Falluja or Samarra, regardless of who one is” (Brookings, 11). Toby
Dodge goes further in showing how years of authoritarian rule and sectarian tension had
encouraged, for instance, widespread weapon ownership, and how this contributed to an
atmosphere of instant ethnic tension and insurgent movements following the U.S.

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invasion: “Thus, societal trauma, extreme violence as a common currency in both politics
and crime, and high levels of private gun ownership (both legal and illicit), combined to
make the rise of collective violence in Iraq after 2003 relatively easy to organize” (33).
Tanner refers to this as a kind of geographic and sectarian-based instability, which
occurs when, for instance, the Sadr Office might benefit when poor, urban Shia are
displaced from Baghdad, and end up in areas like Najaf or Kerbala, contributing to the
fight there against SCIRI. In fact, Khalidi and Tanner identify main four categories of
Iraqis who were displaced by sectarian violence: Sunnis from Shia areas, Shia from Sunni
areas, Arabs from Kurdish areas, and minority groups from Sunni and Shia areas (26).
Thus, given these calculations, creating an atmosphere that encourages and perpetuates
instability is to the tactical advantage of insurgent and extremist groups attempting to use
citizens as pawns in their regional wars (15). Khalidi and other scholars have examined
how this intense geographic instability has lead to changes in the levels of urbanized
populations in Iraq, many of which are fleeing to city centers to become part of insurgent
movements. Other patterns of urbanization reflect regional migration of various ethnic
groups as a result of conflict or intimidation.
The 2006 bombing of the al-Askari mosque, a holy Shia shrine in Samarra, is a
good example of this phenomenon. The bombing sparked outrage and a wave of vicious
revenge killings, and the action of the Mahdi Army to roam freely conducting massacres
of Sunni citizens and defacement of Sunni holy sites, leading to retribution from those
groups. The estimated casualties from the violence in the wake of the bombing is
estimated to be in the hundreds, and may have done much to strengthen groups like
SCIRI and the Mahdi Army, whose goal is to erode the Iraqi state’s ability to govern
(Brookings, 6).

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From “Varieties of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2003-2009,” 49.
Finally, external factors also tend to contribute to the perpetuation of instability in
Iraqi governance, including the functions of international governance groups and aid
organizations that Van Gennip outlines in his critique of post-conflict development.
Cohen notes the overreliance in the MENA region on international aid organizations,
particularly in Iraq, and shows how such IGOs and NGOs that deal specifically with
refugees and internally displaced persons have a special degree of lack of coordination
compared with other regions (61). Many issues of varying definitions, regional power and
sovereignty mean that the issue of government accountability in Iraq is exacerbated from
the outside; such organizations have provided the bulk of security and infrastructure
funding, especially since 2003.
In summary, corruption, lack of accountability, persistent insurgencies, ethnic
politics, and overreliance on external organizations have perpetuated the instability of the
Iraqi state. In order to capture these indicators more precisely, I will refer to the Six Key

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Dimensions of Governance identified and codified by the World Bank Development
Research Group, which nicely line up with the indicators described here that are specific
to the Iraqi state’s instability. The indicators are provided in the figure below. The
Dimensions of Governance indicators seek to capture the degree to which states succeed
in matching their economic development with political development, and attempt to do
this in a non-normative fashion. As shown, the indicators measure different aspects of
governance related to citizen participation, accountability of leaders, stability and absence
of violence, regulatory efficacy, rule of law and corruption. All of these factors effectively
describe the aspects of Iraq’s instability that I will attempt to analyze here in relation to
displacement.

From “The World Bank Development Project,” www.info.worldbank.org/governance, World Bank.

VIII. Internal Displacement in Iraq: A Post-Conflict Multiplier
The issue of internal displacement in Iraq has regional, national and local
implications. Although aid organizations have worked since the early 1990s, to an extent,

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with refugees and IDPS within Iraq, security concerns and varying definitions of
displacement have lead to spotty organization, a lack of common protocol and no
regional focus. Indeed, as Cohen notes, the displacement crises of Sudan, Somalia and
Iraq went all but unaddressed by the region’s only intergovernmental organization, the
League of Arab States, who invoked the need for national sovereignty to avoid
involvement. In addition, other institutional problems plague the issue of displacement in
Iraq, such as a lack of regional monitoring organizations and a general tendency for aid
organizations (who would normally be the first response in dealing with displaced
persons) to focus on humanitarian needs alone, and to leave any idea of security or
protection out of the equation (Cohen, 236). Ineffective coordination, a lack of reach and
unpredictable responses of existing organizations further exacerbate this problem (185).
Other factors, including the scale of socioeconomic losses in education, employment and
social services, as well as losses of property and livelihood, contribute to the inability of
aid organizations or the Iraqi state to adequately address the needs and unique position of
IDPs. State institutions will be able to do the best job of coming closest to addressing the
needs of IDPs in a given community, but for the time being, it looks doubtful that the
Iraqi state will mobilize its resources enough to address the needs of its internally
displaced persons.
This, as O’Brien outlines in his 2011 study, is precisely the link between internal
displacement and political stability: that a lack of resources and state cohesion prompts
cycles of violence attempting to get back those resources and security, but they
paradoxically made the situation worse by further degrading any potential abilities of the
state. He points to a phenomenon known as “cumulative causation” by scholars like
Marfleet, who note the accelerated pace of displacement and mass exodus in a given

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community based on the actions of a few individuals, an action which disrupts
community structures until the integrity of the community as a whole is at risk (18). With
pressures from the outside, and an inability of aid organizations to address the unique and
hidden concerns of internally displaced persons, displacement will continue to be an
exacerbating factor in the development of political stability in Iraq.
While the issues surrounding displacement can be best conceived of in terms of their
most immediate relationship to conflict, natural disaster or physical insecurity, the
feedback effects of violence push this phenomenon into the long-term sphere.
Displacement then becomes a post-conflict multiplier, perpetuating and multiplying the
effects of this instability with ongoing time and lack of resources and attention. Tanner
and al-Khalidi have written extensively about the nature of internal violence in Iraq, and
how it prompts patterns of movement that force certain ethnic groups out of their homes
and into differently-oriented geographical areas. As they write of the insurgent groups:
There are many parallels between the radical armed groups on both sides. Both
seek to sow violence in areas where inter-communal relations remain good. AlWashash, for instance, is a poor, mixed area near the upscale Baghdad
neighborhood of Mansur, where relations between Sunni and Shi‘a have remained
good and radical sides from neither side hold sway. But in recent months many
young people, both Shi‘a and Sunni, have been killed by armed men. Several local
residents told of a KIA van that was caught when residents set road blocks and
check points. The people in the van confessed that they had been paid to kill young
people from both sides. Of course this story remains unconfirmed, but what is
important is that people believe it to be true (Brookings Institute, 20).
This anecdote contains several vital issues demonstrating the connection between
displacement and insurgency, including demographics, intimidation, insurgent mentality
and the ways in which sheer belief about a perceived threat can alter the entire make-up
and decision-making process of Iraqi citizens. In this section, I will attempt to analyze
these issues, and to synthesize the reasons for which forced internal displacement has
become such a prevalent and long-standing issue in Iraq. These include general categories

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of regional dynamics, concepts of the issue of displacement, and a pervasive kind of
ethnic violence that leads to increased pressure for homogeneity in populations.
According to the Refugee Studies Center, Iraq has suffered from waves of
displacement since its inception as a state, most notably during the 1970s and 1990s,
when millions were externally and internally displaced in attempting to flee the harsh
realities of life under Saddam Hussein (Protracted Displacement, 1). Displaced Iraqis
now constitute the second largest worldwide refugee population, at approximately 2
million living abroad—for most of whom, the idea of returning home is all but
impossible. Although the study of refugee populations abroad is necessarily a different
topic, complete with complex issues of its own, the inability of Iraqis to return to their
own homes —whether they are one town or one continent away—is the ongoing and
pervasive issue that deserves analysis. Why are huge amounts of Iraqis forced from their
homes? And what happens when they cannot return home?
Joseph Sassoon identifies three main “waves” of forced displacement in post2003 Iraq: the first taking place from May 2003 to February 2006, during the initial
waves of violence following the invasion; the second from February 2006 to summer
2007, following the sectarian bombing of the Al-Askari mosque; and the third during the
American troop surge (10). As he notes, and as is apparent from the data, the ebb and
flow of forced displacement is a function of the political situation of a given area, and the
interaction between the internally-facing insurgent violence and the externally-facing
IDPs, who see escape as their only option. Various socioeconomic factors contribute to
this, and are important to consider separately.

IX. Statistical Analysis: The Multiplying Effect of Displacement

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In order to properly establish links between Iraq’s displacement and political
instability, I performed a series of regressions on key indicators from the years spanning
from 2000 to 2013. Using the World Bank Governance Indicators, which range from -2.5
(low) to 2.5 (high) and data relating to the number of IDPs, the number of internal
refugees, and the urbanization of the Iraqi population, I sought to operationalize the
relationship between political stability and development.
The results of these regressions, shown in an attached appendix, are revealing. I
created a variable that averaged each year’s score along each of the six indicators, and
used this average score as a yearly estimate of overall political stability for each year. As
shown in Figure 7, this overall score dropped intensely between 2005 and 2007, went up
slightly around 2008, and began to drop off again around 2012. However, this variable
showed no statistical correlation with any of the displacement indicators. For this reason,
each of the six dimensions of governance was analyzed in isolation with the displacement
variables, and this allowed for some important statistical relations to be established. As
shown in Figure 1, there is a marked and significant relationship between overall
government effectiveness and the degree of urbanization of the Iraqi population. This
suggests, as previously noted, that urbanization, a symptom of displacement, can be
negatively tracked with government effectiveness. The overall Iraqi refugee population
and urbanized population are both statistically correlated with government effectiveness
and regulatory quality at the 95% confidence level. The increase of the Iraqi IDP
population and refugee population is also negatively correlated with rule of law, and with
voice and accountability. This suggests that as more refugees and IDPs enter and
participate in the Iraqi state, political stability is degraded.
X. Alternate Explanations: Lack of Data and U.S. Involvement

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There are significant limitations to the data and analysis in this study. A lack of
information plagues the development workers and study of Iraq, since the security
situation makes accurate data collection difficult. Similarly, the data presented here
covers only 12 years, and may not be extensive enough of a set of data to draw long-term
conclusions. Finally, key indicators which would be helpful to include in this analysis—
including levels of government expenditure on health care and unemployment and
numbers of female-headed households and children out of school—are lacking. Further
research that yields data on these indicators is sorely needed.
In addition, there are many important reasons to consider alternate explanations,
both for the development of Iraq’s political instability as well as its displacement
situation. Of course, alternate explanations play a role in this consideration: they are both
the result of complex and interworking social, economic and political factors. As noted,
one interesting contributor to the discussion of internal displacement is a difficulty in
measurement and information-gathering, noted by most scholars in the field, which
makes analysis of the issues of displacement extremely difficult, if not impossible. As
Tanner, Cohen, and others note, the figures released by various aid organizations are
often skewed one way or another based on that individual organization’s conception of
refugees and IDPs, and many often combine the multiplying effects of refugees and IDPS
in one single indicator. Additionally, many agencies don’t feel the need to make a
distinction in their work or scholarship, and this blurriness is detectable in many aid
reports. And as Cohen discusses extensively in Masses In Flight, internal displacement is
an indicator that is notoriously difficult to measure, track, and to analyze accurately
(160). Many IDPs fear to register as such, because of political threats, loss of livelihood,
shame, or lack of access to resources. This means that underreporting is endemic.

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Similarly, IDPs living with family or friends often are not recorded or noticed as living in
a displaced situation, and this discounts a good deal of the Iraqi IDP population.
Finally, O’Brien’s work suggests another alternate hypothesis: is the involvement
of foreign troops a factor which uniquely sets apart a conflict and IDP situation like Iraq,
making it an unfair comparison? The presence of an occupying force certainly multiplies
the likelihood of violent or resentful responses in the form of insurgencies, and can
exacerbate political instability (55). This suggests that a cross-state analysis is crucial. In
order to understand the unique factors of state-level conflict and instability that
characterize displacement issues, an analysis of multiple states would be a crucial
direction for future research.
XI. Conclusion
As Tanner notes in his report on sectarian-induced displacement, the violence in
Iraq “is neither spontaneous nor popular” (3). He argues that most citizens would
desperately like to see a change in the rhetoric of their nation’s politics and security, one
which would allow for greater vocalization of silenced topics, including displacement,
homelessness and refugee status. As the US commitment in Iraq becomes less and less
concrete, and less interesting to voters, it seems inevitable that the direction of Western
aid and involvement in Iraq will be in NGOs and official aid organizations, and not so
much in troops on the ground. So what of ongoing political instability, and its impact on
the lives of everyday Iraqis?
As I have attempted to show, internal displacement has emerged as one of the
most wide-reaching, pervasive and insidious effects of the conflict in Iraq, one that
threatens the lives and livelihood of citizens from all sectors of life in the country.
Because of its unique impact on economic, political and social aspects of Iraqi life, it can
be considered a post-conflict multiplier, having an exponential degrading effect on Iraqi

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political instability the longer it goes unaddressed. Past conceptions of displacement have
counted the topic as mainly impacting humanitarian factors, but it is more complex than
this. There are, as other scholars have also shown, direct links between political
instability (including insurgency, lack of accountability, and corruption), and
displacement in Iraq. Like other post-conflict multipliers, displacement promises to
continue as a silent but deadly drain on the Iraqi state and its ability to heal. The longer
this problem goes unaddressed, the less hope there is for future generations of Iraqi
citizens, at home and elsewhere.

Works Cited
Al-Khalidi, Ashraf and Victor Tanner. “Sectarian Violence: Radical Groups Drive
Internal Displacement in Iraq.” The Brookings Institution: University of Bern
Project on Internal Displacement. October 2006.
Al-Khalidi, Ashraf, and Victor Tanner, Sectarian Violence: Radical Groups Drive
Internal Displacement in Iraq, The Brookings Institution, October 2006.
Al-Makhamreh, Sahar; Spaneas, Stefanos; Neocleous, Gregory. “The Need for Political
Competence Social Work Practice: Lessons Learned from a Collaborative Project
on Iraqi Refugees—the Case of Jordan.” The British Journal of Social Work 42.6
(Sep 2012): 1074-1092.
Berman, Eli, Callen, Michael, and Joseph F. Felter. “Do Working Men Rebel?
Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 55 (2011): 496-528.
Bernal-Verdugo, Lorenzo E. “The Dynamic Effect of Social and Political Stability on

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Output: The Role of Reforms.” International Monetary Fund: Working Paper.
2013. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1391.pdf (accessed 10
February 2014).
Couldrey, Marion and Tim Morris, eds. Iraq’s Displacement Crisis: The Search for
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Codebook
IDP: number of internally displaced Iraqis living within Iraqi borders
iraqirefugeepop: total number of refugees of non-Iraqi origin living within Iraqi borders
urbanpop: percentage of Iraqi citizens living in urbanized areas, percentage of total
rulelaw: Rule of Law
voiceaccount: Voice and Accountability
poltotal: Averaged Six Indicators for Indicated Year
regqual: Regulatory Quality

Appendix

Campbell 24
Figure 1.
(1)
goveffect

VARIABLES
IDP
iraqirefugeepop
urbanpop
Constant

-1.01e-07
(9.66e-08)
-8.94e-08
(1.63e-06)
-0.624***
(0.128)
40.42***
(8.531)

Observations
12
R-squared
0.805
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p